Contaminations : beyond dialectics in modern literature, science, and film. by Mack,  Michael
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
03 May 2016
Version of attached ﬁle:
Other
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Mack, Michael (2016) 'Contaminations : beyond dialectics in modern literature, science, and ﬁlm.', Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-contaminations.html
Publisher's copyright statement:
Additional information:
In a world on the brink of environmental catastrophe, we have come to realise that humankind is not superior to
nature, but intimately bound up with it. Michael Mack's shows in his new book how the division between man and
nature is just one of many false separations that inﬂuence the way we think. Listen to Michael's podcast explaining
more about his philosophy, the role that literature plays in it, and how the concept of contaminated thought may help
us to conceptualise climate change in particular. http://bit.ly/1Tt5lIE
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Contaminations
MACK PRINT.indd   1 26/11/2015   11:14
MACK PRINT.indd   2 26/11/2015   11:14
Contaminations
Beyond Dialectics in Modern 
Literature, Science and Film
Michael Mack
MACK PRINT.indd   3 26/11/2015   11:14
© Michael Mack, 2016
Edinburgh University Press Ltd  
The Tun – Holyrood Road
12(2f) Jackson’s Entry
Edinburgh EH8 8PJ
www.euppublishing.com
Typeset in 10.5/13 pt Sabon by
Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire,
and printed and bound in Great Britain by 
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon CR0 4YY
A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 978 1 4744 1136 3 (hardback)
ISBN 978 1 4744 1137 0 (webready PDF)
ISBN 978 1 4744 1138 7 (epub)
The right of Michael Mack to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted 
in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, and the Copyright and 
Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498).
MACK PRINT.indd   4 26/11/2015   11:14
Contents
Acknowledgements vi
 Introduction: Climate Change and the Contamination of the 
Anthropocene 1
1 Contaminating Psychology with Biology: Descartes, Spinoza, 
Freud, and Žižek 23
2 Contaminating the Visible with the Invisible: From Einstein 
via H. G. Wells to Hannah Arendt, Luhmann and Derrida  50
3 Contamination of Nature with Society: The collapse of 
Natural Order from Melville to Wells and Ellison 77
4 Contaminating Judgement with its Suspension: Guilt and 
Punishment in Walter Benjamin, Herman Melville and Henry 
James 107
5 Contaminating the Digital: Action and Perception in Henry 
James and Alfred Hitchcock  129
6 Contaminating the Sacred with the Profane: Pier Paolo 
Pasolini and Biopolitics 159
7 Contaminating Posthumanism 191
Bibliography 216
Index 225
MACK PRINT.indd   5 26/11/2015   11:14
Acknowledgements
Several institutions and individuals supported the conception and com-
pletion of this study and substantially influenced its content and form. 
First of all, I am most grateful to the Leverhulme Trust who awarded 
me a research fellowship in 2012/2013 for a project entitled ‘Science 
and the Ethics of Literature’. This award encouraged me to start work 
on the project, while completing Philosophy and Literature in Times of 
Crisis. I am also most grateful to the Humanities Research Centre at the 
Australian National University for awarding me a visiting fellowship 
in the summer of 2014. Collette Gilmour of the HRC has been most 
generous in her support and hospitality. I would like to thank Durham 
University’s Faculty of Humanities for allowing me a term of research 
leave in the autumn of 2014 which gave me time to revise the book 
manuscript of Contaminations.
I would like to thank Gillian Beer for her support and most helpful 
advice. I am most grateful to Paul Mendes-Flohr for his generous 
encouragement, his sincere support, and invaluable advice that enabled 
the completion of this study. Avital Ronell, Nancy Cartwright, Antonio 
Damasio, Bernard E. Harcourt, Joseph Tabbi, Nonica Datta, Anna 
Grundy, Michael N. Forster, Richard Velkley, Norelle Lickiss, Jeff 
Malpass, Geoffrey Scarre, David Jasper, Peter Boxall, and Dipesh 
Chakrabarty were most supportive with encouragement and advice.
I am very grateful to Jackie Jones of Edinburgh University Press 
for her great help, her understanding and her invaluable advice. It is 
a pleasure working with her and her colleagues Adela Rauchova and 
James Dale. I would like to thank the anonymous readers for Edinburgh 
University Press. Each helped improve the structure and content of this 
book. I am also grateful to the Press Committee of Edinburgh University 
Press for invaluable feedback on the film studies aspect of this book. 
Many thanks to the artist Elisabeth Mack-Usselmann for allowing 
me to use her 1997 painting ‘Contamination’ for the cover image of 
MACK PRINT.indd   6 26/11/2015   11:14
Acknowledgements    vii
Contaminations. I would also like to thank Richard Stopford for his 
photograph of Elisabeth Mack-Usselmann’s painting.
Work on this study benefited from discussions about literature and 
science at the University of Bergen: I am most grateful to Margareth 
Hagen, Margery Vibe Skagen, George Rousseau and Jan Baars.
I would like to thank Durham University’s English department and 
Nicoletta Asciuto and Miriah Reynolds for help with the copy-editing 
of a first draft of the book manuscript. I am also grateful for most 
helpful discussions with Mark Sandy, Michael O’Neill, David Herman, 
Peter Garratt, Patrick Gray, Sarah Wootton, Abbie Garrington, Dan 
Grausam, Simon James and Sam Thomas.
All material is presented under the fair dealing agreement. The author 
and the Press will be pleased to receive details of anything used in 
contravention of copyright, and will make changes accordingly in the 
preparation of future editions.
MACK PRINT.indd   7 26/11/2015   11:14
I dedicate this book to my mother and to the memory of my father
MACK PRINT.indd   8 26/11/2015   11:14
Introduction: Climate Change and the 
Contamination of the Anthropocene
‘The disorder of nature is apparent’
Nancy Cartwright
This work is a study in theory, intellectual history, science, cinema 
and literature, comprising American and English literature from the 
mid-nineteenth century to the present. It is an original work of research 
which could at the same time be read as an advanced critical analysis of 
the theory of contamination. This monograph introduces the figure of 
contamination as an alternative to dialectics: whereas dialectics separates 
two entities and traverses from one to the other (finally negating nega-
tion), contamination allows for the simultaneous interdependence of 
what has previously been conceived of as separate or opposed. Whereas 
dialectics unfolds through the positing of oppositions, contamination 
operates on the biological model of symbiosis (‘the world of life not only 
consists of independent species, but every individual of most species is 
actually a consortium of several species’ (Mayr 2002: xiv)).
The motif of contamination is implicit in postmodern literature and 
theory. In this sense the book offers an exploration into the theory of 
contamination, a theory which has not been explicitly addressed in a 
monograph before. By contributing towards a novel view of the figure of 
contamination, this study also constitutes an original work of research. 
Derrida’s notion of the trace implies some form of contamination, but it 
is a neutral term (it could be a trace of something positive or negative). 
The figure of contamination as developed in this book, however, offers 
a new perspective on negativity which questions the current influence 
of Hegelian dialectics in contemporary theory and philosophy (from 
Robert Pippin to Slavoj Žižek, and Catherine Malabou).
Dialectics has been implicitly questioned in Hannah Arendt’s critique 
of modern science. This is why Chapter 2 focuses on Arendt’s critique 
of a scientific loss of the word. As we will see there, her contaminating 
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approach to the secularisation controversy anticipates that of Derrida’s 
deconstruction. Like the Frankfurt School, she is addressing both 
Descartes’s cogito and its later revisions in German idealist notions of 
autonomy (Kant) and dialectics (Hegel). In this way the book also offers 
an advanced critical introduction to the critique of dialectics, to which it 
at the same time contributes as an original piece of research. How does 
it combine the accessible element of an advanced critical introduction 
with that of an original piece of research? By bringing to the fore what 
has previously been unspoken in philosophical and theoretical accounts.
Robert Musil’s notion of ‘Essayismus’ is closely related to the figure of 
contamination as developed in this book. Musil attempts to develop an 
ethics of literature while working through the legacies of a systematic, 
dialectical and scientific modernity. As Mark M. Freed has recently 
shown, Musil’s ‘Essayismus does not seek to supercede modern philo-
sophy by dialectically working through the aporias of the Western 
philosophical tradition (its logocentrism, for example) in the manner of 
deconstruction’ (Freed 2011: 109). Instead, his Essayismus allows for ‘a 
minimal cognition free from determination of a priori moral concepts’ 
(Freed 2011: 153). In doing so, Musil conceptualises literature as a space 
where we can operate outside the a priori framework of systematic and 
dialectical ways of thinking: ‘By privileging possibility over Truth and 
even over Reality, Essayismus points beyond a critique of denotative dis-
course and beyond an alternative way of seeing the world to function as 
the discursive strategy that is ultimately productive of an alternative way 
of being in the world, what Musil terms the Other Condition’ (Freed 
2011: 10). The figure of contamination points to this Other Condition 
that is no longer subject to the a priori framework that governs philo-
sophical and scientific modernity from Kant’s notion of autonomy to 
Hegel’s dialectics. Contamination instantiates the Other by dissolving 
various oppositions (such as the one between the positive and the nega-
tive) which are the foundations of dialectics. Deconstruction and other 
postmodern schools have highlighted the problems that accompany 
such oppositions. As Freed has shown, they nevertheless partake of 
the systems (such as dialectics and logocentrism) whose aporias they 
attempt to trace and illuminate.
Entanglements of literature and science
The last decade has seen a resurgence of interest in the relationship 
between science and literature. Although Lorraine Daston and Peter 
Galison have recently charted the cultural history of the modern notion 
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of scientific objectivity (Daston and Galison 2007), there does not 
exist a monograph that analyses the ways in which literary works have 
questioned the construction of the ‘purely objective’ from its point of 
emergence roughly around the 1850s.
Against this background, the main part of the following introductory 
section enquires how a contamination of discourses may be required 
to come to terms with the full range of risks associated with environ-
mental contamination. Does the idea of contamination paradoxically 
help to de-contaminate dichotomising and potentially destructive habits 
of mind that posit autonomous modes of representation? As Bruno 
Latour has shown, the natural and the social are not separate, but rather 
entangled entities. The mutual contamination of society and nature does 
not, however, mean that one can be reduced to the other. Karen Barad 
writes:
What is needed is an analysis that enables us to theorise the social and the 
natural together, to read our best understandings of the social and natural 
phenomena through one another in a way that clarifies the relationship 
between them. To write matter and meaning into separate categories, to 
analyse them relative to separate disciplinary technologies, and to divide 
complex phenomena into one balkanised enclave or the other is to elide 
certain crucial aspects by design. On the other hand, considering them 
together does not mean forcing them together, collapsing important differ-
ences between them, or treating them in the same way, rather it means allow-
ing any integral aspects to emerge (by not writing them out before we get 
started). (Barad 2007: 25)
Similar to Barad’s notion of entanglement, the figure of contamination 
as developed in this book denotes the reciprocal interdependence and 
intra-action1 of different entities: ‘we need a method for theorizing the 
relationship between “the natural” and “the social” together without 
defining one against the other or holding either nature or culture as the 
fixed referent for understanding the other’ (Barad 2007: 30). As Barad 
points out, the entanglement of difference in form of diffraction has 
implications for the inseparability of ethics and science: ‘It is not possi-
ble to extricate oneself from ethical concerns and correctly discern what 
science tells us about the world’ (Barad 2007: 37). Contaminations: 
Beyond Dialectics in Modern Literature, Science and Film complements 
Barad’s discussion of science and philosophy by analysing how literary 
works confound stable and pure forms of categorisation.
By taking literature seriously for a better understanding of empirical 
issues, this book is premised on Barad’s (and also David Herman’s) 
‘new understanding of how discursive practices are related to the 
material world’ (Barad 2007: 34).2 In analysing literary discourses 
MACK PRINT.indd   3 26/11/2015   11:14
4    Contaminations
in order to reach a new perspective on pressing issues of the material 
world, this book follows Barad in establishing an innovative notion 
of realism that departs from the mimetic paradigm of representa-
tion: ‘Realism, then, is not about representations of an independent 
reality but about real consequences, interventions, creative possibilities, 
responsibilities of intra-acting within and as part of the world’ (Barad 
2007: 37; see also Mack 2012: 72–152). This book examines literature’s 
capacity to confound categories (such as those of purity, order and 
visibility).
As the semantic field of the word ‘contamination’ indicates, it comple-
ments Barad’s term ‘entanglement’ by arguing for a new non-dialectical 
approach to what we have come to perceive and represent as ‘negative’. 
In this context, this book introduces the figure of contamination as an 
alternative to dialectics. Dialectics separates two entities and traverses 
from one to the other (finally negating negation). The figure of contami-
nation, however, allows for the simultaneous interdependence of what 
has previously been conceived of as separate or opposed.
Moreover, the figure of contamination relates to Barad’s concept 
of entanglement, which also shows how apparently self-enclosed or 
separate entities ‘lack an independent, self-contained existence’ (Barad 
2007: ix). In contrast to Barad’s notion of ‘entanglement’, however, 
my term ‘figure of contamination’ is oxymoronic: in Steven Connor’s 
words, ‘figura means both form and face’ (Connor 2006: 30), whereas 
contamination donates the blurred character of life. This formlessness 
and facelessness of contamination evokes Connor’s description of the 
impossible figure of the fly: ‘The fly is always itself, but that self does not 
form a figure, nor yet exactly figure a form. More than anything else, 
the fly is a figure of this unfigurability. The significance of the fly is that 
it marks the insignificant, an ordinary but vexatious remission in the 
given-ness or apparentness of things’ (Connor 2006: 32). The figureless 
figure of the fly may encapsulate the holding together of opposites which 
the term contamination performs in this book.
As Donna Haraway has argued, there is also a sense in which the 
word ‘figure’ denotes entanglement and contamination. In this reading 
the term ‘figure’ evokes the blurred vision of figurations, a semantic field 
that goes back to the eighteenth century, as Haraway has shown:
Figures help me grapple inside the flesh of mortal world-making entangle-
ments that I call contact zones. The Oxford English Dictionary records 
the meaning of ‘chimerical vision’ for ‘figuration’ in an eighteenth-century 
source, and that meaning is still implicit in my sense of figure. Figures collect 
the people through their invitation to inhabit the corporeal story told in 
their lineaments. Figures are not representations or didactic illustrations, 
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but rather material–semiotic nodes or knots in which diverse bodies and 
meanings coshape one another. For me, figures have always been where the 
biological and literary or artistic come together with all of the force of lived 
reality. My body itself is just such a figure, literally. (Haraway 2008: 4)
Haraway understands the term ‘figure’ to embrace the material world of 
cohabitation and symbiosis. There is no such thing as a self-contained 
form.
Drawing on Lynn Margulis’s and Dorion Sagan’s biological account 
of symbiosis as the fabric of life in their 2002 study, Acquiring Genomes: 
A Theory of the Origins of Species, Haraway states that ‘the basic 
story is simple: ever more complex life forms are the continual result 
of ever more intricate and multidirectional acts of association of and 
with other life forms’ (Haraway 2008: 31). This means that scientific 
approaches which privilege forms and notions of purity are misguided. 
Our philosophical and scientific perspective has been shaped by such 
preoccupation with pure entities that supposedly constitute nature’s 
order, and differentiate it from the unsightly chaos of ‘unnatural’ disor-
der and other forms of contaminations or perversions: ‘Objects entangle 
one another in a crisscrossing mesh of spacetime fluctuations’ (Morton 
2013: 65). Modern physics, from Einstein’s relativity to quantum theory 
(see Chapter 2), has radically challenged Newtonian scientific method-
ologies that are premised on the assumption of pure and solidly distinct 
entities.
Contaminations enquires into the problem of various oppositions 
between pure entities such as nature and society, body and mind, science 
and the arts, subjectivity and objectivity, action and contemplation, 
the sacred and the profane. It examines for the first time how works 
of literature and cinema have contaminated constructions of the pure 
and the immune with their purported opposite. The book contaminates 
binary oppositions between madness and reason, between health and 
illness, between action and perception, between the biological and the 
psychological, between science and literature.3
This study has two main aims. Firstly, on a theoretical level, it ques-
tions the dialectics of opposing two supposedly ‘pure’ entities (such as 
mind and body) and offers the figure of contamination as an alterna-
tive to a way of thinking that is still based on notions of purity and 
immunity. Secondly, it practises contaminations of often separated 
historical periods (such as nineteenth-century and modernist literature), 
of national literatures (such as American, British and Italian literature), 
of genres (tragedy and comedy), of media (cinema and literature) and 
philosophical/scientific and literary writings.
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The figure of contamination: an alternative to dialectics
Modern dialectics has shaped the history of ideas from Herder and Hegel 
onwards. The starting point is a negative position which dialectics negates, 
transforming it into a superior force. As Roberto Esposito has recently 
shown in his Immunitas: The Protection and Negation of Life (2011), J. 
G. Herder introduced the dialectical notion of ‘compensation’ into com-
parisons between the human and the animal. Humanity compensates for 
its instinctual weakness through technical and intellectual skills which in 
the end negate its lack, promising a longer and healthier life than that of 
other animals: ‘The human animal can live longer than all others because 
– not despite the fact – he is constitutionally sick’ (Esposito 2011: 90). The 
dialectical paradigm of compensation has thus informed philosophical 
anthropology from Herder via A. Gehlen and H. Plessner to N. Luhmann 
and it still influences contemporary discussions of posthumanism.
Esposito analyses the destructive aspects accompanying dialectical 
moves from the negative to the positive, wherein negation ends up 
negated: ‘If the immune dialectic always implies the incorporation of 
a negative, this is both confirmed and radicalized by the functioning of 
autoimmunity: the dissolution of the negative from any positive role and 
its destructive doubling up on itself, or in other words, the destruction, 
through self-destruction, of the entire body it is intended to defend’ 
(Esposito 2011: 165). This destructive and also self-destructive aspect 
of the dialectical negation of the negative emerges from an opposition 
between two entities which are spread out as not only distinct but also 
as separate if not opposed. Esposito argues that ‘the entire Western 
tradition has remained held in this antinomic turn: the stranger is 
conceivable only in terms of its preventive dissolution’ and that ‘not 
even the attempts carried out by the most radical ethnology to shift the 
point of observation from the self to the other has managed to escape 
it’ (Esposito 2011: 172). Esposito offers his notion of immunitas as an 
alternative to this tradition.
Following Giorgio Agamben’s bio-political paradigm wherein life 
becomes dialectically excluded by being included – i.e. the inclusion 
of negation which results as negated or excluded – Esposito’s starting 
point is a dialectics of immunity that should protect life by absenting 
it. He then goes on to ask whether there is a way out of this exclusion-
ary and destructive impasse of dialectics: ‘is there a point at which the 
dialectical circuit between the protection and the negation of life can be 
interrupted, or at least problematized? Can life be preserved in some 
other form than that of its negative protection?’ (Esposito 2011: 16). 
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Employing Alfred Tauber’s innovative understanding of immunity as an 
opening towards rather than as a negation of the body’s environment, 
Esposito argues that immunitas is indistinguishable from a communitas. 
Esposito maintains that from Tauber’s perspective, ‘far from being a 
unit closed within blocked, impassable borders, the body is posited as an 
ecosystem that has evolved over time into what the author [i.e. Tauber] 
unhesitatingly describes as a “social community” ’ (Esposito 2011: 
166). Esposito’s notion of immunitas is still premised on a dialectical 
opposition wherein what has been posited as negative becomes negated. 
Immunity through the dialectics of negation morphs into community:
If anything, the immune system must be interpreted as an internal resonance 
chamber, like the diaphragm through which difference, as such, engages and 
traverses us. As we were saying: once its negative power has been removed, 
the immune is not the enemy of the common, but rather something more 
complex that implicates and stimulates the common. The full significance of 
this necessity, but also its possibility, still eludes us. (Esposito 2011: 18)
In keeping with the tradition of a dialectical paradigm, which he never-
theless sets out to question, Esposito thus bases his notion of immunitas 
on the removal or negation of what he calls ‘negative power’.
Similarly to related contemporary discussions of diverse issues and 
topics such as posthumanism and climate change, Esposito’s conception 
of the immune is still informed by the dialectical constellation where 
the negative is finally negated. Contaminations discusses what Esposito 
understands by immunity under the term ‘purity’. Here immunity or 
purity does not undergo a dialectical itinerary, where it finally opposes 
or negates itself. Rather than opposing something, purity or immunity 
becomes exposed as a construct which does not exist in either negative 
or positive form. The ‘pure’ or immune is always already contaminated 
by the impure, the negative. In contrast to Esposito’s notion of immu-
nitas, the figure of contamination as developed in this book does not 
attack or absent or negate the negative. The term contamination signals 
the capitulation to, rather than the defence against, forces which have 
come to represent entities that should be attacked or fought, such as 
mental illness, or failure, or scandal.
Esposito appraises his notion of immunitas as ‘true dialectical 
exchange between a good that comes from an evil and an evil that 
is transformed into good, in a sort of progressive indistinctiveness 
comparable to the structurally double-edged character of the Platonic 
pharmakon (but also of the Latin medicamentum or High-German and 
Anglo-Saxon Gift)’ (Esposito 2011: 127). Immunity turns into com-
munity by way of its negation – in other words, its finitude: ‘This is the 
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condition common to all that is immune: the endless perception of its 
own finitude’ (Esposito 2011: 174). As we have seen, Esposito’s self-
negation of immunity in terms of what Derrida has previously theorised 
as autoimmunity still has a dialectal, superseding linear movement ori-
ented towards its own negation.
Instead of approaching immunity or purity dialectically, as Esposito 
does, this book introduces the concept and the practice of contamina-
tion as an alternative to traditional dialectics. In this context, it under-
mines notions of negation and affirmation.
There have, however, been recent attempts to avoid negation tout 
court. The most striking may be Rosi Braidotti’s, according to which 
‘the posthuman turn’ is ‘an amazing opportunity to decide together 
what and who we are capable of becoming, and a unique opportunity 
for humanity to reinvent itself affirmatively, through creativity and 
encompassing ethical relations, and not only negatively, through vulner-
ability and fear’ (Braidotti 2013: 195). Here the negative aspects too are, 
if not negated, then at least marginalised. The figure of contamination, 
while highlighting what we would normally tend to avoid, abstains from 
attacking what we have come to perceive as negative.
Indeed, the figure of contamination simultaneously connects – rather 
than opposes – the anxious and the gracious, the abject and the beauti-
ful. These entities have, according to Esposito, been opposed with each 
other. Rather than use one to attack the other, the figure of contamina-
tion allows for a space of interdependence, or, in Barad’s terms, entan-
glement. The notion of interdependence derives from Spinoza (Mack 
2010: 11–47) – a thinker who is also crucial for Braidotti’s understand-
ing of posthumanism. Her interest in Spinoza, as well as Hasana Sharp’s 
(Sharp 2011: 85–153), derives from the philosopher’s divergence from 
a dialectical way of thinking, with which Hegel took issue as Braidotti 
explains:
The absence of any reference to negativity and to violent dialectical oppo-
sitions caused intense criticism of Spinoza on the part of Hegel and the 
Marxist-Hegelians. Spinoza’s monistic worldview was seen as politically inef-
fective and holistic at heart. The situation changed dramatically in the 1970s 
in France, when a new wave of scholars rehabilitated Spinozist monism 
precisely as an antidote to some of the contradictions of Marxism and as a 
way of clarifying Hegel’s relationship to Marx. The main idea is to overcome 
dialectical oppositions, engendering a non-dialectical understanding of mate-
rialism itself (Braidotti 1991; Cheah 2008), as an alternative to the Hegelian 
scheme. (Braidotti 2013: 56)
Rather than absenting itself from the negative, Contaminations com-
bines what Braidotti calls Spinoza’s ‘vitalist materialism’4 with both 
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P. P. Pasolini’s and W. Benjamin’s re-evaluation of negation. Benjamin 
attempted to change our perception of the negative, following his 
friend Gershom Scholem’s interpretation of a Kabbalistic ‘redemp-
tion through sin’ (the apostasies of the seventeenth-century would-be 
Messiah Shabbatai Zvi are emblematic in this respect). In this way, he 
argued that redemption consists in its apparent opposite: in the going 
under of loss, failure and disappointment.5
Similarly, Pasolini confronts us in his films and in his literary work 
with the simultaneity of what is apparently opposed: the anti-social, or 
in other words negative, position of outcasts (as most strikingly in his 
film Accattone) and a peculiar form of grace, beauty and peace. Abel 
Ferrara opens his new film on the last day of Pasolini’s life (with Willem 
Dafoe as lead actor), highlighting Pasolini’s notion of scandal with the 
following quotation: ‘Scandalizzare è un diritto, essere scandalizzati è 
un piacere’ (To scandalise is a duty, to be scandalised is a pleasure). In 
his famous film The Gospel According to St Matthew, Pasolini contami-
nates the traditionally opposed figures of Jesus and Judas, by rendering 
the dividing line between the two increasingly blurred. How does such 
contamination occur? In parallel scenes Pasolini’s Jesus uses the term 
‘scandalo’, first to describe himself and then Judas.
Celebrating scandal thus, Pasolini attempts to transform our percep-
tion of what we have come to represent as negative or hostile. The 
negative does not so much oppose and then give way to the positive as 
dialectics claims. It is bound up with its other instead. Interdependence 
rather than opposition informs the workings of the figure of contamina-
tion. Contemporary social and environmental concerns such as climate 
change or demographic challenges have made us aware of our interde-
pendent, contaminated rather than pure or autonomous position within 
our environment.
The figure of contamination as developed in this book thus emerges 
from Pasolini’s as well as Benjamin’s respective re-evaluations of what 
we would normally attack or fight under the nomenclature of the nega-
tive. Pasolini frequently referred to the notion of scandal (scandalo) as a 
way of highlighting his embrace of what societal representation margin-
alises or excludes as the negative. Absenting negativity does not actually 
‘overcome dialectical oppositions’, as Braidotti claims. Braidotti writes: 
‘The posthuman recomposition of human interaction that I propose is 
not the same as the reactive bond of vulnerability, but is an affirma-
tive bond that locates the subject in the flow of relations with multiple 
others’ (Braidotti 2013: 50). How, however, can there be a bonding with 
others that excludes a sense of vulnerability?
The lives of humans and animals are exposed to negative forces of 
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vulnerability, decay and death. Alasdair MacIntyre has drawn atten-
tion to the extent to which vulnerability has been a neglected topic in 
the history of ideas: ‘From Plato to Moore and since there are usually, 
with some rare exceptions, only passing references to human vulner-
ability and affliction and to the connections between them and our 
dependence on others’ (MacIntyre 1999: 1). Proof of rapidly advancing 
climate change has, however, reinforced a sense of our vulnerability and 
potential finality as a species. According to Dipesh Chakrabarty, global 
warming has increased rather than diminished ‘contemporary moods of 
anxiety and concern about the finitude of humanity’ (Chakrabarty 2009: 
197). Global warming confronts us with the negativity of globalisation.
Environmental catastrophes and the figure of contamination
Chakrabarty argues that globalisation is not only negative but also 
encompasses beneficial elements, alleviating poverty in countries such 
as China and India. He discusses globalisation as a contaminated entity 
which gives rise to both the Anthropocene and to the democratisation 
of prosperity throughout the globe. How can we describe the notion 
of Anthropocene? The term Anthropocene describes humanity as a 
geological force capable of changing the environment to a point of no 
return. Libby Robin and Will Steffen have defined the Anthropocene in 
such terms:
The Anthropocene defines the momentous and historical change in circum-
stances whereby the biophysical systems of the world are now no longer 
independent of the actions of people. It is the Epoch dominated by humans. 
People have officially and geologically changed the course of nature at a 
global scale. The idea of the Anthropocene demands an integration of bio-
physical and human history, and provides the over-arching reason why the 
history of people on Earth has become core business of this largely scientific 
group. (Robin and Steffen 2007: 1699)
Natural and human histories are no longer separate, but contami-
nated entities. The chemist Paul J. Crutzen, who introduced the term 
Anthropocene, stresses the significance of interdependence when he, 
together with the environmentalist Thomas E. Graedel, employs the 
sociological term ‘system’ for a better understanding of climate change:
Systems of all types share a few common characteristics, the most basic of 
which is that each is a group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent 
elements forming a collective entity. Another characteristic of systems is that 
they are dynamic, reacting constantly to driving forces and perturbations 
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from within and without. A consequence of this dynamism is that the lon-
gevity of a system is not assured: some systems remain virtually unchanged 
for long periods, others alternate rapidly between growth and decline, some 
sicken and die. (Graedel and Crutzen 1997: 2)
The system of our climate reacts to both biophysical and social changes: 
Chapter 2 discusses Nikolas Luhmann’s systems theory, delineating how 
apparently closed systems are paradoxically all the more exposed to and 
interacting with their environments. The term Anthropocene denotes the 
exposure of the biophysical system to the ever increasing force of human 
activities and their concomitant residues in the form of carbon emis-
sions. These emissions have gradually changed our planet’s atmosphere 
since the beginning of the industrial revolution, from the late eighteenth 
century onwards.6 This process rapidly gains in speed and force: if we 
neglect the contaminating, the Anthropocene repercussion of our action-
driven lifestyle, depending on the consumption of energy resources, we 
may risk reaching a tipping point where the climate has changed beyond 
repair.
Chakrabarty argues, however, as if this fatalist turn after the tipping 
point had already occurred, asking: ‘Is the Anthropocene a critique of 
the narratives of freedom? Is the geological agency of humans the price 
we pay for the pursuit of freedom?’ (Chakrabarty 2009: 210). On this 
view the apocalyptical prospect of an inevitable destruction of our envi-
ronment (human-induced and yet beyond any human remedy) outdoes 
the global promise of democracy and freedom as inaugurated by indus-
trialisation. Human-induced climate change (i.e. the Anthropocene) 
overturns notions of eternal and infinite time spans, which have previ-
ously governed approaches to human history that conceived of nature as 
a mere background for humanity’s quasi-immortal achievements:
In today’s climatologists’ terms, we could say that Stalin and Braudel and 
others who thought thus [i.e. of nature as a backdrop] did not have avail-
able to them the idea, now widespread on the literature on global warming, 
that the climate, and hence the overall environment, can sometimes reach a 
tipping point at which this slow and apparently timeless backdrop for human 
actions transforms itself with a speed that can only spell disaster for human 
beings. (Chakrabarty 2009: 205)
The question remains: have we already passed the tipping point? Had 
we done so, attempts to remedy the situation would be useless. We 
would have no choice but to await the inevitable end of both natural and 
human history. Human agency would prove to be futile.
Chakrabarty appears to allow for some form of agency when he 
evokes the concept of universalism, writing that ‘species may indeed 
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be the name of a placeholder for an emergent, new universal history of 
humans that flashes up in the moment of danger that is climate change’ 
(Chakrabarty 2009: 221). This universal is, however, purely negative, 
lacking any form of agency and indeterminacy. Past universal schemes 
were premised on Hegelian dialectics in which the negative negates 
itself, thus making room for positive futures. Chakrabarty differentiates 
a new form of universalism from the Hegelian one by insisting on this 
pure negativity that refuses to be negated: ‘It is more like a universal that 
arises from a shared sense of a catastrophe. It calls for a global approach 
to politics without the myth of global identity, for, unlike the Hegelian 
universal, it cannot subsume particularities. We may call it a “nega-
tive universal history” ’ (Chakrabarty 2009: 222). This purely negative 
universal history is as homogeneous (if not more so) as its traditional 
dialectical version where negativity becomes superseded by its pure 
opposite.
Challenging various concepts of purity, Contaminations enables us 
to recognise the simultaneity of catastrophe and hope, of anxiety and 
grace. The figure of contamination helps us discover a new perspective 
on our world where juxtaposed differences are not so much opposed but 
mutually entangled with each other. This presupposes the collapse of 
various notions of order (see Chapters 2 and 3). The idea of contamina-
tion as developed in this book grows out of various readings of literary 
and cinematic works, but it chimes with what the philosopher of science 
Nancy Cartwright has recently called ‘the dappled world’. Critiquing 
traditional notions of scientific enquiry based on an all-encompassing 
sense of order and validity, she writes:
Since at least the time of Mechanical Philosophy, physicists have been busy at 
work on a theory of everything. For its part, contemporary economics pro-
vides models not just for the price of the rights for offshore drilling, where the 
market meets very nice conditions, but also for the effects of liberal abortion 
policies on teenage pregnancies, for whom we marry and when we divorce 
and for the rationale of political lobbies. My belief in the dappled world is 
based in large part on the failures of these two disciplines to succeed in these 
aspirations. The disorder of nature is apparent. (Cartwright 1999: 1)
Awareness of the collapse of the natural order makes us realise the 
dappled constitution of our world. Cartwright’s notion ‘dappled’ could 
also be another word denoting the blurring of traditional divisions. 
According to the OED ‘dappled’ describes objects ‘marked with round-
ish spots, patches, or blotches of a different colour or shade; spotted, 
speckled’7 – a contamination of sorts.
A dappled world allows for mutual interactions between the sciences 
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and the arts and the humanities. Public opinion still associates the sci-
ences with objectivity and the humanities with subjectivity. This book 
shows how both entities are not to be perceived as opposites but rather 
as bound up with each other. The simultaneity of divergent concepts 
as well as substances validates the prospect of agency counteracting 
human-induced global warming. There is no such thing as either a 
purely negative universal history or a purely positive one (which has 
dialectically negated negation). The absence of purity may preclude 
the establishment of utopian futures but it also questions apocalyptical 
prospects of the inevitable end of human and natural history.
Social expectations shape aspects of scientific enquiry. They motivate 
the prioritisation of public funding for scientific enquiries and they lead 
to the establishment of social policies. Clearly scientists do not do their 
work in a self-enclosed space, cut off from society and culture at large. 
For this reason, this book envisages culture via the way communities 
face scientific issues (such as cloning/genetic engineering as discussed 
in Chapter 7). Misunderstood bio-medical topics distort meanings 
of culture and communities. Contaminations: Beyond Dialectics in 
Modern Literature, Science and Film addresses this problem with new 
knowledge derived from discussions of literary and cinematic works.
Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom: contaminating hermeneutics 
with empiricism
An example from contemporary literature helps to sketch how this book 
envisages a new dialogue between traditional hermeneutics and the 
empiricist core of the social sciences and climate sciences. Via analyses 
of literary texts (such as Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom), Contaminations 
discovers a new form of literature’s socio-cultural significance: ways of 
uncovering fictions that govern society at large. Through this method, 
it also opens up new scholarly horizons on how we may come to see 
literature as an activity that potentially changes our way of interacting 
with the fictitious core by which we deceive ourselves about substantial 
issues such as climate change. Reality often outdoes fiction in being or 
appearing incredible. Philip Roth has emphasised how literature cannot 
avoid a confrontation with the often fictitious core that governs actual 
events and happenings, writing that:
the American writer in the middle of the twentieth century has his hands full 
in trying to understand, describe, and then make credible much of American 
reality. It stupefies, it sickens, it infuriates, and finally it is even a kind of 
embarrassment to one’s own meagre imagination. The actuality is continually 
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outdoing our talents, and the culture tosses up figures almost daily that are 
the envy of any novelist. (Roth 1961: 167–8)
Satire highlights the ways in which our socio-political context is stran-
ger, sicker, and more infuriating than fiction. It shows us how incredible 
our reality actually is.
This holds true of Franzen’s new novel, Freedom. Walter Berglund, 
one of the main protagonists of the novel, advocates the removal of 
mountaintops in the Appalachian forests. This is of course supported 
by the biggest coal producer, Vin Haven. Together with Vin Haven, 
Walter Berglund founds the ‘Cerulean Mountain Trust’ (Franzen 2010: 
209). The crucial point is that Walter and the coal monopolist emo-
tionally shift the argument from environmental exploitation – which 
is substantially at stake here – to environmental preservation of an 
endangered bird species. Similarly to The Corrections, the novel depicts 
the way in which we deceive ourselves by banishing highly emotionally 
charged destructive and unhealthy issues (such as mental illness as in 
The Corrections, or climate change as a scientific issue that cannot be 
discussed without the context of community concerns as in Freedom) 
into the background. Here it is the deceptive obsession with the health 
of birds that disguises a disgust with and active denigration and expul-
sion of those communities who live in the Appalachian Mountains. 
Expulsion from their habitat of course takes these communities out of 
their established work environment. Sam Tannenhaus has described this 
situation succinctly as follows: ‘Walter, “greener than Greenpeace,” 
strangely colludes with a superrich Texan to despoil a West Virginian 
mountaintop, though it means uprooting 200 local families, “most of 
them very poor” – all to create a sanctuary for a species of warbler not 
even on the federal endangered species list’ (Tanenhaus 2010). Here the 
negative turns into the affirmative. There would be new job prospects in 
new locations. Politicians and journalists do not countenance any nega-
tive representations either of climate change or of the Iraq War.
The negative negates itself and turns positive: ‘As for job security, it 
was enough to point to the declarations, issued by various members of 
the Bush administration, that America would be defending itself in the 
Middle East for generations to come. There was no foreseeable end to 
the war on terror and, ergo, no end to the demand for body armour’ 
(Franzen 2010: 301). Here we witness how society falls prey to delu-
sions about what it takes to be beneficial but what is in fact seeped in 
violence and blood (the Iraq War). Politicians, with the assistance of 
various media outlets, spin the reality of suffering and violence into 
issues that are to be affirmed. In quasi-dialectical manner war turns into 
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a boon for the job prospects of the communities in the Appalachian 
Mountains, providing them with work in factories spread throughout 
the US. Workers for such factories will be in heavy demand because, so 
the spin goes, the production of body armour will be desperately needed 
thanks to the prospect of an unending war on terror.
This is of course a satire but one that is real, that relates to real issues 
in a manner that Franzen admires in the work of the Austrian early 
twentieth-century satirist Karl Kraus. Franzen denies that Kraus’s satires 
on the politics and journalism of the twenties and thirties of the last 
century are to be confined to history and thus separated from pressing 
contemporary issues. He writes:
And Kraus is foreign, more so than his better-known contemporaries, because 
his work was so particularly tied to his own time and place – to long forgot-
ten controversies, to rivals now obscure, to newspapers and literary works 
that only scholars read anymore. And yet, paradoxically, Kraus has more 
to say to us in our own media-saturated, technology-crazed, apocalypse-
haunted historical moment than his more accessible contemporaries now do. 
(Franzen 2013: 5)
Despite the historical and geographic distance separating Kraus’s 
Austria from Franzen’s America, his satires still speak to a contempo-
rary American audience because they concern real social issues which 
are still pertinent today. A crucial one is the power of the media to 
distort warfare (in Kraus’s case World War I) and turn it into something 
attractive or appealing.
Following Kraus’s approach, Franzen sets out to alert us to how ‘our 
own media-saturated’ society falls prey to fictions or delusions of what 
is represented as positive, good or worthy. Walter and the coal magnate 
use the preservation of a non-endangered bird species for a media spin 
that represents the removal of mountaintops for the mining of fossil 
fuels as good rather than damaging for the environment. When Walter’s 
wife Patty confronts him with his implicit support of the coal industry 
(‘You think we should be burning more coal. Making it easier to burn 
more coal. In spite of global warming’ Franzen 2010: 323), he acknowl-
edges the fatalism that incongruously governs his environmental activ-
ism: ‘We’re heading for a catastrophe, Patty. We’re heading for total 
collapse’ (Franzen 2010: 323). Walter, the well-intentioned and decent 
environmentalist, here expounds what Chakrabarty has recently theo-
rised as the inevitable and irreversible link that binds globalisation to 
global warming. The enjoyment of freedom and prosperity in previously 
poor regions (such as India and China, which have become emergent 
markets) is ineluctably tied to global warming whose prevention would, 
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according to Chakrabarty, come at great economic and social costs to 
countries such as India or China.
In contrast to Walter Berglund, however, Chakrabarty sets out to 
safeguard the prosperity of previously impoverished communities in 
India and China. Walter does not value the lives of the poor inhabitants 
of the Appalachian Mountains. The satirical irony of the novel operates 
on the level of incongruity: Walter’s moralistic stance fighting the evil of 
the Anthropocene (humanity’s ‘overpopulation’) clashes with the ruth-
lessness of his actions (actually colliding with the interests of the coal 
industry). Walter separates society from nature, playing off the latter 
against the former. Walter thus creates a notion of nature as pure entity 
which he opposes to the pollutions caused by humanity. The human-
induced destruction of our planet dialectically ensures the triumph of the 
positive after ecological collapse:
I meant that world population and energy consumption are going to have to 
fall drastically at some point. We’re past sustainable even now. Once the col-
lapse comes, there’s going to be a window of opportunity for ecosystems to 
recover, but only if there’s any nature left. So the big question is how much of 
the planet gets destroyed before the collapse. Do we completely use it up, and 
cut down every tree and sterilize every ocean, and then collapse? Or are there 
going to be any unwrecked strongholds that survive? (Franzen 2010: 323)
In dialectical manner ‘collapse’ morphs into ‘a window of opportunity’: 
it is this uncritical and unreflective environmental discourse which 
Timothy Morton has in mind in his provocative book, Ecology without 
Nature. Nature has all too often been hypostasised as a pure and inno-
cent image or notion cut off from the defilement of society, culture and 
humanity: ‘Since the Romantic period, nature has been used to support 
the capitalist theory of value and to undermine it; to point out what is 
intrinsically human, and to exclude the human; to inspire kindness and 
compassion, and to justify competition and cruelty’ (Morton 2007: 19). 
In Walter’s discourse, nature denotes salvation, signalling the dialectical 
swerving of the negative into the positive: ‘Once the collapse comes, 
there’s going to be a window of opportunity for ecosystems to recover, 
but only if there’s any nature left.’ The affirmative and distortive media 
campaign which Walter launches on the bidding of the coal magnate 
reflects the wish for the uncontaminated presence of what we can emo-
tively espouse as good or worthwhile, which in the quote above goes 
under the name of ‘unwrecked [i.e. uncontaminated] strongholds’.
In the face of inevitable catastrophe we have to work even harder at 
ensuring a redemptive space for the positive, albeit one that is an island 
of survival surrounded by apocalypse. Walter’s environmental activism 
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actually supports the destruction of the environment: he campaigns for 
the mining of coal, the burning of which further propels the advance of 
climate change.8 In search of the positive we delude ourselves about what 
is truly harmful. Activism here emerges as deception and self-delusion:
Each new thing he encountered in life impelled him in a direction that fully 
convinced him of its rightness, but the next thing loomed up and impelled 
him in the opposite direction, which also felt right. There was no controlling 
narrative: he seemed himself a purely reactive pinball in a game whose only 
objective was to stay alive for staying alive’s sake. (Franzen 2010: 318)
Actions as reactions are passive.9 Walter Berglund is political, he is an 
activist. However, his actions lack the problematising aspect of reflec-
tion and contemplation (see Chapter 6). One path of action dialectically 
turns into its opposite pathway and thus in dialectical manner outdoes 
itself. Here actions cancel themselves out because they are not contami-
nated by what would reflectively call them into question.
Like Chuck Lambert (who turns from an academic critic of free 
market capitalism to a leading fraudster selling the investment case 
for a completely privatised and corrupt country of the former Warsaw 
Pact) in The Corrections, Walter Berglund evaporates his own sense of 
freedom or fulfilment by spinning ecological collapse into opportunities 
for preservation. The self in quest for its own preservation here destroys 
itself, precisely by being preoccupied with its own moralistic ideals, 
which ironically do more damage than good to the community (of the 
Appalachian Mountains) and to the planet as whole (paving the way 
for more coal mining through mountaintop removal). The very title 
of Franzen’s novel evokes the traditional structure of a quest for the 
attainment of ethical ideals (such as freedom) only to show the damage 
it might do to our world. As Camilla Nelson has recently put it: ‘In 
Freedom, this structural problem rapidly transforms into a vision of 
the world in which all happiness exists at the cost of others’ happiness, 
and all freedom exists at the cost of others’ freedom’ (Nelson 2013: 3). 
Walter seeks his own ethical sense of wellbeing by incongruously violat-
ing that of his environment.
Yet Franzen’s Freedom does not portray Walter as an egoist. The 
novel refrains from judging him.10 Crucially, the targets of the novel’s 
satire are various moralistic discourses that refer to high ethical values 
(such as environmental preservation or freedom) in the defence of both 
increased coal mining and the Iraq War. Far from passing moral judge-
ment on Walter Berglund, straight from its opening the narrative voice 
observes a certain strangeness, a certain paradox in his dialectical way of 
acting: ‘it seemed strange that Walter, who was greener than Greenpeace 
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and whose own roots were rural, should be in trouble now for conniv-
ing with the coal industry and mistreating people’ (Franzen 2010: 323). 
With the best of intentions, a socially responsible environmental activist 
behaves unethically.11 How can we explain this?
Paul Mendes-Flohr’s interpretation of Martin Buber’s critique of 
political activism may help us understand the pitfalls of this one- 
dimensional approach to action which is uncontaminated by reflection:
An ethical noblesse oblige compels one, in the words of the Jewish philoso-
pher Martin Buber, to become a homo politicus, to be attentive to the needs 
of others and to be actively committed to promoting the social good. But 
at the same time, Buber teaches, one is to become a homo problematicus. 
While one is politically and socially engaged, one is to fend off the threat of 
self-righteousness and political arrogance, through a self-reflective scrutiny of 
one’s motives and an acknowledgment of the complexity of the social reality 
in which one seeks to intervene. As a homo politicus one is to be bold and 
decisive, while as a homo problematicus one is to demand of oneself to be 
humble and ever on guard against one’s ideological vanities and ethical con-
ceits. (Mendes-Flohr 2010: 13)
Walter’s preoccupation with what appears to him to be ethical actually 
blinds him to the social reality in which he attempts to do noble or good 
deeds. He is obsessed with the power of the positive, and crucially he 
characterises himself as ‘Mr Good’ (Franzen 2010: 481). The good of 
course keeps changing from circumstance to circumstance, from situa-
tion to situation.
Being so concerned with doing good, Walter is incapable of recognis-
ing the contaminated reality of what appears to be positive. He cannot 
problematise the good as being entangled with its opposite. Franzen’s 
novel shows us how affirmation of the positive might merely be the 
affirmation of a self who appears to be self-less. Franzen’s novel does 
not judge or condemn the selfishness which motivates Walter’s appar-
ently noble political actions. It observes, however, the trajectory of these 
actions in a non-judgemental, satirical way. As satire the novel makes us 
realise the violence and damage that might result from ‘ethical’ commit-
ments that ruthlessly perpetuate their goals with complete disregard to 
their actual environment. Walter’s problem is not his unacknowledged 
concern for himself but his self-righteousness, his political arrogance. 
As Martin Buber has argued in his famous I and Thou, the issue here is 
not the self but the quasi-ethical affirmation of the self who presumably 
does good deeds:
What has to be given up is not the I, as most mystics suppose: the I is indispen-
sable for any relationship, including the highest, which always presupposes 
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an I and You. What has to be given up is not the I but that false drive for self-
affirmation which impels man [i.e. the human; den Menschen] to flee from 
the unreliable, unsolid, unlasting, unpredictable, dangerous world of relation 
into the having of things. (Buber 1970: 126)12
Franzen’s Freedom depicts the way a self that affirms itself and its high 
moral ground in actual fact damages what it ostensibly is trying to care 
for and protect. Walter’s activism partakes of his self-affirmation, even 
though he proclaims to act in a selfless, ‘good’ way. Morton has recently 
critiqued this non-reflective preoccupation with actions within contem-
porary environmentalism, writing:
Indeed, one could successfully argue that it’s the presentism of contemporary 
environmentalisms that put them on the wrong side of history. Consider the 
rhetoric of immediacy common to what I have called ecomimesis: stop think-
ing, go out into Nature, turn off your irony. Presentism also manifests in the 
injunction to stop thinking and do something, the paradoxical form taken by 
the contemporary beautiful soul, a defining, overarching subject position of 
modernity that has been with us since the late eighteenth century. (Morton 
2013: 92)
Franzen’s satirical novel contaminates our contemporary concerns for 
the present, for action, and for affirmation, with the reflexivity inherent 
in the working of irony. Affirmation that goes without the contamina-
tion of reflective, problematic, so-called negative moments violates its 
environment. It does so by imposing its affirmative and certain schemes 
on a reality that is, in Buber’s words, ‘unreliable, unsolid, unlasting’ – in 
short, anything else but solely positive.
Methodology of Contaminations
This book undermines unproblematic understandings of affirmation by 
engaging a methodology shaped by the figure of contamination, con-
taminating literary and scientific forms of enquiry. Here the first meth-
odological procedure is dedicated to the act of hermeneutic uncovering, 
which is literary criticism’s form of discovery. The second methodologi-
cal procedure shows how these hermeneutic forms of discovery are the 
so far missing methodological requirement to solve scientific problems 
of timely concern to different communities. This second methodological 
strand thus establishes a critical dialogue between kinds of literary or 
artistic new knowledge and areas of scientific enquiry whose process of 
discovery requires an engagement with data derived from the diverse 
research findings of different hermeneutic enquiries.
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The new knowledge explored in this book thus helps to advance 
interdisciplinary research at the interface between the empiricist core of 
science and the understanding of culture and communities. The crucial 
point here is that we cannot understand the empiricist core of science 
without understanding the ever changing cultural framework in which 
evidence-based research takes place. Contaminations attempts to show 
how literature is capable of changing both the substantial and the subjec-
tive aspects that comprise our lives. Literature and the arts have a two-
pronged and radically divergent field of activity: one side is ethereal or 
non-substantial – what the term fiction may denote in this context – and 
the other transmogrifies the way we relate to issues of substance in the 
emotive and embodied sphere of society. Literature’s independence from 
life paradoxically provides a new lease on life. The literary performs the 
crossover between substance and subjectivity which determines much of 
our health-related socio-political world. The interaction between subjec-
tivity and substance (and vice versa) constitutes the intersubjective realm 
of politics (the topic of Franzen’s Freedom) as well as economics, and 
accounts for their tendency to fall prey to various fictions that are taken 
to be real with often deleterious if not lethal effects. These fictions grow 
out of monolithic concepts which proscribe a ‘one size fits all’ approach 
to medical and socio-economic issues. The ethics of literature counters 
such homogeneous conception of our humanity and thus opens up new 
horizons for scholarship.
Brief overview of the book
Chapter 1 introduces the problem of a traditional divide between nature 
and society, between science and ethics, which is premised on Descartes’s 
prioritisation of the mind over the body. It critically engages with Slavoj 
Žižek, who argues that our experience in the world is purely a mental 
one and that all corporeal experiences are nothing but illusions. It does 
so through a discussion of how some strands in contemporary neuro-
science (A. Damasio) contaminate body and mind. They thus develop 
Spinoza’s notion of a parallelism between the corporeal and the cerebral 
which also informs Freud’s new science of psychoanalysis. Chapter 2 
moves from the mind–body opposition to the division between nature 
and society as analysed in Bruno Latour’s history of science. It discusses 
how oppositions between mind and body, nature and society, science 
and the arts have given rise to the modern as well as modernist concerns 
with invisibility. Chapter 3 analyses the critique of the notion of a natural 
order against the background of the French Revolution’s reign of terror. 
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Through a close reading of Melville’s Moby Dick (with references to 
Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter) it shows how the presentation of the 
collapse of nature’s order prepares for a modernist contamination of 
science with literature. Chapter 4 considers how a deferral of judge-
ment informs a modernist preoccupation with the internal workings 
of the mind. A suspension of judgement preconditions literary as well 
as scientific explorations of stigmatised topics such as mental illness or 
aging. Chapter 5 analyses H. James’s as well as A. Hitchcock’s psychol-
ogy of action. It shows for the first time how James and, in a cinematic 
way, Hitchcock discover perception to be a form of action. Chapter 6 
theorises Pasolini’s notion of scandal (scandalo) in terms of the figure of 
contamination, which allows for a blurring of traditional and dialecti-
cal distinctions between action and contemplation as discussed in the 
previous chapter. Chapter 7 delineates ways in which we can overcome 
humanist as well as posthumanist dialectics of inclusion and exclusion, 
also engaging with the persistence of positing pure forms and opposing 
them with each other in the contemporary context of posthumanism.
Notes
 1. Barad writes: ‘The notion of intra-action is a key element of my agential 
realist framework. The neologism “intra-action” signifies the mutual con-
stitution of entangled agencies’ (Barad 2007: 33).
 2. As David Herman has put it: ‘At issue here is the way that narratives cue 
interpreters to engage with discourse models or storyworlds as referential 
targets’ (Herman 2013: 44).
 3. As Mads Rosendahl Thomsen has recently put it: ‘But literature has the 
capacity to present nuanced positions, because it does not have to convince 
and draw conclusions, but can operate through multiple perspectives and in 
different registers within the same work, ranging from seriousness to dark 
irony’ (Thomsen 2013: 73).
 4. ‘This vitalist materialism rests solidly on a neo-Spinozist political ontology 
of monism and radical immanence, engendering a transversal relational 
ethics to counteract the inhuman(e) aspects of the posthuman predicament’ 
(Braidotti 2013: 115).
 5. For a detailed discussion of Benjamin’s and Scholem’s understanding of the 
term ‘redemption through sin’ see Vatter (2014: 171–2).
 6. ‘The precise date of onset of the Anthropocene is arguable, but Crutzen 
set it to coincide approximately with James Watt’s invention of the steam 
engine in 1784, because of analyses of air trapped in polar ice that dated 
the rapid growth of carbon dioxide and methane concentrations to the late 
eighteenth century. The Anthropocene is not just a new way to look at 
the past; it strongly affects the future. Crutzen argued, for example, that 
anthropogenically induced carbon-dioxide emissions may affect global 
climate for the next 50,000 years’ (Robin and Steffen 2007: 1699).
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 7. The Oxford English Dictionary online, www.oed.com [accessed 27 
November 2014].
 8. Morton mentions another uncritical form of calling upon the well-being 
of birds as ‘evidence’ against renewable energy: ‘The reactionary response 
to wind farms in the United Kingdom, for instance, has tried to bog down 
environmentalists with the idea that birds will be caught in the blades of 
windmills’ (Morton 2007: 6).
 9. In this context Morton critiqued environmental activism as follows: 
‘Ecology without Nature takes seriously the idea that truly theoretical 
reflection is possible only if thinking decelerates. This is not the same 
thing as becoming numb or stupid. It is finding anomalies, paradoxes, and 
conundrums in an otherwise smooth-looking stream of ideas’ (Morton 
2007: 12).
10. Stephen Burn has analysed the ways in which Franzen abstains from char-
acterising anyone or anything in pure terms as either this or that. One 
could say that he practises literature as a form of contamination, or as Burn 
writes: ‘Franzen’s imagination characteristically works by fusing opposites 
on every level – formal, thematic, geographic – so his novels become a kind 
of synthesis of divergent forces’ (Burn 2008: xi).
11. There are striking parallels between Walter Berglund and Franzen himself: 
Franzen has admitted to his own love of birds and to his anger about the 
destruction of the environment: ‘I made a conscious decision not to worry 
about the environment. There was nothing meaningful I personally could 
do to save the planet, and I wanted to get on with devoting myself to things 
I loved. I still tried to keep my carbon footprint small, but that was as far 
as I could go without falling back into rage and despair. But then a funny 
thing happened to me. It’s a long story, but basically I fell in love with 
birds’ (Franzen 2012: 12).
12. ‘Ein Aufgeben also nicht des Ich, aber jenes falschen Selbstbehauptungstriebs, 
der den Menschen vor der unzuverlässigen, undichten, dauerlosen, unüber-
sehbaren, gefährlichen Welt der Beziehung in das Haben der Dinge flüchten 
lässt’ (Buber 1979: 94).
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Biology: Descartes, Spinoza, 
Freud and Žižek
Between Spinoza and Kant: Catherine Malabou, Freud, 
Damasio and Žižek
As we have seen in the Introduction, the current crisis of climate change 
calls into doubt traditional oppositions between natural history and 
human history. Our contemporary environmental predicament has 
made us cognisant of our being a physical force of nature, far from 
residing in a disembodied, intellectual/spiritual realm. Paul Crutzen 
and Eugene F. Stoermer’s term ‘Anthropocene’ describes humanity’s 
predominating presence in nature that derails homeostasis to the tipping 
point of planetary collapse.
Against this background, the following chapter introduces the problem 
of a traditional divide between nature and society, between science and 
ethics, which is premised on Descartes’s prioritisation of the mind over 
the body. Our present condition of an Anthropocene planetary crisis in 
fact collapsed the still regnant philosophical proposition which assumes 
various divisions between the natural and the human, between nature 
and society, between natural and human history.
One striking proponent of the hold of this philosophical axiom which 
demotes the embodied world as inferior, if not delusory, is Slavoj Žižek, 
who argues that our experience in the world is purely a mental one and 
that all corporeal experiences are nothing but illusions. One target of 
Žižek’s polemics against a Spinozan parallelism of mind and body is 
contemporary neuroscience. Žižek establishes his own Cartesian and 
Kantian position as progressive and labels Spinoza’s notion of the mind 
as the idea of the body as regressive. Contemporary neuroscientific find-
ings have backed up Spinoza’s philosophical alternative to a Cartesian 
prioritisation of the cerebral over the corporeal, showing that the mind 
not so much controls as depends on bodily inputs.
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Turning the tables on Žižek’s self-proclaimed progressive stance, this 
chapter therefore analyses his dismissal of contemporary neuroscience 
as philosophical regression. What causes Žižek’s unease with cognitive 
science is precisely a Spinozan conception of a parallelism of mind and 
body (rather than a controlling position of the former over the latter). In 
contrast to Catherine Malabou’s recent account of the incompatibility 
of contemporary neuroscience and psychoanalysis, this chapter analyses 
the ways in which Freud’s critique of both philosophical and theological 
prioritisations of the mind over the body anticipates neuroscientific find-
ings of various contaminations between the cerebral and the corporeal. 
Freud locates the site of this interconnection between mind and body 
in the libido, the product of contamination. The libido is neither purely 
cerebral nor purely physical: it is both.
In contrast to Freud, Žižek argues that the libido is uncontaminated, 
that is, nothing but cerebral – a plague of phantasy (Žižek 2009). In 
reducing Freud’s drives to states of pure disembodiment, Žižek presents 
us with a Cartesian version of psychoanalysis which dismisses the emo-
tions of the brain. This is not Freud’s understanding of psychoanalysis. 
As Eric R. Kandel has shown (and contra Malabou’s Žižekian reading), 
Freud took neuroscientific investigation of the embodied mind seriously. 
This is his Spinozan, Darwinian and Nietzschean or anti-Cartesian 
heritage. Antonio Damasio famously established Spinoza’s key role 
in developing a new conception of the mind’s interdependence on the 
body, which has been foundational for contemporary neuroscience:
What is Spinoza’s insight then? That mind and body are parallel and mutu-
ally correlated processes, mimicking each other at every crossroad, as two 
faces of the same thing. That deep inside these parallel phenomena there is 
a mechanism for representing body events in the mind. That in spite of the 
equal footing of mind and body, as far as they are manifest to the percipient, 
there is an asymmetry in the mechanism underlying these phenomena. He 
suggested that the body shapes the mind’s contents more so than the mind 
shapes the body’s, although mind processes are mirrored in body processes 
to a considerable extent. On the other hand, the ideas in the mind can double 
up on each other, something that bodies cannot do. If my interpretation of 
Spinoza’s statements is even faintly correct, his insight was revolutionary for 
its time but it had no impact on science. (Damasio 2003: 217)
With these sentences Damasio attempts to summarise the groundbreak-
ing significance of the seventeenth-century philosopher Baruch Spinoza 
for twenty-first-century neuroscience. In the paragraph above Damasio 
focuses on Spinoza’s thought about the mutual contamination of mind 
and body. Contrary to Descartes, who allocated a commanding or 
ruling function to the mind – which he physiologically tried to locate in 
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the pineal gland – Spinoza argued that mental images originate in bodily 
perceptions and sensations. Spinoza famously argued that the mind is 
the idea of the body.
This implies a parallelism between mind and body. Damasio and 
other leading neurologists have discovered that body, brain and mind 
are intricately connected, and that bodily emotions are the foundation 
of mental feelings and a sense of consciousness: ‘The inescapable and 
remarkable fact about these three phenomena – emotion, feeling, con-
sciousness – is their body relatedness’ (Damasio 2000: 284). As Damasio 
points out in the paragraph above, Spinoza’s insight into the parallelism 
between mind and body, groundbreaking though it was, ‘had no impact 
on science’. In Spinoza and the Specters of Modernity I have shown that 
his thought has had significant – albeit marginalised – repercussions in 
political, historical, cultural, biological and psychoanalytical theory. 
Freud in particular developed his notion of a ‘new science’ as part of 
Spinoza’s shift from the Cartesian as well as Kantian idealist notion of 
the mind’s (autonomy or) full control over merely bodily or contingent 
external events. This Freudian shift in the understanding of mind science 
will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.
Do we do justice to Freud when we characterise him as a covert 
Spinozist? As we shall see below, he was certainly highly critical of 
Kant’s perception of the mind’s autonomy from external or pathologi-
cal exposures. Strikingly, contamination is a notion that derives from a 
medical context of pathology. Kant uses the term autonomy in the sense 
of purity from any form of infection or contamination. The body is 
prone to becoming infected; it is exposed to contaminating forces.
Kantian autonomy denotes a cerebral immunity from contamination. 
It is not surprising that Kant casts our embodied and natural environ-
ment into the medical language of pathology. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, both Kant and modernity at large engage in various purification 
projects in order to keep the feared and chaotic forces of contamination 
at bay. For one thing, the contamination of body, emotion, feeling, brain 
and mind maintained by Spinoza, together with contemporary neuro-
scientists, has troubling implications for Freudian psychoanalysis too. 
Žižek – perhaps the most important contemporary Freudian/Lacanian 
theorist – has recently raised a red flag over what he calls the reductive 
materialism of neurologists à la Damasio. Žižek’s point of contention is 
self-proclaimedly progressive: the neurologists abandon their Kantian 
position and retreat to a ‘naive’ pre-critical perception of life. Poking 
fun at Damasio, Žižek articulates his ‘problem with this easy and clear 
solution: reading the cognitivists, one cannot help noting how their 
description of consciousness at the phenomenal–experiential level is very 
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traditional and pre-Freudian’ (Žižek 2012: 716). Later on, Žižek makes 
it clear that he actually understands ‘pre-Kantian’ by his expression 
‘pre-Freudian’ (Žižek 2012: 716). Here it is important to attend to what 
Žižek refers to as ‘this easy and clear solution’. Without referencing her 
new book The New Wounded: From Neuroscience to Brain Damage, 
Žižek mentions Catherine Malabou – whose work on Hegel he keeps 
praising – for having advocated a dismissal of Freudian or Lacanian 
psychoanalysis in favour of contemporary neuroscience:
Only with today’s brain science do we have the true revolution, namely that, 
for the first time, we are approaching a scientific understanding of the emer-
gence of consciousness. Catherine Malabou draws a radical consequence 
from the cognitivist standpoint: the task is not to supplement the Freudian 
unconscious with the cerebral unconscious, but to replace the former with the 
latter – once we accept the cerebral unconscious, there is no longer any space 
for the Freudian version. (Žižek 2012: 715)
As we will see, Malabou does not advocate abandoning Freudian psy-
choanalysis. She does, however, take issue with the Kantian residue of 
the mind’s autonomy in Freud’s writing and thought. It is this critique 
of an idealist unconscious in Freud’s conscious and outspoken attack on 
Kant’s notion of a mind that is in full possession of itself (Mack 2003: 
136–54) which provokes Žižek’s censure of Malabou’s position.
Rather than doing justice to Freud’s complex position between 
Spinoza and Kant, Žižek reads Freudian psychoanalysis as yet another 
version of Kantian autonomy. His fondness of paradox brings Žižek to 
declare that radical Cartesian (Descartes’s cogito) and Kantian (Kant’s 
autonomy) idealism coincide with the radical materialism of Marx, 
Lenin and Stalin. For pure idealists as well as pure materialists, there 
is no such thing as matter, brain, mind or selfhood. Rather than being 
embodied (as Spinoza and contemporary neuroscience maintain), we are 
disembodied, substance-less subjects: minds or organs without bodies. 
This insight into the non-substantial or non-corporeal foundation of 
human existence is what Žižek understands by ‘Freudian’. According to 
Žižek the progressive ‘Freudian’ or Kantian position is one of ‘purity’, 
of the mind’s autonomy from any contamination with the pathologies of 
the environmental natural or embodied world.
This modern purification project rejecting the figure of contamination 
actually derives not from Freud but from Descartes, Hume and Kant, 
as Žižek makes clear later on: ‘while Hume endeavours to demonstrate 
how there is no Self (when we look into ourselves, we only encounter 
particular ideas, impressions, etc. – no ‘Self’ as such), Kant claims that 
this void is the Self’ (Žižek 2012: 720). The emptiness of the empirical 
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or embodied self serves as the foundation of Kantian autonomy. On 
account of the self’s void, it is able to disregard empirical, embodied and 
contingent conditions of the merely natural (i.e. non-rational) world and 
legislate in an autonomous manner.
The self’s void justifies the rule of a mind that is here even more radi-
cally than in Descartes’s cogito completely independent of corporeal or 
material conditions. This independence from matter establishes the 
mind’s autonomous rule over the material or embodied world. As Žižek 
has put it:
The post-Humean critical-transcendental idealists, from Kant to Hegel, do 
not return to the pre-critical, rock-like, substantial identity of the Ego – what 
they struggled with was precisely how to describe the Self which has no 
substantial identity (as was stated by Kant in his critique of Descartes’s own 
reading of cogito as res cogitans ‘a thing that thinks’), but nonetheless func-
tions as irreducible point of reference – here is Kant’s unsurpassable formula-
tion in his Critique of Pure Reason: ‘[. . .] Through this I or he or it (the thing) 
which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of 
the thoughts=X’. (Žižek 2012: 720–1)
According to Žižek, neuroscience returns to a pre-Freudian position, 
because his understanding of pre-Freudian is pre-Kantian or Spinozan 
(critical of both Descartes’s and Kant’s autonomy of the thinking thing). 
Kant has emptied thought of any substance. In his critique of the mate-
rial vestiges of Descartes’s cogito he has banished the matter implicit 
in the Cartesian notion ‘res cogitans’: ‘Kant thus prohibits the passage 
from “I think” to “I am a thing that thinks”: of course there has to be 
some noumenal basis for (self-)consciousness, of I must be “something” 
objectively, but the point is precisely that this dimension is forever inac-
cessible to the “I” ’ (Žižek 2012: 721). The inaccessibility in question 
here is epistemological.
Kant’s epistemological critique sets the stage for his metaphysical 
redefinition of the body. The presupposition of scientific knowledge in 
this Kantian context is premised on notions of purity. Only pure entities 
are objects of scientific insight. According to Kant, the messy, contami-
nated or ‘pathological’ matter of the embodied world lies beyond the 
grasp of categorisation, representation and meaning. Given that we do 
not know the possible meaning of our contaminated embodiment, it 
also could not be said with certainty that bodily contingency has any 
relation to a transcendent ground that would bestow on it some form of 
value. Our pure rational activity, which is supposedly unexposed to the 
pathologies of the contaminating force of our environment, operates as 
the true source of moral validity.
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Kant’s idealism does not deny the existence of matter, but maintains 
that matter has no right to exist except as material base for the mind’s 
autonomous constructions. Precisely because the intrinsic value of 
matter is inaccessible, the mind can rule it without restrictions. The 
scandal of Spinoza’s mind–body parallelism and that of contemporary 
neuroscience lies in the fact that corporeal matter here is no longer inac-
cessible to mental insight but, on the contrary, the very survival of the 
mental depends on corporeal materiality.
This takes us to the precarious existence of the mind, according to 
contemporary neuroscience. The mind’s dependency on the body – or, 
in other words, the mutual contamination of the mental and the envi-
ronmental – has serious implications for the survival or the eternity of 
the cerebral, because the mind is subject to corporeal mortality. In her 
new book, Malabou focuses on precisely this issue. She argues that 
cerebral plasticity not only denotes the donation and reception but 
also the destruction of life. She does not dismiss Freudian or Lacanian 
 psychoanalysis – as Žižek claims she does. She asks, however, whether 
Freudian thought can imagine the mortality of psychic life. Addressing 
the question of whether Freud allows for the radical negativity of death 
as part of mental life, Malabou first points out that psychoanalysis 
defines mental illness not in terms of mortality but in terms of regression:
Freud thus underscores two fundamental characteristics of pyschopatholo-
gies: They always entail both regression and destruction, and they only 
destroy that which stands in the way of regression. Destruction only bears 
upon the ‘later acquisitions and developments’ that Freud compares to a 
garment or envelope. These superstructures are thus designed to cover over 
the essential – the nature that breaks through our ‘hard-won morality’ – the 
nudity of the primitive psychic stratum, which becomes the aim of regression. 
Destruction is merely the most effective manner of uncovering or revealing 
the indestructible. (Malabou 2012: 59)
In establishing a link between mental illness and regression, Freud 
reiterates crucial tenets of Victorian psychology. As Sally Shuttleworth 
has recently shown, from roughly the mid-nineteenth century onwards 
childhood became a trope for nervous excitability and madness: ‘Mental 
disorder, the loss of intellectual or emotional control, is thus defined as 
a form of a heightened state of childhood’ (Shuttleworth 2010: 50). The 
state of childhood no longer offered glimpses of a qualitative leap back 
or forwards towards innocence (as some of the Romantics proclaimed) 
but was seen as regression to a primitive or irrational state: ‘This shift 
in perception of the child marks a turning point, for it is now possible 
to see in the child’s freedom from adult mental constraint the grounding 
MACK PRINT.indd   28 26/11/2015   11:14
Contaminating Psychology with Biology    29
of insanity’ (Shuttleworth 2010: 50). According to Freud, madness is a 
regression to an infantile state, either at an onto- or phylogenic level. 
The past contaminates present and future. This fusion of the different 
levels of time makes not for immortality (so that individuals should die) 
but for a sense of eternity (the contamination of the past with the present 
and the future ensures that certain aspects of life keep being passed on).
Death’s role is not very active here, as the dead can still pass on their 
heritage to the future generation. The indestructible is not death but the 
death drive. The death drive never comes to an end but turns around 
death – returning to the primitive pasts of childhood and the evolution-
ary beginnings of humanity before the stage of restrictive mental life, 
of civilisation. According to Freud, the psyche operates autonomously, 
as an inward drive, progressing and regressing ontogenetically to the 
childhood of a given individual as well as polygenetically to the savage 
origins of mankind, to the murder of the primeval father by the brothers 
who envy their progenitor’s exclusive possession of women. Oedipus is 
itself a regression to this primal scene of savage patricide.
Nothing seems to get lost in psychic life: the same events keep return-
ing in human history. This is what Malabou means by Freud’s inde-
structibility of the psychic life. This indestructibility contrasts sharply 
with contemporary neuroscientific findings of the mind’s dependence 
on bodily growth and mortality: the brain of an Alzheimer’s patient, for 
instance, does not regress to childhood.
On the contrary, rather than growing like a child’s, it incrementally 
closes down and retreats from an affective engagement with the outside 
world. As Malabou shows in her book, Freud vehemently denied that 
psychic life could shut down and cease to exist. From this perspective, 
Freud clings to a notion of psychic autonomy:
The psychical regime of events, for Freud, is autonomous; it does not depend 
on any organic causes – especially not upon any cerebral cause. This auton-
omy manifests itself precisely through the independence of fantasmatic work 
whose only creative resources come from the psyche and not the brain. Once 
again, the concepts of scene, fiction, and scenario are foreign to any neuronal 
organization that, according to Freud, does not possess an apparatus of rep-
resentation. (Malabou 2012: 98)
Malabou here confuses Freud’s position with that of Lacan. As Alain 
Ehrenberg has shown (Ehrenberg 2010), Lacan turns Freud’s account 
of the psyche’s contamination with embodied drives (i.e. the libido) into 
one of the mind’s state of purity in a linguistic, symbolic sphere that 
operates independently from any environmental factors. Indeed, Freud’s 
notion of the death drive elevates the traditionally demoted notion of 
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embodied or bare life to prospects of eternity. He does so by precisely 
contaminating the body with the recurring traits of mental life which, 
as we have seen above, keep occurring from the mythical times of the 
primeval father to the modern Oedipus complex.
There is a so far underappreciated bio-political dimension to Freud’s 
scientific work: his new science contaminates visible, organic life with 
the invisible and eternal forces of psychic life. This contamination of the 
mortal body with the eternity of the mind or psyche makes for a sense 
of indestructibility (in other words, eternity) which Malabou has rightly 
noted. Malabou misreads Freud in a Lacanian manner when she argues 
that such a sense of eternity disregards the mortality of the body.
Rather than purifying the mind from the body, Freud contaminates 
the organic with the indestructability of the death drive, the libido. By 
contaminating the eternal forces of the psyche (pervading the prehistoric, 
the historic, the modern and the contemporary) with the organic, Freud 
endows bare life with philosophical validity which modern purification 
projects have tried to deny. The contaminating force operating in Freud’s 
new science helps us discover a fusion of the mental and the embodied 
which Miguel Vatter, following Esposito, has recently appraised as the 
affirmation of merely embodied ‘bare life’ (zoé) as follows:
I am interested in pursuing Esposito’s suggestion that a conception of the 
power of life that escapes thanatopolitics depends on interpreting ‘life’s rela-
tionship with politics philosophically’ (2008: 150). I understand this claim 
in the following sense: philosophy becomes truly political when it provides 
a conception of life (zoé) that is immediately theoretical or contemplative. 
Philosophy is political, or political philosophy exists, only where biology is 
philosophical. Philosophy is to be understood in the traditional sense of con-
templating what is most real and actual, what never perishes, what is eternal. 
Thus eternal life would be a conception of a contemplative zoé. (Vatter 2011: 
218)
Freud indeed contaminates his new science of psychoanalysis with 
political philosophy when he offers a conception of life that is theoreti-
cal, mental or, in other words, psychological. For Freud, as for Spinoza, 
the mind is the idea of the body. As such the psyche attempts to map 
or represent the organic state. According to contemporary neuroscience 
too, the brain engages in works of representation. These representations 
are, however, creative rather than mimetic in a flat or replicating way.1
As Damasio has shown, the brain’s mapping of the external world 
‘is not a mere copy, a passive transfer from the outside of the brain to 
the inside’ (Damasio 2010: 64). Instead, the ‘assembly conjured up by 
the senses involves an active contribution offered from inside the brain, 
available from early in development, the idea that the brain is a blank 
MACK PRINT.indd   30 26/11/2015   11:14
Contaminating Psychology with Biology    31
slate having long since lost favor’ (Damasio 2010: 64). Mental mappings 
are therefore not full representations of the objects concerned; they are 
creations:
But the correspondence is not point-to-point, and thus the map need not be 
faithful. The brain is a creative system. Rather than mirroring the environ-
ment around it, as an engineered information-processing device would, each 
brain constructs maps of that environment using its own parameters of inter-
nal design, and thus creates a world unique to the class of brains comparably 
designed. (Damasio 2000: 322)
These different and divergent representations of the world constitute 
part of our subjectivity and create difference of perspective, different 
takes on things.
At first glance Freud seems, however, to be close to Žižek’s image 
of him: he appears to dismiss any talk of material, embodied objects 
as imperious to the autonomy of psychic life. There is no such thing as 
external reality, only the hallucinations and fictions generated by the 
void which is psychic life:
The gap that separates the quantum level from our ordinary perceived reality 
is not a gap between ultimate hard reality and a higher-level unavoidable-
but-illusory hallucination. On the contrary, it is the quantum level which is 
effectively ‘hallucinated,’ not yet ontologically fully constituted, floating and 
ambiguous, and it is the shift to the ‘higher’ level of appearance (appearing 
perceived reality) that makes it into a hard reality. (Žižek 2012: 726–7)
Our sense of ‘hard reality’ is itself a product of fiction whose basis is 
psychic life. This makes Freud appear as a Kantian who rejects con-
tamination and transposes Kant’s notion of autonomy or purity into the 
workings of the psyche. How can we then account for Freud’s repeated 
criticism of Kant’s philosophy?
Freud’s new science
Indeed Freud defines his new science as a science of contamination. He 
thus establishes his differentia specifica from Kant’s understanding of 
the scientific as, in the words of Latour (see Chapter 2), the modern 
purification project.
Freud ironically characterises Kant’s Copernican revolution as ‘old 
science’. What makes it old is its presumption of purity and intra-human 
omniscience and omnipotence. Contra Kant, Freud argues that our 
world is not pure but contaminated – contaminated to the extent that 
we are not masters in our own house. Instead of being purely one entity, 
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our ego or our psyche is split into competing claims and commandments 
of which we can rarely gain control. Significantly, Freud undermines the 
Kantian notion of autonomy as mastering one’s own house and world, 
when he locates the psychoanalytical revolution in the historical context 
of both Copernicus and Darwin: both have inflicted contaminating 
wounds on humanity’s narcissism. Psychoanalysis deals a third and 
decisive blow to this kind of anthropomorphism:
Humanity had to endure two big wounds of its naïve self-love as inflicted by 
science over the ages. First when it learned that our earth is not the centre 
of the world, but a tiny part of a much bigger and unimaginable system of 
the world. This wound is associated with the name of Copernicus, although 
Alexandrinian science has pronounced something similar. The second: when 
biological science rendered null and void the presumed privilege of creation 
of man by referring to both his descent from animals and to the inerasable 
nature of his animalistic constitution. This re-evaluation has taken place in 
our time under the influence of Charles Darwin, Wallace and their predeces-
sors [i.e. Spinoza, Herder, and Goethe], which have been met not without the 
fiercest resistance of their contemporaries. The third and most severe wound, 
however, human megalomania has to endure from psychological research, 
which proves to the ego2 that it is not even master in his own house, but 
remains dependent on pathetic information derived from something which 
takes place unconsciously in the life of its soul. (Freud 1975 Vol. 1: 283–4)3
Here Freud clearly places his new science in a historical trajectory of 
maverick scientists who have radically rejected humanity’s conception 
as pure and uncontaminated.
The Copernican revolution has questioned the pure, quasi-divine 
place of the earth as the centre of the universe, and Darwin and his 
predecessors Spinoza, Herder and Goethe have shown how humanity 
has always been exposed to being contaminated by its natural– corporeal 
environment. From the scientific perspective of both Spinoza and 
Darwin, nature does not cunningly perform a higher cerebral purpose. 
Instead the contaminating forces of chance and contingency govern its 
operations. As Gillian Beer has put it:
‘natural selection’ is a pithy rejoinder to ‘natural theology’. Instead of an 
initiating godhead, Darwin suggests, diversification and selection have gener-
ated the history of the present world. Instead of teleology and forward plan, 
the future is an uncontrollable welter of possibility. (Beer 2000: xviii)
Within a Spinozan trajectory Darwin disrupts the divide between nature 
and society, contaminating one with the other. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 2, the construction of a harmonious, proportional and predict-
able natural world serves to justify punitive and exclusionary measures 
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in politics. The assumed teleology of nature contrasts with the incalcu-
lable and unpredictable intricacies of human psychology. First Spinoza 
and then more outspokenly Darwin dismantle the theory of a nature’s 
proportionality and teleological rationality.
The fatal blow to human pride which Freud attributes to psychoa-
nalysis has to do not so much with issues of humanity’s unpredictable 
psychic life as with the Cartesian doctrine of the mind’s control over 
the mere extension, the mere matter of the body. In this way the most 
severe wound to humanity’s anthropomorphic concept of God and the 
universe is still inflicted by Freud’s new science. Why is this so? The 
preceding revolutions had to do with the strictly biological (Darwin) 
and astrological (Copernicus) spheres, while only minimally touching 
upon the sphere of the mind. This is why Kant is part of the Copernican 
revolution: with Copernicus he acknowledges the periphery of the astro-
logical position of our habitat, the earth, but he nevertheless reclaims the 
autonomous mastery of humanity within its post-Copernican limits (i.e. 
the limits of the sublunar world).
Freud’s new science is radical, because it assaults this last remaining 
bastion of purity: the mind. Rather than guaranteeing humanity’s resist-
ance to any contaminating, embodied forces, the mind is ‘not master in 
his own house but remains dependent on pathetic information derived 
from something which takes place unconsciously in the life of its soul’. 
This indefinite ‘something’ (von dem, was) makes nonsense of any claim 
to an unambiguous, uncontaminated or pure self-knowledge. It there-
fore strongly undermines the Kantian position concerning transcending 
the empirical world, because of the autonomy of the rational mind.
According to Kant, reason shapes the material world in a pure, a 
priori manner, and as a result is capable of freedom from natural condi-
tions (Mack 2003: 23–41). In Freud’s Introductory Lectures of 1933 
Kant appears as the godfather of philosophers, who argues that ‘time 
and place are necessary forms of psychic activities’ (Freud 1975 Vol.1: 
511). Far from being able to create uncontaminated structures of space 
and temporal rhythms, the mind easily turns mindless when it removes 
the ego from the flow of time and also from the flow of life. This removal 
from time and space is consubstantial with a loss of reality which char-
acterises various forms of psychosis.
In undermining Kant’s conception of autonomy, Freud’s new science 
refashions Spinoza’s conception of the mind contaminated by its envi-
ronment (the mind as the idea of the body). As Suzanne R. Kirschner has 
pointed out, Freudian psychoanalysis analyses ‘the limitations of moder-
nity’s emphasis on rationality and autonomy’ (Kirschner 1996: 199). 
Freud’s new science enmeshes cultural with natural history. According 
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to Freud we cannot overcome embodied condition and attain Kant 
and Hegel’s state of freedom where natural impulses are suspended. 
Psychoanalysis focuses on damage caused precisely by such suspension. 
Rather than emphasising a future state of reason and freedom, Freud’s 
new science tries to persuade us to commemorate a ‘savage’ (i.e. pre-
modern) past which, if not brought to consciousness, determines our 
presumably modern and civilised way of life.
The death drive
As Gillian Beer has shown, Darwin writing about nature ‘displaces the 
absoluteness of man’s power of reason as an instrument for measuring 
the world’ (Beer 2000: 92). His description of nature lacks, however, 
any ethical component and is thus removed from Spinoza’s social 
agenda in his Ethics. Freud seems to intensify this naturalistic bleakness 
when he discusses the death drive: ‘A strange drive’, he exclaims, ‘that is 
bent on the destruction of its own organic home!’ (Freud 1975 Vol. 1: 
538).4 Distinguishing his approach from Schopenhauer’s, Freud argues 
that far from being opposed to life, the death drive is actually the very 
foundation of our ability to survive. As we have seen in the preceding 
section, Freud sees psychic life as eternal, thus pervading the whole of 
natural and human history, rather than immortal, with the individual 
being subject to death.
The death drive only turns deadly if it has been cut off from an organ-
ism’s erotic circulation, to which it originally belongs. This reliance on 
the corporeal organism contradicts Žižek’s take on psychoanalysis in 
terms of a Kantian radicalisation of Descartes’s cogito. As Malabou 
has shown, ‘Freud dismisses any suggestion that an organic cause could 
have etiological autonomy’ (Malabou 2012: 112). In this way he denies 
that mental illness can ever result from injury to the organ of the brain. 
His denial of the etiological autonomy of an organic cause does not, 
however, mean that Freud invalidates the significance of organic, mate-
rial and embodied life and the psyche’s interaction with the external 
world. Malabou does justice to Freud when she emphasises that he ‘in 
no way minimizes the importance of external threats or perils’ (Malabou 
2012: 123). Oedipal phantasies and castration anxieties refer back to 
substantial and embodied events such as the trauma of separation taking 
place at birth and the baby’s dependence on parental support later on: 
‘Castration anxiety (the third form of separation) is itself a substitute 
for the fear of punishment – punishment by the mother who threatens to 
withdraw her love for the child (the second form of separation); and this 
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punishment anxiety, in turn, is the expression of an even older anxiety 
linked to the trauma of birth (the first form of separation)’ (Malabou 
2012: 125). The paradoxical position of the death drive – confirming life 
while driving beyond it – results from the deeply ambiguous, contami-
nated constitution of embodied life from birth onwards.
Freud’s Spinozan contamination
The death drive certainly forms part of the libido and as such it is life 
preserving. In this way, Freud speaks of ‘the way in which the two drives 
[i.e. of life and of death] interconnect and how the death drive is placed 
at the services of Eros’ (Freud 1975 Vol. 1: 540).5 This contamination 
of the constructive and destructive represents another shift within a 
Spinozist conception of an interconnected universe. The name Spinoza 
seems to be conspicuous by its absence in Freud’s oeuvre – as he is 
frequently referred to indirectly. The absence of a direct reference to 
Spinoza points to the indirection or, we may say, the shift that Spinoza’s 
thought is capable of inspiring. Freud only directly addresses his debt 
to Spinoza when he is asked to do so. In this way Spinozist Dr Lothar 
Bickel requested of the late Freud an acknowledgement of his intel-
lectual reliance on Spinoza. Freud’s reply (28 June 1931) is affirmative:
I readily admit my dependence on Spinoza’s doctrine. There was no reason 
why I should expressly mention his name, since I conceived my hypotheses 
from the atmosphere created by him, rather than from the study of his work. 
Moreover, I did not seek a philosophical legitimation. (Yovel 1992: 139)
The term ‘atmosphere’ denotes a contaminating force in which we 
cannot pinpoint a pure source. What Freud seems to have in mind is 
what he has in common with Spinoza, namely being affiliated while 
at the same time being disaffiliated with the contemporaneous Jewish 
community and with Jewish history. Both Freud and Spinoza are double 
outsiders: they are not part of their own community in terms of reli-
gious affiliation though they are perceived as Jews by the non-Jewish 
majority of their respective societies; moreover, being seen as typically 
Jewish, they are automatically associated with the Kantian fear of the 
‘pathological’, the negative of Hegelian dialectics, and with the anxiety 
of contamination – the threatening, the savage, or, in Spinoza’s case, 
the Satanic. This perception of their ethnicity is then reinforced through 
the subject matter of their writing and thought, which undermines in dif-
ferent but nonetheless related ways the conception of humanity as pure 
representations of God.
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In his letter to Bickel Freud downplays the way in which he was an 
actual student of Spinoza’s work. As a later communication makes clear, 
this lack of systematic study does not mean that he was not shaped by 
Spinoza’s thought. While declining to contribute to a volume dedicated 
to Spinoza’s 300th anniversary, Freud nevertheless emphasises his intel-
lectual debt to the Dutch Jewish philosopher: ‘Throughout my long life’, 
he writes, ‘I [timidly] sustained an extraordinarily high respect for the 
person as well as for the results of the thought [Denkleistung] of the 
great philosopher Spinoza’ (Yovel 1992: 139). Here Freud implicitly 
conceives of Spinoza not as a single and isolated figure; rather, he sees 
in the name Spinoza an intellectual constellation of thinkers and writers 
who, from Herder and Goethe to Darwin, have introduced various shifts 
in the way we see humanity, not as a quasi-divine representative on 
earth, but as contaminated by the environmental forces of nature.
It may well be that it is due to this contaminating, non-definable, 
super-individual influence of Spinoza’s work that Freud avoids mention-
ing his name in his various psychoanalytical studies. Freud sometimes 
alludes to Spinoza by referring to Heine as his non-religious coreligion-
ist (Unglaubensgenossen).6 This is precisely the term Heine employs in 
order to describe his affinity with Spinoza. Significantly, Heine focuses 
on Spinoza’s critique of anthropomorphism in both philosophy and 
theology. Heine is often ingenuously right by saying something that 
is blatantly wrong: he does this, for instance, when he claims that 
Spinoza never denies the existence of God but always the existence of 
humanity.
Heine’s avant-là-lettre posthumanist take on Spinoza has recently 
been supported by Vatter’s interpretation of Spinoza as scientist and 
political philosopher not of a mentalist conception of humanity but of 
bare life’s (zoé) eternity. ‘I shall therefore’, writes Vatter, ‘call Spinoza’s 
account of life “providential” insofar as the struggle to keep alive that 
characterizes the duration of every being rests on something other than 
itself, namely, on the eternal life that perseveres in it and through which 
it receives what it struggles to preserve’ (Vatter 2011: 224). Breaking 
with notions of scientific purity, Spinoza confronts us with a world that 
is eternally contaminated, where the conatus (preservation) is not a 
question of single or pure entity but the product of infinite contamina-
tions of one with the other. One may die but the other may persevere, 
and what perseveres is precisely a contaminated rather than distinct or 
pure entity.
Implicitly contradicting the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
charge of atheism and the twenty-first-century appraisal of Spinoza as 
atheist, Heine writes:
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Nothing but sheer unreason and malice could bestow on such a doctrine the 
qualification of ‘atheism.’ No one has ever spoken more sublimely of Deity 
than Spinoza. Instead of saying that he denied God, one might say that he 
denied man. All finite things are to him but modes of the infinite substance; 
all finite substances are contained in God; the human mind is but a luminous 
ray of infinite thought; the human body but an atom of infinite extension: 
God is the infinite cause of both, of mind and of body, natura naturans. 
(Heine 1986: 72)7
What Heine refers to in this important quotation is precisely the topic 
on which I want to focus the discussion of encounters between psychoa-
nalysis and neuroscience: namely, the shift Spinoza introduces away 
from thought centring on the priority of the mind over merely embodied 
matter. In other words, Spinoza’s philosophy corrects a problem which 
will be discussed in the next chapter: the modern divide between the 
mind’s ‘natural order’ and the irrational deviance from this order in 
human society and psychology (criminals, outcasts and so forth). Freud 
reinforces this Spinozan shift when he distinguishes his new science from 
the presumptuous claims of both religion and philosophy. By contami-
nating the psychological with the organic or embodied, Freud is not so 
far removed from a neuroscientific approach as Žižek in his critique of 
Malabou would make us believe.
Freud’s new science of contamination
We can better understand Freud’s conception of his ‘new science’ by 
attending to his polemics against religion. In a highly ironic manner 
Freud argues that religion renders God anthropomorphic by endowing 
humanity with quasi-divine notions of purity. As has been discussed 
above, Freud clearly characterises his new science as an affront to Kant’s 
conception of an autonomous mind that is capable of shaping its own 
world and history.
Why does Freud, despite his nineteenth-century background in 
anthropological evolutionism (i.e. Frazer and Tylor), base his concep-
tion of psychoanalysis on the non-progressivist footing of contamina-
tion, of lack (or incompletion), and the insufficiency of civilisation and 
its morals (or on aggression and savagery as the original foundation of 
morals and civilisation)?
To address this question it is worth drawing attention to Eric L. 
Santner’s brilliant discussion of a sense of ‘too muchness’ in Freud’s 
writing and thought. Santner’s term ‘too muchness’ evokes images of 
contamination, of a vessel overflowing and thus contaminating what 
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surrounds it. The confrontation with this topic stipulated the composi-
tion of Santner’s On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life. Here Santner 
speaks of his ‘sense that Freud’s mostly negative assessments of religion 
are in some way undermined or at least challenged by what I can’t help 
but characterise as the “spiritual” dimension of the new science he 
founded’ (Santner 2001: 8). This ‘spiritual dimension’ is precisely the 
contamination of physiological with a psychic energy of excess (or too 
muchness):
Psychoanalysis differs from other approaches to human being by attending 
to the constitutive ‘too muchness’ that characterizes the psyche; the human 
mind is, we might say, defined by the fact that it includes more reality than 
it can contain, is the bearer of an excess, a too much of pressure that is not 
merely physiological. The various ways in which this ‘too much,’ this surplus 
of life of the human subject seeks release or discharge in the ‘psychopathol-
ogy of everyday life’ continues to form the central focus of Freudian theory 
and practice. Now the very religious tradition in which Freud was raised, his 
protestations of lifelong secularism notwithstanding, is itself in some sense 
structured around an internal excess or tension – call it the tension of election 
– and elaborates its particular form of ethical orientation to it. For Judaism 
(as well as for Christianity), that is, human life always includes more reality 
than it can contain and this ‘too much’ bears witness to a spiritual and moral 
calling, a pressure toward self-transformation, toward goodness. (Santner 
2001: 8)
This excess is paradoxically humanity’s limitation: it is so overwhelmed 
by various pressures and conflicting demands that it is incapable of 
mastering its own house. This sense of ‘too muchness’ contaminates the 
ego, splitting it apart into at least three incompatible force fields: one is 
the demand to attend to the hardship imposed by external reality (what 
Freud calls Lebensnot: Freud 1975 Vol. 9: 186), the second is the realm 
of aggressive or sexual drives (the so called id), and the third, equally 
overwhelming and potentially destructive, is the valid, but sometimes 
non-significant, moral imperative imposed by civilisation (the superego).
In his works on religious history, Freud attempts to show how the 
superego or civilisation are themselves contaminated by the aggression 
and obscenity of the drives, of the id. Instead of a narrative of progres-
sion here we clearly have an account of how qualitative leaps emerge 
only thanks to what they apparently oppose, and into which they could 
easily regress yet again. According to Freud, civilisation begins not 
with the promulgation of moral doctrines but with the murder of the 
primeval father by his sons, who are so envious of his exclusive sexual 
possession of women that they kill him in a fit of rage. How is murder 
responsible for morality? It evokes a sense of guilt. The excessive and 
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contaminating demands of psychic and physiological drives thus give 
way to the too much of self-destructive feelings of guilt. As Santner puts 
it in the excerpt quoted above, it is due to this contamination of guilt 
that we attempt to be ‘good’.
This sense of goodness, however, can easily turn into an anthropo-
morphic conception of God: through our moral consciousness we may 
feel identical with God. In this way religion does not bring about humil-
ity but megalomania. So Freud’s critique of religion is in fact a Spinozist 
one that criticises human self-aggrandisement out of which we construct 
notions of pseudo-scientific purity. The spectre of anthropomorphism 
looms large when Freud argues that religious folk are the most hubristic 
imaginable because they feel at one with the limitless power of God. It 
is this conviction of being a representative of divine purity that provides 
the foundation for the thanatopolitical exertion of power over bare 
life (see the discussion of posthumanism and biopolitics in Chapter 7). 
According to Freud, religious folk:
give the name of ‘God’ to some vague abstraction which they have created 
for themselves; having done so they can pose before all the world as deists, 
as believers in God, and they can even boast that they have recognized a 
higher, purer concept of God, notwithstanding that their God is now nothing 
more than an insubstantial shadow and no longer the mighty personality of 
religious doctrine. Critics persist in describing as ‘deeply religious’ anyone 
who admits to a sense of man’s insignificance or impotence in the face of the 
universe, although what constitutes the essence of religious attitude is not this 
feeling but only the next step after it, the reaction to it which seeks a remedy 
for it. The man who goes no further, but humbly acquiesces in the small part 
which human beings play in the great world – such a man is, on the contrary, 
irreligious in the truest sense of the world. (Freud 1964: 53)
Freud argues that it is not an awareness of humanity’s contaminations 
with its natural environment but a sense of quasi-divine purity that 
characterises religion. He makes it clear that his way of thinking here is 
idiosyncratic, if not ironic. This is so because we usually define religious 
character in the opposite manner: not in terms of anthropomorphically 
occupying the place of the divine but, on the contrary, in terms of accen-
tuating human lack in the face of God or nature. According to Freud, in 
contrast, this sense of contamination and incompletion shapes not the 
world view of religion, but that of science.
Freud’s notion of science is indeed new – not least because it reverses 
the role traditionally attributed to religion with that of his ‘new science’. 
Rather than delineating the triumphal progress of the mind’s ‘natural 
order’, Freud’s new science analyses the way in which the cerebral 
remains contaminated by an embodied loop which it cannot overcome 
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without imperilling its existence. Progress remains dependent on an 
awareness of a savage or regressive history (that of the primal scene or 
that of Oedipal conflict and incest). Here we encounter the opposite of a 
triumphal narrative of progression.
Freud’s ‘new science’ focuses on contamination, on our lack of 
self-mastery, proving that we are not even masters of our own house. 
Radicalising Spinoza’s analysis of the self as being contaminated by the 
other, Freud denies that we are unified entities. Rather than forming 
a consistent whole, our psyche is torn by a whirlpool of excessive 
demands, commands and urges. It is due to this internal strangeness, 
or, in other words, this experience of being contaminated by competing 
drives and desires and aspirations, that it is so difficult for us to take 
account of what is actually happening in the external world. Psychic 
illness results from an overflow of internal pressures so that the ego 
cannot see anything in its environment but an intensification or mirror 
image of its mental conflicts. This is, of course, what Spinoza criticises 
as anthropomorphic distortion of nature or God according to the life 
of our internal appetites or passions. This distortion is nothing but a 
psychotic loss of reality where we cannot accurately recognise that our 
self is always exposed to its environment and various contaminations 
that constitute selfhood as a fluid entity that can rarely reach a point of 
autonomy or purity.
This loss of coordination between self and other brings about destruc-
tion as self-destruction. As Malabou has pointed out, psychoanalysis 
focuses on the point where the distinction between internal and external 
danger collapses, where the ‘ego doubles itself, and this scission opens 
the psyche to the horizon of its own disappearance’ (Malabou 2012: 
128). Freud attributes equal significance to the materiality of the external 
world and to the immateriality of psychic life. The material presence of 
the external world which contaminates the psyche is the Spinozan herit-
age of psychoanalysis. It is from this corporeal or material perspective 
that Freud criticises the lofty aspirations of Kantian moral philosophy.
In his Ethics, Spinoza provides a philosophical guide for a sustain-
able integration of the self within the world at large. From a Kantian 
perspective, Spinoza’s notion of preservation (conatus) would appear 
to be ‘pathological’ in its connection with the external world: the self 
perseveres within the eternity of a diverse environment where it is fused 
and yet contaminated by it. According to Spinoza, we achieve an eternal 
state of contamination through the realisation that we are part of what 
is ostensibly not us. Spinoza calls this contaminating force of the other 
the third kind of knowledge or the intellectual love God, an immanent 
force that keeps us eternally enmeshed with our constantly changing 
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embodiment and environment. Vatter has analysed how Spinoza does 
not distinguish between the immanence of the embodied mortal and yet 
eternal other and the traditionally demoted existence of bare life (zoé):
In short, Spinoza’s doctrine is that human life, or the divine contemplation 
(for these are the same), brings God down from the Height of his Throne, 
where the tradition said He ruled over the world like a King. A (philo-
sophical) life is providential, therefore in the sense that in and through it, 
God is entirely ‘among’ things and in no way separate from them: for in a 
(philosophical) life, there can be no more sacred precincts, spaces, and times 
absolved from the profane, where God or his representatives come to stand 
in judgment over the becoming of life. From this point of view, God’s life as 
the eternal living contemplation refers to the state of things in which every-
thing is connected with everything else in exactly such a way as to allow it to 
persevere in its most singularizing being. (Vatter 2011: 244–5)
Spinoza contaminates contemplation and material existence, body and 
mind, self and environment. He discusses immanence not as a self-
sufficient entity sub species aeternitatis but rather as contaminated by 
the intellectual love of God. Freud, too, develops his new science of 
psychoanalysis within a Spinozan atmosphere of contamination.
According to Freud, ‘truth consists in the agreement with the actual 
external world’.8 Spinoza tackles the passions and appetites and Freud 
attends to the surreal reality of various drives and hyper-moral com-
mandments to prepare for an accurate perception of the actual world 
surrounding us. Spinoza’s passions and Freud’s various libidinal urges 
and demands cause a distorted or anthropomorphic reading of nature 
or God. Significantly, the two thinkers take these distortions seriously, 
because the loss of reality brought about by the passions importantly 
shapes the life of human society. According to Spinoza, reason has to 
collaborate with the passions to change social practices.
Rather than imposing a categorical framework on the affects, Spinoza 
encourages us to conduct an ethical life that is not at war with the pas-
sions but makes use of their constructive rather than their destructive 
potential. In a similar vein, Freud’s new science criticises the deleterious 
effects of a morality that attempts to destroy the passions. This attempt 
at destruction is in actuality self-destructive. Rather than advocating 
resistance and warfare, both thinkers of modern science plead for 
reframing what has traditionally been demoted as inferior, negative, 
unhealthy or pathological and dangerous: the boundary traversing force 
of contamination. In order to prepare for such revaluation of values, the 
traditional system of morality has to be emptied of various hierarchies 
and boundaries. Both Freud and Spinoza undermine the quasi-divine 
status of moral commandments. Spinoza shows how our  understanding 
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of good and evil reflects our appetites and so we call good what we 
desire and evil what we loathe. These categories therefore reflect our 
psychic and physiological state but they distort the object that they are 
supposed to denote.
In Spinozist fashion Freud’s ‘new science’ questions ‘morality which 
God has presumably given to us’.9 Morality as gift from God is of course 
an anthropomorphic construct. Significantly, Freud sees anthropomor-
phism as operative not only in religion but also in philosophy – and that 
nowhere more than in Kantian moral philosophy. To illustrate his dis-
cussion of an anthropomorphic deity as foundation of morality, Freud 
refers to Kant’s famous parallelism between the mind and the starry 
heavens above:
Following the famous sentence by Kant, who connects our conscience with 
the starry heavens, a pious person could be tempted to venerate the two as 
masterpieces of creation. The stars are certainly marvellous but as regards 
conscience, God has done an uneven and careless job [. . .]. We do not fail to 
appreciate the bit of psychological truth that is contained in the claim that 
conscience is of divine origin, but the sentence requires interpretation. If con-
science is something ‘in us’, then it is, however, not so from the beginning. 
It is quite a counterpart to sexual life which is really there straight from the 
beginning of life and is not superadded only later.10
Rather than following Kant and becoming a pious person, Freud follows 
Spinoza and Nietzsche when he uncovers the appetites as the ground of 
morality. By turning upside down the anthropomorphic narrative of con-
science or reason as original divine endowment, Freud ironically trans-
lates the contaminating force of sexual drives into the point of origin of 
all human values. The excessive contamination of sexual drives limits 
rather than aggrandises humanity’s position in the universe. Instead 
of confirming the quasi-divine status of morality, Freud naturalises all 
aspects of human society. This naturalisation is so all-encompassing that 
it includes the realm of cultural and intellectual achievements.
Intellectual or spiritual achievements are not the offspring of a divine 
gift mirroring the sublimity of the stars, but rather they emerge from 
the plasticity of the libido. The plasticity of the libido is at once organic 
and cerebral: ‘In Freud “plasticity” mainly designates two essential 
phenomena: on the one hand, the vitality of the libido, its capacity to 
change its object and resist fixation; on the other hand, the indestructible 
character of psychic life. Within the psyche nothing is forgotten; traces 
have an indestructible character’ (Malabou 2012: 18). Malabou sees, 
however, in Freud’s notion of indestructibility the danger of a new form 
of religion or immortality.
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Does Freud’s understanding of the plasticity of the psyche and the 
libido give rise to a quasi-religious assumption of life beyond death? 
Malabou criticises Freud for not taking into account the destructive 
connotations of ‘plasticity’: ‘If brain damage creates a new identity, this 
creation can be only a creation through the destruction of form. The 
plasticity at stake here is thus destructive plasticity’ (Malabou 2012: 17). 
Does Freud’s notion of the death drive not describe precisely destruc-
tive plasticity? Surely Freud does not propound a new theory of human 
immortality which would reinstate the anthropomorphism of God, 
which is the point of his critique of religion. He perceives in religion the 
main enemy of his ‘new science’, because it does not allow for human 
finitude and precludes an unsavoury view of humanity’s intellectual 
achievements. Freud does not take issue with art and literature, because 
they do not presume to be anything else but illusions.
Freud contaminates science with literature and the arts. His ‘new 
science’ is indeed heavily indebted to works of art and literature. One 
could even say that he takes their purported illusion to be a true reflec-
tion of psychic reality. A striking example is the Oedipus complex. Freud 
believes in the actual truth of the Oedipus myth. The Oedipus myth 
articulates our unacknowledged desires. They are unacknowledged 
because any acknowledgement of their actuality would be an intolerable 
offence to humanity’s quasi-divine self-image (surely as images of God 
we must not have any unconscious desire to be so depraved as to want 
to kill our father and to sleep with our mother).
Freud values art for ‘not daring to make any encroachments into the 
realm of reality’.11 As his reading of the Oedipus myth illustrates, Freud 
does, however, employ the self-professed illusion of art for a better 
understanding of psychic reality. In Beverley Clack’s words, ‘engage-
ment with Freud’s work is fruitful precisely because he takes seriously 
the power that phantasy has to shape one’s experience of the world’ 
(Clack 2008: 209). Freud’s new science is far from being positivistic in 
so far as it attends to dreams and other forms of consciousness such as 
religious narratives or myths that are ostensibly illusory and cannot be 
proven in any quantitative way. In what is pertinent for the discussion in 
the following chapter, Freud’s new science contaminates the visible with 
the invisible, presence with absence, evidence with what is evidentially 
not there, and yet exerts a graspable impact on a given society (such as 
religion, myth and fiction).
Freud’s method, however, is empiricist: he observes the details of 
an illusory reality in a way similar to the way a physicist or chemist 
depicts the progress of an experiment. The crucial point here is that 
Freud’s new scientist dedicates such time and energy to the observation 
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of false consciousness because it forms a substantial part of our psychic 
condition. In Spinozist terms, false consciousness is a lamentable but 
necessary ingredient of humanity. Spinoza’s rationalism consists in 
recognising falsehood. Both Spinoza and Freud take issue with theol-
ogy and philosophy, because these two disciplines tend to focus on the 
mind’s perfection while paying scant attention to where and when it 
makes mistakes. Psychoanalysis, on the contrary, focuses on the mind’s 
blind spots. It is, however, not judgemental but treats mental failures 
as inevitable or, in Spinoza’s terms, necessary aspects of our humanity 
with which we have to reckon (rather than dismiss them as unworthy of 
scientific discussion).
It is then unsurprising that, next to the anthropomorphic conception 
of God as found in various religions, Freud should discuss the discipline 
of philosophy as hostile to his ‘new science’. Like religion, philosophy 
proclaims to be promulgating nothing less than the truth. One of its 
illusions, however, consists in its claim to ‘proffer an unbroken and 
consistent world view’.12 Freud’s new science contaminates philosophi-
cal consistency with the inconsistency that shapes our embodied mortal 
but also communally eternal life (the individual dies and yet individual 
traits persevere in the ongoing life of society at large – this is what 
Vatter described earlier as Spinoza’s mortal and yet eternal realm of 
immanence).
According to Freud, philosophy’s methodology is even more ques-
tionable, because it ‘overrates the cognitive value of our logical opera-
tion’.13 Philosophy shares with religion the illusion of an omniscient 
quasi-divine mind. Similar to the way that Spinoza warns against elect-
ing either philosophy or theology as the key to a full understanding of 
biblical texts, Freud differentiates his ‘new science’ from the lofty sphere 
of the pure mind as found in secular form in philosophy and in spiritual 
shape in religion. Rather than endowing our cognitive capacities with an 
infallible, quasi-divine power, Freud asks us to be mindful of our mind 
by contaminating the mental with the corporeal, the psychological with 
the organic.
Freud makes the mind mindful of its origination within the dark and 
unsavoury sphere of the drives. The drives are themselves a product of 
the contamination between the psychological and the organic. Attending 
to these contaminations helps bring to the fore repressed memories. 
Freud sees a resistance to this work of remembrance not so much in the 
relatively small world of philosophy, but in the larger ambience of reli-
gion, particularly in Christianity. ‘Philosophy, however’, Freud writes, 
‘does not have an immediate influence on a large amount of people; it 
only catches the interest of a small number, and of that small number 
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only a tiny elite of intellectuals; and philosophy is unfathomable for 
everyone else.’14 Religion, on the other hand, shapes the lives of most 
people. Freud considers in particular Christian and Jewish salvation 
narratives in which he sees the nucleus of endowing morality with a 
quasi-divine force. Those who conceive of intellect and will as pertaining 
to God transcribe human values and human cognition into the sphere 
of Divinity.
This unduly aggrandises the mind. The divinisation of humanity’s 
intellect prevents a critical engagement with the way the mind assists 
rather than checks the destructive and self-destructive life of the pas-
sions. Abstractions veil what is actually occurring at the interface that 
contaminates the cerebral with the emotive. Malabou denies Freud’s 
knowledge of an interconnection between the cerebral and the affective: 
‘Could it be that psychoanalysis hasn’t said everything on the subject 
of psychic suffering? Could it be, precisely, that it ignores the suffering 
of the brain and along with it, the emotive and emotional dimension of 
the brain?’ (Malabou 2012: xiii). Clearly Freud’s new science does not 
invalidate or deny the mind’s reliance on emotions.
Conclusion
As we have seen in this chapter, following Spinoza (and also Nietzsche) 
Freud takes issue with both theology and philosophy for covering the 
often unsavoury aspects of the emotive life of the brain or mind with 
grandiose abstractions. These abstractions precisely constitute the resist-
ance to psychoanalysis. Those who dismiss Freud’s new science in fact 
reject critical engagement with how the mind is itself contaminated 
by spectres of corporality. Our sexual constitution certainly refers to 
embodied existence. As we have seen, the cerebral and the organic meet 
in the Freudian notion of drives.
Rather than ignoring the brain’s suffering – as Malabou claims – 
Freud discovers the contamination of our psyche with the passions of 
our embodied life. He certainly did not dismiss neuroscientific attempts 
at understanding the brain as embodiment of the mind. Indeed, as Eric 
R. Kandel has pointed out, ‘a keen student of the anatomy of the brain, 
Freud had written repeatedly about the relevance of the biology of the 
brain to psychoanalysis’ (Kandel 2006: 45). What Freud sees as ‘resist-
ance to sexuality’ (Pfister 1963: 63) results from an anthropomorphic 
conception of God, which, in Cartesian fashion, prioritises the mind 
over the body (the brain). Freud’s psychoanalysis radicalises Spinoza’s 
demand to be mindful of the mind; that is to say, to attend to the ways 
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in which the corporeal contaminates the cerebral. Resistance to such 
mindfulness originates in a loss of reality, where the mind has assumed 
the position of omniscience and omnipotence attributed to God by 
theology.
The incompatibility of neuroscience and psychoanalysis is thus not 
to be found in (according to Žižek) the demoted pre-critical Spinozism 
of the former and the assumed Kantianism of the latter. Rather than 
being incompatible, psychoanalysis and neuroscience contaminate each 
other. As we have seen earlier, Freud does not conceptualise the self as 
substance-less, non-organic, non-biological entity. Instead he tries to 
evaluate when and how the ‘I’ loses a sense of her material conditions 
(the reality principle). To prevent such loss, Freud attempts to weaken 
resistance to the scientific insight into our contaminated constitution 
wherein mind and body, psychology and biology, psychoanalysis and 
neuroscience are enmeshed with each other.
This chapter has analysed how in different ways both Spinoza and 
Freud try to re-evaluate demoted forms of what Agamben (see Chapter 
7) would later call ‘bare life’. Here demoted life is a matter of the body 
and nature. There are, however, also constructions of an order of nature 
which establish hierarchies between the natural and the societal. These 
constructions contrast the posited purity of nature with the deviance 
of human psychology. Even though this mentally constructed order of 
nature operates under a different nomenclature (the natural here rep-
resents the perfection of the cerebral as opposed to the irrationalism of 
the human psyche), here too the opposition of pure binaries is liable to 
eventuate in violent forms of resistance and confrontation rather than in 
the contamination and reconciliation of two purportedly irreconcilable 
aspects of our constitution.
The following two chapters will thus discuss the larger historical 
context of a new scientific paradigm of contamination which was cri-
tiqued by Bruno Latour as modernity’s purification project. As analysed 
by Latour, this project constructs a divide between the natural and 
the human, between nature and society, which can of course never be 
put into practice, because, as the discussion in the current chapter has 
shown, the human mind is itself embodied (as brain) and the natural 
and the societal are deeply interwoven. In this context the following 
shows how the divide between nature and humanity turns deleterious 
at the point at which the unpredictability of the human psyche is seen 
to contrast sharply with the transparency and predictability of ‘nature’.
In what ways has a mental construction of nature as harmonious 
and predictable (from the economic and medical discourse of François 
Quesnay and his fellow physiocrats onwards) become the model for an 
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ideal or virtuous human society? Here we encounter a utopia that turns 
out to be a dystopia: an ideal societal order that would mimetically 
replicate the mentally constructed order of nature in that it would have 
overcome deviance and other forms of human unpredictability. Revising 
Latour’s thesis, the following chapter argues that the divide between 
nature and society serves to create theories of human inadequacy and 
worse still (later in the twentieth century) exclusion, criminalisation 
and genocide. Modernity’s purification project (as theorised by Latour) 
denies various contaminations. First, it posits an order of nature in terms 
of visibility and predictability. It then proceeds to contrast this construc-
tion of an ordered natural sphere with the supposed unpredictability, 
the deviance and the unnatural or perverse nature of certain groups of 
people (ethnic, religious or occupational).
How can we explain that the first modern attempt to subjugate 
the self under the homogeneous rule of the state proceeded under the 
concept of natural affect? Far from abandoning a Cartesian mind–body 
divide, Robespierre refers to emotions as the visible concretisation 
of virtue. As a result of such reduction, ethics becomes naturalised, a 
matter to be measured by the mind. The reign of terror followed the 
concept of natural order first established by the physiocrats. The follow-
ing two chapters will also analyse how certain literary works of the mid-
nineteenth century which refer to the guillotine and the reign of terror 
question the reduction of our embodied nature to what is measurable, 
monolithic and predictable, here anticipating the argument of Antonio 
Damasio and other leading contemporary neuroscientists.
Notes
 1. For a critique of what I call flat mimesis see Mack (2012).
 2. Translating Freud’s Ich as ‘ego’ can be misleading: the term ego seems to 
be related to the notion of egoism. Freud’s Ich does not encompass such 
semantic associations. However, I refer to the common translation of ‘ego’ 
for Ich in order not to confuse the reader.
 3. ‘Zwei große Kränkungen ihrer naiven Eigenliebe hat die Menschheit im 
Laufe der Zeiten von der Wissenschaft erdulden müssen. Die erste, als sie 
erfuhr, daß unsere Erde nicht der Mittelpunkt des Weltalls ist, sondern ein 
winziges Teilchen eines in seiner Größe kaum vorstellbaren Weltsystems. 
Sie knüpft sich für uns an den Namen Kopernikus, obwohl schon die 
alexandrinische Wissenschaft ähnliches verkündet hatte. Die zweite dann, 
als die biologische Forschung das angebliche Schöpfungsvorerecht des 
Menschen zunichte machte, ihn die Abstammung aus dem Tierreich und 
die Unvertilgbarkeit seiner animalischen Nature verwies. Diese Umwertung 
hat sich in unseren Tagen unter dem Einfluß von Ch. Darwin, Wallace und 
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ihren Vorgängern nicht ohne das heftigste Sträuben seiner Zeitgenossen 
vollzigen. Die dritte und empfindlichste Kränkung aber soll die menschli-
che Größensucht durch die heutige psychologische Forschung erfahren, 
welche dem Ich nachweisen will, daß es nicht einmal Herr ist im eigenen 
Hause, sondern auf kärgliche Nachrichten angewiesen bleibt von dem, was 
unbewußt in seinem Seelenleben vorgeht’ (Freud 1975 Vol. 1: 283–4). My 
translation.
 4. ‘Ein sonderbarer Trieb, der sich mit der Zerstörung seines eigenen Heims 
befaßt!’ My translation.
 5. ‘Wie sich die beiden im Lebensprozeß vermengen, wie der Todestrieb den 
Absichten des Eros dienstbar gemacht wird.’ My translation.
 6. Freud called Heine an Unglaubensgenossen in the Future of an Illusion 
(Freud 1975 Vol. 9: 183). And in his monograph on Jokes and their Relation 
to the Unconscious he quotes the Heine excerpt where Heine uses the term 
Unglaubensgenosse as synonym for Spinoza: ‘ “Mein Unglaubensgenosse 
Spinoza”, sagt Heine’ (Freud 1975 Vol. 4: 75).
 7. ‘Nur Unverstand und Böswilligkeit konnten dieser Lehre das Beiwort 
“atheistisch” beilegen. Keiner hat sich jemals erhabener über die Gottheit 
ausgesprochen wie Spinoza. Statt zu sagen, er leugne Gott, könnte man 
sagen, er leugne die Menschen. Alle endlichen Dinge sind ihm nur Modi 
der unendlichen Substanz. Alle endliche Dinge sind in Gott enhalten, der 
menschliche Geist ist nur ein Lichtstrahl des unendlichen Denkens, der 
menschliche Leib nur ein Atom der unendlichen Ausdehnung; Gott ist die 
unendliche Ursache beider, der Geister und Leiber, natura naturans’ (Heine 
1968: 95).
 8. ‘Diese Übereinstimmung mit der realen Außenwelt heißen wir Wahrheit.’ 
(Freud 1975 Vol. 1: 597). My translation.
 9. ‘Die Moralität, die uns angeblich von Gott verliehen wurde’ (Freud 1975 
Vol. 1: 500). My translation.
10. ‘In Anlehnung an einen bekannten Ausspruch Kants, der das Gewissen 
in uns mit dem gestirnten Himmel zusammenbringt, könnte ein Frommer 
wohl versucht sein, diese beiden als die Meisterstücke der Schöpfung zu 
verehren. Die Gestirne sind gewiß großartig, aber was das Gewissen bet-
rifft, so hat Gott hierin ungleichmäßige und nachlässige Arbeit geleistet, 
denn eine große Überzahl von Menschen hat davon nu rein bescheidenes 
Maß oder kaum so viel, als noch der Rede wert ist, mitbekommen. Wir 
verkennen das Stück psychologischer Wahrheit keineswegs, das in der 
Behauptung, das Gewissen sei göttlicher Herkunft enthalten ist, aber der 
Satz bedarf einer Deutung. Wenn das Gewissen auch etwas in “in uns” ist, 
so ist es doch von nicht von Anfang an. Es ist so recht ein Gegensatz zum 
Sexualleben, das wirklich von Anfang des Lebens an da ist und nicht erst 
später hinzukommt’ (Freud 1975 Vol. 1: 500). My translation.
11. ‘wagt sie kein Übergriffe ins Reich der Realität’ (Freud 1975 Vol. 1: 588). 
My translation.
12. ‘ein lückenloses und zusammenhängendes Weltbild liefern zu können’ 
(Freud 1975 Vol. 1: 588). My translation.
13. ‘sie den den Erkenntniswert unserer logischen Operationen überschätzt’ 
(Freud 1975 Vol. 1: 588). My translation.
14. ‘Aber die Philosophy hat keinen unmittlenbaren Einfluß auf die große 
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Menge von Menschen, sie ist das Interesse einer geringen Anzahl selbst von 
der Oberschicht der Intellektuellen, für alle anderen kaum faßbar’ (Freud 
1975 Vol. 1: 588). My translation.
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2Contaminating the Visible with the 
Invisible: From Einstein via H. G. 
Wells to Hannah Arendt, Luhmann 
and Derrida
‘You are invisible now’
Bob Dylan, ‘Like a Rolling Stone’ (1965)
Introduction: Einstein’s and Latour’s contamination of 
objectivity with subjectivity
In what ways does the Cartesian division between mind and body 
reinforce hostility to what is invisible and immeasurable? According to 
Descartes, the body is matter and as such subject to measurement and 
control by a sovereign mind. The mind, however, remains invisible and 
cannot be measured. We cannot grasp the mind as an external object. 
How can we then claim to know that it rules sovereign over the bare life 
of the body? The invisibility of the mind also denotes the lack of a clear 
definition distinguishing or separating it from the corporeal. As we have 
seen in the preceding chapter, new neuroscientific findings have shown 
that the mind is linked to the body in an inseparable loop.
However, this interconnection between the corporeal and the cerebral 
does not solve the mystery of the mind’s invisibility: the brain may be 
the material foundation for mental activities but these activities cannot 
be grasped through any empirical measurements of the grey matter and 
the skull. As we shall see below, the division between mind and body 
had particular resonance in the nineteenth century, because Victorian 
brain-worship in its striking positivism proved inconclusive, especially 
in semi-para-natural disciplines like phrenology.
Avant-garde twentieth-century science began to take issue with notions 
of certainty and objectivity which preoccupied nineteenth-century posi-
tivism. As Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison have recently shown, 
‘many early twentieth-century scientists increasingly concluded that 
subjectivity could never be extirpated. Some frankly espoused the need 
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for subjective judgment in the production and use of scientific images; 
objectivity without subjectivity was, they concluded, an ultimately self-
defeating ambition’ (Daston and Galison 2007: 190). Twentieth-century 
science consciously and conscientiously contaminated the subjective 
with the objective, recognising that nineteenth-century positivism tried 
to expurgate the subjective element through an effort of the will.
The paradigm governing science from the mid-nineteenth century to 
the early twentieth century was what Daston and Galison have called 
‘mechanical objectivity’: ‘By mechanical objectivity we mean the insistent 
drive to repress the wilful interventions of the artist-author, and to put 
in its stead a set of procedures that would, as it were, move nature to the 
page through a strict protocol, if not automatically’ (Daston and Galison 
2007: 121). While these ‘protocols aimed to let the specimen appear 
without that distortion characteristic of observer’s personal tastes, com-
mitments, or ambitions’ (Daston and Galison 2007: 121), they were 
themselves the product of a subjective desire to supress the will.
We could define positivism’s mechanical objectivity as the will’s 
wilful self-extirpation. Rather than being purely ‘objective’, a certain 
interpretative and Kantian moral perspective shaped the operations of 
mechanical objectivity: ‘Only the “good” will, which acted solely in 
accord with the “objective laws” ordained by reason, was genuinely 
autonomous, insofar as the will was also swayed by personal inclina-
tions and interests, “as it really is with humans,” it remained less than 
free’ (Daston and Galison 2007: 210). Twentieth-century avant-garde 
science, by contrast, contaminated objectivity with subjectivity, truth 
with relativity.
A case in point is Einstein’s relativity and unified field theory: ‘Einstein 
took special relativity to shatter the objectivity that seemed to charac-
terize time by itself. Time could be defined objectively only alongside 
space’ (Daston and Galison 2007: 302). Rather than being pure, time’s 
objectivity is always contaminated by the subjective position of those 
who find themselves in a specific space:
In the special theory of relativity two events simultaneously in one constantly 
moving reference frame are not simultaneous in another: as Einstein says, 
‘ “Now” loses for the spatially extended world its objective meaning. It is 
because of this that space and time must be regarded as a four-dimensional 
continuum that is objectively irresoluble, if it is desired to express . . . 
 objective relations without unnecessary conventional arbitrariness.’ In other 
words, two observers will disagree as to the separation of two events in both 
space and time – there is no unique division between differences in space and 
differences in time that will be shared by all observers. (Daston and Galison 
2007: 302)
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Einstein redefined scientific objectivity in terms of contamination: 
‘Einstein did not take objectivity itself to be purely objective’ (Daston 
and Galison 2007: 303). Rather than being a pure entity, the objective 
cannot be grasped apart from being contaminated by the subjective:
In the case of relativity, Einstein took subjective time to be the beginning 
of our construction of objective, coordinated time. That subjective starting 
point, alongside what he always insisted was a conventional method for coor-
dinating clocks, showed very clearly how inextricable the subjective and the 
objective were within a theory. (Daston and Galison 2007: 303)
Einstein implicitly introduced the figure of ‘contamination’ into science 
by showing how scientific objectivity cannot be purified from its pur-
ported opposite – the subjective element of interpretation. This does not 
mean that Einstein plays off the subjective against the objective. On the 
contrary, he undermines the certainty of our Kantian synthetic judge-
ments which remain mired in our own subject position and fail to take 
into account the complexity and uncertainty of our environment.1
As Daston and Galison have argued, Einstein’s insight into the mutual 
contamination between objectivity and subjectivity has been largely 
ignored in our contemporary obsession with positivist certainty that 
clings to the purported evidence of what can be measured as opposed 
to what remains immeasurable or invisible: ‘The suspicion of the indi-
vidual, the private, the sectarian, and the ineffable has, if anything, 
deepened: the positive ideal of objective knowledge as that which 
remains invariant under the transformations of any and all perspectives 
is still current’ (Daston and Galison 2007: 305–6). Rather than allowing 
for a contamination of the quantitative with the qualitative, the objec-
tive with the subjective, current public opinion pitches one against the 
other, and as part of this purification project the assumed objectivity 
of science seems to remain incompatible with the taken for granted 
subjectivity of the arts (the humanities, literature and cinema and so 
forth).
In the meantime, literary and cultural theory in the mid-twentieth 
century has come to be wrongly associated with the promotion of a 
distorted image of the humanities and arts wherein they have abandoned 
all pretensions to objectivity or universality. Objectivity and universality 
seem to be the exclusive precinct and prerogative of the sciences. The 
figure of contamination – as evoked in this book – tries to unsettle such 
firm or purified classifications. As Einstein has shown in his relativity 
theory, the subjective might well be the cornerstone of what we have 
come to see as the objective.
Rather than laying claims to either subjectivity or objectivity, we 
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should allow for a contamination of both. Contamination here is as 
much physical as it is conscious and conscientious: it is one where we 
are aware of the pitfalls and limitations of both the subjective and the 
objective. In this way it would be as distortive to reject positivistic ele-
ments in the arts and humanities as it would be deleterious to banish 
interpretative and critical efforts from our scientific endeavours.
There might be ways of contaminating positivism and interpretation 
not only in the arts but also in the sciences. One striking proponent 
of such contaminating work is indeed Albert Einstein. As Jeroen van 
Dongen has recently shown, Einstein gradually distanced himself from 
Ernst Mach’s positivism which shaped his early philosophical point of 
view:
The empiricist attitude of Ernst Mach, prominent in the late nineteenth 
century, implied that one should remain as close as possible to the experi-
mental facts: one should confine oneself to searching out the most economic 
statements of relations of observation. Broadly speaking, one can say that 
Einstein moved from Mach’s empiricism, earlier in his career, to a strong 
realist position later on. But at no given moment can one decisively put him 
in either camp. (Dongen 2010: 37)
Einstein’s position in-between the metaphysics of realism (realism ‘has 
maintained that the claims of scientific theories are true of a reality 
independent of us’: Dongen 2010: 37) and the positivism of empiricism 
allows for a contamination of the factual with what remains out of our 
reach and thereby ‘invisible’.
Twentieth-century field theory departs from holders of certainty 
and measurability which influence the mutually opposed approaches 
of empiricism and realism. As Timothy Morton has recently put it: 
‘Quantum theory extends the non-mechanism inherent in relativity 
theory’ (Morton 2013: 41). Field theory as well as quantum physics 
overturned traditional notions of modern science as formulated by 
Newton and then by Kant: ‘The great appeal of Kant’s system had been 
that it warranted the feeling that geometry, arithmetic and the funda-
mental principles of Newtonian kinematics were too certain to be based 
merely on generalization from experience’ (Dongen 2010: 46). In this 
way Kant read Newton’s empiricism in terms of a realist position, of a 
priori established laws and truths:
Contra Hume, Kant argued that there are such necessary and more than 
merely inductive laws. Kant found examples of these in the principles of 
Newtonian mechanics, i.e. the law of conservation of matter or the equality 
of action and reaction. These are synthetic a priori principles: human under-
standing guarantees the a priori truths of these principles. Our understanding 
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can further elevate inductively established rules to necessary and universal 
laws. (Dongen 2010: 45)
Einstein, however, ‘felt that the fundamental principles of geometry 
and physics cannot be grounded in some a priori fashion. Instead, he 
emphasized that they are “free creations of the human mind” ’ (Dongen 
2010: 46). By rejecting the Kantian version of Newtonian physics (i.e. 
‘Kant’s a priori necessary truths’: Dongen 2010: 46), Einstein allows for 
the non-predictable and uncertain, for what may be invisible now but 
might become visible later on.2
Van Dongen emphasises the uncertain and revisable character of 
Einstein’s approach to not only what is visibly or measurably there (and 
so following a positivist approach) but also to what theory posits in a 
certain or a priori manner (realism) about what remains (to us at least) 
invisible: ‘But one could never be certain that a theory is correct: there is 
always the possibility that additional observation would prove it wrong’ 
(Dongen 2010: 53). Einstein departs from the dogmatism of nineteenth-
century positivism while remaining wary of a priori notions of certainty 
which, in Kantian manner, translate empirical laws into metaphysical 
ones. At the same time he does not abandon metaphysics as such: ‘I 
believe that every true theorist is a kind of tamed metaphysicist, no 
matter how pure a “positivist” he may fancy himself’ (Einstein 1950: 13).
In some ways learning from the mistakes of nineteenth-century 
science, twentieth-century field theory and string theory as well as some 
strands within contemporary neuroscience refrain from claiming to have 
discovered crudely positivist explanations of intellectual work. What 
neuroscience makes visible is the corporeal ground of the mind’s invis-
ible operations.
The question of the invisible, immeasurable and the non-territorial 
has been a constant reason for provocation and irritation for secular or 
modern attempts to solve the riddles of the universe. Here the nineteenth 
century again plays a crucial role for a conception of scientific modernity 
with which we are still trying to come to terms. As Bennett Zon has 
clearly put it:
The liminal state between mind and body, the unmeasurable and the measur-
able, was no further advanced by the Victorians, but it did go some way to 
paralysing modernity with uncertainty and fear. Determination to objectify 
the mysteriously invisible – in effect to make the invisible visible – caused 
great anxiety. Darwin tried it with modification by descent, otherwise known 
as evolution. When exactly is an evolutionary change observable? The fact 
is that evolution is invisible, yet measurable over intangibly vast stretches of 
time.3
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Focusing further on various contaminations of what have traditionally 
been depicted as incompatible entities (the visible and the invisible, mind 
and body, and so forth), Chapters 3 and 4 will discuss how the inability 
to materialise and rationalise invisibility also led to sexual aggression 
(in Nathaniel Hawthorne) and violence (in Hermann Melville).  This 
chapter will analyse how the damage resulting from such frustration and 
aggression caused disenchantment with our experience in the world – or 
in other words a secular loss of the world, which philosopher Hannah 
Arendt describes in her book The Human Condition. Arendt responds 
to the conundrum of nineteenth-century positivism in her critique of 
science and secularisation. Positivism held out the promise of making us 
more at home in the world by illuminating what had so far been dark 
or invisible. Rather than making our planet more homely, however, a 
preoccupation with the merely visible and measurable has reduced and 
diminished our horizon for diverse encounters in a multidimensional 
sphere which goes under the name ‘world’.
Arendt’s and Einstein’s dissatisfaction with positivism is not entirely 
new. In her novel Middlemarch George Eliot demonstrated the absurd-
ity of positivist claims to find the key to the enigmas of both the 
human mind and the embodied natural world. One aspect of the novel 
illuminates the futility (Edward Causabon) of finding the key to all 
mythologies (the mind). Dr Lydgate’s search for a route towards under-
standing the origins of nature and the body proves fruitless too. In her 
scientific scepticism Eliot responds critically to the positivist promise to 
discover a universal and objective formula capable of explaining and 
predicting the future, targeting in her critique various assumptions of 
certainty.
This chapter discusses how the obsession with a world purified of all 
uncertainty has led to various pitfalls in modern science and politics. As 
Akira Mizuta Lippit has recently pointed out, expectations of rendering 
the invisible visible and the uncertain certain were frustrated rather than 
encouraged by new scientific discoveries at the end of the nineteenth 
century: ‘X-rays and cinema, along with the technique of psychoanalysis, 
established in 1895 new technologies for visualising the inside, for imag-
ining interiority; but they also transformed the conditions of visuality as 
such’ (Lippit 2005: 30). In this way, the scientific preoccupation with the 
invisible does not endorse positivist notions of certainty, transparency 
and visible evidence. Thus, the X-ray does not eradicate the invisible. It 
merely allows us to see what is inside us and what nevertheless remains 
obfuscate: ‘Not so much an exposure as a disclosure, the X-ray reveals 
secret visibility as a mode of secret visuality, showing what nonetheless 
remains invisible, without operation or accident’ (Lippit 2005: 32). In 
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a similar way, the scientific technique that operates cinematography 
removes from presence what it ostensibly illuminates:
A secret sign and homonym that signifies in two registers, bringing together 
ashes and movement. To cinefy: to make move, to make cinema and to 
incinerate, to reduce to ashes. Traces and residues of movement, and the 
movement of ashes. Cinefaction. Like the true story of your death, a secret 
cinema, registered in the unimaginable depths and interiority of the Library 
of Babel at the end of the universe. Burning and disappearing, atomic . . .’ 
(Lippit 2005: 33)
From the fin de siècle onwards modern scientific discoveries reveal the 
paradoxes of sight, movement and enlightenment. Light does not only 
illuminate, but it also blinds and incinerates.
Radical twentieth-century science – such as Einstein’s new approach 
to physics and quantum physics – has overturned traditional scientific 
notions of hierarchical dichotomies and clear separations between sup-
posedly incompatible fields (including the supposed incompatibility of 
the subjective and the objective).4
As N. Katherine Hayles has pointed out, ‘One of the important 
points of continuity between Romanticism and the field concept [i.e. as 
encountered in twentieth-century physics] is the appearance of inherent 
limits on sequential, logical analysis’ (Hayles 1984: 9).5 In a related way, 
contemporary neuroscience has discovered a parallelism between body 
and mind. In so doing, it has also analysed how such discoveries pose a 
challenge to traditional science (or natural philosophy) from Descartes 
to Žižek.
The following analysis of a paradoxical secular retreat from the 
world prepares for the discussion of a possible source for such loss of 
immanence in the worship of virtuous affect that justifies Robespierre’s 
enlightened reign of terror (see Chapter 3). This and the following 
chapter attend to the conundrum of a scientific loss of the secular, by 
interrogating the ways in which modern literature has questioned mind–
body distinctions as a response to – on a political level – Robespierre’s 
reign of terror and the ensuing scientific positivism of the mid-nineteenth 
century.
Literature has proved resistant to such illusions of all-encompassing 
visibility and measurability, not least because one of its subject matters 
is subjectivity, which is another word for what goes on in our mind. 
Literature illuminates the ways in which what we take to be subjective is 
already contaminated by the objective. Conversely, it sheds light on the 
subjective foundations of what has been categorised as objective. This is 
also the point of Sylvia Plath’s poem ‘Daddy’, which deflates the image 
MACK PRINT.indd   56 26/11/2015   11:14
Contaminating the Visible with the Invisible    57
of an objective father figure – representing ‘all there is’ – to a bizarre and 
obscene, highly biased representative of Nazi ideology: a German WWII 
Panzermann.6
This is not to deny objectivity but to alert us to the ways in which the 
objective is implicated in the subjective (see Mack 2014). In order to 
gain a more truthful or nuanced view we need to take seriously biased 
positions which claim to represent the universal and objective but which 
are in fact parochial. As Daston and Galison have shown, from its scho-
lastic origins the term objectivity has been exposed to contaminations 
with subjectivity, albeit here the two words go with a reversed order of 
meaning:
From the very beginning, it [i.e. objectivity] was always paired with subjecti-
vus/subjective, but the terms originally meant almost precisely the opposite of 
what they mean today. ‘Objective’ referred to things as they are presented to 
consciousness, whereas ‘subjective’ referred to things in themselves. (Daston 
and Galison 2007: 29)
It was Kant who introduced derogatory connotations into the term sub-
jective by associating subjectivity with the illusory and inferior sphere 
of our relationship with the empirical world which is our external envi-
ronment (heteronomy): ‘And his habit of using “subjective” as a rough 
synonym for “merely empirical sensations” shares with the later usage 
only the sneer with which the word is intoned’ (Daston and Galison 
2007: 30). When ‘sometime circa 1850 the modern sense of “objectiv-
ity” had arrived in the major European languages, still paired with its 
ancestral opposite “subjectivity” ’ (Daston and Galison 2007: 31), both 
terms ‘had turned 180 degrees in meaning’ (Daston and Galison 2007: 
31).
Now objectivity had become a scientific ideal whereas subjectivity 
was to be avoided at all costs in any quest for accuracy and truth:
Objectivity the thing was as new as objectivity the word in the mid- 
nineteenth century. Starting in the mid-nineteenth century, men of science 
began to fret openly about a new kind of obstacle to knowledge: themselves. 
Their fear was that the subjective self was prone to prettify, idealize, and, in 
the worst case, regularize observations to fit theoretical expectations: to see 
what it hoped to see. Their predecessors a generation or two before had also 
been beset by epistemological worries, but theirs were about the variability 
of nature, rather than the projections of the naturalist. (Daston and Galison 
2007: 34)
From now on science laid claim to objectivity, whereas literature and 
the arts were seen to be confined to the epistemological limitations 
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and distortions that go with subjectivity: ‘The scientific self of the mid-
nineteenth century was perceived by contemporaries as diametrically 
opposed to the artistic self, just as scientific images were routinely con-
trasted to artistic ones’ (Daston and Galison 2007: 37). However, such 
radical contrast between scientific objectivity and artistic subjectivity 
neglects how these opposed terms contaminate each other. Some aspects 
of mid-nineteenth-century literature highlight how investigations into 
the subjective sphere of the mind illuminate where presumptions of sci-
entific objectivity create new distortions rather than new truth.
The theoretical discussion of this chapter prepares the ground for the 
analysis of literary works from the mid-nineteenth century which react 
not only – as Eliot’s Middlemarch does – to the positivism in the social 
and natural sciences, but also to the quest for certainty in the everyday 
praxis of politics and economics. One striking case is how long before 
contemporary neuroscience that literature discovered the human mind 
as embodied and yet invisible.
Meanwhile, neuroscience has had to abandon models of explanation 
which claimed to have fully grasped the workings of the mind through 
quantifiable evidence: from nineteenth-century phrenology – which pro-
fessed to make the mind fully measurable through the study of the skull 
– to the twentieth-century neuroscientific doctrine of the fully grown and 
static brain of adults. As John Lehrer has put it, ‘the Cartesian impulse to 
worship the brain and ignore the body gave rise to the new “science” of 
phrenology’ (Lehrer 2007: 3). Following Descartes, the neuroscientists of 
the nineteenth century ‘looked for the soul solely in the head, desperate 
to reduce the mind to cranial causes’ (Lehrer 2007: 5). In the twentieth 
century the doctrine of the measurability of the brain gave way to Pasko 
Rakic’s ‘theory of the fixed brain’ (Lehrer 2007: 39), maintaining that 
‘a human was born with a complete set of neurons’ (Lehrer 2007: 38) 
which after infancy remain incapable of change or further development. 
Far from being assessable through skull measurements and far from ever 
reaching a measurable state of full growth, the mind constantly generates 
itself. Contemporary neuroscience has discovered that neurons renew 
themselves and thus form the plasticity of the brain. The brain’s plasticity 
also reinforces its resistance to measurement. How can we measure and 
depict in visible terms something like the mind-brain which keeps chang-
ing its composition? Our brain and our mind cannot be pinned down to 
a visible, measurable manifestation. Rather than being either one thing 
or another, the cerebral undergoes contaminations with the corporeal, 
mutating from visible (neurons) to invisible operations (such as thought 
and emotions). Plasticity denotes precisely such mutations wherein vis-
ibility and invisibility contaminate each other.
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We can see the operations of the mind in various manifestations but 
its substance remains invisible. As this brief account of the pitfalls of 
neuroscientific attempts to make visible and measurable the working 
of the mind has shown, issues of the not-to-be-fully-grasped and the 
immeasurable persist in our current culture, which defines science (as 
Daston and Galison have shown) in purely positivistic terms.
One could indeed say that a split between the measurable and the 
non-demonstrable distinguishes modernity (and our current form of 
high modernity) from what preceded it. Bruno Latour has described 
this gap between facts and subjects, between visibility and the obscure, 
in terms of the conceptual gulf between nature (non-humans) and 
humanity (culture, politics, society), which he sees as foundational for 
modernity’s self-understanding. As we shall see, in this split between the 
natural and the societal – replicating the Cartesian mind–body divide 
– society has been cast in a rather problematic setting, because human 
psychology cannot be fully measured and controlled.
Nature, by contrast, holds out the promise of full control, order, 
harmony, transparency and measurability. Conversely, mind could 
be associated with society and body with nature. This is so because 
the conception of nature in terms of order is itself a mental construct. 
Mental constructions are superimposed on what is perceived as mere 
matter, mere embodiment or, as Giorgio Agamben puts it, the ‘bare life’. 
According to Agamben, the various divisions of life (i.e. into mind and 
body, societal and natural, and so forth) are themselves symptomatic 
of how our culture avoids establishing definitions of what constitutes 
‘life’: ‘everything happens as if, in our culture, life were what cannot 
be defined, yet, precisely for this reason, must be ceaselessly articulated 
and divided’ (Agamben 2004: 13). In other words, the political duality 
between a natural order of the mind and the potential disorder of the 
extended societal body furthers social divisions between those who 
come to represent the posited order of nature – which turns out to be 
a mentally constructed order – and those who are seen to embody the 
potential disorder of society at large.
According to Latour we have never been modern for the reason that 
the modern purification project – premised as it is on the radical separa-
tion between nature’s supposed order and society’s potential disorder 
– has actually never been put into practice. Where theories proliferate 
that posit the existence of pure entities – such as objectivity versus sub-
jectivity – mutual contaminations between these notional oppositions 
are in fact prevalent.
Latour thus argues that the division between ‘here, on the left, [where 
there] are things themselves; [and] there on the right, [with] the free 
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society of speaking, thinking subjects, values and signs’ (Latour 1993: 
37) does not work, because the two separated spheres of non-human 
fact and human consciousness require mediations. He continues in such 
terms: ‘Everything happens in the middle, everything passes between 
the two, everything happens by way of mediation, translation and net-
works, but this space does not exist, it has no place. It is the unthinkable, 
the unconscious of the moderns’ (Latour 1993: 37). Latour calls this 
excluded middle of mediation between the objective and the subjective, 
between science and politics, between fact and its social usages, either 
network or translation.
This mediating work is unconscious because modernity’s constitution 
denies its existence. The term contamination, by contrast, awakens to 
consciousness various mediations which the modern purification project 
has relegated to unconsciousness. The figure of contamination acts 
by dint of its scandalous connotations that evoke an array of medico-
cultural horrors ranging from the abject, to the defiled, the infected and 
the impure.
By radically separating science from society, the modern constitu-
tion proclaims, however, the purity of objective visibility, which it 
separates from the vagaries that accompany social and political life. 
Following Stephen Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s revolutionary account 
of the history of science, Latour points out that the objective visibility 
of scientific fact is itself a construction of science’s modern setting: the 
laboratory.
Modernity ignores, or more radically still, flatly denies the element of 
subjective construction in both scientific as well as socio-political rep-
resentations of what is purportedly objective: ‘Boyle and his countless 
successors go on and on both constructing Nature artificially and stating 
that they are discovering it; Hobbes and the newly defined citizens go 
on and on constructing the Leviathan by dint of calculation and social 
force, but they recruit more and more objects in order to make it last’ 
(Latour 1993: 31). In this way both nature and society are rendered 
objective, while the work of subjective construction officially remains 
invisible, unacknowledged, or as Latour puts it in the quote above, 
‘unconscious’.
The figure of contamination brings to the level of consciousness the 
fusion of the objective and the subjective, the visible and the invis-
ible. Further developing Latour’s analysis one could define modernity 
as the repression of the invisible or as the unconscious of the invis-
ible. Modernity falls prey to delusions when it denies the existence of 
invisible factors constituting the workings of our minds. Denial may 
give rise to repression or to aggression. The focus on forcing the invis-
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ible into the visible and on reducing the immeasurable to what can be 
measured in this chapter prepares for an analysis in Chapter 3 of both 
the frustration and the aggression that accompanies such attempts. As 
we shall see there, in a discussion of key texts from the mid-nineteenth 
century, literature explores the ways in which the self-deluding or ficti-
tious aspects of the modern constitution first deny or repress (sexuality 
in Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter) and then attack (the obsessive and 
violent quest for the white and quasi-invisible whale in Melville’s Moby 
Dick) what remains hidden, invisible or ghostly sensory (the result of the 
first violent encounter with the whale which leaves Captain Ahab with 
the invisible sensation of his amputated leg).
Approaches to secularisation and Hannah Arendt’s critique 
of a scientific loss of the world
Whereas (according to Latour) the unrealisable project of modernity 
disputes the validity or, more radically still, the existence of the invisible, 
premodern forms of social and scientific thought appear to leave some 
space for the non-demonstrable. Here we may sometimes encounter an 
acknowledgement of the actual contamination of the visible with the 
invisible, of the objective with the subjective and of the biological with 
the psychological.
In a variety of ways religion permeates different forms of premodern 
society. The religious does not necessarily denote belief in god or gods 
but it also refers to a sphere beyond full empirical proof (i.e. full meas-
urability and visibility). This non-empirical sphere may go under the 
name theology or the numinous, the ghostly, the religious, the sacred, 
the totem or taboo. There is nothing surprising about the premodern, 
albeit parochially Western/Christian inclusion of – or perhaps, more 
accurately, focus on – the empirically ephemeral concept of the other-
worldly. Modernity shifts this focus away from the other-worldly to the 
worldly – or so it seems.
Firstly, the following discusses two contrasting theoretical narratives 
about the shift from the religious to the secular in European societies. It 
then discusses how Hannah Arendt refers to more nuanced sociological 
and philosophical discussions of the emergence of modernity when she 
formulates her intriguing analysis of the ways in which the worldly and 
the other-worldly are contaminated in supposedly pure conceptions of 
the modern scientific.
Let us first turn to Carl Schmitt’s famous secularisation theory, which 
does not argue for a break but rather for the continuity of the  theological 
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from the premodern to the modern. Here the secular appears to remain 
entangled with the religious or theological – that is to say, with empiri-
cally not to be substantiated concepts and creeds.
Schmitt’s most striking example is that of modern sovereignty: 
secular modern politics still invests the leader or the ruling elite with the 
arbitrary and unjustifiable power to decide over the state of exception 
wherein norms are suspended. The power to declare this state of excep-
tion does not have an empirically visible ground. It is as ephemeral as 
the power with which theology invests God. The secular merely turns 
from the other-worldly sphere of God to the worldly precinct of the 
sovereign or ruling elite. The grounds which establish the prerogatives 
of secular sovereignty are as ghostly as belief in non-verifiable other-
worldly forces. According to Schmitt, however, the theological does not 
contaminate the political. Instead, modern politics reinstates the purity 
of theology in new, modern form.7
Taking issue with this reading of the secular as being identical with 
the theological, Hans Blumenberg asserted the break of the modern 
with what preceded it. Here the secular does not mean the persistence of 
traditional theology within an immanent context. On the contrary, the 
modern proclaims the liberation of the worldly from the other-worldly 
context of theological premodernity. While Schmitt celebrates the 
purity of the theology that goes under the modern name of sovereignty, 
Blumenberg argues that modernity is a pure break with premodernity. 
Even though their arguments differ, both thinkers deny the presence of 
contamination in their respective theories of the theological (concerned 
with what is sometimes invisible and measurable) and the political (the 
visible manifestation of social and political structures).
The persistence of the immeasurable, invisible, non-graspable, other-
worldly, or even non-worldly flies in the face of efforts to legitimate 
modernity’s break with the premodern, such as Blumenberg’s famous 
defence of the modern age’s (Neuzeit) legitimacy. Blumenberg insists 
on modernity’s purity (or on what Latour calls modernity’s purification 
project). In doing so, he attempts to invalidate Schmitt’s secularisation 
thesis (first published in 1922) according to which ‘all precise notions of 
the modern state are secularised theological notions’ (Schmitt 1990: 49). 
Writing in post-World War II West Germany, Blumenberg set out to 
show – in painstakingly researched and highly nuanced scholarly studies 
– that modern politics and science are not merely different translations 
of various theological paradigms or notions, as the Catholic ‘crown 
jurist of the Third Reich’ Schmitt had claimed before: ‘For Blumenberg, 
secularization constituted a “category of historical injustice”. It denied 
the legitimacy of the modern age, which made it seem derivative and 
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somewhat inferior’ (Müller 2003: 159). Rather than showing the infi-
nite reach of theological or other-worldly concepts, Blumenberg tried 
to prove the allure of modern, worldly notions as far back as medieval 
scholastic thought.
This process of modernisation reaches a culmination in Descartes’s 
cogito in which ‘the provocation of the transcendent absolute at the 
point of its most extreme radicalization reverts into the unveiling of 
the immanent absolute’ (Blumenberg 1974: 209).8 Whereas Schmitt’s 
secularisation thesis detects in the most striking secular features of the 
modern age, theological concepts at their purest, Blumenberg follows 
the opposite methodological procedure: he sees in Descartes’s religios-
ity the point where theology turns radically non-theological, radically 
immanent and secular. As has been intimated in Chapter 1, by radicalis-
ing the mind–body divide, Descartes philosophically prepares for the 
scientific measurement of the world which characterises modernity:
Particularly in his [i.e. Descartes’s] Geometry, the distinction Aristotle pro-
posed between the mode of connection of units and points, between arith-
metic and geometry is collapsed, thus rendering the material, external world 
– res extensa – as amenable to calculation and division. (Elden 2006: 10)
Modern science promises the rationalist transparency of the world. How 
do societal obsessions with visibility, transparency and the measurable 
develop from the philosophical constellations of a Cartesian mind–body 
divide? The body denotes the world. Body and world are matter. The 
mind, however, constitutes immaterial and yet immanent sovereignty 
which fully knows and directs the matter under its control. By render-
ing the matter of the world visible and all comprehensive, the role 
Descartes allocates to the mind performs the promise of modern science. 
Blumenberg argues that the theology behind Descartes’s mind–body 
divide is itself modern and scientific.
Rather than being contaminated by the theological, Blumenberg 
argues that Descartes’s thought is purely scientific and modern. He sees 
in the divide between sovereign immateriality which forms and makes 
visible the material world – and from which it is, like God, hierarchically 
distinct – modern science’s emergence uncontaminated by the theology 
which supposedly preceded it.
In advancing his thesis of scholasticism’s modernity, Blumenberg 
struggles with a number of thinkers and scholars (especially Karl Löwith) 
who propound a contrasting thesis about the modern.9 Moreover, 
Blumenberg ignores the fact that at least some practitioners of twen-
tieth-century science have changed its modus operandi with regard to 
traditional notions of order and hierarchical dichotomies such as the 
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Cartesian mind–body divide. As has been intimated above (and as will 
be further developed in the following chapter), avant-garde twentieth- 
and twenty-first-century science has taken nineteenth-century literature 
seriously, together with its critique of positivist approaches to order, 
hierarchy, visibility, measurability and certainty.
As Sally Shuttleworth has clearly shown, ‘it is certainly not the case 
that literary texts simply drew on emerging scientific theories. Indeed, 
the reverse can be shown to be true, with key literary works playing 
a formative role in the development of the frameworks of nineteenth-
century psychiatry’ (Shuttleworth 2010: 3). As we shall see in Chapter 
3, literature has played a significant role for a newly emerging scientific 
paradigm in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century science (one 
that includes but is not restricted to the field of child psychiatry as ana-
lysed by Shuttleworth).
From this historical perspective it is not surprising that Blumenberg’s 
thesis of modern secular science’s independence from the theological 
should remain an isolated and controversial thesis. Contrasting with 
Blumenberg’s approach, in different but related ways, Max Weber, 
Walter Benjamin and Karl Löwith maintain that scholasticism has not 
given rise to modernity but that the latter is, in Derrida’s opinion, a differ-
ing and differentiating trace of premodern theological ideas. No surprise 
then that Blumenberg should take issue with Löwith’s thesis according 
to which the modern concept of progress is nothing but a slightly altered 
version of theological redemptions (Löwith 1949). Löwith, Benjamin 
and Weber prepare the ground for Hannah Arendt’s argument that the 
modern cannot be understood as uncontaminated by what preceded it.
It is Arendt’s thesis of the secular as contaminated by its supposed 
opposite, the other-worldly, which offers an alternative to secularisa-
tion theories which, even though they develop contrasting arguments, 
share a structural preoccupation with pure entities. In opposed ways, 
Schmitt and Blumenberg are concerned with pure manifestations: for 
the former the modern is purely theological, whereas for the latter it is 
purely rational. In contrast to Schmitt, Blumenberg attempts to prove 
modernity’s legitimacy as the horizon of rational measurability and 
transparency.
This horizon of rational measurability and transparency describes 
what the sociologist Niklas Luhmann calls functionality: ‘that the tran-
sition from traditional societies to modern society can be conceived as 
the transition from a primarily stratified form of differentiation of the 
social system to one which is primarily functional’ (Luhmann 1986: 5). 
Luhmann’s systems theory approach radicalises Blumenberg’s notion of 
a secular autonomy from a transcending realm of the theological.
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Luhmann thus translates the biologists’ terms of autopoiesis into 
the cultural sphere of meaning:10 Luhmann claims ‘that human con-
sciousness and human societies are also autopoietic systems that do 
not produce life as biological systems do, but instead operate in terms 
of meaning, whether this is part of communication, or internally, in a 
mind’ (Thomsen 2013: 20). However, the visible functions of measur-
able systems do not merely reproduce themselves. In their autopoietic 
operations of self-reproduction systems also create obfuscate hybrids.11
The purity of either the theological or the secular disintegrates within 
both systems theory and deconstruction. Here the figure of purity gives 
way to the figure of contamination. In a fascinating itinerary of thought, 
Blumenberg’s autonomy of the secular undergoes a transformation 
when Luhmann contaminates the biological notion of autopoiesis with 
exposure to the cultural sphere of interpretation.
Less striking are the subtle differences between Schmitt’s secularisation 
theory and Derrida’s project of deconstruction. Where Schmitt insists on 
tracing purely theological terms within the secular, Derrida in a more 
formal way develops an approach to culture, society and politics which 
is premised upon the contaminating traces of remnants. Comparable 
to the invisibility of the trace in Derrida’s deconstruction, however, 
Luhmann’s Blumenbergian secular-functionalist systems theory para-
doxically produces non-functionalist remnants of the invisible.
According to Derrida the invisible emerges as ‘irrepressible difference 
whose unavoidability and unmasterability deconstruction aims to bring 
to light and sustains’ (Wolfe 2010: 14). Similarly, Luhmann argues that 
in ‘systems theory, however, this radical heterogeneity is handled within 
an adaptive and operational framework, as a fundamental evolutionary 
problem for autopoietic systems that have to reproduce themselves in 
the face of overwhelming difference’ (Wolfe 2010: 14). The difference 
to systems is their environment.
By isolating itself from its environment, a given system becomes 
paradoxically contaminated by this same environment from which it 
attempts to reproduce itself as a pure, uncontaminated, autonomous 
entity: ‘In the form of meaning, then, we find that systems increase their 
contacts with their environments paradoxically by virtualizing them’ 
(Wolfe 2010: 18). This virtualisation of their environment constitutes 
the immanent transcendence of systems – thus calling into doubt positiv-
ist assumptions of scientific visibility and measurability.
In some ways anticipating the figure of contamination in Luhmann’s 
system and Derrida’s deconstruction theories, Hannah Arendt diverges 
from Schmitt’s and Blumenberg’s contrasting accounts of the secular. As 
we have seen, even though they are opposed to each other, Blumenberg’s 
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and Schmitt’s respective approaches to secularisation nevertheless share 
a triumphant element – in Schmitt’s case it is the purity and resilience 
of theological sovereignty (which in Derrida becomes a figure of 
 contamination – i.e. the past or its trace) and in Blumenberg’s it is the 
triumph of the secular. Arendt, by contrast, deprives both the theologi-
cal and the secular of their purported purity. Her writing and thought 
in fact contaminates the worldly with the other-worldly. According to 
Arendt, modernity reaches the Archimedean point of nature’s absolute 
transparency and measurability, but this very high-point of the secular 
backfires: by gaining a full and translucent account of the world it 
paradoxically loses it. The Archimedean point turns back on itself and 
thereby forms a knot.
This perspective on the modern is modernist: not as continuation of 
triumphant teleological movements (either that of Schmitt’s political 
theology or that of modernity’s worldly progress), but as regressing 
and contaminating knot. It embodies what Maud Ellmann has recently 
called The Nets of Modernism: ‘Like the Delphic omphalos, hollow 
in the middle and encased in knotted nets, the navel is both seam and 
fissure, knot and not’ (Ellmann 2010: 5). More radical than Ellmann’s 
discussion of the nets in Joyce’s modernist novel and navel, Arendt’s 
knot is a not. It is a modern qualitative leap (reversing, however, the 
teleological moment implied by this Hegelian term) forward, which at 
the point where it comes into the full visibility of its target or goal flips 
over and accelerates backwards to a point of not just invisibility but 
darkness: the not – or the loss of the world which it so desperately tried 
to grasp and illuminate in the first place.
Arendt’s modernist-existentialist writing and thought has been shaped 
by that of her mentor Heidegger. Heidegger’s brief infatuation with 
Nazism did not dampen Arendt’s admiration for his philosophy. She 
was not, however, an uncritical follower of his philosophical insights.12 
She took issue with his reinterpretation of contingency in eschatological 
and teleological terms (the Geworfenheit or the teleological trajectory 
towards death), which she confronted with her notion of natality, and 
what I have called her philosophy of birth (Mack 2012: 62–71).
Heidegger’s critique of the calculable and measurable in the Cartesian 
model of modern science, in contrast, deeply impressed Arendt. 
Heidegger identifies in Descartes’s mind–body divide the philosophical 
justification for a modern interpretation of both politics and science in 
terms of the visible, measurable and calculable: ‘Descartes’ understand-
ing of “space” as extension – and, moreover, of the material world 
as something extended in three dimensions of which geometry is the 
science that best allows us access to – has more than merely mathemati-
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cal implications. It is behind his overall ontological casting of the world 
as calculable, which, in Heidegger’s account paves the way for modern 
machine technology’ (Elden 2006: 10). In the wake of Heidegger’s 
critique of modern science, Arendt’s is not so much concerned with 
secularisation as such but with the experience of the secular in terms of 
the worldly. A Cartesian reduction of the world to what is purely visible 
and measurable has put at risk the viability of contamination, which 
would allow for a blurring between the visible and the invisible. Such 
contaminated rather than pure entities permeate the plurality of lived 
worldly experience with which Arendt’s political and scientific thought 
is concerned.
It is in this context of contamination that we can explain Blumenberg’s 
irritation with Arendt’s work. Clearly Arendt does not argue that the 
modern is ‘nothing new’ and just a transformation of premodern theol-
ogy. Arendt’s idiosyncratic position within theories of either modernity’s 
trace (Derrida, Benjamin, Weber and so forth) or its autopoiesis – i.e. 
break with and independence from what preceded it (Blumenberg and 
Luhmann) – has not been sufficiently appreciated. Crucially, her point 
is that the modern does not constitute a repetition but rather an inten-
sification of a quasi-religious, quasi-theological loss (what in Christian 
theology has been called kenosis) or renunciation of the worldly.
Arendt discovers the contamination of theology and modern science 
in what she calls the alienation from the world. Blumenberg gives 
Arendt’s ‘reluctant modernism’ (Benhabib 2003) short shrift, writing 
that the ‘notion “world” is not a stable one but subject to historical 
change’ (Blumenberg 1974: 15–16). Arendt would not deny this and 
Blumenberg has not succeeded in invalidating her approach. Arendt’s 
point is that the world at hand – in other words, what Blumenberg 
would call the current world as it is present to us – becomes reduced to 
the zero point of its existence in modern purification projects.
Arendt’s critique of modernity is precisely that it reduces our plural 
and contaminated experiences of the world to a point of purification 
instantiating a radicalisation of traditional notions of the other-worldly. 
This would also confound Blumenberg’s thesis, according to which the 
modern break with an irrational past may be found in premodern scho-
lasticism and Cartesian theology. Arendt’s oxymoronic definition of the 
secular in terms of the loss of the world also questions Schmitt’s claim 
that secularisation simply translates the old truth claims of theology. 
Far from positing continuity between the premodern and the modern 
(as Schmitt, Löwith and others argue), Arendt demarcates modernity’s 
break with what preceded it (this is exactly Blumenberg’s concern).
In contrast to Blumenberg’s account of Neuzeit, however, Arendt 
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idiosyncratically argues for an interruption so forceful that it actually 
breaks itself and thus turns into a contaminating trace. According to 
Blumenberg, modernity emerges as a pure entity. For Arendt, however, 
modernity’s break with what preceded it is so radical that it changes the 
way we experience the world to an unprecedented zero-point of exist-
ence and significance. It erases meaning by doing away with the con-
taminating forces of plurality and difference. Modernity’s measurement 
of the world shrinks what it measures to a tiny spot of insignificance:
Only now has man taken full possession of his mortal dwelling place and 
gathered the infinite horizons, which were temptingly and forbiddingly open 
to all previous ages, into a globe whose majestic outlines and detailed surface 
he knows as he knows the lines in the palms of his hand. (Arendt 1998: 250)
The Cartesian ideals of measurability, transparency, control and order 
instigate a loss of experience and meaning. Mid-nineteenth-century 
literature attends to the paradox in question here which Arendt and 
Luhmann theoretically analyse in terms of the instability of autopoietic 
systems. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Melville’s Moby Dick 
confounds the identification of scientific truth with autonomy, propor-
tionality, visibility and surveillance. The novel helps us discover the 
illusions of purportedly modern conceptions of science.
From the perspective of Arendt’s analysis, by taking ‘full possession’ 
of the globe modernity paradoxically loses the world. Descartes’s all 
comprehensive knowledge of matter gives rise to a new and increased 
sense of immateriality. A given system’s autopoietic isolation from its 
environment produces virtual, invisible environments. The visibility and 
measurement of matter – what Arendt calls the world – eventuates in a 
loss of sight and experience. Having argued that the now fully measured 
and comprehended vastness of the world shrinks to the visible and yet 
tiny ‘lines in the palm’ of a hand, Arendt further reduces the possibility 
of secular experience within the surveyed confines of modernity. The 
hand and what is in its proximity has become obsolete:
It is in the nature of the human surveying capacity that it can function only if 
man disentangles himself from all involvement in and concern with the close 
at hand and withdraws himself to a distance from everything near him. The 
greater the distance between himself and his surroundings, world or earth, 
the more he will be able to survey and measure and the less worldly or earth-
bound space be left to him. (Arendt 1998: 251)
By measuring and controlling the world of matter, the Cartesian mind 
severs its connection to embodiment as such (what Arendt calls ‘worldly 
or earth-bound’).
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As we have seen, the mind–body divide shapes Latour’s critique of 
what he calls the modern purification project, which separates nature 
from society. Nature or the body are the objects of society’s mental 
comprehension and control. It is crucial to emphasise that for Arendt 
modernity goes further than simply translating or tracing a theological 
distance to and demotion of embodiment and matter: it empties our 
corporeal world from any remainder of worldliness by precisely reduc-
ing the space for a contamination of various supposedly opposed entities 
(such as the visible and the invisible or the objective and the subjective). 
In short, the paradox of a secular loss of the world shrinks the contami-
nating complexity of life to questions of measurement and thus denies 
the presence of the immeasurable, the subjective and the invisible.
While explicitly following the secularisation thesis of Max Weber, 
Arendt implicitly analyses the presumed translation of a theological into 
a secular praxis as a disturbing break away from life’s habitat within an 
earth-bound, embodied world. The secular is not secular as Blumenberg 
and secularisation theorists à la Schmitt and Weber proclaim. The 
secular in Arendt’s usage does not denote what it usually does: the 
worldly. More radically still, Arendt turns the word secular upside 
down so that it means the opposite of what it proclaims to signify. 
While evoking Weber and the secularisation theory, she undermines the 
semantics of the very term ‘secular’:
The greatness of Max Weber’s discovery about the origins of capitalism lay 
precisely in his demonstration that an enormous, strictly mundane activity is 
possible without any care for or enjoyment of the world whatever, an activ-
ity whose deepest motivation, on the contrary is worry and care about the 
self. World alienation, and not self-alienation as Marx thought, has been the 
hallmark of the modern age. (Arendt 1998: 254)
The full comprehension of the globe paradoxically gives rise to a sense 
of the other-worldly that has lost any sacred or spiritual connotations. 
Arendt here seems to evoke Weber’s disenchantment thesis. Modern 
scientific knowledge deprives us of a sense of wonder. The loss of the 
capacity to wonder about the world turns our globe into a dreary and 
tiny substance from which we retreat. The world has become a dead 
object which we exploit in our capitalist quest for wealth creation.
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Conclusion: the contaminating force of Arendt’s, Kafka’s 
and H. G. Wells’s modernism
Following Weber’s approach, Arendt’s methodology is modern through 
and through: she separates nature (the world) from human society, 
politics and economics. This part of her argument could be subjected to 
Latour’s charge of an illusory purification project – radically separating 
nature from society, the mind from the body – by which he defines what 
is modern. Arendt’s notion of a loss of worldliness assumes, however, 
that there once had been a contamination of the natural and the social, 
the corporeal and the cerebral. She calls humanity’s sense of a fusion 
with the natural or earth-bound ‘love of the world’. Indeed our reliance 
on nature characterises our human condition: we are, as Arendt puts it, 
‘still bound to the earth through the human condition’ (Arendt 1998: 
262). Her recognition of the illusory or impossible (as Latour would put 
it) foundation of the purification project that lies at the heart of moder-
nity turns Arendt from a modern thinker into a modernist.
Michael Levenson has recently defined modernism as ‘a radically 
alternative practice that presented a counterhistory for modernity’ 
(Levenson 2011: 12). This ‘counterhistory’ of modernity was ‘seen as 
dangerous and contagious’ (Levenson 2011: 5). The contagion contami-
nates what the modern purification project attempts to keep as separate 
entities (nature and society, environment and system, immanence and 
transcendence, and so forth):
In this view, the telling events were not the text, the painting, the film, or the 
quartet, no matter how extreme, but the artifacts as emblems of a widening 
counterworld. The growing perception, as conspicuous in the dominant press 
as in avant-garde journals, was that these formidable artifacts exemplified 
rival forms of life, other styles of thinking and feeling. (Levenson 2011: 12)
One way to define modernism is to say that it both analyses and ques-
tions the modern attempt to purify the societal from the natural and the 
mental from the embodied. Arendt’s methodology is at once modern 
and modernist: she first thinks on the basis of the modern purification 
project and then proceeds to turn around this line of thought and to 
undermine the purification project with the contaminating force of what 
she calls worldliness – a term that combines seemingly opposed entities 
(nature and society; body and mind, and so forth).
Crucially, Arendt refers to literature when she reverses her meth-
odological procedure and calls into question the traditional scientific 
(which includes also the social science of Weber’s sociology) attempt to 
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compartmentalise mind from world and society from nature. The case 
in point here is one of Kafka’s aphorisms which frames the opening of 
the last chapter in The Human Condition: ‘He found the Archimedean 
point, but he used it against himself; it seems that he was permitted to 
find it only under this condition’ (Arendt 1998: 248). Kafka’s aphorism 
illustrates modernism’s critique of the modern purification project.
By forcing the realisation of the impossible or illusory denial of the 
natural within the societal, modernity’s ‘purity’ turns self-destructive. 
The ideal of an Archimedean point of view refers to the rationalist dis-
trust of the senses which informs not only Descartes but also Spinoza’s 
modern philosophy. Like their ancient scientific-philosophical ancestor 
Archimedes, Spinoza and Descartes had ample justification to distrust 
bodily senses and intuitions, which, according to them, tend to be mis-
leading. Spinoza’s differentia specifica from Descartes’s rationalism is, 
however, that he implicates the mind in the illusions of bodily intuitions. 
According to Spinoza, the mind is the idea of the body and this means 
that our minds are unavoidably bound up with the input received from 
the body.
As we have seen in Chapter 1, Spinoza’s philosophy anticipates the 
current neuroscientific discovery of a loop that binds the corporeal 
to the cerebral. Spinoza’s rationalism admonishes us to be mindful of 
our minds: to falsify any potential distortions and hallucinations that 
arise in the mind as it receives misleading sensations from our corpo-
real existence in its entirety. In contrast to Spinoza, the conventional 
scientific outlook has opted for a radical separation from the merely 
natural or embodied. This is exactly what Arendt sees in Kafka’s vision 
of an Archimedean point of view: ‘the Archimedean wish for a point 
outside the earth from which to unhinge the world’ (Arendt 1998: 262). 
According to Spinoza and Latour, this would be like wishing for the 
impossible. In Arendt’s interpretation of Kafka, however, modernity 
realises the impossible by damaging not only nature but also society: ‘the 
[Archimedean] wish would be granted only provided that we lost reality’ 
(Arendt 1998: 262). This loss of reality (the world) is self-destructive: 
Kafka’s Archimedean point of view resides outside of nature, and this 
distance to the object under investigation preconditions the measur-
ability and potential transparency of the world. The very precondition 
of this scientific triumph, however, also seals the fate of the subject who 
achieves this feat of science, because we cannot ever leave the world or 
its corporeal ground without giving up our life.
Kafka is not the only writer who may alert us to humanity’s autoim-
mune uses of science. In the last part of H. G. Wells’s The Time Machine, 
the narrative voice abandons grand hopes for moral and educational 
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progress which scientific advances might have helped to achieve. Instead 
the conquest and subjugation of nature goes hand in hand with human-
ity’s self-destruction:
The great triumph of Humanity I had dreamed of took a different shape 
in my mind. It had been no such triumph of moral education and general 
cooperation as I had imagined. Instead, I saw a real aristocracy, armed with a 
perfected science and working to a logical conclusion the industrial system of 
today. Its triumph had not been simply a triumph over Nature, but a triumph 
over Nature and the fellow man. (Wells 2005a: 49)
As Marina Warner has pointed out, it is so-called ‘degeneration’ rather 
than class struggle which brings about humanity’s self-destruction 
(‘Wells abandoned this kind of agitprop for science, his true interest, and 
took a very long view. Extinction, not renewal, was to be the ultimate 
outcome’: Wells 2005a: xxvi). Degeneration simply implies the passing 
of time. In Wells, however, the future also alludes to progress – to scien-
tific progress to be precise.
Paradoxically, it is within this narrative of progression that humanity 
degenerates and self-destructs. The divide between nature and society 
ends up turning humanity into nothing but matter – a natural object to 
be consumed: in the quote above Wells writes of ‘a triumph over Nature 
and the fellow man’. Degeneration does not happen through the neutral 
medium of a mere lapse in time. Rather there are societal and cultural 
dispositions which create degeneration. These preconditions are para-
doxically the opposite of the degenerate: they are progressive.
As Simon J. James has argued recently, Wells contaminates the 
cultural with the biological through his ‘scientific romances [which] 
evaluate culture and morals as a function of biology, only as enduring 
as biological reality will allow them to be. Biology, the parent, must 
always dominate over and even ironise culture’ (James 2011: 120). 
Biology ironises the cultural construction of history’s assumed progress 
by contaminating it with its anonym (i.e. regression or degeneration). 
Progression works for degeneration and this not only on a biological but 
also on an intellectual-scientific level.
How could this be possible? The scientific parameters of modernity 
first establish a divide between nature and society, and then within 
this construction of nature as radically separated from human society, 
scientific progress reduces every form of embodied life (whether human 
or non-human) to a measurable object which is almost transparent in its 
visibility.
What remains provocative is, however, the invisibility and plurality of 
the mind, together with human psychology. In order to extinguish this 
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last bastion of the invisible, progress promises to turn humanity into a 
measurable, fully transparent object. The hopes and dreams invested by 
public opinion in science are bound up with the desire for security as 
promised by science’s promise of predictability and certainty – by the 
secure and clear vision which transparency and measurability seem to 
proffer.
In Lippit’s words, ‘global visibility: a universal archive, in which 
everything in the world is visible, everything is visible to the world’ 
(Lippit 2005: 47). Full transparency, however, may coincide with a form 
of vanishing and thus with invisibility. In 1895 Röntgen’s discovery of 
the X-ray rendered the invisible visible, and yet the visibility which such 
scientific innovation yielded came at a cost: ‘At work from the X-ray 
to the VHP is also a form of destructive visuality, a visuality born from 
abstraction’ (Lippit 2005: 48). Scientific sight indulges in the longing for 
clarity and measurability but then it also creates new anxieties about 
how the transparency of its objective view has been produced.
In the case of Röntgen’s X-rays, the translucent images they afford are 
those of the living body reduced to dust: ‘The X-ray situates the specta-
cle in its context as a living document even when it depicts, actually and 
phantasmatically, an image of death or the deterioration of the body 
that leads to death. A living image of death and the deathly image of life 
are intertwined in the X-ray’ (Lippit 2005: 47). From Darwin’s invisibly 
visible traces of evolution to Röntgen’s discovery of the X-ray onwards, 
modern science has thwarted expectations of clarity, measurability and 
visibility.
Modern techniques of rendering the invisible visible produce new 
remnants of darkness, the phantasmal, and the immeasurable. Darwin’s 
invisibly visible evolutionism, Röntgen’s X-rays, the invention of pho-
tography as well cinema and Freud’s new science of psychoanalysis 
share a peculiar fusion of the visible and the invisible, the measurable 
and the immeasurable, the conscious and the unconscious, the factual 
and the fictive: ‘Like the X-ray image, Freud’s dream confuses art and 
science, phantasy and fact, imagination and observation. Like psychoa-
nalysis itself. The lines between those orders have been blurred’ (Lippit 
2005: 41). Science’s quest for visibility and measurability brought to the 
fore the blurring of opposites – the disorder merely presenting the fiction 
of order. The enlightenment and modern, cutting edge science illumi-
nates the illusions produced by light, the delusions spurned by illusions 
of measurability. Traditional ideals of order and clarity pertain to the 
surface: ‘The Enlightenment project always was, perhaps, an attempt to 
move toward the surface, to search for that locus in which the subject 
would be annihilated by the glare of an intensive radiation, one that 
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moves resolutely toward intensity and interiority’ (Lippit 2005: 80). The 
sight of interiority, however, dissipates what it illuminates.
Here the process of hypostasising humanity in terms of measurable 
matter goes so far as to render it consumable and digestible. At this 
point progress clearly becomes regressive and most spectacularly so 
in the societal practice of cannibalism. Here humanity has literally 
found the Archimedean point to wrest the measurable and fully visible 
from the last bastion of invisibility. It achieves this illusory triumph of 
transparency by turning the embodied mind into a fully knowable feast 
for the digestive organs. This is the moment when the psyche has fully 
turned into visible and measurable nature: into a culinary object on the 
kitchen table:
His prejudice against human flesh is no deep-seated instinct. And so these 
inhuman sons of men – ! I tried to look at the thing in a scientific spirit. After 
all, they were less human and more remote than our cannibal ancestors of 
three or four thousand years ago. And the intelligence that would have made 
this state of things a torment had gone. Why should I trouble myself? These 
Eloi were mere fat cattle, which the ant-like Morlocks preserved and preyed 
upon – probably saw to the breeding of. (Wells 2005a: 62)
Humanity uses its knowledge against itself to the point of preying on 
itself. What makes this more than regressive state of cannibalism (‘more 
remote than our cannibal ancestors’) possible is a certain socio-scientific 
process, which reduces human diversity into visible states of one homo-
geneous entity: at one extreme we encounter nothing but sheer delicacy 
– the ‘mere beautiful futility’ (Wells 2005a: 58) of the Eloi – and, as 
polar opposite we confront the Morlocks who are purely ‘mechani-
cal’ (Wells 2005a: 57). Far from being ineluctable, degeneration is the 
product of a modernity that is obsessed with the reduction of not only 
the non-human but also the human world to visible and measurable 
states of homogeneity – as Wells succinctly puts it elsewhere: either 
‘feeble prettiness’ or ‘mere mechanical industry’ (Wells 2005a: 79). The 
reduction of human diversity to two binary opposed  characteristics 
– futile delicacy versus mechanical industry – deprives humanity not 
only of intelligence and creativity but also of subjectivity. Wells’s grisly 
vision of a degenerate modernity confronts us with the paradox of a 
world which has been reduced to the zero-point of visible, objective 
matter – ready for consumption. It is a society which no longer allows 
for a contamination between the measurable and the immeasurable, the 
visible and the invisible.
Wells’s The Time Machine describes the structure of totalitarian soci-
eties wherein plurality has been sacrificed to what can be identified as 
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uncontaminated, as pure: the Eloi are purely delicate and the Morlocks 
are solely mechanical. Here we indeed encounter the practice of homo-
geneity in these purely opposed specimens of either the merely artistic 
(Eloi) or the purely technological (Morlocks).
There is no room for deviation from the norm of constituting a single-
minded, pure entity. Here we are confronted with the radical lack of 
contamination and difference: there is nothing approximate which could 
be the divergence of subjectivity and individuality. The following chapter 
discusses how some early modernist texts from the mid- nineteenth 
century tackle the problem of humanity’s quasi-scientific political reduc-
tion to visible and measurable assemblies of the homogeneous.
Notes
 1. Timothy Morton has recently described Einstein’s departure from both 
Newton’s and Kant’s notions of science: ‘It is a false cliché that we have 
grasped the meaning of relativity. Far from it. In our daily social and psy-
chological practices, we are still Newtonians, still in awe of infinite space. 
At most we see infinity and space as transcendental categories, as Kant 
does. [. . .] it is Einstein who continues the Copernican legacy, by showing 
how time and space emerge from objects, not from synthetic judgments 
that preunderstand being to be thus and so’ (Morton 2013: 62).
 2. As Morton has pointed out: ‘Nuclear radiation is not visible to humans’ 
(Morton 2013: 38).
 3. Bennet Zon’s email from 9 May 2014 in response to an earlier version of 
this paper presented at the inaugural conference launch of the Centre for 
Nineteenth-Century Studies at Durham University (10 May 2014).
 4. As Dongen has put it, ‘Generally speaking, one could say that the quantum 
program initially introduced principles and rules that were in opposition 
to “classical” physics, yet depended on classical physics to be formulated’ 
(Dongen 2010: 158).
 5. As Dongen has shown, Einstein’s approach has been shaped by the lit-
erature and thought of German romanticism: ‘No lesser figures than 
Alexander von Humboldt and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, the latter in 
particular through his Faust figure, had emphasized the striving of science 
for simplification on the one hand and the ultimate unity of nature on the 
other. While the origins of these ideas are located in romantic and natural 
philosophy of the early nineteenth century, Einstein likely absorbed them 
for the first time through the works of popular science writers like Ludwig 
Büchner and Aaron Bernstein (who had in fact considered themselves 
critical of the natural philosophers)’ (Dongen 2010: 60). Goethe and other 
writers indeed questioned the ideas of order which were part of the classical 
science of the natural philosophers. See Mack (2010: 139–67).
 6. For a detailed discussion of this point see Mack (2014).
 7. As Roberto Esposito has recently argued, Schmitt’s political theology 
outdoes or neutralises the political in terms of the theological. His political 
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theology is dialectical and does away with the secular as a negation of the 
negation. This triumph of theology in Schmitt’s espousal of sovereignty 
follows Hegel’s dialectics which does away (Aufhebung) with what it 
encounters as resistant or negative, thus recuperating traditional theodicy’s 
proof of God’s and the world’s goodness: ‘The very concept of the Hegelian 
Aufhebung, for that matter, as the overcoming of evil by encompassing it, 
demonstrates the survival of the language of theodicy after it seemed to 
have been exhausted by Kant’s downgrading it to a transcendental illusion’ 
(Esposito 2011: 78).
 8. My translation.
 9. As Esposito has shown, Blumenberg does not circumvent the theological in 
his juridical argument contra Löwith: ‘But the eminently juridical argument 
that he [i.e. Blumenberg] uses, especially against Karl Löwith, attests more 
than he cares to admit to the crucial function performed by the theologi-
cally informed lexicon of immunization in the constitution of modernity’ 
(Esposito 2011: 78).
10. As Mads Rosendahl Thomsen has recently pointed out: ‘The theory of 
autopoiesis was originally developed by biologists Humberto Maturana 
and Francisco Varela as a way of defining life, and to better describe how 
self-identity may be maintained over time in a system that changes its ele-
ments over time’ (Thomsen 2013: 20).
11. ‘Luhmann’s gambit is based from the outset on replacing the theory of 
closed systems with a theory of open systems; the system only lives in rela-
tion to the environment from which it draws the stimulus towards increas-
ing complexity, which it reproduces in continually more developed forms. 
But this relationship is a closed one, since systematic communication with 
the environment is, in principle, impossible, other than through a progres-
sive inclusion of its exteriority. This means that the system is open only to 
its own closure; or that closure is a condition for any form of openness’ 
(Esposito 2011: 47).
12. See Vatter (2006: 137–59) as well as Mack (2009: 35–60).
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3Contamination of Nature with 
Society: The collapse of Natural 
Order from Melville to Wells and 
Ellison
Introduction: Kandel’s contamination of modernism with 
biology
Modernism began in the mid-nineteenth century as a response not only to 
the restrictions and hypocrisies of everyday life, but also as a reaction to 
the Enlightenment’s emphasis on the rationality of human behaviour. The 
Enlightenment, or Age of Reason, was characterized by the idea that all 
is well with the world because human action is governed by reason. It is 
through reason that we achieve enlightenment, because our mind can exert 
control over our emotions and feelings. (Kandel 2012: 11)
In the quotation above, Eric R. Kandel locates the beginning of modern-
ism in the middle of the nineteenth century. At that time the dark side 
of the Industrial Revolution had already become apparent, and with it 
the ambiguity of modernity’s – or, in other words, the enlightenment’s 
– claim that reason’s controlling position over the body and the emo-
tions guarantees unambiguous progress: ‘The modernist reaction to 
the Enlightenment came in the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution, 
whose brutalizing effects revealed that modern life had not become 
as mathematically perfect, or as certain, rational, or enlightened, as 
advances in the eighteenth century had led people to expect’ (Kandel 
2012: 12). Kandel further substantiates his claim that modernism begins 
not at the end but at the middle of the nineteenth century by pinpointing 
the then emerging rise of biology as a radical break with modernity’s/the 
Enlightenment’s intellectual anchorage in physics and astronomy: ‘As 
astronomy and physics inspired the Enlightenment, so biology inspired 
modernism. Darwin’s 1859 book On the Origin of Species introduced 
the idea that human beings are not created uniquely by an all-powerful 
God but are biological creatures that evolved from simpler animal ances-
tors’ (Kandel 2012: 12). Far from claiming (see the concluding section 
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to this chapter) that mid-nineteenth-century works such as Büchner’s 
Danton’s Death, Hawthorne’s Scarlet Letter or Melville’s Moby Dick 
are classic modernist works of literature avant là lettre, the following 
chapter nevertheless argues that in their concern with the potential 
modern loss of worldliness and diversity these texts are less about their 
historical subject matter than about the fears for a future where subjec-
tivity has been subjected to bio-political visibility and measurability.
Natural order as terror and social invisibility: Wells’s The 
Invisible Man and Ellison’s Invisible Man
Kandel’s socio-historical point of orientation is the Industrial Revolution. 
In terms of intellectual history, he mentions the Enlightenment as fur-
thering the general hope that science would facilitate a global society 
turned secular and uncontaminated by irrational interference – in short, 
a new polis that is fully at home with the world. The flip side of these 
enlightened expectations for a secure and autonomous secular order 
emerged when the French Revolution morphed into Robespierre’s reign 
of terror.
The title of Wells’s The Time Machine (1895) evokes the mechanisa-
tion of life in the wake of this revolution. In his next novel, The Invisible 
Man (1897), Wells frequently refers to Robespierre’s reign of terror 
in order to highlight the ambiguity of the Enlightenment’s promise to 
render the world visible and measurable in a peaceful or non-violent 
manner. This novel accentuates the paradox of the great expectations 
public opinion had previously invested into science for rendering the 
world less dangerous and more secure, measurable, and predictable. The 
novel’s scientist, Mr Griffin, retreats from London into a remote village 
(the secluded village of Iping) in order to embark on an experiment that 
would render him invisible. As Akira Mizuta Lippit has pointed out, this 
experiment is premised on an axiom that pushes the Cartesian demotion 
of corporality to a point where ‘the human body is like paper, a network 
of fibres and essentially transparent’ (Lippit 2005: 89). Lippit reads 
Wells’s Mr Griffin in the 1895 context of Röntgen’s groundbreaking 
scientific discovery: ‘Griffin experiences his vanishing body like an X-ray 
image’ (Lippit 2005: 90).
Discussions of The Invisible Man have so far focused on its imme-
diate historical setting, neglecting its crucial references to the French 
Revolution and to Robespierre’s reign of terror in particular.1 In the 
novel, however, Griffin’s fellow scientist Doctor Kemp does not see 
the quest for invisibility as an innovative scientific endeavour but, on 
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the contrary, as a repetition of the terror that precipitated the collapse 
of the French Revolution. Kemp insists: ‘He [i.e. Griffin] dreams of a 
reign of terror! A reign of terror, I tell you’ (Wells 2005b: 127). In his 
missive to Kemp, Griffin announces his quasi-scientific resurrection of 
Robespierre’s rule:
There is nothing for it, but to start the Terror. This announces the first day 
of the Terror. Port Burdock is no longer under the Queen, tell your Colonel 
of Police, and the rest of them; it is under me – the Terror. This is day one of 
year one of the new epoch, – the Epoch of the Invisible Man. I am Invisible 
Man the First. To begin with the rule will be easy. The first day there will be 
one execution for the sake of example, – a man named Kemp. Death starts for 
him today. He may lock himself away, hide himself away, get guards about 
him, put on armour if he likes; Death, the unseen Death, is coming. (Wells 
2005b: 143)
Griffin, the invisible man, has become a ghost, the ghost of the French 
Revolution that has turned into a reign of terror.
Like Robespierre, Griffin announces the beginning of a new calendar, 
a new time. The irony is of course that there is nothing new here, that 
Griffin’s experiment is a modernisation of the previous rule of terror. 
Griffin’s ‘new epoch’ produces a scientifically enhanced and modernised 
version of the ‘new era’ inaugurated by the guillotine’s death-dealing 
mechanism. Death is indeed the destination: just as Robespierre has his 
fellow revolutionist killed – as Büchner’s Damton puts it: ‘the revolution 
is like Saturn, it devours its own children’ (Büchner 1993: 21)2 – Griffin 
sets out to kill his fellow scientist Kemp. The references to the French 
Revolution do not, however, have a political agenda or horizon.
Indeed, Wells’s 1897 novel is not so much about politics as it is 
about science.3 In this context, science, however, becomes a question 
of politics (the term politics here understood rather narrowly as the 
quest for power). The interaction between the scientific and the social 
is problematised in the novel. For some critics Griffin’s fate illustrates 
how society can potentially lose a talented scientist. As Steven McLean 
has pointed out:
Since The Invisible Man is the first of his [i.e. Wells’s] scientific romances 
in which ‘we are shown a recognizable society’, it is through the grotesque 
figure of Griffin that Wells most thoroughly investigates the factors which 
can lead potentially to the scientist’s alienation from the community, and 
thus to the loss of outstanding scientific capacity which could be of far greater 
benefit to society as a whole. (McLean 2009: 66)4
The focus of the novel is, however, not on the loss of scientific capacity 
for the greater benefit of society, but on the way in which science can 
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become deleterious for society once it attempts to ‘revenge’, and at the 
same time free itself from its supposedly contaminating natural and 
socio-political environment.
Griffin employs ‘science’ to wage a ‘war’ against society or, as the 
novel puts it, ‘the world’. This combative posture evokes the reign of ter-
ror’s declaration of war against what preceded its ‘new epoch’, its ‘new 
calendar’. Unlike Robespierre, however, Griffin does not announce a 
political programme. Rather than envisioning a new social order, Griffin 
tries to enhance his own personal sense of omnipotence. The repeated 
evocation of the French Revolution within a work of science fiction has, 
however, serious implications for reconfiguring the relationship between 
the scientific and the socio-political.
Anticipating Latour’s analysis of the actual contamination of what 
the modern purification project theoretically separates (i.e. the sup-
posed opposition between natural sciences and society), Wells’s The 
Invisible Man highlights the politics of science. First of all, there is the 
power struggle between two scientists (i.e. Griffin and Kemp). Kemp 
has gained recognition for his work and is not interested in excessive 
forms of power. Griffin, however, employs his scientific work in order to 
eliminate not only his competitors in his specialist field but also to wage 
war against the embodied world tout court.
Becoming invisible seems to depend on losing one’s corporality by 
becoming ‘pure’ mind. Like Latour, Wells questions the validity of 
modern purification projects. Griffin learns to do without food so that he 
can morph into an invisible entity: ‘I was fasting; for to eat, to fill myself 
with unassimilated matter, would be to become grotesquely visible 
again’ (Wells 2005b: 114). Here indeed Arendt’s unearthly, unworldly 
immateriality preconditions the attainment of the Archimedean point 
where science could fully illuminate the world.
The illumination of the world paradoxically causes the loss of the 
world. We witness the return of the supernatural and the medieval 
with the arrival of miracle-working science. In Kemp’s words, ‘One 
might think we were in the thirteenth century’ (Wells 2005b: 70). The 
crucial point here is that science’s potential indifference to the vulner-
ability of the embodied world is itself political. The fusion of scientific 
ambitions and political megalomania emerges as social concern in The 
Invisible Man. Griffin’s science attacks the world with the motto ‘contra 
mundum’ (Wells 2005b: 135). His is a political ‘last great struggle 
against the world’ (Wells 2005b: 133). The Invisible Man accentuates 
the risk of how the Enlightenment and scientific reason may turn into 
what it set out to overcome: the alienation from the world in premodern 
preoccupations with the supernatural and the other-worldly. Wells’s 
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novel establishes parallels between the secular political project of the 
French Revolution and the rapid progress in science. Revolution may 
become more regressive than what preceded it; and secular science may 
deprive us of worldly experience in a way more severe than a polis gov-
erned by a theological idea.
The so far neglected political references to the French Revolution in 
Wells’s early scientific novel come fully to the fore in Ralph Ellison’s 
mid-twentieth-century Invisible Man (1952). Ellison’s novel ‘shares its 
name with Wells’s novel but without the definite article’ (Lippit 2005: 
98). What has so far been neglected is the way in which Ellison redirects 
the focus on science in Wells’s The Invisible Man and inverts it with 
one on politics. In his ‘Author’s Introduction’ (1981), Ellison invokes 
the scientific preoccupation in Wells’s novel. Here, however, it is not so 
much concerning nature as the social sciences. Ellison sets out to correct 
pseudo-scientific delusions about visibility and he takes pains to distance 
himself from science fiction à la Wells:
And all the more so because the voice seemed well aware that a piece of 
science fiction was the last thing I aspired to write. In fact, it seemed to tease 
me with allusions to that pseudoscientific concept which held that most Afro-
American difficulties sprang from our ‘high visibility’: a phrase as double-
dealing and insidious as its more recent oxymoronic cousins, ‘benign neglect’ 
and ‘reverse discrimination,’ both of which translate ‘Keep those Negroes 
running – but in their old place.’ My friends had made wry jokes out of the 
term for many years, suggesting that while the darker brother was clearly 
‘checked and balanced’ – and kept far more checked and balanced – on the 
basis of his darkness he glowed nevertheless, within the American conscience 
with such intensity that most whites feigned moral blindness toward his 
predicament; and these included the waves of late who refused to recognize 
the vast extent to which they too benefited from his second-class status while 
placing all the blame on white southerners. (Ellison 2001: xxxiii)
Whereas invisibility is a question of scientific potentiality and power 
in Wells’s novel, in Ellison’s Invisible Man it turns into an issue of 
perception.
Whom does society grant the privilege of being visible and as being 
thereby socially recognised? This is a socio-political concern. Literature 
here corrects the politically fraught misconception of the social sciences: 
‘Thus despite the bland assertion of sociologists, “high visibility” actu-
ally rendered one un-visible’ (Ellison 2001: xxxiii). The societal neglect 
of ‘high visibility’ evidences wilful ignorance: the refusal to grant social 
recognition. This refusal of social recognition flies in the face of the 
Enlightenment presupposition of human brotherhood on which the 
French Revolution and, in its wake, the American Constitution had been 
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founded at the end of the eighteenth century. Ellison implicitly indicts 
the social sciences for a political refusal to recognise non-recognition 
– in other words, the societal construction of invisibility – in the suppos-
edly ‘enlightened’ and democratic culture of the American East Coast in 
the mid-twentieth century.
What is problematic in the (social) sciences is that they remain too 
positivistic. They are too much taken in by what is factually, visibly and 
measurably there but they are unable to attend to the invisible and yet 
always present questions of the mind – of perception, consciousness and 
conscience. As Ross Posnock has shown, Ellison’s concern with invisibil-
ity counteracts notions of cultural and biological purity: ‘Ralph Ellison 
and Albert Murray pondered a pragmatist pluralism that, borrowing 
Murray’s words, thrives on “complexity and confusion” and is allergic 
to whatever “has any presumptions of purity” ’ (Posnock 2010: 185). 
Here the sciences have much to learn from literature.
According to Ellison, literature has the capacity to alert us to the 
contamination of the invisible and the visible, the interpretative and 
the positivistic. In this context Ellison singles out Henry James as the 
discoverer of mental deeds which operate in an invisible sphere and 
nevertheless take visible manifestations in the social and scientific sphere 
of facts: ‘Henry James had taught us much with his hyperconscious, 
“Super subtle fry,” characters who embodied in their own cultured, 
upper-class way the American virtues of conscience and consciousness’ 
(Ellison 2001: xxxii). Ellison presents his African-American protagonist 
with precisely such ‘virtues of conscience and consciousness’ that had so 
far been the prerequisite of wasp American society.
His novel thus does justice to scientific as well as political questions 
(which the social sciences had misconceived): he integrates those kept on 
the margins of our social and intellectual horizon by pseudo-scientific 
and political forces. Literature’s work of social and cognitive integration 
brings to the fore the Enlightenment’s view on social interdependence, 
which neither the French Revolution nor the American Revolution were 
capable of uncovering.
Ellison declares that it is art which fulfils the democratic promise of 
equal social visibility which is truly non-exclusive:
Here it would seem that the interests of art and democracy converge, the 
development of conscious, articulate citizens being an established goal of this 
democratic society, and the creation of conscious, articulate characters being 
indispensable to the creation of resonant compositional centers through 
which an organic consistency can be achieved in the fashioning of fictional 
forms. (Ellison 2001: xxxiii)
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The work of the imagination is integrative and achieves the unification 
which is the modern ideal of the sciences (most prominently of course 
Einstein’s unified field theory): ‘The human imagination is integrative – 
and the same is true of the centrifugal force that inspires the democratic 
process’ (Ellison 2001: xxxiii). Literature’s ‘victory of conscious percep-
tion’ (Ellison 2001: xxxix) brings about the universalism and the fra-
ternity about which the enlightened thinkers of the French Revolution 
could only theorise:
So my task was one of revealing the human universals hidden within the 
plight of one who was black and American, and not only as conveying my 
personal vision of possibility, but as a way of dealing with the sheer rhetorical 
challenge involved in communicating across our barriers of race and religion, 
class, color, and region – barriers which consist in many strategies of divi-
sion that were designed, and still function, to prevent what would otherwise 
have been a more or less natural recognition of the reality of black and 
white fraternity. And to defeat this national tendency to deny the common 
humanity shared by my character and those who might happen to read of 
his experience, I would have to provide him with something of a worldview, 
give him a consciousness in which serious philosophical questions could be 
raised, provide him with a range of diction that could play upon the richness 
of our readily shared vernacular speech and construct a plot that would bring 
him in contact with a variety of American types as they operated on various 
levels of society. Most of all, I would have to approach racial stereotypes as a 
given fact of the social process and proceed, while gambling with the reader’s 
capacity for fictional truth, to reveal the human complexity which stereotypes 
are intended to conceal. (Ellison 2001: xl)
Ellison’s novel works within the theoretical framework of the 
Enlightenment, the French Revolution and the American Constitution. 
Crucially, he shows how enlightened, scientific truth becomes a lie when 
it denies the existence of what does not fit into its theoretical schema. 
Here revolution turns into regression.
Invisible Man sheds light on the darkness of an Enlightenment that 
belies itself. The novel does so while fully depicting the high visibility 
of what has been wilfully ignored: social divisions that persevere in a 
supposedly democratic and liberal society. Literature confronts social 
and scientific discourse with the contaminating complexities of experi-
ence. These complexities are paradoxes, which Ellison’s narrator has 
the courage to render visible, perceptible, so that we can change our 
conscience and consciousness.
The narrator’s grandparents embody these paradoxical and con-
taminating complexities: ‘About eighty-five years ago they were told 
that they were free, united with others of our country in everything 
pertaining to the common good, and, in everything social, separate like 
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the fingers of the hand’ (Ellison 2001: 15). On a scientific or theoretical 
level the end of slavery guaranteed inclusion of the freed slaves into the 
common good of American society.
Yet the truth in question here is a lie, because on a practical and 
socially embodied level African-Americans had still been excluded from 
integration. The ‘high visibility’ of the narrator’s grandparents kept them 
invisible, forced into a state of social invisibility. Ellison shows how the 
truth of scientific visibility covers the invisibility of its lie: ‘Perhaps the 
truth was always a lie’ (Ellison 2001: 498). The truth of certain scientific 
theories turns out to be lies when they impose invisibility on those whom 
they prefer not to recognise: ‘Well, I was and yet I was invisible, that 
was the fundamental contradiction. I was and yet I was unseen’ (Ellison 
2001: 507). The same contamination of truth with a lie holds true for 
Brother Jack’s revolutionary ideology:
What if Brother Jack were wrong. What if history was a gambler, instead of 
a force in a laboratory experiment, and the boys his ace in the hole? What if 
history was not a reasonable citizen, but a madman full of paranoid guile and 
these boys his agents, his big surprise! His own revenge? (Ellison 2001: 441)
The figure of contamination confronts the purported truth held dear 
by science and society with its opposite: the lie morphs into what is 
considered to be true. This reversal of perspectives on socially approved 
truths as lies only emerges when we are able to question representations 
of stable and pure identities.
The reign of terror or the collapse of nature’s order
Ellison’s novel inverts the scientific focus of Wells’s The Invisible Man 
by showing how whole segments of society have become subjected to 
political, societal and scientific invisibility. Here invisibility concerns a 
general state of affairs for a demoted group within the ‘common good’ 
– hence the definite article is missing from Ellison’s title (not Wells’s The 
Invisible Man but less definitive, more general Invisible Man). In doing 
so, however, Ellison further develops and accentuates Wells’s critique 
of the power struggle that takes place in various social-scientific arenas.
Within this scientific–societal constellation, around which both 
Ellison’s Invisible Man and Wells’s The Invisible Man revolve, the 
French Revolution is a crucial historical turning point. The French 
Revolution is a turning point because it promised to translate central 
Enlightenment concepts of order and rationality into socio-political 
practice. The revolution’s mutation into a reign of terror, however, 
MACK PRINT.indd   84 26/11/2015   11:14
Contamination of Nature with Society    85
highlights the actual instability of eighteenth-century ideas about stabil-
ity and order.
We may come to understand modernity’s conceptual framework 
through an analysis of what it means to be secular. The Secular is con-
cerned with immanence: the sphere of what is visibly and measurably 
there – in other words positivist, or, as Heidegger would say, zuhanden 
(graspable, ‘at hand’). The rationality of the natural order, however, 
becomes surreptitiously the model of both, on a collective level, a stable 
society and, as concerns individuals, a well-balanced psyche.
Nature here turns into a space wherein reason plays out its progress: 
the worldly or immanent movement towards a fully rational, clear 
and visible world which has abolished biological impulses that have 
become closely associated with the opposite of the rational – the merely 
embodied or animal sphere of ‘bare life’. Modern and contemporary 
literature attempt to do justice to this demoted realm of our embodied 
or animalistic constitution which we cannot overcome through scientific 
and philosophical concepts of order, predictability and efficiency.
What goes under the name ‘modern’ has certainly not come into being 
with modernism. Instead perhaps some of the most intriguing aspects of 
modernist art, music and literature counter stifling and homogeneous 
tendencies within the modernity of the eighteenth, nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, these less 
appealing facets of the modern could – as Hannah Arendt and H. G. 
Wells feared – turn hostile towards invisible and immeasurable instan-
tiations of our thoughts and emotions.
Reason is indeed closely bound up with the less predictable workings 
of emotions. This is the result of new neuroscientific findings which have 
proved right William James’s intellectual treatment of feelings. William 
M. Reddy has summed up these recent neuroscientific discoveries, 
pointing out that ‘research in cognitive psychology has also shown that 
emotions are virtually indistinguishable from cognition itself’ (Reddy 
2001: 321). Against this background, Reddy takes issue with the lack 
of attention which the emotions have received in scholarly and intellec-
tual discussions: ‘I insist that emotion is the one concept that has most 
needed theoretical interrogation, that has most – and most mysteriously 
– suffered from theoretical neglect in our long Western examination of 
the self’ (Reddy 2001: 319). Reddy holds the French Revolution – and 
its reign of terror in particular – responsible for an otherwise inexpli-
cable avoidance of theoretical engagement with the emotions in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Why the French Revolution? Because the French Revolution may 
have been the first modern event whose actors tried to mobilise political 
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affects in order to channel these into the assumed rationality and effi-
ciency of the body politic. Instead of allowing for animal-like instincts 
and impulses in human emotions, the leaders of the French Revolution 
saw in sentiments evidence of humanity’s participation in a rational – 
rather than animalistic – natural order.
According to Reddy, the French Revolution took the originally liter-
ary form of sentimentalism as an aesthetic and formal model for the 
practice of politics. It divided the polis into citizens with either good or 
evil sentiments: ‘suspicion of the insincere gave a tinge of Manichaeism 
to the political thinking of the period, a sense that goodness was locked 
in conflict with evil. After the French Revolution got underway and 
sought to establish the rule of sentiment, its leaders had great difficulty 
distinguishing between reasonable dissent and evil, dissembling opposi-
tion’ (Reddy 2001: 326).
In her 1963 (contemporaneous with the publication of her study of 
totalitarian mentality, Eichmann in Jerusalem) book On Revolution, 
Arendt pinpoints in Robespierre’s reign of terror the early beginning of a 
totalitarian concept of history which helps to justify the suppression of 
both diversity and dissent by invoking the overruling force of ‘historical 
necessity’.
Whatever does not homogeneously fit into this supposedly necessary 
order of history becomes relegated to non-existence or, as Ellison would 
put it, invisibility. The figure of contamination makes visible how we 
reduce the divers and plural into invisibles when they are seen as not 
cohering with specific representations of what nature or history should 
be like.
According to Arendt, the French Revolution paradoxically progressed 
towards a regressive replacement of truly revolutionary freedom with 
totalitarian constructions of historical necessity and natural order:
Yet the point of the matter is that all those who, throughout the nineteenth 
century and deep into the twentieth, followed in the footsteps of the French 
Revolution saw themselves not merely as successors of the men of the French 
Revolution but as agents of history and historical necessity, with the obvious 
and yet paradoxical result that instead of freedom necessity became the chief 
category of political and revolutionary thought. (Arendt 1973: 52–3)
The turn away from the stifling protocols of the ancien régime towards 
political affect and sentiment did not establish a breakaway from des-
potism and oppression.
Knot-like, progress here does not move towards new beginnings, but 
either repeats old forms of subjugation or regresses beyond them to 
even worse forms of terror. How, however, can we explain that the first 
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modern attempt to subjugate the self under the homogeneous rule of the 
state proceeded under the concept of natural affect or sentiment? Far 
from abandoning a Cartesian mind–body divide, Robespierre refers to 
emotions as the visible concretisation of virtue.
As a result of such reduction, ethics becomes naturalised and as such 
turns into ‘matter’ measurable by the mind. The reign of terror followed 
the concept of natural order first established by the Physiocrats. As has 
been discussed in Chapter 2, the Physiocrats developed an economic 
as well as disciplinary theory in eighteenth-century France. In some 
ways anticipating Adam Smith’s interpretation of economics in terms 
of a rational and harmonious conception of nature, they argued that 
the economy not only represents but also replicates purported rational 
operations of the natural order. The Physiocrats were not the first 
to refer to the concept of natural order – a concept reaching back to 
Aristotle – but ‘they became known as the most vocal defenders of 
natural order’ (Harcourt 2011: 89). In their usage the concept of natural 
law reconciles individuals with the economic system (which is here part 
of nature): ‘According to this logic, natural law and its orderliness alone 
can reconcile the perfect liberty of the individual with the determinism 
of an autonomous economic system’ (Harcourt 2011: 89). Here we first 
encounter what Arendt would see developing further from the French 
Revolution onwards to the extreme violence which characterises totali-
tarianism in nineteenth- and twentieth-century political thought and 
praxis: the suppression of diversity under the dictum of an all necessitat-
ing or all determining force – be that the economy, nature or history.
Crucially, necessity first goes under the name of nature and nature 
itself is here strongly affiliated with reason, order and virtue. The 
natural order is indeed a product of the mind. Whatever lies outside it 
is deviant, irrational, unnatural, insane or criminal. Here the sphere of 
deviance is not nature (even though within another mentally constructed 
framework it could easily be classified as such) but the unpredictability 
and potentially non-conforming diversity of human society and psychol-
ogy. The latter bears a troubling resemblance to the opposite of rational 
predictability and efficiency – the ‘bare life’ (‘bare’ because it is deprived 
of mental capacities such as language which seem to be prerogatives of 
the human) of animals.
The order of nature, by contrast, is visible, predictable and measur-
able and must not be interfered with. According to the OED, the term 
‘order’ was coined around 1225 to denote both the theology of angels 
(‘any of the nine grades of angels, according to medieval angelology’) 
and the immanent management of worldly affairs. The word thus 
combines theological hierarchies with connotations of classifying and 
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 managing the contaminating diversity of the secular (the worldly). 
Order safeguards against the contamination of the predictable with the 
unpredictable, the measurable with the immeasurable, and the visible 
with the invisible. Building on the classifying and hierarchical connota-
tions of the thirteenth-century term ‘order’, modern disciplinary thought 
and practice endows the economic sphere with nature’s perfection, 
which contrasts with the unpredictability, the deviance, and worse still 
the ‘perversion’ from the norm that goes under the names of contami-
nation and hybridity: the consuming and impure psyche of the human 
animal. Let me explain.
As Bernard Harcourt has recently shown, the leading Physiocrat 
François Quesnay was a medical doctor as well as a founding father of 
the modern discipline of economics: ‘The economic domain, Quesnay 
believed, was governed by natural order and constituted an autono-
mous, self-regulating system that required no external intervention – no 
administration, no police’ (Harcourt 2011: 78). According to Quesnay, 
economics was part of a natural order which we can understand per-
fectly well, in the same way that we are in a position to acquire full 
knowledge of the human body through medical research. Nature’s and 
economy’s rationality contrasts sharply, however, with the unruliness, 
plurality, unpredictability – in short, irrationality (in terms of non-
measurability) of human society and the human psyche.
Here we see how the divide between nature and society – which, as 
we have seen, Latour has analysed as modernity’s prime paradigm – is 
intricately bound up with a Cartesian mind–body divide. How so? 
Nature’s rationality partakes of the mind, whereas human society and 
psychology are here seen to bear the characteristics of the traditionally 
sinful, potentially ill and mortal body. Like the body, society requires 
control, oversight and discipline. The split between economic freedom 
and societal incarceration which characterises the free market society 
of modern America (which is of course the setting of Ellison’s Invisible 
Man) constitutes a socio-political version of the dualism between mind 
and body.
This socio-political split between a rational natural order of econom-
ics and an embodied, plural and potentially deviant society first crystal-
lised in the divide between economic rationality and political despotism 
of Quesnay and his fellow Physiocrats:
The idea of natural order, Quesnay would explain in 1767, inexorably led to 
a political theory of despotism. Natural order in the autonomous economic 
sphere demanded, first, that there be no human intervention in terms of posi-
tive law in the economic realm and, second, that positive law limit itself to 
punishing the deviant. (Harcourt 2011: 93)
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As Harcourt convincingly shows, this split between nature, economic 
reason, on the one hand, and body, society, psychology, on the other, 
characterises social thought from the Physiocrats via the French and 
American Revolutions to the neoliberal paradigm of a rational free 
market.
Against this background of partial demotion of our constitution, 
we can better understand why in a post-Enlightenment, liberal society 
such as Ellison’s mid-twentieth-century East Coast America, whole 
social groups are still subjected to invisibility, to non-recognition. No 
wonder that the narrator of Invisible Man insists on having not only a 
body but also a mind: ‘I am a man of substance, of flesh and bone, fibre 
and liquids – and I might even be said to possess a mind. I am invisible, 
understand, simply because people refuse to see me’ (Ellison 2001: 3). 
As we have seen in the preceding section, invisibility here is a question of 
perception, of the societal refusal to recognise the existence of someone 
or a group.
The reason for this refusal reaches back to various Platonist, Christian, 
humanist as well as Cartesian scientific paradigms which construct our 
constitution along the lines of a mind–body divide. In this division 
mental capacities (foremost language) are allocated to the human and 
an indifferent, as good as invisible body to the animal. As Derrida has 
put it:
It is as if the men representing this configuration had seen without being 
seen, seen the animal without being seen by it, without being seen seen by 
it; without being seen seen naked by someone who, from deep within a life 
called animal, and not only by means of the gaze, would have obliged them to 
recognize, at the moment of address, that this was their affair, their lookout 
[que cela les regardait]. (Derrida 2008: 14)
Derrida’s perhaps rather awkward ‘seen seen’ phrase describes the 
mutuality of social recognition whose absence describes Ellison’s social-
scientific notion of invisibility. Thinking matter is what characterises the 
human: as Derrida has shown, radicalising a Christian as well as human-
ist mind–body divide, ‘Descartes proposes abstracting from his “I am”, 
if I can put it this way, everything that recalls life’ (Derrida 2008: 72). 
The body becomes irrelevant and might as well be non-existent, invis-
ible. Racist stereotyping identifies a given ethnic group with the demoted 
body that stands in for the animal as the occlusion (hence ‘invisibility’) 
and exclusion of the human. As a result of such demotion it is no longer 
seen to be human but animalistic.
In this way the narrator of Ellison’s Invisible Man loses his scholar-
ship and with it his place at his school because he had ventured with 
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his College’s white philanthropist (Mr Norton) to the slum neighbour-
hood of Jim Trueblood. Why is this encounter with poverty disturbing 
to the wasp benefactor? Because it confirms white racist stereotypes 
of African-Americans as animals: the narrator and his classmates fear 
‘the crude, high, plaintively animal sounds of Jim Trueblood’ (Ellison 
2001: 47). Paradoxically, African-Americans only become invisible 
when they reach the ‘high visibility’ of Trueblood. Trueblood is scan-
dalous: ‘Norton literally goes into shock when he is exposed to the 
squalid poverty and moral depravity of the rural blacks who lead lives 
that discredit the reassuring message of the College’s tranquil gentility’ 
(Scheingold 2010: 149). While still being socially visible – apparently 
due to the social and financial support of the white benefactor and his 
school – the narrator and his classmates are embarrassed by the presence 
of Trueblood just outside the precincts of their educational institution:
I didn’t understand in those pre-invisible days that their [i.e. his school’s] 
hate, and mine too, was charged with fear. How all of us at the college hated 
the black-belt people, the ‘peasants’, during those days! We were trying to lift 
them up and they, like Trueblood, did everything to pull us down. (Ellison 
2001: 47)
His school makes the narrator genteel and visible. Hence his College 
days are ‘those pre-invisible days’. He becomes invisible when his school 
expels him, rendering him contaminated and scandalous. Then he falls 
in with the demoted sections of society who, like Trueblood, due to 
their scandalous ‘high visibility’, do not get granted social recognition 
and thus submerge into the ‘invisibility’ of overlooked animal life. Here 
society’s poverty comes to represent a threat to nature’s posited order: 
the contamination of the animal with the human, of what should be 
invisible with what is proudly visible.
The predicament of Invisible Man illustrates that the problem is no 
longer the external, natural world (which after Descartes and Kant has 
become visible, measurable, manageable matter), but the invisible and 
immeasurable intricacies of psychology and society. Here we need dis-
ciplinary rules and regulations to punish those who violate the posited 
natural order of economics.
As Harcourt and Derrida have shown, this preoccupation with the 
potential animal-nature of society emerged in the seventeenth century 
in the wake of Descartes’s and Hobbes’s scientific and social thought. 
Derrida has argued that Hobbes’s sovereign is a beast, precisely because 
the state has to be prepared to deal with its subjects as if they were 
beasts.
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The art of statecraft is monstrous, is beastly: ‘Art is here, like the 
institution itself, like artificiality, like the technical supplement, a sort 
of animal and monstrous naturality’ (Derrida 2009: 27). The nature of 
the beast Leviathan is unnatural due to its societal frame of reference: 
‘but this absolute sovereignty is, as we shall see, anything but natural; it 
is the product of mechanical artificiality, a product of man, an artifact; 
and this is why its animality is that of a monster as prosthetic and artifi-
cial animal, like something made in the laboratory’ (Derrida 2009: 27). 
Politics is a product of a social laboratory set up to tame or purify the 
beast or monster of society.
This is why there exists a close correlation between the criminal and 
the sovereign: the sovereign has to beat the criminal at his or her own 
game. The police employ violence and sovereignty to impose the state 
of exception in order to make what is perceived to be beastly disappear 
into thin air – to render it invisible. In this sense Derrida writes, ‘there is 
between sovereign, criminal, and beast a sort of obscure and fascinating 
complicity, or even a worrying mutual attraction, a worrying familiar-
ity, an unheimlich, uncanny reciprocal haunting’ (Derrida 2009: 17). 
The social sciences engineer the beast of absolute sovereignty so as to 
counteract and thereby turn invisible what has been all too visible in 
feared states of lawlessness and bawdry. As Derrida has pointed out, 
the beast of absolute sovereignty operates through producing fear in 
the populace – fear that accompanies Robespierre’s reign of terror: 
‘Leviathan is the name of an animal-machine designed to cause fear or of 
a prosthetic and state organon, a state as prosthesis, the organ of a state 
prosthesis, what I nickname prosthstatics, which runs on fear and reigns 
by fear’ (Derrida 2009: 39–40). The social scientist adopts the radical 
and potentially violent procedure of a physician or surgeon.
As a physician, the economist or political/legal theorist refers to 
artificial prosthetic measures in order to cure the assumed unnatu-
ral monstrosities that are seen to be societal insufficiencies (such as 
criminal behaviour or mental illness). Quesnay was a court physician 
to Madame de Pompadour and later to Louis XV and was clearly part 
of the ancien régime. As the Encyclopaedia Britannica has stressed, the 
free trade theory – based as it is on an equation between natural order 
and economic law – had, however, a huge influence on the French 
Revolution:
Their [i.e. that of the Physiocrats] free-trade theories were, however, embod-
ied in the Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1786 and in the Revolutionary 
decree of Aug. 29, 1789, freeing the grain trade. The land tax established 
by the Revolutionary Constituent Assembly on Dec. 1, 1790, also followed 
physiocratic precepts.5
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Similarly, Harcourt refers to Tocqueville who ‘famously noted, in La 
ancien régime et la Révolution, that the Physiocrats were the first writers 
who sounded most truly revolutionary toward the end of the ancien 
régime’ (Harcourt 2011: 210–11).6 Robespierre and St Just extended the 
notion of a natural order from the economic sphere to that of society, 
politics and ethics as whole. As Harcourt has shown, Quesnay and 
the Physiocrats advocated legal despotism in the face of deviance from 
the natural order of economics.
The reign of terror’s totalitarianism consisted in extending this visible 
and ‘manageable’ sphere of natural order from economics to society as a 
whole. This raises the question whether the ‘naturalisation’ of not only 
economics but also the societal in its entirety resulted in the dissipation 
of the modernist purification project. Once humanity has been com-
pletely naturalised, the need for a compartmentalisation (or purification) 
of nature and society seems to be lost. This, however, did not eventuate.
On the contrary, Robespierre and his fellow practitioners of terror did 
not declare human society to be contaminated with, or indistinguishable 
from a rational and virtuous state of natural order. The purported split 
between nature and society only increased, because of society’s per-
ceived deviance and defiance in the face of what it should ‘naturally’ (or 
‘sentimentally’) be: i.e. virtuous. (In a different historical context, this is 
also the predicament of Ellison’s Invisible Man, who has been deprived 
of his pre-invisible days; as has been discussed above.) What has been 
economics according to the Physiocrats becomes terror in the hands of 
St Just and Robespierre: an instrument of the natural order which is at 
once free and disciplinarian, chopping off the heads of those who do not 
conform to virtue’s affect.
Büchner’s play Danton’s Death pivots around this equation of terror 
with the natural order as opposed to the perversity of human society set, 
as it is posited here, against nature. Terror does not only work for the 
natural order – it is its own manifestation. Büchner’s St Just identifies 
social with natural order, justifying the reign of terror as follows:
Nature follows her own laws, calmly, irresistibly; man is destroyed wherever 
he comes into conflict with them. A change in the composition of the air, 
a burst of subterranean fire, a shift in the equilibrium of a mass of water – 
an epidemic, a volcanic eruption, a flood kills thousands. And what is the 
outcome? An insignificant, scarcely perceptible ripple on the surface of the 
physical world that would almost have disappeared without a trace were 
it not for the jetsam of corpses. I ask you now: should moral nature be any 
more considerate in her cataclysmic revolutions than physical nature? Does 
an idea not have just as much right as a law in physics to destroy whatever 
stands in its way? (Büchner 1993: 42)7
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Here terror establishes the identity of the order of nature with the 
social order of virtue. The contextualisation of Büchner’s Danton’s 
Death in the mid-nineteenth century thus links it not only with the his-
torical past of the French Revolution, but also with what the equation 
between rational nature and historical necessity (as discussed by Arendt 
above) may hold out for modern politics. As we have seen, the French 
Revolution and Robespierre’s reign of terror were important compo-
nents of an emergent modern and yet violent equation of natural with 
social order. In the following we will see how not only Büchner but also 
Melville and Hawthorne complicate timeless conceptions of both nature 
and society.8
Melville’s Moby Dick and the birth of twentieth-century 
science
In a similar way to Danton’s Death, Melville’s Moby Dick was published 
in the middle of the nineteenth century, articulating fears about moder-
nity’s future while ostensibly being concerned with the past. Effectively, 
the historical background of Moby Dick indirectly encompasses the 
French Revolution. How does Melville achieve this? As Charles Olson 
has discussed in some detail, the novel traces and depicts the ways in 
which whale oil was utilised to produce a certain type of light – a light 
that contributed to a growing readership’s conception of an emerging 
modernity shaped by enlightenment ideas as well as practices of early 
globalisation (in the form of colonialism and imperialism; see Olson 
1967). Derrida correctly argued that the French Revolution gave rise 
to both the Enlightenment idea of human rights and the Leviathan-like 
absolute sovereignty that operates within Robespierre’s reign of terror: 
‘the modern name “terrorism” coming initially, as you know, from 
the Terror of the French Revolution, of a Revolution that was also 
at the origin of all the universal declarations of human rights’ (Derrida 
2009: 30). As we shall see below, following Derrida, Žižek has recently 
emphasised the close correlation between the light of the enlightenment 
and the darker elements of terror.
Žižek, however, pays little attention to the fact that in Robespierre’s 
reign of terror Enlightened rationality gave way to a delirious combina-
tion of terrifying affect and strategic thinking. Robespierre appealed to 
the emotions of his audience in order to establish a break with the cool 
or detached government of the ancien régime. A quasi-religion of the 
affects emerges where feelings overcome the calm of the unemotional 
whose coldness has come to signify a profound lack of virtue. Affect 
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has thus turned into the cornerstone of the revolution’s continual dis-
satisfaction with the status quo: ‘Do they really feel’, Robespierre asks, 
thus highlighting the leading role of the emotions, ‘the full weight of 
that sacred mission, those who, in answer to our justified complaints, 
are content to say coolly: “With all its faults, our constitution is still the 
best that has ever existed” ’ (Robespierre 2007: 8). Žižek nevertheless 
mentions the raison d’être behind this mobilisation of the emotions: 
the willingness to risk one’s life for the greater good of virtue and the 
revolution.
The emotional espousal of sacrifice preconditions the virtuous inde-
pendence from worldly or material interests and concerns: ‘It is against 
the background of this topic of the sovereign acceptance of death that 
one should reread the rhetorical turn often referred to as the proof of 
Robespierre’s “totalitarian” manipulation of his audience’ (Žižek 2007: 
xv). Žižek abstains from questioning the totalitarian character of such 
emotive endorsement of sacrifice, and he refers to Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy, premised on such metaphysics of a loss of embodied life: 
‘The argument only works if, in a Kantian way, one presupposes a pure 
transcendental subject unaffected by this catastrophe – a subject which, 
although non-existing in reality, is operative as a virtual point of refer-
ence’ (Žižek 2007: xvii). The term ‘catastrophe’ here refers to the loss 
of world (through ecological crises or other types of destruction and 
violence) which is the theme of Arendt’s critique of modern science: 
its aspiration to reach the Archimedean point of view from which the 
world becomes fully visible. By not only illuminating our condition but 
rendering it completely translucent modern science also risks harming 
humanity and its environment. Light here might act as a magnifying 
glass, incinerating what it illuminates. Conversely, the social and sci-
entific preoccupation with visibility might lead to treating those who 
are, on account of their societal demotion, highly visible as if they were 
invisible – the subject matter of Ellison’s Invisible Man.
Against this background, Žižek argues that from a Kantian metaphys-
ical perspective the ambivalence of light and Enlightenment – at once 
illuminating and destructive (incinerating what it lights up) – disappears. 
This metaphysical vantage point is of course that of Kant’s radicalisa-
tion of the Cartesian mind–body divide. No wonder that Žižek uses this 
opportunity to launch his attack on contemporary neuroscience (the 
more developed version of his attack has been discussed in Chapter 1), 
arguing that metaphysics remains the last bastion which could defend 
the mind’s full supremacy over the philosophical irrelevance of embod-
ied life.9
Here Žižek faces an unacknowledged problem: at the point at which 
MACK PRINT.indd   94 26/11/2015   11:14
Contamination of Nature with Society    95
philosophy meets politics, embodied social life cannot be easily over-
come. The dark side of Robespierre’s democratic enlightenment comes 
to view: terror’s positive or substantial imposition of force onto those 
who are perceived not to conform to virtue and reason. Žižek asks ‘how 
to translate/inscribe the democratic explosion into the positive “police” 
order, how to impose on social reality a new lasting order’ (Žižek 2007: 
xxxv), avoiding to remain ensconced in the virtual sphere of Kantian 
transcendental philosophy.
Instead, he returns to political reality with a vengeance, appraising the 
mind’s ‘virtuous’ reign over the mere body of society. In a satirical mode 
he sides with contemporary religious fundamentalists, who perpetuate 
Robespierre’s affect-ridden espousal of virtue’s reign of terror over what 
is deviant, and non-orthodox, the enemy of a democracy conceived in 
terms of a homogeneous group. In other words, they represent Carl 
Schmitt’s fascist version of demos; manifested in totalitarian form as 
the ethnic or religious or class coherence of sovereignty: ‘Happy we 
who live under cynical public-opinion manipulators, not under the 
sincere Muslim fundamentalists ready to fully commit themselves to 
their projects . . . What better proof of the ethico-political misery of 
our epoch whose ultimate mobilising motif is the mistrust of virtue!’ 
(Žižek 2007: xxxix). Without acknowledging it, Žižek resurrects the 
philosophical tradition of constructing natural order as model for the 
economy and society at large. The crucial point here is that nature has 
become a synonym for rationality. Nature as product of reason’s con-
struction rules over the unruliness of a potentially deviant, unruly, non- 
homogeneous social body – the traditional body politic which Hobbes 
clearly conceptualised in his Leviathan.
The way in which natural order manifests is still varied. As we have 
seen, in the context of the reign of terror, sentiments of virtue evidence 
natural justice. In his late novella, Billy Budd, Sailor, Melville narrates 
the working of natural order in a different ambience: that of the counter-
revolutionary English navy. Here the harmless, loyal, good-natured and 
naive sailor Billy Budd arouses the suspicion of being in league with the 
French Revolution. As an apparent secret agent of the French Revolution 
he thus represents danger and the violation of the natural law of justice 
in the context of counter-revolutionary English naval politics.
As a ‘dangerous man’ (Melville 2001: 141), the harmless sailor turns 
into the opposite: rapacious and animalistic nature which disorders the 
order of natural law – which is of course the proper sphere of human 
reason. The construction of the innocuous as dangerous is ironically 
the product of a seemingly rational but in actual fact deeply irrational 
mind. Claggart, whose mind constructs such fictional but effective 
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 distortions (Billy Budd indeed acts the revolutionary by killing the accus-
ing Claggart in a single blow), resembles the monomania of Captain 
Ahab in Moby Dick. Hidden emotions drive the irrational actions of an 
apparently rational mind:
Though the man’s even temper and discreet bearing would seem to intimate 
a mind peculiarly subject to the law of reason, not the less in heart he would 
seem to riot in complete exemption from that law, having apparently little 
to do with reason further than to employ it as an ambidexter implement for 
effecting the irrational. That is to say: Toward the accomplishment of an aim 
which in wantonness of atrocity would seem to partake of the insane, he will 
direct a cool judgment sagacious and sound. (Melville 2001: 128)
Whereas during the reign of terror the display of virtuous affect pro-
vided proof positive of rational justice, in the context of the English navy 
(fighting France and its revolution) coolness and the absence of emotions 
evidences a rational and just mind.
The element that triggers moral anxiety and panic remains, however, 
the same: the feared contamination of the animalistic with the human, 
which comes to represent the dreaded deviance from a natural order of 
either a revolutionary or counter-revolutionary conception of the mind.
As we shall see, the rationality of Moby Dick’s Ahab is a pretext for 
his emotional instability too: the economic quest for the profitable oil of 
whales covers the real motive of revenge. Ahab’s monomaniacal desire 
for revenge quasi-naturally, or, in other words, ‘organically’, grows out 
of having his leg amputated by the whale. The latter will from then on 
bear the name ‘Moby Dick’ and the apprehended contamination of the 
human and the animal occurs – what Derrida has called ‘the becoming-
whale of Ahab in Moby Dick’ (Derrida 2009: 69). Strikingly, Claggart’s 
insane or obsessive evil is a product of nature too.
A reversal of the meanings of science and nature has taken place. 
According to Melville nature and its scientific exploration no longer 
presents a proportional, stable or predictable structure: ‘Now something 
such a one was Claggart, in whom was the mania of an evil nature, not 
engendered by vicious training or corrupting books or licentious living, 
but born with him and innate, in short “a depravity according to nature” ’ 
(Melville 2001: 128). The narrator spells out that it is not human knowl-
edge or habit or indulgence which causes Claggart’s malevolence but 
nature. Crucially, in Moby Dick the whale symbolises nature, which here 
too provokes Ahab’s violent rush for revenge.10 In both Moby Dick and 
Billy Budd, Sailor, Melville dismantles or dismasts the architecture of 
natural order which, under the pretext of justice and rationality, justifies 
either emotive-revolutionary or cool counter-revolutionary violence.
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In her intriguing reading of Melville’s Billy Budd, Sailor Arendt exclu-
sively discusses ‘the men of the French Revolution’ and ‘their proposi-
tion that man is good in a state of nature and becomes wicked in society’ 
(Arendt 1973: 83). She here clearly articulates the nature–society divide 
which (as has been discussed above) partakes of a Hobbesian and 
Cartesian mind–body opposition.
Perhaps the most astonishing of Melville’s achievements is to have 
undermined the divide to which Arendt refers and which, according 
to Latour, establishes the impossible ground of modernity’s purifica-
tion project: the supposed purity of nature as opposed to the potential 
depravity of human society. Nature has traditionally been associated 
with the concept of science and up to the mid-nineteenth century the 
revealing term ‘natural philosophy’ denoted what we now understand 
by science. The ethics of Melville’s literature questions the nature–
society divide that has shaped our understanding of science.
The term ‘science’ too easily evokes the illusion of a natural and 
ordered sphere that has been freed from its messy societal context. What 
Arendt neglects, however, is that this divide between natural order and 
disorderly humanity does not only prove to be foundational for modern 
revolutionary but also modern conservative social thought: for instance, 
Melville critiques the natural order of political obedience and hierarchy 
in the figure of Captain Ahab.
Why, however, does a discussion of Melville’s Moby Dick contribute 
towards establishing an innovative perspective on Latour’s famous con-
ception of a spurious construction which divides society from nature? 
As we have seen in the preceding chapter, this divide is bound up 
with another one: that between mind and body. Following Descartes, 
Kant established a new definition of freedom premised on the mind’s 
autonomy from merely empirical or, in other words, embodied life. 
According to both Adorno’s and more recently Derrida’s analysis, Kant 
identifies embodied life with the animal (Adorno 1997: 80): ‘Nothing, 
Adorno says, is more abhorrent, more hateful, more odious (verhasster) 
to Kantian man than the memory of a resemblance between human and 
animality (die Erinnerung an die Tierähnlichkeit des Menschen)’ (Derrida 
2008: 103). As Derrida goes on to make clear, ‘Adorno takes things much 
further: for an idealist system, he says, animals virtually play the same 
role as Jews did for the fascist system’ (Derrida 2008: 103). Kant indeed 
identified Jews with the opposite of freedom and autonomy (see Mack 
2003: 23–41), becoming for him symbolic placeholders of heteronomy. 
In this context of excluding the animal from the human, Kant develops 
his notion of freedom in terms of the liberation from our (as he sees it 
animal-like) inclination to depend on objects in the empirical world.
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Kant’s notion of autonomy clearly has a liberating potential, because 
it can demystify as mentally constructed what we may have taken to be 
natural.11 To say, as Judith Butler rightly does,12 that the material or 
embodied is always already preconceived in a signifying system, does 
not, however, touch upon Kant’s and Descartes’s prioritisation of the 
mental over the corporeal and relatedly the demonisation of the societal 
body in the face of nature’s assumed rationality and virtue. The latter 
is part of what preceded the foundation of modern science: natural 
philosophy.
Following Adorno, Derrida has highlighted the violence that goes with 
such opposition between the natural and the societal, between order and 
chaos, between man and animal: ‘And as such a fascism begins when-
ever one insults an animal, even the animal in man. Authentic idealism 
(der echte Idealismus) consists in insulting the animal in the human or in 
treating the human as animal’ (Derrida 2008: 103). This exclusion of the 
animal from concepts of the human is founded upon various oppositions 
between self and other – as they play out in the mind–body divide or in 
the contrast between natural order and societal chaos or, conversely, 
in the division between the merely empirical, chaotic matter of nature 
and the refined cerebral entity that goes under the name of culture. 
Throughout his work Derrida ‘has been emphasizing the fragility and 
porosity of this limit between nature and culture’ (Derrida 2009: 15). 
Melville’s Moby Dick undermines this binary construction by highlight-
ing the contamination of human and animal as epitomised by the whale.
Indeed, Moby Dick radically questions the tradition of natural phi-
losophy or physical science which presupposes rational and virtuous 
conceptions of nature. At its very opening Ishmael, the narrator of the 
novel, acknowledges the irrationality or the ‘spleen’ of his constitution 
which makes him seek diversions by taking off to sea: ‘It is a way I have 
of driving off the spleen, and regulating circulation’ (Melville 1992: 3). 
In an as yet insufficiently appreciated irony, the narrator does not so 
much escape his internal spleen but rather confronts a much bigger form 
of madness in the figure of the captain of the ship whose crew he decides 
to join (Captain Ahab of the Pequod).
This pervasive sense of irony joins ‘the problematic two-part structure’ 
(Bryant 1998: 69) of the novel. Reviewing the literature on Moby Dick, 
John Bryant has maintained that given the novel’s ‘flip-flopping from 
Ishmael to Ahab – from comedy to tragedy and from lyric meditation to 
drama – scholars might locate the cause of the novel’s structural oddities 
in its actual composition and assign differently structured sections to 
different phases of the composition’ (Bryant 1998: 68). Departing from 
the scholarly consensus, the following shifts the focus of analysis away 
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from the two main protagonists, Ishmael and Ahab, to nature which 
is the secret prime mover of the novel and of which ‘the whale’ is the 
symbol.
Crucially, the image of nature here differs from the natural order of 
traditional scientific discourse. In Moby Dick nature appears unhinged 
rather than ordered. The suicidal mental disorder of Ishmael and Ahab’s 
self-destructive obsession with revenge meet not only in the generic term 
‘madness’ but also in the inscrutable unpredictability of nature which is 
as unstable as the sea. Monomaniacal feelings of revenge drive Ahab to 
kill the whale which deprived him of one of his legs in a primal act of 
violent counteraction – a classic case of the hunted turned hunter:
‘it was Moby Dick that dismasted me; Moby Dick that brought me to this 
dead stump I stand on now. Aye, aye,’ he shouted with a terrific, loud, animal 
sob, like that of the heart-stricken moose; ‘Aye, aye; it was that accursed 
whale that razeed me; made a poor pegging lubber of me for ever and a day!’ 
(Melville 1992: 177)
Here natural philosophy’s (from Descartes to Kant to Heidegger and 
Lacan) various divisions between man and animal collapse: humanity 
transmogrifies into the animal – the object of human exploitation – ‘the 
heart-stricken moose’.
Ahab’s feelings of pain and loss have later come to be classified in 
neuroscientific findings. Therein they have been categorised by the 
term ‘sensory ghost’. Ahab still feels the presence of the leg which the 
whale took away. His self-characterisation as a ‘pegging lubber’ refers 
to his need of an artificial peg leg for which he summons a carpenter 
in chapter 108. The carpenter describes the predicament of the sensory 
ghost from what he heard by hearsay: ‘how that a dismasted man never 
entirely loses the feeling of his old spar, but it will still be pricking him 
at times’ (Melville 1992: 513). On a neuroscientific level, Ahab’s bodily 
illusion of the presence of his missing leg causes his obsession with the 
quasi-intangibility and invisibility of the whale (as John Lehrer has 
shown, Melville here anticipates Weir Mitchell’s medical discovery 
of the ‘sensory ghost’ symptom; see Lehrer 2007: 13). He commits to 
chasing the whale in a way that parallels his searing and searching pain 
caused by the persistent feeling of the leg of which Moby Dick deprived 
him. The past presence of the leg disturbs the present, which is that of 
the leg’s absence. A disorienting and disordered blurring takes place 
which confuses and contaminates distinctions between animal and man, 
between the actual and the virtual, between present and past. Here we 
encounter nature as disorderly force – a force that mutilates and pro-
vokes tyrannical rule and obsession for revenge.
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The whale Moby Dick in fact gives rise to a new conception of nature 
not in terms of natural order and physical laws but of intangible and 
unpredictable life (biology) which resides invisibly in the depth of the 
sea. Melville indeed makes clear his divergence from traditional scien-
tific conceptions of nature, based as they were on the physics of natural 
philosophy:
And when we consider that other theory of the natural philosophers, that all 
earthly hues – every stately or lovely emblazoning – the sweet tinges of sunset 
skies and woods; yea, and the gilded velvets of the butterfly cheeks of young 
girls; all these are subtle deceits, not actually inherent in substances, but only 
laid on from without, so all deified Nature absolutely paints like the harlot, 
whose allurements cover nothing but the charnel house within; and when 
we proceed further, and consider that the mystical cosmetic which produces 
every one of her hues, the great principle of light, for ever remains colour-
less in itself, and if operating without medium upon matter, would touch all 
objects, even tulips and roses, with its blank tinge, pondering all this, the 
palsied universe lies before us like a leper; and like wilful travellers in Lepland 
who refuse to wear coloured and colouring glasses upon their eyes, so the 
wretched infidel gazes himself blind at the monumental white shroud that 
wraps all the prospect around him. And of all these things the Albino whale 
was the symbol. Wonder ye at the fiery hunt? (Melville 1992: 212)
This important quotation highlights the collapse of a traditional scien-
tific view which is based on the idea of natural order. What is crucial 
here is that the unmasking of the illusion of natural order preconditions 
Melville’s egalitarian politics. The latter casts Ahab’s political theology 
of revenge and unconditional fealty to the sovereign into the dark ambi-
ence of madness.
With Ahab’s mad but effective calls for absolute authority – untouched 
by critical thinking – Melville parodies the famous medieval concept 
of the king’s two bodies, which Schmitt argues still informs secular 
notions of sovereignty: ‘There is one God that is Lord over the earth and 
one Captain that is lord over the Pequod – On deck!’ (Melville 1992: 
517). Ironically it is not Ahab the sovereign ruler over the ship but the 
intangible and disorderly creature of the sea which resembles divinity. 
We read of the whale’s first appearance in the following revelatory 
terms: ‘the grand god revealed himself, sounded, and went out of sight’ 
(Melville 1992: 597). The intangibility of the whale – its appearance 
on and submergence below water – gives rise to a supernatural sense of 
ephemerality.
What enrages Ahab is the apparent invisibility of nature of which 
the whale is a symbol. At the point where natural phenomena turn 
disorderly, invisible or indecipherable they seem to call into question the 
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political theology of the sovereign’s apparent omniscience and omnipo-
tence: ‘Would now the wind but had a body; but all the things that most 
exasperate and outrage mortal man, all these things are bodiless, but 
only bodiless as objects, not as agent’ (Melville 1992: 614). This invis-
ible and yet embodied entity constitutes animal nature – nature beyond 
the grasp of the mind’s construction of a natural order or natural law. 
The whale is clearly an embodied form of nature. Nature here, however, 
resembles the potential deviance of society, of the human mind that has 
not abandoned its animal constitution. The whale is an embodied agent 
of animal instinct and impetus but yet cannot be pinned down, cannot 
be the target of a hunt as a clearly visible object could. The whale, 
however, turns invisible when it submerges its body into the depth of 
the sea.
This bodily lack of visible objectification highlights the dangerous 
and at the same time sacred quality of untamed and untameable animal 
nature: it differs from ordered, controlled and controllable nature; in 
other words, it avoids becoming the ‘matter’ of Cartesian science. The 
novel endows Moby Dick indeed with an angelic aura of madness: ‘but 
maddened by yesterday’s fresh irons that corroded in him, Moby Dick 
seemed combinedly possessed by all the angels that fell from heaven’ 
(Melville 1992: 618). The whale’s madness in fact reflects that of Ahab.
Ahab’s revenge on the whale turns out to be self-destructive, because 
the line dividing man and animal is illusory, is actually non-existent. 
This becomes amply apparent in the brilliant but so far unanalysed 
collation of Ahab’s human cry earlier in the novel (below deck) and 
the whale’s animalistic shriek towards its end: ‘Ahab descried the spout 
again, and instantly from the three mast-heads three shrieks went up as 
if the tongue of fire had voiced it’ (Melville 1992: 615). Within two lines 
the text enfolds humanity’s ‘descrying’ with the shrieking of animals. 
The supernatural quality of the ‘tongue of fire’ bestows not so much the 
effect of order but of gothic disorder.
Melville’s usage of the supernatural derives from his friend Nathaniel 
Hawthorne’s gothic techniques of defamiliarisation. As Lauren Berlant 
has shown, Hawthorne’s ‘gothic semiotics of historical transmission’ 
in his ‘tales locates the power over the American historical materials in 
strange and deformed old crones, implying that the past is not our heim-
lich origin, but a place of potential exile from understanding, control, 
and identification’ (Berlant 1991: 37). As is well known, the German 
word heimlich does not only refer to the noun ‘home’ but also to the 
order and security associated with being at home, in a secure, tangible, 
known and structured space. Melville, however, does not merely copy 
Hawthorne’s gothic semiotics. Instead, he transfers from the historical 
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context of Hawthorne’s writings to the scientific matter which is the 
natural philosophy of ‘the whale’. By describing nature in a gothic key, 
Melville transforms the traditional scientific (or natural philosophy) 
conception of nature from the orderly to the uncanny.
Rather than establishing a model of proportionality, rationality, 
health and sanity, the passage above illuminates the horrors lurking 
behind the façade of such illusions of colourful, beautiful, cohesive, and 
orderly nature to which human society should conform. As Harcourt 
has shown, this idea of a natural order informs not only scientific but 
also socio-economic practices from the eighteenth century onwards. 
Harcourt ‘reveals how the notion of natural order from the eighteenth 
century evolved into one of market efficiency at its most sophisticated, 
erudite, scientific theorisation – the version that achieved multiple Nobel 
prizes, prizes that have validated and confirmed in the public imagina-
tion the superiority of the supposed unfettered market’ (Harcourt 2011: 
232). Melville’s Moby Dick demystifies the orderliness and freedom of 
the market that produces, exchanges, and consumes whale oil.
Moby Dick does so not only in the figure of Ahab but more impor-
tantly in its depiction of nature (of which the whale is a symbol), which 
is far from guaranteeing the supposed order of free markets in the 
novel. As Harcourt has shown, free markets have become increasingly 
associated in the public imagination as orderly, proportional, ‘natural’, 
whereas the social has turned into a potential problem of deviancy and 
criminality – in need of discipline and punishment. In Melville’s novel, 
by contrast, Ahab’s revengeful and disproportional monomania does 
not deviate from nature (i.e. the whale). Rather Ahab’s insanity develops 
from and radicalises the natural force to which it has been subjected (i.e. 
Moby Dick’s amputation of Ahab’s leg).
Conclusion: the collapse of natural order
Where the Enlightenment proclaimed modernity as the future promise 
of full knowledge, visibility, measurability and understanding, Melville’s 
magnum opus narrates the ‘collapse of knowledge and of understand-
ing’ (Peretz 2003: 30). Its main subject matter is the economic hunt for 
the oil of whales: ‘In general, the mission of sperm-whale hunts is an 
economic one – to kill as many whales as possible in order to extract 
oil from their blubber, oil that will be used to light up the dark nights 
of the inhabitants of the land’ (Peretz 2003: 42). As we have seen, this 
economic mission is also a rational and educational one, because it 
literally promises to enlighten darkness by dint of the exploitation of 
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sperm-whale oil (producing the light that makes possible the reading 
of the novel at night). Yet Ahab’s economic–rational quest – based on 
the enlightened mind’s natural order – undergoes a collapse into the 
disorder associated with madness. Ahab obsesses about revenge rather 
than economic gain or an increase of intellectual light fuelled by nature’s 
oil. It is this turn from self-proclaimed reason to monomaniacal violence 
which highlights the novel’s anxiety about modernity’s future. Peretz 
has recently emphasised this aspect of Melville’s mid-nineteenth-century 
work:
It is precisely in this remaining open of the enigmatic past beyond its own 
context that these historical events communicate and resonate even with 
chronologically ‘later’ events – the destruction of the Indians is linked to 
the disaster of the Jews, for example – and thus a book like Moby Dick 
can be said to testify to twentieth-century events, that is, to speak for them 
and to communicate the horrible excess beyond linear historical time which 
was revealed through their occurrence. It is because of this that there is no 
essential difference between Moby Dick’s testifying to ‘literary’ events and its 
testifying to ‘historical’ events. (Peretz 2003: 94)
The name of the ship Pequod refers to and commemorates the exter-
mination of the Pequods. In doing so it also establishes an intertextual 
point of reference to Timothy Dwight’s eighteenth-century poem ‘The 
Destruction of the Pequods’, ‘which chronicles the annihilation of the 
Pequod tribe by the Puritans in a swamp just outside Fairfield in 1637, 
in response to the murderous activities of Indian “savages” ’ (Giles 
2011: 63). In Melville’s novel, the Pequods – bearing the name of the 
whaling ship – become associated with the ‘whale’ and thereby traverse 
traditional, distinct boundaries between man and animal. From the 
innovative perspective of Melville’s magnum opus various distinctions 
collapse – whether they are those between nature and society or those 
between past and future. Ahab’s cry portends disasters to come not 
only within the plot of the novel but also those which are visible on the 
historical horizon of the twentieth century. The namelessness of Ahab’s 
quest also fuses with the white blankness of the animal – ‘the whale’ 
resembles ‘a ray of light, to be sure without an object to color, therefore 
blankness itself’ (Melville 1992: 220). Ahab’s cry of light incinerates 
what it illuminates.
Another American novel of the mid-nineteenth century inscribes such 
a portentous cry: ‘A scarlet letter or a scar(let) letter is the very definition 
of the cry’ (Peretz 2003: 58). According to Peretz, the cry in Melville’s 
Moby Dick is addressed to Hawthorne, author of The Scarlet Letter (to 
whom the book is dedicated):
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Indeed I would suggest that a certain vision of literary history is implied in 
this exchange of cries, a non-Bloomian vision of literary history, which is 
not structured as an Oedipal scene with the anxiety of influence inscribed in 
it, but rather as a history where the past calls out as a wound or a cry that 
can only be heard and transmitted to the future through a response in kind, 
through an additional wail. (Peretz 2003: 58)
Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter and Melville’s Moby Dick indeed share 
repeated evocations of shrieks and cries. Strikingly it is not the victim 
who has to bear the scarlet letter – Hester Prynne – but the priest Arthur 
Dimmesdale who succumbs to crying under the weight of unacknowl-
edged guilt:
Mr Dimmesdale was overcome with a great horror of mind, as if the universe 
were gazing at a scarlet token on his naked breast, right over the heart. On 
that spot, in very truth, there was, and there had long been, the gnawing and 
poisonous tooth of bodily pain. Without any effort of his own will, or power 
to restrain himself, he shrieked aloud; an outcry that went pealing through 
the night, and was beaten back from one house to another, and reverberated 
from the hills in the background; as if a company of devils, detecting such 
misery and terror in it, had made a plaything of the sound, and were bandy-
ing to and fro. (Hawthorne 1970: 130)
Within this scream the scarlet letter pierces through the surface of reality 
and permeates the world in its entirety: ‘as if the universe were gazing 
at the scarlet token’. This reduction of our experience to one hue, as 
it were, is what Arendt has in mind when she writes about the loss of 
worldliness. Melville elaborates on this reduction of experience while 
discussing what he calls Captain Ahab’s monomania. Monomania char-
acterises the shrinking of our perception and experience of human and 
natural diversity to one interest, one characteristic, one mission or obses-
sion (which is the subject matter of Don DeLillo’s late  twentieth-century 
parody of mathematics in his novel Ratner’s Star). This reduction of 
diversity to homogeneity is the panicked response to our disorderly 
animal nature which cannot be fully or smoothly suppressed. The cry 
or shriek articulates the return of the repressed, violating the mind’s 
construction of nature in terms of order and proportion.
The crucial point here is that it is not so much the phenomenon of 
madness – which binds the different personalities Ishmael and Ahab 
to one common characteristic – but a new perspective on nature which 
allows for vistas of despair in the face of violence. Both Moby Dick and 
The Scarlet Letter trace the societal mechanisms of violence to ideational 
constructions that establish sharp distinctions between animal nature 
and ordered nature, between sin (adultery in the Puritan context of 
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Hawthorne’s Scarlet Letter) and purity. The collapse of natural order 
conceptually as well as formally preconditions a peculiar modernist style 
which ruins stable positions of either order or reliable perspective.
Notes
 1. In this way Jack Williamson’s study (1973) does not discuss Wells and the 
ideologies of progress which were the trademark of the Enlightenment as 
well as the French Revolution.
 2. ‘die Revolution ist wie Saturn, sie frißt ihre eigenen Kinder’ (Büchner 1988: 
84).
 3. As Simon J. James has pointed out in a conversation with the author, the 
reason for neglecting politics and the French Revolution in Wells’s early 
1897 novel about science might well be that his later political works are 
rather disappointing. Critics tried to avoid questions of politics in Wells’s 
better received earlier fictions on science so as not to evoke the later politi-
cal novels which do not live up to the literary quality of his early oeuvre 
focusing on science (but which does not ignore socio-political questions).
 4. McLean reads the novel in didactic terms as follows: ‘The didactic purpose 
of Griffin’s bizarre behaviour should be understood in the context of 
Wells’s insistence that scientists must endeavour to facilitate effective com-
munication with the rest of society, or else risk alienating the ever prolif-
erating public sources of funding for scientific research’ (McLean 2009: 
87). Rather than being a didactic novel putting on public display the social 
benefits of scientific research, The Invisible Man questions the expectations 
public opinion has invested in science from the Enlightenment and nine-
teenth century onwards.
 5. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/458805/physiocrat (last 
viewed 23 August 2014).
 6. Harcourt goes on to show how this split between nature/reason and society/
psychology shapes not only the French but also the American Revolution. 
He emphasises ‘the important role of liberal economic thought in American 
discourse at the turn of the nineteenth century and the significance not only 
of Adam Smith, but also that of the Physiocrats’ (Harcourt 2011: 210–11).
 7. ‘Die Natur folgt ruhig und unwiderstehlich ihren Gesetzen, der Mensch 
wird vernichtet, wo er mit ihnen in Konflikt kommt. Eine Veränderung 
in den Bestandteilen der Luft, ein Auflodern des tellurischen Feuers, ein 
Schwanken in dem Gleichgewicht einer Wassermasse und eine Seuche, ein 
vulkanischer Ausbruch, eine Überschwemmung begraben Tausende. Was 
ist das Resultat? Eine unbedeutende im großen Ganzen kaum bemerkbare 
Veränderung der physischen Natur, die fast spurlos vorübergegangen sein 
würde, wenn nicht Leichen auf ihrem Wege läge’ (Büchner 1988: 103).
 8. For discussion of a later, early twentieth-century, philosophical critique 
of the timeless in the thought of Bergson, Hannah Arendt, Husserl and 
Heidegger see Baars (2012).
 9. ‘For today’s cognitivist analytic philosopher, after the cognitivist turn, 
philosophy has finally reached the maturity of serious reasoning, leaving 
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behind metaphysical speculations. For a hermeneutician, analytical phi-
losophy is, on the contrary, the end of philosophy, the final loss of a true 
philosophic stance, the transformation of philosophy into another positive 
science’ (Žižek 2007: xviii).
10. As Pramod K. Nayar has recently pointed out: ‘Driven, monomaniacal 
and tempestuous, Ahab hates being a disabled captain. Yet, as we see the 
novel’s plot progressing, we understand that Ahab controls everything on 
the ship. Ahab is an embodiment of the ‘reformulation’ pattern of the disa-
bled individual’s coping with hegemonic views of the male or human body’ 
(Nayar 2014: 105).
11. In this way Judith Butler has analysed the social construction of what may 
be assumed to be ‘natural’: gender and sexuality. She does so by referring 
to Kant’s transcendental method (see Butler 2004: 258–77).
12. Significantly, she does so while abstaining from a Kantian prioritisation of 
the mental over the embodied: ‘It must be possible to concede and affirm 
an array of “materialities” that pertain to the body, that which is signified 
by the domains of biology, anatomy, physiology, hormonal and chemical 
composition, illness, age, weight, metabolism, life and death. None of this 
can be denied. But the undeniability of these “materialities” in no way 
implies what it means to affirm them, indeed, what interpretive matrices 
condition, enable and limit that necessary affirmation’ (Butler 2004: 151).
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4Contaminating Judgement with its 
Suspension: Guilt and Punishment in 
Walter Benjamin, Herman Melville 
and Henry James
Introduction: Agamben, Benjamin and the contamination of 
modernity
Natural philosophy or, in other words, traditional science and some 
strands within literary criticism have been preoccupied with the explo-
ration of orders and patterns – establishing clear but often spurious 
boundaries between genres such as comedy and tragedy and between life 
worlds such as society and nature.
Scientists and natural philosophers set out to discover order in nature. 
According to Bruno Latour, this traditional concern with nature’s order 
informs our modern conception of science. As proof of this persistent 
privileging of pure categorisations and classifications Latour discusses 
what he calls a modern division between the assumed perfection of 
nature and the unpredictability of human society and psychology. 
Constructions of a virtuous or perfected society – and this equally holds 
true for socio-economic blueprints derived from either a conservative or 
revolutionary ambience – took this traditional scientific conception of a 
natural order as the model for various social theories and practices, from 
the French revolution’s quasi-natural disposition of the sentiment of 
virtue to the counter-revolutionary categorisation of social hierarchies. 
Economics is a key social science in this context, because it transposes 
notions of natural order onto a homogeneous conception of society: one 
that mirrors the mentally constructed order of nature. Society here turns 
into a mental model of nature which is posited to be ordered, govern-
mental, or, in contemporary parlance, ‘manageable’.
In his recent study The Kingdom and the Glory, Giorgio Agamben 
goes so far to argue that ‘modern biopolitics up to the current triumph 
of economy and government over every other aspect of social life’ can be 
traced to what he calls an ‘economic theology, which replaces’ political 
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theology’s ‘transcendence of sovereign power’ (i.e. God as sovereign) 
‘with the idea of an oikonomia, conceived as an immanent ordering’ 
(Agamben 2012: 1). The notion ‘biopolitics’ here describes the imposi-
tion of a quasi-scientific order of nature onto the ethical–political core 
of human sociability. The reference to Homo Sacer in the subtitle of The 
Kingdom and the Glory limns the centrality of biopower in this discussion 
of a theology turned immanent that pervades modern economic discourse 
and practice, and which Bernard Harcourt has recently analysed as the 
illusion or myth of ‘free markets’ (as has been discussed in Chapter 3).
Notions such as modernity or biopower are exposed to contamina-
tions with what their apparent negative is supposed to be. The figure 
of contamination indeed evokes negativity not in a Hegelian dialectical 
or plastic way (as recently advocated by the neo-Hegelian philosopher 
Malabou) where the negative bends or turns into the positive. Rather 
than a movement from one to the other, here we encounter the 
co- presence of two or more opposites that contaminate each other. 
Agamben’s recent discussion of economics is deeply indebted to the 
work of Walter Benjamin who in fact develops a non-Hegelian approach 
to time and history.
Crucially, Benjamin analyses the dubiousness of purportedly modern 
understandings of a rational economic order, which under scientific 
investigation turns out to be more disordered and unscientific than has 
been acknowledged in some traditional theories and practices. Indeed, 
Benjamin proposes an alternative image of modernity, which is not 
hierarchical and that confounds linear or progressive understandings of 
time. His notion ‘Now-time’ (Jetztzeit) contaminates the past with the 
present and future: it denotes the co-presence of different temporalities. 
In the Arcades Project he detects in the buildings of modernity what he 
calls ‘images in the collective consciousness in which the new is perme-
ated with the old (Benjamin 1999: 4). These wish images undermine 
the hierarchical prioritisation of the present over and above the past, 
because they evidence dissatisfaction with current modes of production 
and social organisation. Being unsatisfied with the present, they turn 
to the past, commingling the present as rejection with the past as an 
opening that could liberate the current state of affairs from past and 
future injustices.
History thus emerges as the renewing force of the absent, insignificant 
and forgotten. Modernity describes the birth of what has been sup-
pressed and repressed as scandalous, infectious or contaminating: it 
instantiates the promotion of the demoted historical past. This attempt 
to rescue those who have been marginalised and forgotten is affiliated 
with an idiosyncratic type of theology: one that avoids dogmas and 
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a specific doctrine. As Miguel Vatter has recently argued, Benjamin 
attempts to free what Agamben would later call ‘bare life’ from any 
dogmatic or mentally constructed notions of guilt:
If life is guilty by nature, then it deserves to be punished, to expiate its guilt. 
The punishment for disobeying God and eating of the fruit of the tree of 
knowledge is death. For Benjamin, this conception of a natural life of guilt is 
entirely ‘mythical,’ even though it is a mythology that also traverses mono-
theistic religions, including Judaism. (Vatter 2011: 219)
Benjamin, however, contaminates one aspect of monotheistic religions 
with its opposite: he argues that the messianic strain in Judaism is 
not concerned with establishing mythical notions of either guilt or 
punishment but with overturning such disciplinary mechanisms and 
procedures.
This holds true also for secular versions of a theological–mythical 
paradigm: with a despairing gesture, Benjamin saw in the reinforce-
ment of a Kantian divide between freedom (the intellectual/spiritual) 
and nature (the profane) its messianic overcoming (Mack 2003). To 
reinforce this dualism between the rational and the natural means to 
accept a certain level of violence. The violence in question is perpetrated 
on the demoted body of the profane. This demotion of nature is a crucial 
theme in Benjamin’s book about Baroque tragic drama and in his essays 
‘Capitalism as Religion’ and ‘Critique of Violence’. The disgust with 
nature, the body, and the profane brings about the desire to read the 
world allegorically. Baroque allegory, in Benjamin’s understanding, 
immanently transcends the immanent to the point of annihilating it. This 
is exactly what he perceived to be operative in the non-signifying eco-
nomic transactions that characterise the secular religion of capitalism.
Related to capitalist economics as it emerged within the Christianity 
of the Reformation and fully developed into the commodification of life 
at the end of the nineteenth century as analysed in the Arcades Project, 
the reformationist aesthetics of the baroque destroys the profane bodies. 
This commandment of destroying the profane rules the workings of 
allegory, just as it seems to motivate the abrupt coming of a redeemed 
society: ‘The human body could be no exception to the commandment 
which ordered the destruction of the organic so that the true meaning, 
as it was written and ordained might be picked up from its fragments’ 
(Benjamin 1977: 92).1 As a self-enclosed, un-contaminated entity, the 
profane is deprived of meaning.
Such absence of signification engulfs the whole of nature (human 
nature included) into a maelstrom of guilt. Benjamin foregrounds this 
point in his essay on Goethe’s late novel Elective Affinities in such terms: 
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‘With the disappearance of supernatural life in man, his natural life turns 
into guilt, even without his committing an act contrary to ethics. For 
now it is in league with mere life, which manifests itself in man as guilt’ 
(Benjamin 1996: 308). Agamben turns Benjamin’s notion ‘mere life’ 
into his ever so slightly changed coinage ‘bare life’. Both expressions, 
however, refer to life as a pure material, embodied entity uncontami-
nated by intellectual or spiritual connotations. It is only on the basis of 
such reduction of life to a zero-point of purity where it is nothing but the 
biological that the mind emerges in absolute distinction from the body 
as punitive force. Here the cerebral becomes indistinguishable from 
politics or power. It exerts violence (what Benjamin calls ‘the mythical’) 
by publicly upholding concepts of guilt and punishment which can then 
be superimposed socially (by the police, by medical authorities and/or 
courts of law and so forth) on the lives of those who are categorised as 
being purely alive.
In his 1921 essay ‘Capitalism as Religion’ Benjamin analyses capitalist 
economics as such a cerebral–mythical–theological superimposition of 
guilt onto those who have fallen into debt. Schuld, the German word for 
debt, means both being financially indebted and being legally as well as 
morally defined as guilty. Benjamin argues that rather than working for 
a change of heart, Christianity heralds the utter destruction of profane 
life. Christianity does so when it has become identical with capitalism, 
declaring the whole of life guilty so that redemption can only be attained 
in complete despair:
Capitalism is entirely without precedent, in that it is a religion which offers 
not the reform of existence but its complete destruction. It is the expansion 
of despair, until despair becomes a religious state of the world in the hope 
that this will lead to salvation. God’s transcendence is at an end. But he is not 
dead; he has been incorporated into human existence. (Benjamin 1996: 289)2
It is human existence which has been deprived of contamination with 
the something else of a transcendent, spiritual or intellectual realm. Life 
in its immanent, purely biological or bare (Agamben)/mere (Benjamin) 
form is prone to be demoted rather than contaminated by that which is 
perceived to be its opposite (the life of the mind).
There is a sense in which Benjamin is fascinated by the apocalypti-
cal aspects of the religion of capitalism. He seems to dwell on the 
Zertrümering (complete destruction) unleashed by capitalist economics 
in a way similar to which the allegorist dwells on the Trümmer (ruins) to 
which profane life has been transformed in Baroque tragic drama.
Are these landscapes of destruction however to be read in a literal 
sense? Or rather, does Benjamin celebrate this destructive force as what 
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makes incomplete the presumed and presumptuous completion or purity 
of any kind of work, whether it is that of the profane or that of the spirit/
intellect (i.e. that which the German term geistig denotes)? Modernity’s 
destructive force would then be what renders modernity incomplete: 
it would not necessarily destroy the past which precedes the presence 
of the modern but it would shatter modernity’s pretended position – 
posing as the temporal endpoint where history’s long progress finds its 
culmination.
Benjamin contaminates the lowly sphere of the profane with the 
elevations of revelation and redemption. The figure of contamination 
implicitly operates in Benjamin’s work at such crucial moments when 
it outdoes dualisms between the profane and the redeemed. Benjamin 
puts this dualism into question. While there is a sense in which one can 
interpret his thought in terms of a somewhat despairing Kantianism, 
that is, of Kantianism that despairs of itself, there is also a sense in which 
he continues a romantic critique – a critique that manifests itself in what 
Hölderlin perceives as caesura and Benjamin describes as interruption 
– of Kant’s hierarchical divide between freedom and nature. What I 
have called elsewhere Benjamin’s ‘transcendental messianism’ (Mack 
2003: 155–67) outdoes itself if one locates this problematic notion on 
the ground of an idiosyncratic modernity, one that is not Kantian but 
Spinozist and romantic. This Spinozist sense of the modern seeks to 
establish contaminating parallelisms between purported pure concepts 
and entities (such as mind and body). The modernity of this Spinozism 
resides in its refusal to assume self-contained forms of identity.3 On this 
view, notions such as the profane and the theological lose their semantic 
stability.
In his ‘Theological–Political Fragment’, Benjamin seemingly separates 
the profane from the messianic only to establish their mutual depend-
ence at the end. Politics as the realm of the profane desires a state of hap-
piness but it can reach this state only by way of self-loss.4 Losing itself, 
the profane gives way to the reign of the messianic. This is why neither 
the political nor the theological coincides with itself. Both entities are 
incomplete and thus contaminate each other. Rather than being autono-
mous, their seemingly teleological strivings for either profane happiness 
or messianic redemption diverge from the straight lines of their respec-
tive initial constructions and co-inhabit what is, on the surfaces of their 
appearance, their respective opposites. One path destroys not itself but 
its reduced, uncontaminated, ‘pure’ form (as an isolated entity) at the 
point it enters the pathway of its other.
Is this what Benjamin understands by destruction? If so, his notion of 
violence is in fact non-violent. It denotes not the annihilation of a given 
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work but its contaminated and contaminating incompletion. In what is 
pertinent for the discussion of Pasolini’s notion of scandal (see Chapter 
6), in Nietzschean vein Benjamin argues that ‘happiness on earth is 
encountered only on the way down’ (Vatter 2014: 175). The profane 
finds its fulfilment in states of contamination where it interrupts itself 
and simultaneously co-inhabits the realm of theology. Mutatis mutan-
dis, theologians betray theology when they depict it as autonomous 
and complete. Theology does not coincide with itself. It requires the 
profane as its subject matter in a way similar to that in which philology 
needs a textual basis in order to do its work. Benjamin draws on this 
non-coincidence of the theological with itself in the N convolute of his 
Arcades Project:
Bear in mind that commentary on a reality (for it is a question here of com-
mentary, of interpretation in detail) calls for a method completely different 
from that required by a commentary on a text. In the one case, the scientific 
mainstay is theological; in the other case, philology. (Benjamin 1999: 460)
This is a rather unsettling argument because it disorders the distinc-
tion between the profane and the theological, a distinction on which 
Benjamin dwells in his theological–political fragment. As ‘a commentary 
on reality’, theology depends on the profane in order to do its interpre-
tative work. In order to function it demands of itself a submergence 
into its opposite, and it has to immerse itself into the profane realm of 
politics. As Miguel Vatter has shown, Benjamin here refers to Gershom 
Scholem’s notion of ‘redemption through sin’ (Vatter 2014: 172). 
Diverging from dialectics, sin, in short the negative, here is not negated 
but contaminated with its supposed opposite, redemption.
Contaminating economic prudence with mental illness: 
Melville’s Bartleby, the Scrivener and James’s The 
Ambassadors
One could argue that Benjamin was the first thinker who has given us 
an intriguing account of literature’s implicit renunciation of various 
purification projects which are pseudo-scientific in their reliance on 
systems of classification and categorisation. Benjamin develops his plea 
for a suspension of judgements in the face of not so much dialectical or 
plastic but contaminating, co-focal insights into the apparent incompat-
ible diversity of our lives.
A suspension of judgement is a scientific approach that also informs 
the analyses of the following two chapters on contamination in the work 
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of Melville, James and Hitchcock. Hitchcock’s idiosyncratic notion of 
suspense indeed derives from holding the audience’s convictions about 
what happens on screen in a suspended position while keeping it in the 
know. Hitchcock’s suspense suspends judgements in the face of knowl-
edge: the spectators are cognisant of crucial pieces of information which 
elude the protagonists whose actions they are observing.
The same holds true of the relationship between the readers of James’s 
The Portrait of a Lady and its main protagonist: we know that Isabel 
Archer will forfeit her freedom while rushing to marry Mr Osmond, 
whose aestheticism she imagines will free her from conventional society. 
As we shall see in the Chapter 4, James’s and Hitchcock’s practice of 
suspense slows down and suspends pressures to act and judge. It does so 
by providing the audience with the knowledge of deleterious actions and 
judgements of which the main actors in a given work (Isabel Archer in 
The Portrait of a Lady and Scottie in Vertigo) are ignorant.
This chapter discusses two novels that set out to persuade us to defer 
judgements in the face of various uncertainties. It first analyses the 
reversibility of categories of economic prudence and mental illness in 
Melville’s short novel Bartleby, the Scrivener and then explores how 
such openness to revisions and corrections informs the so far overlooked 
scientific experiment that Henry James conducts in his impressionist/
expressionist novel The Ambassadors. Melville’s Bartleby, the Scrivener 
radically stages a suspension of judgement confronted with someone 
whose profession is the law. As Branka Arsić has pointed out, Bartleby’s 
‘I would prefer not to’ reverses the priority of the law and its guardian 
in Kafka’s parable ‘Before the Law’:
Bartleby seems thus to have reversed Kafka’s parable of the law, as if he had 
managed to go behind the doorkeeper’s back, and then to close the open gate, 
thus keeping the doorkeeper outside of the law. In other words, as if in con-
trast to Kafka’s doorkeeper who claimed that ‘this door was open for you,’ 
Bartleby instead says ‘this door is closed, and will not be open for you.’ By 
closing the door Bartleby turns the lawyer into the outsider. (Arsić 2007: 20)
According to Arsić, Melville’s novella forecloses the narrative scope of 
Kafka’s parable, by closing the gate of the law and thereby excluding 
anything to do with a legal system. While this is an intriguing reading, it 
neglects the fact that lawyers (and, as we shall see, economists) still play 
a significant role in Bartleby, the Scrivener. Rather than precluding the 
law, Melville’s short novel confronts notions of guilt and punishment 
with what they are superimposed upon: the (in Benjamin’s words) ‘mere 
life’ of the rather innocuous Bartleby. While questioning concepts of 
a legal order, Bartleby, the Scrivener nevertheless presents us with the 
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work of the law, albeit in a rather contaminated context where judge-
ments become suspended rather than executed.
Melville’s Moby Dick is a key text for a new conception of how litera-
ture dismantles illusions of scientific order. Similarly, Henry James’s late 
novels perform a feast of insight into the illusions of perceived modern 
advancements of order and rationality through the presumed panacea of 
economic management. Melville’s short novel Bartleby, The Scrivener 
(1853) lays the ground for James’s engagement with the psychology of 
disorder which scientific constructions of the certain and the supposedly 
risk-free tend to neglect. The subtitle of Bartleby points to the sphere 
of high finance: A Story of Wall Street. Melville’s short novel, however, 
abstains from displaying economic transactions. The plot of Bartleby, 
The Scrivener is rather uneventful.
In a similar way, James’s The Ambassadors evokes the economic 
emporium of Mrs Newsome’s New England enterprise only to thwart 
the expectations it builds. Mrs Newsome sends Lambert Strether from 
her New England seat of economic power (Woollett) to Paris. In Paris 
she charges Strether to bring her son Chad back to run the family 
enterprise. Were he to succeed, Strether would be granted a share of the 
profits, because he would return as Mrs Newsome’s husband. As E. M. 
Forster has put it: ‘Well, whatever it is, Chad Newsome ought to come 
back and help make it [i.e. economic success at home], and Strether 
undertakes to fetch him. He has to be rescued from a life which is both 
immoral and unremunerative’ (Forster 1974: 105). In well-established 
Puritan manner, morality and profit here seem to be indistinguishable.
Strether has therefore much to gain (both morally and financially) 
from his ambassadorship. Strikingly, he rejects his ambassadorial 
mission despite the economic personal gain it holds out for him. Chad 
wants to return to his family’s business and to make it more profit-
able. He sets out to do so with the knowledge about advertisement he 
has acquired in Europe and which he attempts to introduce to North 
America. His mother’s, Mrs Newsome’s, Puritanism in its secular form 
alludes to traditional notions of both economic and scientific rationality, 
as made famous in Max Weber’s account of the origins of capitalism in 
his Protestant Ethics – a book to which Benjamin implicitly refers in his 
‘Capitalism as Religion’.
James’s novel also associates the character of Mrs Newsome with 
Puritanism’s stringent moralistic ambience. Ironically, the ‘new world’ 
of America – to which the name of Chad’s mother alludes – is the geo-
graphic location of a form of science which appears outmoded from not 
only the Parisian literary perspective of James’s narrator. As has been 
intimated above, Chad is not so much a literatus but a business innova-
MACK PRINT.indd   114 26/11/2015   11:14
Contaminating Judgement with its Suspension    115
tor, and the innovation he will bring to his American enterprise is the 
new practice of advertisement which he appraises in a conversation with 
Strether towards the end of the novel as follows:
But there was just one thing for which, before they broke off, Chad seemed 
disposed slightly to bargain. His companion needn’t, as he said, tell him, but 
he might himself mention that he had been getting some news of the art of 
advertisement. He came out quite suddenly with this announcement, while 
Strether wondered if his revived interest were what had taken him, with 
strange consequence, over to London. He appeared at all events to have been 
looking into the question and had encountered a revelation. Advertising sci-
entifically worked presented itself thus as the great new force. ‘It really does 
the thing, you know.’ They were face to face under the street lamp as they 
had been for the first night, and Strether, no doubt, looked blank. ‘Affects, 
you mean, the sale of the object advertised?’
 ‘Yes – but affects it extraordinarily; really beyond what one had supposed. 
I mean of course when it’s done as one makes out that, in our roaring age, it 
can be done.’ (James 1964: 339)
Chad here fuses the economic with the scientific. Science promises to 
enhance profits. The success of the new art of advertisement, which 
Chad seems to have learned in London, depends on it being ‘scientifi-
cally worked’. What, however, does it mean to work advertisement in 
a scientific manner? Chad goes on to clarify what he means by scientific 
with the term ‘the fact of the possible’ (James 1964: 340). Money instan-
tiates the factuality of the possible: it promises to render the uncertain 
certain, the invisible visible – as Chad makes clear when he goes on to 
say, ‘I mean the money in it’ (James 1964: 340). Strether’s reply ‘Oh 
damn the money in it’ (James 1964: 340) encapsulates the rejection of 
any reduction of the possible to the certain, the measurable.
It is this (Strether’s) rejection that harks back to the famous ‘I would 
prefer not to’ from Melville’s Bartleby. Both novels avoid economic 
transaction by shrinking their respective plots to an impressionist as well 
as expressionist matter of perception, rather than action.5 Instead of 
narrating a certain manifest and linear story, James’s The Ambassadors 
adumbrates possibilities of a plot (hence the plural in the title of the 
novel).6 Similarly, almost nothing happens in Melville’s Bartleby, except 
the arrival and the subsequent removal of a new clerk in the narrator’s 
office, who is in charge of drawing up various deeds. The name the 
narrator ascribes to his occupation implies movement: ‘that of a convey-
ancer and title hunter, drawer-up of recondite documents of all sorts’ 
(Melville 2001: 9). The novel tells the story of how this legal/economic 
work undergoes a peculiar change through the arrival of the new clerk 
Bartleby.
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Bartleby disrupts the supposed order of the social sciences (econom-
ics and law) not through any disorderly action but by merely being 
‘motionless’ (Melville 2001: 9), by remaining still: by what the narrator 
calls ‘his great stillness’ (Melville 2001: 15). Bartleby’s strange presence 
precipitates a heuristic event – a quasi-scientific discovery – on the part 
of the narrator. The narrator comes to realise that his conception of the 
world has previously been blinded by taken for granted assumptions, by 
‘inveteracy’ (Melville 2001: 15). Doing away with habituated concep-
tions of traditional science, the narrator discovers what Moby Dick 
explores in great detail (as has been discussed in Chapter 3): the dark-
ness and uncertainty which traditional scientific quests for the certain 
and risk-free tend to ignore.
Enlightened by such darkness, the narrator explains: ‘Ah, happiness 
courts the light, so we deem the world gay; but misery hides aloof, so 
we deem that misery there is none’ (Melville 2001: 18). Melville’s short 
novel revolves around the psychological reactions to such insights on 
the part of the narrator. It is concerned not so much with the figure of 
Bartleby as with what such unhabituated presence provokes in the inter-
nal workings of the mind. It shows how unstable the supposed mental 
stability of the narrator is when faced with such exposure of a so far 
neglected aspect of life: ‘Revolving all these things, and coupling them 
with the recently discovered fact that he [i.e. Bartleby] made my office 
his constant abiding place and hoke, and forgetful of his morbid moodi-
ness; revolving all these things, a prudential feeling began to steal over 
me’ (Melville 2001: 18). Prudence adumbrates far-sighted wisdom and 
economic calculation. The sagacious and economical narrator attempts 
to reduce his exposure to risk.
Bartleby provides insight into how such prudent desire to avoid con-
tamination with the economics of loss remains in actual fact blind to the 
dangers that it does not want to countenance. The narrator shifts from 
a mode of discovery to one that fears the invisible. The invisible mani-
fests itself in what he and his audience are accustomed not to see, what 
they avoid acknowledging as existent. The term for such invisibility is 
‘melancholy’, another word for mental illness – a term that Freud used 
too when he described what we now classify as depression (Ehrenberg 
2010: 167).
When Bartleby slightly elaborates on his famous ‘I would prefer not 
to’ with ‘At present I would prefer not to be a little reasonable’ (Melville 
2001: 20), fear of mental contamination seizes the mind of the narra-
tor: ‘And I trembled to think that my contact with the scrivener had 
already affected me in a mental way’ (Melville 2001: 20). As a result of 
this anxiety, he decides ‘surely I must get rid of a demented man, who 
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already has in some degree turned the tongues, if not the heads of myself 
and the clerks’ (Melville 2001: 21). How can he remove Bartleby’s 
presence?
In what is crucial for the preceding discussion of invisibility, Bartleby 
establishes an implicit contrast between preference and assumption. In 
order to get rid of his unwelcome employee, the narrator assumes first 
his departure, and when this does not take place his invisibility, his 
non-presence: ‘Without loudly bidding Bartleby depart – as an inferior 
genius might have done – I assumed the ground that depart he must; 
and upon the assumption built all I had to say’ (Melville 2001: 23). The 
narrator, however, deludes himself about the non-violent character of 
assumptions. As in Ellison’s Invisible Man, the neglect of the other can 
be deeply hurtful if not lethal (as in the case of Bartleby, who dies of 
neglect – starvation – in his jail cell).
Melville’s short novel shows how assumptions are in fact impositions, 
while Bartleby’s insistence on preference allows for the coexistence 
of diverse subjectivities. Assumption creates a false sense of scientific 
objectivity by rendering those invisible who do not fit into what has been 
axiomatically assumed. The narrator indeed renders Bartleby invisible 
by assuming his absence: ‘In the legitimate carrying out of this assump-
tion, I might enter my office in a great hurry, and pretending not to see 
Bartleby at all, walk straight against him as if he were air’ (Melville 
2001: 24). In treating Bartleby ‘as if he were air’, the narrator falls prey 
to delusions.
Deluded, the prudent narrator turns out to be deranged rather than 
Bartleby, whom critics have singled out as mentally ill. In his short 
novel Melville contaminates medical categorisations of mental illness 
with what is posited to be their opposite: mental health and economic 
prudence. A reversal takes place which anticipates the contamination of 
class hierarchies with madness. Bartleby, the Scrivener helps us discover 
how not only social oppositions but also assumed biological predisposi-
tions are subjective constructions of a mind (i.e. that of Melville’s narra-
tor who assumes the role of economic prudence).
Melville unsettles what we take to be risk-free or prudent in the 
economic sphere and shows how social conceptions of the normal 
also extend to what we have come to consider as a biologically fixed 
predisposition to mental illness. Melville’s Bartleby becomes catego-
rised as mentally ill because he runs counter to societal assumptions of 
social standing and economic production. Here literature clearly brings 
together what various scientific purification projects attempt to separate: 
the sphere of nature and nurture, the natural and the societal. In so 
contaminating such presumed mutually opposed fields, Melville’s short 
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novel makes us realise the unscientific assumption of ‘science’ when it 
ignores what does not fit into its notion of certain, risk-free purity – that 
is to say, those entities that are uncertain, unpredictable, and therefore 
risky but not to be wished away aspects of our world.
James’s The Ambassadors and the contamination of 
boundaries dividing the sciences from the arts
Now we shall see how Henry James further develops Melville’s engage-
ment with what we have not been confronted with in standard scientific 
accounts of gender, class, economics and health. In his 1903 novel The 
Ambassadors, James advances a so far neglected critique of pseudo-
scientific assumptions by bringing to the fore the pitfalls of a publicly 
acclaimed trust in the chimera of economic order. Having intimated 
some of the discussion that follows, it is worthwhile bearing in mind 
that the focus of critical discussion (regarding The Ambassadors) has 
so far been on traffic and the network of a growing global information 
age.7 The transatlantic trafficking of letters and people is no doubt a 
major topic in The Ambassadors.
What has been overlooked is that the much discussed international 
theme which constitutes the narrative framework of the novel8 implicitly 
refers to the emerging acceleration of global trade in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. In an important and detailed study, the 
philosopher Robert B. Pippin has highlighted the absence in critical 
literature of a historical consciousness that partakes of James’s inter-
national theme as follows: ‘But this, this resistance to reading James 
as having such a significant historical consciousness, is all because the 
major categories of the International Theme are often treated very much 
as they appear on the surface of James’s narrative, and on the surface 
they can seem very conventional’ (Pippin 2001: 32). The narrators of 
James’s historical consciousness record as well as debate the effects of 
an accelerating global capitalist economy – which is also an important 
theme in the preceding discussion of Melville’s Moby Dick – on social 
and intellectual life. Pippin maintains that due to the ever increasing 
intensity as well as predominance of these global financial transactions 
‘everything of significance in the basic manners of civilized life known 
heretofore, in the role of history, hierarchy, sensibilities, gender rela-
tions, social power, is about to change’ (Pippin 2001: 33). Questions of 
economic rationality certainly lurk in the background of the novel.
Most striking here are the words ‘money’ and ‘Puritanism’. In his 
notes on the ‘Project of the Novel’ James depicts the main character of 
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the novel, ‘the ambassador’ Lambert Strether, as having endured con-
siderable exposure to the Puritanism of New England. Strether’s is ‘the 
history of a man no longer in the prime of life, yet still able to live with 
sufficient intensity to be a source of what may be called excitement to 
himself, not less to the reader of his record’ (James 1964: 367). Strether’s 
excitement is that of consciousness, of reflection and observation.
It is the ‘fun’ of theory (understood as spectatorship) if you will. 
Theory, here defined in terms of its Greek or Latin etymology, denotes 
sight and the act of perceiving or viewing. As a person who views, 
Strether could be associated with the contemporary (around 1900) 
ascendency of the modern media cinema, and in a recent article Brenda 
Austin-Smith has convincingly argued that:
Strether might be seen as the ideal spectator, the prototype of the person for 
whom cinema is intended. The possessor of a modern sensibility to seduction 
by visual impressions, Strether responds with the perfect blend of emotions 
to what he sees, moving through curiosity, desire, envy, regret, and, finally, 
detachment as he encounters the scenes and people before him. (Austin-Smith 
2012: 40–1)
As a cinematic figure, Strether is also associated with the emergence of 
modern science which, as Lisa Cartwright has shown, has a close affin-
ity with cinema.9 Much of what we see while reading The Ambassadors 
becomes mediated through Strether’s observations. He is the camera 
lens that shapes and filters the images projected within the frame of 
the novel. His perceptions are open and his perspective is detached (or 
‘objective’) like that of the scientist. His detachment brings to the fore 
the contours of the surface image of the bodies and souls we encounter 
in The Ambassadors but his intensity and sense of excitement also 
endows these images with an imaginative life which drives and animates 
the experiments, projections and discoveries of both modern cinema 
and science. He is a man in his mid-fifties who has left his native New 
England home for the old European Continent. His fate lies at the heart 
of the international theme: the ground is not that of stable belonging to 
one nation and one tradition. As in Melville’s Moby Dick the ground 
has become unstable and fluid: land has given way to the shiftiness of 
the sea. Strether has indeed traversed the sea which separates the new 
from the old world.
As James, however, makes clear in his letter to T. S. Perry of 20 
September 1867, he understands by the term ‘America’ not the sepa-
ration but the blurring of distinctions between the old and the new. 
According to James, America symbolises the liberating and heuristic 
force of contamination. In his usage America has become a catchword 
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for uncertainty, ambiguity and the dismantling of categories, clas-
sifications and national boundaries. Avant-garde science holds out the 
promise of such contamination, herein departing from the traditional 
scientific quest for purification, for order and for separate as well as 
distinct entities. According to James, Americans are ahead of Europeans 
in having attained the scientific freedom to enquire into truth outside 
traditional rubrics and boundaries:
We can deal freely with forms of civilization not our own, can pick and 
choose and assimilate and in short (aesthetically etc.) can claim our property 
wherever we find it. To have no national stamp has hitherto been a defect and 
a drawback, but I think it not unlikely that American writers may yet indicate 
that a vast intellectual fusion and synthesis of the various National tendencies 
of the world is the condition of more achievements than any we have ever 
seen. (James 1986: 1)
Strikingly, here James defines the paradox of a national identity that is 
transnational and international in aesthetic terms (‘aesthetically’). This 
definition of American identity as the unhindered traversal of all pos-
sible national identities performs a form of freedom which we may also 
experience while engaging with novels and other works of art. More 
importantly, in the quote above James takes such aesthetic experiences, 
in which categories turn fluid and national boundaries turn permeable, 
to be the precondition ‘of more achievements’ in the larger intellectual-
scientific and societal sphere.
Strether’s crossing of the Atlantic partakes of this aesthetic experience 
which goes under the name American. The literary or aesthetic dimen-
sion of this undertaking is crucial: through literature the mechanics of 
travel – acts of traversing the Atlantic and crossing various national 
boundaries – become part of the traveller’s consciousness. The con-
sciousness in question here is, however, no longer that of the tradition. 
It is no longer assured of its controlling position in the world – a world 
that has likewise lost stability and no longer resembles the solidity of 
land but the fluidity of the sea. As James puts it in his project notes, 
Strether indeed lives an ‘incoherent existence, without any of the accom-
panying entertainment or “fun” ’ (James 1964: 377). This absence of 
entertainment highlights another aspect of America which contrasts 
with its characterisation in literary aesthetic terms. The terms America 
or Europe (as every other subject matter in James’s novels and short 
stories) become subjected to a multiplicity of perspectives – to open-
ended exposure to a variety of sights and significations which outdo the 
hegemony perpetuated in the purifying system at work in traditional 
scientific categories. While evoking the illusion of certainty and stability, 
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these pure scientific categories fail to do justice to the open and often 
contingent constitution of our world.
There is another aspect to Strether’s American upbringing: he has been 
shaped not only by Puritanism but also by the capitalist preoccupation 
with money and finance. Most importantly, from a literary–aesthetic 
perspective James takes issue with precisely this economic assessment 
of what it means to be modern (as encapsulated in Strether’s ‘Oh damn 
the money in it’) (James 1964: 340). Here James relegates the capitalist 
dimension of America and modernity at large not to intellectual and 
scientific advances but to the persistence of Puritan and other European 
traditions of which doctrinaire religious hostility to the arts and sciences 
partakes.
In his famous essay ‘The Art of Fiction’ James indeed defines the 
freedom of modernity by the intellectual and scientific achievements of 
literature. The traditional suspicion of the arts, by contrast, is a remnant 
of a doctrinaire past which rejected the free and open-ended enquiry 
characteristic of avant-garde science and literature:
Art, in our Protestant communities, where so many things have got so 
strangely twisted about, is supposed in certain circles to have some vaguely 
injurious effect upon those who make it an important consideration, who 
let it weigh in the balance. It is assumed to be opposed in some mysterious 
manner to morality, to amusement, to instruction. (James 1986: 168)
From this traditional Protestant perspective – whose tradition goes back 
to Plato’s ban on poets in his ideal Republic – literature is more sub-
versive than other arts because it is capable of working most intensely, 
while invisibly, on the audience’s inner life. That is to say, it may have 
the capacity to transform the reader’s consciousness and perception: 
‘But when it [i.e. art] is introduced into literature it becomes more 
insidious – there is danger of its hurting you before you know it’ (James 
1986: 168). The insidious destruction wrought by literature consists in 
changing consciousness and turning the audience’s perception towards 
the discovery of realities which are new and have yet to be faced up to 
intellectually-scientifically as well as emotionally.
These changes are to do with modernity’s fluidity (the theme of 
Melville’s Moby Dick), which requires a new understanding of science, 
no longer in traditional terms of purity, order and stability. Volatility, 
fluidity and instability are of course also pertaining to the actual work-
ings of a modern economy of free markets. The traditional Protestant 
(and Puritan) condemnation of literature amounts to a rejection of 
complex scientific investigations into what constitutes human knowl-
edge. Modernity’s promise of freedom allows for such intellectual 
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 journeys and discoveries. In his essay ‘The Art of Fiction’ James singles 
out literature as the performance of such modern freedom without 
which all scientific and moral values would flounder: ‘But there will be 
no intensity at all, and therefore no value unless there is freedom to feel 
and say’ (James 1986: 170). How does literature enact such intellectual-
scientific as well as affective freedom? On a formal level it innovates 
– and to innovate is precisely what James sets out to do when he breaks 
with the traditional novel in his groundbreaking The Portrait of a Lady.
Crucially, not only does innovation in literature change what we 
understand by a given genre, but it also transforms the way we perceive 
and act in the world (the insidious work it does to consciousness about 
which Plato and the Puritans were so concerned). It overturns traditional 
presumptions of order and other default conceptions of what the world 
must be like. James defines the social and scientific benefit of art and lit-
erature as this work of innovation: ‘Art derives a considerable part of its 
beneficial exercise from flying into the face of presumptions, and some 
of the most interesting experiments of which it is capable are hidden in 
the bosom of common things’ (James 1986: 175–6). Significantly, James 
uses a word which encompasses both scientific methods and procedure: 
‘experiments’.
This scientific, experimental horizon in James’s understanding of 
literature has so far been neglected due to his representation as an 
aesthete. Indeed for the historians Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison 
James epitomises the growing divide between arts and sciences at the fin-
de-siècle. They single out his apparent artistic objections to ‘objectivity’:
Conversely, when James himself self-consciously tried to write with ‘objectiv-
ity,’ he described it as a ‘special sacrifice’ of the novelist’s art. The scientists, 
for their part, returned the favor. For example, in 1866, the Paris Académie 
des Sciences praised the geologist Aimé Civiale’s panoramic photographs 
of the Alps for their ‘faithful representations of the accidents’ of the earth’s 
surface, which would be ‘deplorable’ in art, but which ‘on the contrary must 
be [the goal] towards which the reproductions of scientific objects tends.’ The 
scientific self of the mid-nineteenth century was perceived by contemporar-
ies as diametrically opposed to the artistic self, just as scientific images were 
routinely contrasted to artistic ones. (Daston and Galison 2007: 37)
Does not James’s writing challenge such divisions between the arts and 
sciences? This chapter, together with the following one, discusses how 
he contaminates the subjective with the objective, implicitly repudiating 
the postulate of either ‘pure’ objectivity (which, as Daston and Galison 
have clearly shown, public opinion associates with the sciences) or ‘pure’ 
subjectivity (associated with the arts).
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Rather than subscribe to such common representation of the aesthetic 
as uncontaminated by science, James argues that both artistic and sci-
entific practices meet on the level of experimentation. Art and literature 
open up our common, shared world to experiments wherein we may 
discover new forms of life that we may already inhabit but which we 
have previously been unconscious of.
This element of conscious (experimental, scientific) discovery in 
James’s literary practice has so far been marginalised and attention has 
instead been paid to more general discussions about the changed histori-
cal setting of capitalist bourgeois modernity – a theme particularly dear 
to the philosopher Pippin.10 Pippin importantly emphasises that James 
perceives in capitalist modernity a destruction of traditional communi-
ties and values as well as moral certainties related to such communal life. 
Pippin argues that James as moralist treats ‘not so much the necessities, 
regularities, deadly conformism and so forth of such a society’ as he 
engages with ‘what this new social power has destroyed and how little of 
what we need it has left in its place’ (Pippin 2001: 16). Does James char-
acterise New England’s commercialism and Puritanism indeed as new? 
He traces Puritanism’s hostility to art and literature back to traditional 
Western Christianity (which in turn derives some of its more austere 
aspects from Platonism and other ancient Greek philosophical schools).
This is not to dismiss or belittle the importance of Pippin’s concern 
with a changed historical context, but to say that James sees within these 
putatively modern forms of isolation and alienation a radicalisation of 
inhibitive, consciousness-foreclosing habits which have given rise to all 
kinds of suspicions and superstitions in premodernity as they do with 
admittedly much more powerful effect in more advanced, modern times 
too. Pippin goes on to identify modernity with the historical change 
of capitalism which renders individuals ‘strangers to and suspicious 
of each other but who nonetheless must find some way of counting on 
each other, must find some “modern” moral life’ (Pippin 2001: 16). 
Suspicion is of course what drives Mrs Newsome to send her friend 
Lambert Strether from New England to Paris to report back on the 
life of her son (Chad) there. The Puritanism of New England does not, 
however, characterise the newness of America but rather the persistence 
of old European traditions of which Protestantism and capitalism could 
be seen to partake.
Breaking with both American and European forms of Puritanism, 
James’s The Ambassadors conveys a sense of how Strether becomes 
acquainted with entertainment, as a spectator rather than an actor. 
Clearly he inhabits subjectivity and yet his position as outsider also 
makes for his larger, more objective perspective. The Ambassadors 
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indeed contaminates boundaries that are supposed to separate not only 
Europe from America, but also subjectivity from objectivity, science 
from art.
Strether – while subjectively engaged – is also at a distancing, more 
objective remove from what he witnesses in Paris, the location of a 
certain new freedom and fun of which he has been deprived while spend-
ing the prime of his life in the Puritan ambient of the new world:
He feels tired, in other words, without having a great deal to show for it; 
disenchanted without having known any great enchantments, enchanters, or, 
above all, enchantresses; and even before the action in which he is engaged 
launches him, is vaguely haunted by a feeling of what he has missed, though 
this is a quantity, and a quality, that he would be rather at a loss to name. 
(James 1964: 377)
This sense of a loss, of a missed life opens Strether to new ways of living 
which he encounters in Paris. The new breaks the order of what he has 
been accustomed to in his old home (America).
The move from New England to Paris has confusing and contami-
nating ramifications for Strether’s moral life. Paris exposes him to a 
contamination with what is vulgar and in conflict with moral categorisa-
tions. Before his move to Paris Strether ‘has not been too much mixed 
up with vulgar things; he has always been occupied and preoccupied, 
in one way or another, but always in all relations and connections been 
ridden by his “New England conscience” ’ (James 1964: 377). This ‘New 
England conscience’ indeed instigates his trip to Paris – it is the raison 
d’être for the novel’s narration.
The novel, however, questions the rationality of the move – the reason 
for it is stipulated by the moral, historical and social order to which 
a New England conscience is beholden – and the ensuing narration. 
Strether leaves his old unlived life behind while feeling obligated to act 
as an ambassador to an authority figure in the small New England town 
Woollett: ‘He comes on a kind of moral and sentimental mission, but 
committed to nothing more than to get hold of Chad tactfully, kindly, 
to try to fish him out of his deep waters. He is to act only within his 
full discretion, and he is to report on the situation and enlighten Mrs 
Newsome’s darkness’ (James 1964: 382). Here James establishes an 
interconnection, indeed a chiasmus between darkness and enlighten-
ment. Light here undergoes a visitation or contamination by darkness: 
like the narrator in the first part of Melville’s Bartleby, Strether becomes 
enlightened by the darkness he encounters in Paris.
The question remains, however, whether Mrs Newsome’s New 
England Puritanism allows for the contamination exerted by Strether’s 
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ambassadorship. Strether has to report back to Mrs Newsome about the 
possible moral pitfalls to which her son Chad might be exposed in Paris 
and to persuade him to return home. He is beholden to Mrs Newsome’s 
Puritan obsession with purity: ‘The case has been virtually as simple for 
them as that. Perdition on one side, salvation on the other’ (James 1964: 
382). These Puritan certainties collapse for Strether when he receives his 
‘moral “dishing” ’ (James 1964: 385). Strether’s sense of a moral order 
collapses when he increasingly senses the validity of Chad’s relationship 
with the much older Madame de Vionnet. His sense of ambassador-
ship shifts at this point, partly due to Madame de Vionnet’s freedom 
from any sense of guilt about her relationship (outside wedlock) with 
a young man. From now on Strether sees himself less as a spy who 
reports to Mrs Newsome about her son’s contaminated exposure to 
Paris, but as someone who himself transmits, telegraphs, as it were, the 
contamination.
Strether rejects Mrs Newsome’s ‘idea to spy on Chad’s proper 
freedom’ (James 1964: 128). He does not confirm Mrs Newsome’s 
horror of contamination – which here is the contamination of the old 
(Madame de Vionnet) with the young (Mrs Newsome’s son Chad). 
Strether departs from such horror at contamination, which keeps Mrs 
Newsome on edge:
‘And yet Mrs Newsome – it’s a thing to remember – has imagined, did, that is, 
imagine, and apparently still does, horrors about what I should have found. 
I was booked, by her vision – extraordinarily intense, after all – to find them; 
and that I didn’t; that I couldn’t, that as she evidently felt, I wouldn’t – this 
evidently didn’t at all, as they say, “suit” her book. It was more than she 
could bear. That was her disappointment.’ (James 1964: 299)
Like Bartleby, Strether does not do what is expected of him: he prefers 
not to condemn or report as horrible what Mrs Newsome wants him to 
judge as non-acceptable. His subjective-objective spectatorship unsettles 
prearranged opinions, representations and judgements. In doing so, he 
overturns a preconceived, axiomatic order of things (which posits Paris 
as ‘impure’). Asked if she wants to find her son Chad the butt of condem-
nation, Strether makes clear that it would have been the woman whom 
Mrs Newsome has ‘booked’ as the source of moral contamination:
‘You mean to have found Chad himself horrible?’
‘I was to have found the woman.’
‘Horrible?’
‘Found her as she imagined her.’ (James 1964: 382)
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James transposes Bartleby’s refusal to act into the theoretical sphere 
of seemingly passive observation. Strether’s refusal takes place in the 
sphere of the imagination.
Conclusion: towards a contamination of action with 
perception
What is crucial for the discussion in the next chapter is that James’s 
late novels (such as The Ambassadors) discover perception to be a form 
of action. Strether’s refusal to imagine Chad’s relationship with ‘the 
woman’ as Mrs Newsome wants him to has clear consequences for the 
plot of the novel, as it disrupts the implementation (the booking, as it 
were) of Mrs Newsome’s plan.
Strikingly, The Portrait of a Lady goes without such refusal or disrup-
tion of a prearranged scheme. While trying to avoid confinements, Isabel 
Archer rushes into a life of action which does not liberate her – as she 
hopes – but even more deeply ensnarls her into the plot of those whom 
she admires and yet fails to perceive as who they are: manipulators and 
schemers (Madame Merle and Mr Osmond). As the following chapter 
will show, James and Hitchcock in their novels and films engage in 
aesthetic experiments which help us understand the science of the mind.
Mental activities such as reading, reflecting and thinking are not to be 
separated from urbane or cosmopolitan ambitions. As the literary critic 
and neuroscientist Mark Turner has put it:
The processes of the literary mind are usually considered to be different from 
and secondary to the processes of the everyday mind. On that assumption, 
the everyday mind – with its stable concepts and literal reasoning – provides 
the beginnings for the (optional) literary mind. On the contrary, processes 
that we have always considered to be literary are the foundation of the every-
day mind. Literary processes like blending make the everyday mind possible. 
(Turner 1996: 115)
Indeed, James contaminates word with world. The compartmentalisa-
tion of the literary text from the physical sphere of materialist interests 
results in an embrace such as Isabel Archer’s of tyrannical and reductive 
manipulators such as George Osmond. Isabel’s fate shows how actions 
that refrain from undergoing various revisions within a mental arena 
render themselves null and void (are indeed self-destructive). Our active 
life has to be exposed to mental forces of perception. James makes a 
strong case for contaminating action with perception and intertwining 
our embodied with our cerebral life. Only such reciprocal contamina-
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tion of what traditional scientific and philosophical discourse posits as 
mutually opposed entities (such as the body and mind) facilitates various 
corrections and revisions by virtue of which Strether refuses to buy into 
the plan (the book) of Mrs Newsome.
Notes
 1. ‘Der menschliche Körper durfte keine Ausnahme von dem Gebot machen, 
das das organische zerschlagen hieß, um in seinen Scherben die wahre, die 
fixierte und schriftgemäße Bedeutung aufzulesen’ (Benjamin 1974: 145).
 2. ‘Darin liegt das historisch Unerhörte des Kapitalismus, daß Religion nicht 
mehr Reform des Seins sondern dessen absolute Zertrümmerung ist. Die 
Ausweitung der Verzweifelung zu religiösen Weltzustand aus dem die 
Heilung zu erwarten sei. Gottes Transzendenz ist gefallen. Aber er ist nicht 
tot, er ist ins Menschenschicksal einbezogen’ (Benjamin 1974: 101).
 3. In an intriguing discussion of Benjamin’s image of Proust, Carol Jacobs 
has discussed non-identity and non-coincidence as key characteristics of 
the work of remembrance: ‘Spontaneous remembrance at first seems very 
like that memory that satisfies an elegiac desire for coincidence with past 
happenings, but it brings us instead to a world of non-identity. As the 
children play their game, the rolled-up stocking seems, like the mémoire 
involuntaire, to promise access to a plenitude behind it; but what seems to 
function as container and a sign for fullness is found to have always from 
the first been a mere stocking, an empty sign. The children’s play with the 
stocking is like a particular gesture of Proust: just as the children cannot 
satiate their desire to transform the pouch and its contents into the stock-
ing, “so Proust could not get his fill of emptying the dummy, the Self, with 
a grasp in order over and over to bring in that third thing – the image”. The 
Attrappe (which may be translated as “dummy,” “imitation,” or “trap”) 
for which Proust reaches seems to signify the hidden presence of the self. 
But the grasp that should render this contents (sic!) present only leads to a 
voiding of the self. The dummy that seemed to promise the plenitude to self 
was always a mere image, just as the full pouch of the children was always 
a mere stocking. The gesture of Proust, like that of the children, is only a 
game. His insatiable desire is not the longing for the presence of the self, but 
rather simply to repeat the movement, to transform the dummy over and 
over into an empty image’ (Jacobs 1999: 44–5).
 4. Carol Jacobs has noted a similar notion of identity as premised on the 
loss of selfhood in Benjamin’s essay on ‘The Task of the Translator’: ‘The 
Translatability of the text excludes the realm of man and, with him, the 
figure to which Benjamin’s essay is devoted. The Aufgabe of the translator 
is less his task than his surrender: he is aufgegeben, “given up”, “aban-
doned”. This is the essay’s initial irony’ (Jacobs 1999: 87–8).
 5. This is not to say that Melville’s Bartleby is about the fate of the writer/
reflective man in a society dominated by commerce, as Leo Marx has 
claimed: ‘It is a commercial society, dominated by a concern with prop-
erty and finance. Most of the action takes place in Wall Street. But the 
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designation has a further meaning: as Melville describes the street it literally 
becomes a walled street. The walls are the controlling symbols of the story, 
and in fact it may be said that this is a parable of walls, the walls which 
hem in the meditative artist and for that matter every reflective man’ (Marx 
2001: 241). Melville’s narrator depicts Bartleby not so much as reflective 
as by being marked by a mental pathology. As we will see, the short novel 
turns upside down our understanding of what is normal and what is patho-
logical. The issue of the mind and of perception looms large in James’s 
The Ambassadors too. As Ian Watt has famously shown, straight from its 
opening the novel offers ‘an immediate immersion in the processes of the 
hero’s mind as he’s involved in perplexities which are characteristics of the 
novel as a whole and which are articulated in a mode of comic development 
which is essentially that, not only of the following chapter, but of the total 
structure’ (Watt 1960: 274).
 6. For a discussion of the avoidance of certainty which is related to the narra-
tive refusal of closure in Ambassadors see Bell (1991: 324–77).
 7. Perhaps the strongest discussion of the theme of the international network 
is in chapter 2 of Ellmann (2010).
 8. See for example Rivkin (1986) and Goble (2007).
 9. See Cartwright (1995).
10. But it is a theme that is also dear to preceding generations of critics that 
have been preoccupied with historical issues such as commercialism, which 
is of course an important theme in James’s late novels. As Joseph Warren 
Beach has intriguingly put it: ‘For it involves nothing less than the formal 
opposition of a commercial, utilitarian and narrowly puritan way of living 
and thinking to that “possible civilization in which the manners, etc., shall 
be the index, etc.”. That is, for Strether it involves his instinct to judge 
moral situations from the inside by their quality and substance rather than 
by the labels attached to them by conventional opinion from the outside’ 
(Beach 1918: 7).
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5Contaminating the Digital: Action and 
Perception in Henry James and Alfred 
Hitchcock
‘their feeling as their doing’
Henry James, preface to The Princess Casamassima
Introduction: acceleration from the Industrial Revolution to 
the high modernity of our digital culture
Strether is a spectator. As such, he is a theoretical person: according 
to its Greek etymology, theory is a form of spectatorship. Perception, 
however, does not exclude praxis. On the contrary, James’s writing 
and thought contaminates the practical with the theoretical. Rather 
than preventing an active life, Strether’s theoretical bent slows down his 
actions and in doing so renders them more thoughtful. James’s back and 
forth between perception and action, between meaning and deed has a 
special pertinence for our contemporary digital culture, which accentu-
ates the blurring of the difference between audience and production. 
As George Dyson has recently argued, Von Neumann invented digital 
software when he and Turing instigated numbers not only to mean but 
to do things:
‘“Words” coding the orders are handled in the memory just like numbers,’ 
explained Von Neumann, breaking the distinction between numbers that 
mean things and numbers that do things. Software was born. Numerical 
codes would be granted full control – including the power to modify them-
selves. (Dyson 2012: 64)
Once the computer was invented in the 1940s, ‘numbers would assume 
a life of their own: numerical organisms were replicated, nourished, 
and rewarded according to their ability to go out and do things: they 
performed arithmetic, processed words, designed nuclear weapons, and 
accounted for money in all its forms’ (Dyson 2012: 239). Our digital 
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culture places a premium on actions, on doing. Actions are, however, 
more quickly and more efficiently performed by machines than by 
humans.
Questions of hermeneutics increasingly give way to the startling per-
formance of computer-generated efficiency. Computers read faster than 
a human could ever read. As Dyson has pointed out, however, ‘reading 
does not imply understanding’ (Dyson 2012: 313). Speed does not nec-
essarily coincide with intelligence. Infinite streams of information do not 
ensure that what is transmitted can also be understood:
Through large-scale statistical, probabilistic information processing, real 
progress is being made on some of the hard problems, such as speech recog-
nition, language translation, protein folding, and stock market prediction – 
even if only for the next millisecond, now enough to complete a trade. How 
can this be intelligence, since we are just throwing statistical, probabilistic 
horsepower at a problem, and seeing what sticks, without any underlying 
understanding? (Dyson 2012: 310–11)
Acceleration has been ever increasing since the Industrial Revolution in 
the middle of the nineteenth century. Speed elevated doing: the sheer 
quantity of actions. Henry James and Alfred Hitchcock in different yet 
related ways show how actions without the perceptive work of under-
standing can have deleterious – if not lethal – effects.
James’s novels and Hitchcock’s films work on the way their audi-
ence sees the world of action and perception. They do so in order to 
slow down the way we come to reach a judgement or pursue a certain 
course of execution. Similarly to Melville’s Bartleby, Strether in The 
Ambassadors refuses to come to the conclusions which Mrs Newsome 
has already commissioned him to endorse. He takes his time, observes 
Paris for himself and refrains from condemning the relationship between 
Mrs Newsome’s son and a much older Parisian woman. Judgement, 
condemnation and the concomitant return of her son Chad to the fam-
ily’s business in New England is in ‘the books’ of Mrs Newsome’s plan, 
which Strether should merely implement as an ‘ambassador’. Strether 
– at least for a while – prefers not to.
As we shall see, the suspension of judgement and action also takes 
place in Hitchcock’s idiosyncratic notion of suspense. Both the writer 
and the film-maker place a heavy emphasis on deceleration. This may be 
interpreted as a response to the ever increasing speed of socio-political 
and economic life in the wake of the rapid technological innovations 
which have kept proliferating ever since the onset of the Industrial 
Revolution. Our digital age is an offspring of such innovations.
Slow motion in James’s novels and Hitchcock’s films contaminates the 
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speed which shapes many aspects of life from the Industrial Revolution 
to the contemporary digital high point of modernity. Societal pressures 
in times of acceleration often encourage the endorsement of quick and 
simple solutions. Jaron Lanier (one of the inventors of virtual reality) 
has recently admonished the way a digital world governed by algorithms 
may reinforce the herd mentality of ‘group think’:
In each case, human creativity and understanding, especially one’s own crea-
tivity and understanding, are treated as worthless. Instead one trusts in the 
crowd, in the big n, in the algorithms that remove the risks of creativity in 
ways too sophisticated for any mere person to understand. (Lanier 2010: 99)
Both James and Hitchcock complicate accelerations of actions as well as 
judgements by endowing the audience with the suspense of knowledge 
that the protagonists miss due to their compulsion to move towards and 
to embrace what turn out to be entrapments.
Contaminating action with observation: Henry James’s 
literary-scientific innovation
What has so far been neglected is that James’s The Portrait of a Lady 
and The Ambassadors idiosyncratically reveal observation as the kernel 
of action. The Ambassadors effectively collapses the traditional opposi-
tion between perception and action. By perceiving the freedom which 
arises out of Chad’s scandalous relationship with a married and much 
older woman, Strether gains a new sense of an active life outside the 
restrictions of traditional moral society. James does not problematise 
this sense of a new, free ranging morality out of the sources of contem-
plative discovery (i.e. Strether’s position of observation). James’s literary 
modernism consists precisely in turning upside down our accustomed 
usage of concepts such as new versus old, perception as opposed to 
action. Strether – a product of America’s new world – discovers in the 
old world of Europe (Paris) what his puritanical upbringing previously 
inhibited him perceiving: the liberating force of the new, the modern and 
unconventional which transgresses boundaries of age.
In this way, The Ambassadors radicalises what James had first spelled 
out in The Portrait of a Lady: the modernist novel’s capacity to con-
found categories and traditional ways of perceiving ethics, science and 
human knowledge as such. To be more precise, James fully articulates 
his multi-perspectival approach to literature in the 1908 preface to the 
novel’s New York edition. Strikingly, James wrote this preface after he 
had already published The Ambassadors, which remained, as Michael 
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Gorra has recently pointed out, his favourite novel: ‘The sheets on his 
desk were from a book he had published in 1881, a quarter of a century 
ago: The Portrait of a Lady, the novel in which, after a period of 
careful apprenticeship, he had first allowed his imagination full stretch. 
He didn’t think it was his best book – he preferred The Ambassadors 
(1903)’ (Gorra 2012: xv). In his 1908 preface to The Portrait of a Lady 
James in fact implicitly refers to The Ambassadors when he discusses the 
house of fiction. This implicit reference concerns a certain contamina-
tion of perception with action as highlighted in the characterisation of 
Strether. James’s house of fiction revolves around observation – more 
precisely, the observational position of the house’s many windows.
Critics have, however, neglected the fact that James’s famous house of 
fiction metaphor had repercussions not only for literary studies but also 
for the development of modern science. The diversity of observational 
perspectives (windows) wherein James locates the touchstone of our 
human constitution has important ramifications for a new conception of 
how we approach scientific enquiry into the workings of both nature and 
society. It calls into question a view of nature as well as society which is 
based on notions of purity, order, conformity to universal and system-
atic laws. As Nancy Cartwright has shown, ‘The impressive empirical 
successes of our best physics theories may argue for the truth of these 
theories but not for their universality. Indeed the contrary is the case’ 
(Cartwright 1999: 4). The accuracy of our theory is context-specific.
Our scientific observations are contaminated by the context of our 
actions. The novel’s plot makes us experience perception in terms of 
action: Isabel Archer’s mode of seeing her environment preconditions 
the way she acts. In the preface to The Princess Casamassima (1886) 
James describes ‘her imagination’ as ‘positively the deepest depth of her 
imbroglio’ (James 1987: 8). Yet her imagination is not the actual cause 
of her downfall, because she does not actually realise what she imagines. 
However, it is her imagination that makes Isabel Archer susceptible to 
the manipulative fictions of Madame Merle and Mr Osmond. Crucially, 
she remains blind or imperceptive to these manipulations until it is too 
late. She is not able to perceive these fictions (Osmond’s and Merle’s) 
for what they are.
Due to this fatal flaw of her perceptive capacities she turns these 
manipulations of reality into a reality that entraps and imprisons her. 
James’s critical focus on the deleterious effects of fancy and fiction 
(imagination) does not demote the crucial work carried by perception 
and contemplation. On the contrary, James makes a strong case for 
blurring the traditional division between the perceptive and the active 
aspects of our existence. Isabel desires an active, engaged life of freedom 
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capable of realising her imagination. As Gorra has argued, her under-
standing of freedom is not merely notional or linguistic:
It isn’t just the freedom to name the terms on which she will meet the world. 
No, she wants the freedom, in Emerson’s words, to be self-sufficing, and her 
ambition will define itself in terms of a radical autonomy, a cultivation of 
individual identity in which her very sense of self comes to stand as the chief 
object of her own desire. (Gorra 2012: 52)
The novel reveals this rush to enact one’s desire (a form of imagina-
tive action) – which marginalises the slow work of perception – to be 
working hand in hand with Osmond’s oppressive scheme. Lacking 
enough perceptive capacities, Isabel Archer buys into the manipula-
tions of Osmond’s aura. This dear purchase diminishes the scope of her 
actions and in doing so prevents rather than enhances the realisation of 
her imagination.
What James has to say about perception and its diverse disorderliness 
has important implications for how we could revise traditional and 
modern perceptions of order. We see the world differently and the differ-
ence in perception helps create different worlds: ‘He and his neighbours 
are watching the same show, but one seeing more where the other sees 
less, one seeing black where the other sees white, one seeing big where 
the other sees small, one seeing coarse where the other sees fine’ (James 
1995: 7). This quotation opens up a heterogeneous world wherein one 
thing could be seen in two opposed ways which equally hold true.
Crucially, perception is no longer removed from the world of action 
as has traditionally been the case in standard oppositions between the 
contemplative and the active life of politics. The 1908 preface to The 
Portrait of a Lady makes a strong case for the discovery of action within 
perception. It does so by highlighting not only the literary (as regards 
the alteration of the established genre of the novel by introducing a 
non-plot-based element into it), but also the scientific and conceptual 
innovation of chapter 42 confronting us with an apparent lack of activ-
ity. Isabel Archer simply sits by the fire and reflects. James makes it clear 
that reflection here becomes revealed as an adventure:
She sits up, by her dying fire, far into the night, under the spell of recognitions 
on which she finds the last sharpness suddenly wait. It is a representation 
simply of her motionlessly seeing, and the attempt withal to make the mere 
still lucidity of her act as ‘interesting’ as the surprise of a caravan or the iden-
tification of a pirate. It represents, for that matter, one of the identifications 
dear to the novelist, and even indispensable to him; but it all goes on without 
her being approached by another person and without her leaving her chair. It 
is obviously the best thing in the book, but it is only a supreme illustration of 
the general plan. (James 1995: 15)
MACK PRINT.indd   133 26/11/2015   11:14
134    Contaminations
Here the lack of actions paradoxically becomes identified with what 
happens in adventure stories featuring pirates and the surprise appear-
ance of a caravan. The term surprise evokes its apparent opposite: 
Hitchcock’s innovative redefinition of suspense.
As Paul Marantz Cohen has put it, ‘in later films he [i.e. Hitchcock] 
altered the rules of suspense or rather made a new rule (Hitchcock came to 
define suspense as the art of letting the audience know what the character 
didn’t), so that the focus fell on character rather than on plot revelation, 
thus turning the mechanism something closer to literary narrative’ (Cohen 
1995: 27). Cohen has drawn attention to parallels between James and 
Hitchcock which have to do with their shared focus on character rather 
than narrative action: ‘James developed from a fairly standard action 
oriented storyteller, to a psychological novelist, to a novelist for whom the 
literariness of his medium came to take on a life of its own’ (Cohen 1995: 
9). James’s psychological interest in character has a visual dimension, as 
the very title of the novel (Portrait of a Lady) highlights. A critical concern 
with epistemology holds together James’s and Hitchcock’s respective 
fusions of the pictorial, the psychological and the narrative.
As Susan M. Griffin and Alan Nadel have recently pointed out, both 
the writer and the film director critique assumptions of omniscience:
By the same token, because the conventions of mainstream cinematic editing 
rely on the play of absence as much as they do on creating a window on 
reality, Hitchcock’s exploitation of vacant spaces, false trails, and unseen 
evidence helps us comprehend James’s critique of omniscience. Entailed in 
such a critique is the construction of the gaze, a device of equal prominence 
for both James and Hitchcock. (Griffin and Nadel 2012: 20)
The critique of omniscience also concerns the protagonists of a given 
work. We know well in advance about their delusions of knowledge 
(such as Isabel Archer’s delusions about Madame Merle or Scottie’s 
delusions about Judy/Madeleine in Hitchcock’s Vertigo) before they do.
According to Hitchcock, suspense anticipates the horror to come. 
When something actually happens it is no longer surprising: it is like 
letting the audience know that a bomb has been placed in its midst and 
that it will explode sooner or later. The suspense of James’s The Portrait 
of a Lady operates on a similar level: we know that Ralph Touchett 
wants to test his cousin in order to see how she will navigate the leeway 
for action with which his father’s inheritance endows her. Money here 
epitomises the energy providing the material base or engine to carry out 
what Isabel’s imagination impels her to embark upon: an active, cosmo-
politan and independent life. According to Ralph Touchett his father’s 
inheritance puts wind into his cousin’s sail.
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Isabel Archer reconciles herself to her unexpected possession of 
wealth by conceiving of it as a vehicle for free agency: ‘the girl presently 
made up her mind that to be rich was a virtue because it was to be able 
to do, and that to do could be sweet’ (James 1995: 182). Isabel Archer’s 
promise of action, however, never truly materialises: by  marrying 
Gilbert Osmond and thereby letting herself be manipulated by his 
former lover Madame Merle, she forecloses the horizon of independence 
and agency. The surprise element folds in upon itself. Ralph Touchett 
and other characters in the novel might be startled by Isabel’s decision 
to marry Mr Osmond but we, the readers, have already been informed 
of her fatal misreading of oppression as freedom.
The narrator makes clear that her future husband’s abode in Florence 
resembles a prison, a place of confinement from where it will prove 
difficult to escape: ‘There was something grave and strong in the place; 
it looked somehow as if, once you were in, you would need an act of 
energy to get out’ (James 1995: 217). The energy which supposedly the 
money of the inheritance would provide thus turns entropic: it needs 
to be burned (or spent) to provide the impetus for any attempt to get 
out of what her wealth in the first place tempted Madame Merle and 
her former lover to entangle her in (i.e. marriage to an oppressive and 
misogynist husband).
In contrast to Ralph and other protagonists in the novel, we also 
know of the heroine having set her heart on going straight into the lion’s 
den – straight into the confinement of marriage to Osmond that is bound 
to endanger what she holds so dear: independence, freedom, originality 
and autonomy. We read that ‘for Isabel, however, there was of course 
as yet no thought of getting out [i.e. of Osmond’s place described in the 
previous quotation], but only of advancing’ (James 1995: 217–18). We 
thus already know of Isabel’s self-inflicted danger. Rather than surprise 
us, suspense in James’s literary and Hitchcock’s cinematic work pre-
pares us for the horror to come.
In the words of Pascal Bonitzer, the ‘audience, which is thus no longer 
able to cling naively to the apparent reality of the image, and knows 
what is being woven below the surface, has suffered a loss of innocence’ 
(Bonitzer 2010: 19). Suspense contaminates a given entity with its 
apparent opposite: what appears to be natural turns out to be unnatu-
ral, or, in other words, horrible. Hitchcock’s cinema lets us perceive 
the mutual contamination of traditional moral opposites. On the basis 
of the supposed purity of moral categories, actions may be carried out 
without hesitation. This is precisely what takes place when Isabel Archer 
marries Gilbert Osmond, whom she identifies with her moral idea of 
beauty and truth while not realising that Osmond fabricates an aura of 
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moral autonomy and the aesthetic, which pretentiously and manipula-
tively devalues any concern for material interests.
Only too late (in chapter 42) perception intervenes to question 
actions which have already been carried out. As Gorra has pointed out, 
in chapter 42 the distinction between action and perception becomes 
blurred: ‘These pages do more [i.e. the pages in chapter 42] – they 
change our very sense of what counts as an event in fiction. Sitting still 
counts; thinking, doing nothing, not moving. Emotions count, and the 
activity of perception as well’ (Gorra 2012: 236). Gorra goes on to 
emphasise James’s literary innovations in novels such as What Maisie 
Knew (a work which will also be discussed in this chapter) and The 
Portrait of a Lady: ‘At once austere and grandiloquent, they are both 
modern and modernist in the pointillism with which they catch the 
human mind in the second-by-second act of perception, and modernist 
too in the symbolic force of their language’ (Gorra 2012: 300). How 
does such innovation of the novel on a formal level intervene in larger 
scientific and technological facets of our life? While providing a superb 
literary-historical reading of James’s novel, a critic of the stature of 
Gorra does not attempt to show how literature illuminates larger soci-
etal issues which are pertinent to our contemporary context.
Contaminating the literary with the cinematic
In this respect, a comparison between cinema and literature may be 
worthwhile. Cinema is a more exterior medium than literature. However, 
as Gilles Deleuze has shown, cinema turns internal with Hitchcock: ‘In 
Hitchcock, actions, affections, perceptions, all is interpretation, from 
beginning to end’ (Deleuze 1997: 204). Deleuze makes it clear that this 
interpretative bent within Hitchcock’s films shifts attention from actions 
towards intellectual constellations: ‘What matters is not who did the 
action – what Hitchcock calls with contempt the whodunit – but neither 
is it the action itself: it is the set of relations in which action and the one 
who did it are caught’ (Deleuze 1997: 204). These relations constitute 
what Deleuze calls Hitchcock’s ‘mental image’. While still working 
within the precinct of narrative cinema, Hitchcock’s mental image gives 
rise to the thought image (as perfected in the work of Pasolini which will 
be discussed in the next chapter):
the mental image would then be less a bringing to completion of the action-
image, and of the other images, than a re-examination of their nature and 
status, moreover, the whole movement-image which would be re-examined 
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through the rupture of the sensory-motor links in a particular character. 
What Hitchcock had wanted to avoid, a crisis of the traditional image of the 
cinema, would nevertheless happen in his wake, and in part as a result of his 
innovations. (Deleuze 1997: 209)
Hitchcock’s innovative employment of suspense calls the traditional 
movement-image of the cinema into crisis, because it accentuates the 
audience’s knowledge of actions about which the protagonist in a film 
remains ignorant until it is too late. As has been intimated above, this is 
precisely the reader’s situation faced with the actions of Isabel Archer in 
James’s The Portrait of a Lady. Both James and Hitchcock turn narration 
into a thought experiment. As Deleuze has put it apropos Hitchcock’s 
cinematic legacy: ‘The soul of the cinema demands increasing thought, 
even if thought begins by undoing the system of actions, perceptions 
and affections on which cinema had fed up to this point’ (Deleuze 1997: 
210–11). Actions of a given plot morph into the suspense of reflection, 
perception and thought.
Hitchcock employs techniques of suspense to show on the cinematic 
screen what escapes our attention when we rush to subscribe to stand-
ard categories of good and evil. His films bring to the fore how two 
seemingly opposed characters are in actual fact contaminations of 
each other. In Strangers on a Train we come to realise how Guy, who 
seems to embody order, respectability and high achievement, does not 
simply contrast with Bruno whom he meets by chance on a train ride. 
By visually connecting via montage parallel images of the law-abiding 
(superego) Guy and the lascivious, libidinal Bruno (id) Hitchcock’s film 
confronts us with ‘the view that ordered life depends on the rigorous and 
unnatural suppression of a powerfully seductive underworld of desire, 
and we see the reason for the stiff formality of order in the film’ (Wood 
2009: 178). Robin Wood focuses his analysis on one scene where Bruno 
contaminates not only his immediate surroundings within the precincts 
of the film but also implicates the audience in the act of contamination.
This scene takes place at a party given by the father of Guy’s mistress 
(as distinguished from his wife Ann whom Bruno murders fulfilling 
Guy’s secret wishes). The father is a senator – another striking embodi-
ment of order. At this party Bruno asks one of the guests, the elderly Mrs 
Cunningham, whether he could test on her neck what he takes to be the 
best technique for murdering someone. What begins as a joke seriously 
implicates the expectations of the audience, as Wood has put it:
The scene is a superb example of the Hitchcock spectator trap. First, belief in 
established order has been undermined in the deflation of the judge [whom 
Bruno asks what he thinks about murdering a murderer by sentencing the 
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same to capital punishment]; then the dialogue with Mrs Cunningham and 
her friend, because of the lightness of tone, gives us licence to accept the 
notion of common guilt as something of a joke, to connive at in, allowing 
ourselves to be implicated in the ‘game’ of murdering Mrs Cunningham, who 
is anyway a rich, trivial, stupid old woman. Then abruptly the joke rebounds 
on us – we have nearly been implicated in another murder: swift modulation 
of tone has seldom been used to such disturbing effect. (Wood 2009: 177)
The film induces the audience to naively cling to what the screen first 
represents as a joke. We know, however, that there is a parallel image 
for this apparently light-hearted entertainment: the scene where Bruno 
strangles Guy’s wife in the light-hearted surroundings of a theme park.
Suspense by working with what we already know – the way in which 
the tongue in cheek strangling at the party re-enacts the scene of lethal 
murder in the seemingly carefree surroundings of an amusement park 
– implicates us in what we should not be surprised about and yet are. 
Hitchcock implicates the audience in the confusion of the lethal and the 
light-hearted actions taking place on screen. He disorders the distinc-
tive order which separates laughter from seriousness while keeping the 
audience in the know (we have seen how Bruno has strangled Ann – an 
action which in the scene with Mrs Cunningham first provokes laughter 
before it nearly turns lethal).
The disorder we encounter is that of a collapse of categories which 
divide our lives into neat separations such as good and evil, innocence 
and guilt. Cinema achieves such contamination through the juxtaposi-
tion of images which contaminate each other and thus confuse our expe-
rience of order. The encounter between Guy and Bruno in Hitchcock’s 
Strangers on the Train stages such an experience.
Another striking case in point is Hitchcock’s early American movie 
Shadow of a Doubt which opens with the juxtaposed images of the 
serial killer, Uncle Charlie, and his niece (also going under the name) 
Charlie, the apparently innocent daughter of Mr and Mrs Joseph 
Newton of the small and innocuous Californian town Santa Rose. In a 
sequence of opening montage shots we see both in different geographical 
locations – Uncle Charlie in Philadelphia and his niece in Santa Rose – 
simultaneously lying on a bed.
Before we even know that Uncle Charlie is on the run from the police, 
the contamination of these two bed images calls into question the quiet, 
relaxed content of what they present. By interlinking the bed of uncle 
and niece, they evoke the prospect of incest as James McLaughlin has 
shown: ‘The intense togetherness of uncle and niece is registered then 
in fantasies of incest and identity of name’ (McLaughlin 2009: 146). 
Behind what we take to be innocent and natural dwells a more sinister 
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world which we perceive when the speed of our perceptions slows 
down.
This is exactly what takes place at the famous opening scene of David 
Lynch’s Blue Velvet. At the moment at which the father collapses with 
a heart attack, the camera movement shifts register and moves into slow 
motion until it gradually penetrates the surface of the garden onto which 
the paternal figure falls and the so far unknown kernel of what has taken 
place comes to the fore: insects devouring each other at a hidden level 
covered by grass.
James’s novels and Hitchcock’s as well as Lynch’s films explore in 
their respective fictional work the scientific uncovering of knowledge 
which is so disturbing that we want to ignore it; and yet it is real, it is, 
in a positivistic sense, there. As McLaughlin has put it apropos Shadow 
of a Doubt: ‘Criminality, Hitchcock insists, hides within domesticity; or, 
to put it another way, domesticity is merely the most hidden criminality’ 
(McLaughlin 2009: 152). Suspense here works at an epistemological 
level. It uncovers knowledge which has been hidden by societal concepts 
of respectability, order, purity, and systematic cohesion.
Isabel Archer holds us in suspense in a similar way: we are aware 
before she and other characters in the novel are that her quest for 
freedom will end up entrapping her. By not only providing but also 
implicating their audience in knowledge, both James and Hitchcock let 
us experience the active, suspenseful, and riveting aspect of  perception – 
in short, they confront us with theory as activity. Isabel Archer’s ideals 
of freedom and independence end up not only, as at the opening of the 
novel, defining but, as it turns out in Volume II, confining her. Her active 
life has been the product of a delusion. In James’s novel the work of 
perception achieves what mere action lacks: the recognition of what has 
really happened rather than what went on on the surface of narration 
(or in cinematic terms on the level of what Bonitzer in the quotation 
above calls ‘the image’).
The word horror describes this move from surface to actual sub-
stance. Towards the end of Volume I Countess Gemini employs the 
word characterising the furniture of her brother’s (Gilbert Osmond’s) 
abode: ‘There are some very good seats here, but there are also some 
horrors’ (James 1995: 219). In Volume II, however, Countess Gemini 
uses the term ‘horror’ not in the context of the external narrative ambi-
ence but rather to describe a loss of innocence which may appear to be 
inappropriate in the presence of a child (Osmond’s Pansy): ‘There is no 
harm in knowing horrors she [i.e. the child Pansy] may be in for’ (James 
1995: 300). Horror here emerges as the knowledge of what takes place 
in the novel’s narrative. It is the horror of recognition: the new science 
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of various contaminations wherein gaining insight coincides not with 
knowledge of the systematic but the unsystematic.
James exposes a child to such recognition of the unsystematic in 
What Maisie Knew. The scandal of the horror here is that it avoids 
moral judgement. This is what enervates the governess Mrs Wix about 
Maisie’s knowledge of her parents’ mutual adultery: ‘What I did lose 
patience at this morning was at how it was that without your seeming 
to condemn – for you didn’t, you remember! – you yet did seem to 
know’ (James 1985: 214). Mrs Wix defines by the term ‘moral sense’ 
(James 1985: 260) a kind of knowledge that is judgemental. Knowledge 
which does not judge seems to pose a threat, rendering society horrible, 
unsystematic, disorderly and unnatural. It seems to unleash the animal 
within the child.
In a similar way, the governess who narrates what she takes to be the 
unnatural events of The Turn of the Screw calls the refusal to acknowl-
edge knowing the ghost the turning point at which the human turns 
animalistic, at which the child (Miles) morphs into the beast/ghost of 
the ‘unnatural man’: ‘His [Miles] having lied and been impudent [having 
knowledge of and yet denying judgement and thus acknowledgement of 
the ghost] are, I confess, less engaging specimens than I had hoped to 
have from you of the outbreak in him of the little natural man’ (James 
1966: 37). The outbreak of the ‘little natural man’ describes the con-
tamination of the human with the animal, of the child with the dead.
This mixture of disorder and nature marks society at risk of turning 
animalistic. The epitome of such risk is the child whom a ghost (contam-
ination as such) transmogrifies from innocence to a form of knowledge 
that goes without the order imposed by moral sense. Rather than label 
the governess ‘mad’ as Edmund Wilson and other critics have done,1 she 
embodies a form of ‘normality’ that goes with a dismissal of horrifying 
knowledge. It is beyond doubt something disturbing that has occurred 
to the children. It is such knowledge that aggravates the mental state of 
the governess.
James, as Shoshana Felman has pointed out, abstains from literally 
pinning down such knowledge: ‘The literal is “vulgar” because it stops 
the movement constitutive of meaning, because it blocks and interrupts 
the endless process of metaphorical substitution’ (Felman 2003: 153). 
The knowledge that is so offensive to the governess’s sense of respect-
ability is indeed the ambiguous and the contradictory: ‘the very scandal 
of contradictions and ambiguity’ (Felman 2003: 160). Felman rightly 
warns of vulgar psychoanalytical readings that reduce the ambiguity of 
the text to one meaning.
In contrast to what we know of Isabel’s ignorance about Osmond and 
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Madame Merle, our grasp of knowledge remains suspended in The Turn 
of the Screw. Suspense does not, however, eventuate in self-referentiality 
as Felman argues when she reduces the text to ‘the incessant sliding 
of signification’ (Felman 2003: 215). Rather than referring to itself, 
James’s novel sheds light on the societal distortions of knowledge. As 
Aviva Briefel has recently argued, The Turn of the Screw ‘confirms that 
respectability is, in fact, the place in which trouble is likely to occur’ 
(Briefel 2012: 163). Crucially, James as well as Hitchcock frames such 
societal respectability with cognitive flaws that accompany accelerated 
actions and judgements. Briefel thus establishes an intriguing correlation 
between the failures of perception in James’s governess and the two main 
protagonists of Hitchcock’s Vertigo: ‘Marion’s cognitive inability links 
her to Norman, who is also deluded by his construction of Victorian 
propriety’ (Briefel 2012: 172). Propriety keeps us ignorant of knowledge 
that James’s and Hitchcock’s respective literary and cinematic figures of 
contamination illuminate.
Similarly to Isabel Archer’s prioritisation of action over reflection in 
the first part of The Portrait of a Lady, a rush to judgement characterises 
the cognitive inability of the governess in The Turn of the Screw. She is 
convinced that Miles and Flora – the two children under her charge – 
have already lost the innocence bestowed by nature’s presumed order:
Oh yes we may sit here and look at them, and they may show off to us there 
to their fill; but even while they pretend to be lost in their fairy tale they’re 
steeped in their vision of the dead restored to them. He’s not reading to her,’ I 
declared; ‘they’re talking of them – they’re talking horrors! (James 1966: 48)
Horror denotes the point where we recognise the unsystematic in 
what we previously took to be systematic. At this point order becomes 
revealed as disorder, nature turns unnatural, and the human morphs 
into the unruliness of the dreaded beast or animal. James’s governess 
harnesses herself against the ‘outbreak of the little natural man’ by sheer 
power of moral will. This will imposes the order of nature against a 
society at risk of morphing into the beast, the ghost which contaminates 
the order and innocence of childhood with ‘the little natural man’:
Here at present I felt afresh – for I had felt it again and again – how my 
equilibrium depended on the success of my rigid will, the will to shut my eyes 
as tight as possible to the truth that what I had to deal with was revolting 
against nature. I could only get on at all by taking ‘nature’ into my confidence 
and my account, by treating my monstrous ordeal as a push in a direction 
unusual, of course, and unpleasant, but demanding after all, for a fair front, 
only another turn of the screw of ordinary human virtue. No attempt, none 
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the less, could well require more tact than just this attempt to supply, one’s 
self, all the nature. (James 1966: 80)
While accusing the children under her charge of unacknowledged 
knowledge of beasts/ghosts, the governess upholds a proud and moral-
istic refusal of recognition or perception. She posits the order of nature 
against the disorder of societal-psychological ghosts.
She refuses to live with the apprehensive presence of what she judges 
to be the unnatural, the beastly or the ghostly (what she calls ‘the little 
natural man’ in the previous quotation). Her rigid power of the will 
which does not recognise any lack of system in the embodied disorder of 
our world – ‘the will to shut my eyes as tight as possible to the truth’ – 
seems to precondition the endurance of moral sense and its judgements. 
The basis of these judgements is the construction of natural order.
James’s expression ‘the will to shut my eyes as tight as possible to 
the truth’ should alert us to the science–art opposition and the related 
objectivity–subjectivity divide prevalent in his as it is in our contempo-
rary public discourse. He clearly critiques in the speech of the governess 
a wilful repudiation of scientific discovery. Rather than being opposed 
or disinterested in contemporary scientific debates about objectivity, 
James’s preoccupation with the distorted images produced by the power 
of the will for order, beauty or aesthetic refinement (Isabel Archer’s 
phantasising about Madame Merle and Gilbert Osmond), purity and 
systematic coherence has an explicit bearing on the status of science at 
the fin-de-siècle.
As Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison have amply shown, from 
the mid-nineteenth century onwards objective, scientific operations 
were increasingly represented in public discourse to be dependent on 
a paradoxical self-annihilation of the will: ‘The divided scientific self, 
actively willing its own passivity, was only one possible self within the 
field created by the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity. Its 
polar opposite, equally stereotyped and normalized, was the artistic self, 
as militarily subjective as the scientific self was objective’ (Daston and 
Galison 2007: 246). James’s The Turn of the Screw contaminates such 
oppositions between subjectivity and objectivity, by highlighting the 
distortions and paradoxes of a will which preconditions the scientific 
occlusion of the subject: ‘Objectivity and the scientific self that practiced 
it were intrinsically unstable’ (Daston and Galison 2007: 250). The gov-
erness of The Turn of the Screw refers to the will not only to cover up her 
instability. Her will mainly serves to suppress any recognition of what 
might violate preformed conceptions of health, morality and order. Her 
emphasis on the will is at once eerily resonant of the scientific as well 
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as moralistic insistence on the wilful subjugation of anything subjective 
– ‘Objectivity demanded that the self split into active experimenter and 
passive observer’ (Daston and Galison 2007: 250) – as it accentuates the 
aesthetic distortions of wilful artistic practice which refuses to engage 
with any embodied or real issues that may clash with ideal conceptions 
of beauty and/or moral perfection. For the governess scientific standards 
of objective truth and moralistic as well as aesthetic ideals coalesce in the 
concept of nature and its purported order.
The moral, wilful self here is indeed ‘all nature’. Robert Pippin is right 
to call the reliability of the narrator into question.2 How can we trust the 
accuracy of the governess’s account if she proudly admits to shutting her 
eyes tight? Commenting on this passage Pippin, however, disputes the 
validity of the concept of nature and its related connotation of order and 
homogeneity: ‘She has some sense that there is no nature here, that she is 
beyond even her own notions of the original stain of sin in human nature 
(the “little natural man” in Miles), and that whatever has happened 
cannot be understood in these terms’ (Pippin 2001: 121). A suspenseful 
play with knowledge operates here as it does in our foreknowledge of 
Isabel’s entrapment in The Portrait of a Lady: we – the readers – have a 
clear sense that the nature versus sin (i.e. animal/ghost/beast) opposition 
is cruel; the governess, however, seems to be convinced of the righteous-
ness of her virtuous turn of the screw.
Part of her cruelty is her commitment to turning the screw – which 
she mistakes for virtue – and the concomitant refusal to recognise the 
violence of this conception of nature as order. We know more than her 
and this creates suspense. It does so by staining the governess who is so 
obsessed with what she judges to be the sin of those who perceive or 
know the ghosts. In the governess’s view what disorders the supposed 
order of nature renders us like the ‘little natural man’ running counter 
to grand conceptions of homogeneity and order. James’s narrative, 
however, alerts us to the cruelty of such virtue. We know more than the 
governess who claims to be omniscient and to see the presence of the 
beastly ghosts. In doing so James’s novel trains our capacities of resist-
ance which prevent us from both embracing rash claims to knowledge 
(the governess in The Turn of the Screw) and privileging accelerated 
actions over the slowing down of speed that is involved in acts of percep-
tion and reflection.
An application of Hitchcock’s cinematic notion of suspense helps illu-
minate questions of knowledge, perception and action in James’s literary 
impressionism. Similarly to Hitchcock in his films, James in his novels 
provides his audience with crucial pieces of information that some of 
his main protagonists ignore at their peril. This focus on knowledge, 
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perception and reflection inflects the traditional form of both the novel 
and narrative cinema because it turns epistemological and psychological 
themes into the main fabric of the plot rather than defining the latter 
as simply depicting actions. It would, however, be misleading to read 
this as merely a formal innovation to do with genre. James, as well as 
Hitchcock, is concerned with the ever increasing speed which techno-
logical advances brought about from the Industrial Revolution in the 
mid-nineteenth century onwards.
By contaminating their respective audiences’ view of action with epis-
temological and psychological issues both auteurs interrupt and slow 
down the plot of either the film or the novel. They indeed make a plea 
for suspending judgements and actions at a time when technologies of 
speed are increasingly employed to measure achievements in economics, 
medicine, education and society at large. This is a process that has been 
going on since the technological advances of the mid-nineteenth century. 
Neither James nor Hitchcock dismisses such scientific discoveries which 
help accelerate the way we act and interact with each other. They are 
not dismayed about them either. They warn, however, of an uncriti-
cal embrace of speed and the concomitant marginalisation of isolated 
voices that articulate doubt about some aspects of otherwise beneficial 
developments. The fictions presented in their novels and in their films 
confront us with a reality we might want to ignore. It is a reality where 
speed in both cognition and action results in deleterious or lethal con-
sequences. James’s and Hitchcock’s wariness of the rush to action and 
judgement is all the more relevant in our digital age where we seem to 
have become, as Irving Biederman and Edward A. Vessel have put it, 
‘infoveres’ (devourers of information).3 As the computer scientist Lanier 
has recently put it: ‘Information is alienated experience’ (Lanier 2010: 
28). Information reduces the complexity of experience to a homogene-
ous and deceptively clear issue. Scottie in Hitchcock’s Vertigo takes the 
information handed down to him by the manipulator Elster and runs 
with it into disaster.
Critical attention has so far been focused on how Vertigo portrays 
male desire. Indeed this critical preoccupation with phantasy has 
recently been identified as the generic element which Hitchcock has in 
common with James. As Eric Savoy has recently put it: ‘In the formalist 
vision of both James and Hitchcock, to desire is to broach the territory 
of the gothic: that is, to solicit the return of the repressed, to stage the 
encounter with the traumatic Real, to encounter the void at the centre 
of subjectivity, to become unhinged’ (Savoy 2012: 148). In a rather 
reductive reading, Savoy establishes an archetypal connection between 
Hitchcock’s male characters (such as Scottie) and those of James’s 
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novels. Rather than being a perceptive observer, in this reading (which 
applies Lacan’s notion of the Sinthome to film and literature) Strether 
becomes as deceived by vertiginous ‘captations’ of desire and phantasy 
as Scottie in Vertigo, recovering in a psychiatric unit after what he takes 
to be the suicide of the ghostly Madeleine:
If, as every theorist of trauma after Freud has emphasized, trauma is charac-
terized by the unconscious repetition of an event that remains unfathomable, 
then Vertigo is an exemplary trauma event. Essentially, it grafts onto the 
traumatic residue of Scottie’s vertigo – the chronic fear of falling – the plot 
of falling in love with a ghostly illusion. In terms of character alignment, too, 
Hitchcock’s film recalls the quadrilateral emplotment of The Ambassadors. 
Strether falls into the web of deception woven by Chad Newsome and 
Madame de Vionnet. (Savoy 2012: 153)
Strether clearly takes sides with the contaminating or scandalous (as 
Pasolini would put it, as will be discussed in Chapter 6) relationship 
between Mrs Newsome’s son and the older Madame de Vionnet. He 
decides to abandon his preordained role as emissary for Mrs Newsome 
and her business/family interests in Woollett. He indeed ‘takes up the 
threads of a story that runs counter to Woollett’s line’ (Savoy 2012: 
148), but this is his own thought-through decision and not the work of 
some manipulation à la Madame Merle/Mr Osmond in The Portrait of 
a Lady or Gavin Elster in Hitchcock’s Vertigo.
Savoy’s reductive psychoanalytical reading has not heeded Shoshana 
Felman’s warning about such literal applications of psychoanalysis 
to literary works such as The Turn of the Screw. An interpretative 
approach which reduces the content and form of a given work to a 
prearranged set of issues also informs Laura Mulvey’s essay ‘Visual 
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’. In this article Mulvey has famously 
indicted Hitchcock’s Vertigo for foregrounding a male gaze which is 
active and thereby supposedly contrasts with the passive role allotted 
by Hitchcock to the female, who is merely a passive object: ‘Far from 
being simply an aside on the perversions of the police, Vertigo focuses 
on the implications of the active/looking, passive/looked at split in terms 
of sexual difference and the power of the male symbolic encapsulated 
in the hero’ (Mulvey 2000: 492). A rigid opposition between male 
and female, between action and passivity permeates the discussion of 
Mulvey’s essay.
Recently Marian E. Keane has shown how Mulvey misreads not only 
Freud’s psychoanalysis but also Hitchcock’s cinematic techniques. In 
keeping with the discussion in this chapter, Keane has made amply clear 
that Hitchcock does not privilege action (associated for Mulvey with 
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the male) over perception/passivity. On the contrary, Scottie’s impulsive 
course of action is clearly troubling, and according to Keane Hitchcock 
directs the camera to make us sympathise with Judy.
As we have seen in this section, Hitchcock, as well as James, con-
taminates various actions with the supposed passivity of perception and 
reflection. In James’s The Portrait of a Lady a woman has an active role 
(Isabel). In Hitchcock’s Vertigo it is a man, Scottie, who is apparently in 
control of the action. The film makes us discover how the visual pleasure 
Scottie (James Stewart) takes in his active pursuit of Judy (Kim Novak) 
turns out to be the work of deception and thus turns the actor into a 
passive role (as becomes amply clear in Scottie’s catatonic state after 
‘Madeleine’s’ fall from the Mission Tower). In his critique of Mulvey’s 
essay Charles Barr has astutely brought to the fore how the film subjects 
Scottie’s visual pleasure to both epistemological and psychological 
scrutiny:
This pattern is at the root of what is special about Vertigo. It draws in, and 
indulges, the pleasurable gaze with extraordinary fullness, and at the same 
time foregrounds the mechanisms behind it – first by taking them apart, then 
by pushing them to an extreme. Indeed, the plot, when fully revealed, will 
turn out to foreground these mechanisms still more decisively at the level 
of narrative, hinging as it does on the discovery that the entire scenario of 
surveillance has been a devious construction, set up by Gavin Elster with the 
woman’s connivance and with Scottie as victim. Kim Novak is not simply, 
as a first viewing suggests, playing for Hitchcock the role of a woman 
being voyeuristically observed; she is playing, for Hitchcock, the part of a 
woman who is playing, for Elster, the part of a woman being voyeuristically 
observed. Absorbing at first viewing, when we don’t know the full plot, these 
scenes become even more so when overlaid by the bittersweet awareness that, 
with Scottie, we have been, and are now again allowing ourselves to be, led 
on, deceived, by a consummate manipulator, complaisant victims of what has 
all along been – like all cinema – an illusory construction. (Barr 2012: 21)
Suspense revolves around the audience gaining a level of insight which 
reveals visual pleasure to be the work of manipulation. The emphasis 
is cognitive. As Barr has shown in the quotation above, Hitchcock 
employs cinematic techniques of deception in order to undermine the 
deceptive work of cinema. In a similar way, James writes fiction in order 
to alert us to the fictive or manipulative environment which we con-
front in factual or non-fictive settings of our mundane world of work, 
romance and business. Strikingly, the manipulator Elster in Vertigo has 
financial interests at heart when he kills his wife.4 The same holds true 
for Osmond in The Portrait of a Lady: his marriage to Isabel Archer 
turns him from an impoverished bohemian would-be artist to a wealthy 
socialite.
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Crucially, both James’s novel and Hitchcock’s film reveal unreflec-
tive actions, voyeuristic observations and prearranged judgements to 
be delusions, to be fictions. They are delusory, because they are driven 
by reductive pieces of information: Madame Merle’s about Gilbert 
Osmond’s aesthetic disinterest in conventional worries about finance, 
and Elster’s account of his wife’s genetic inheritance from her grand-
mother of mental illness. Similarly to the governess in The Turn of the 
Screw, Elster imputes to his wife the beastly ghost of mental illness 
– here, however, it is not a quasi-supernatural cause but a seemingly 
rational form of haunting: that of genetic inheritance.
Being preoccupied with the sexual politics of desire, critics have 
ignored how Hitchcock’s Vertigo critiques simplistic reductions of the 
cultural to the biological. Vertigo indeed narrates how the reduction 
of a person’s identity to biological inheritance – Elster feeds Scottie 
the lie of how his wife inherited a supposed mental illness from her 
grandmother – can be used to get away with murdering this person. It 
is common knowledge that cinematic and literary works are imaginary 
rather than real. What has so far not been investigated is the way in 
which these obvious products of the imagination reflect upon how we 
are sometimes governed by fictions in real life. One obvious example is 
the way in which we can fall prey to various forms of deception, which 
is the subject matter of Hitchcock’s Vertigo.
James’s The Portrait of a Lady and Hitchcock’s Vertigo are equally 
concerned with manipulation and deception. What facilitates the act of 
being duped is the speed with which the one who is being manipulated 
accepts the misleading or false information on offer without interrupt-
ing this process with time for reflection. Knowledge and reflection are 
clearly crucial here. What is problematic is the rush to action or judge-
ment: Isabel’s distortive judgement of Osmond in The Portrait of a Lady 
and the governess’s lethal judgement about the beastly corruption of the 
children in her charge in The Turn of the Screw.
The audience knows about Scottie’s lack of knowledge through Judy’s 
flashback which offers the accurate perception about Scottie’s fatal rush 
to action, as Keane has pointed out in her rebuttal of Mulvey’s indict-
ment of Hitchcock’s film: ‘The flashback sequence is inaugurated by a 
striking turn of Novak’s head toward the camera that culminates in her 
look into the camera. Her look into the camera registers what she knows, 
and the flashback that follows represents but a piece of that knowledge’ 
(Keane 2009: 237). Hitchcock renders suspense a question of gaining 
insight or knowledge into what takes place within the plot. He directs the 
camera to moments of suspense within a psychological or epistemologi-
cal frame. In Vertigo this is not the movement of the action hero but the 
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slow motion of reflective flashbacks, and as Keane has argued: ‘At no 
point in Vertigo does Stewart/Scottie possess a knowledge of the camera 
commensurate with Novak’s/Judy’s’ (Keane 2009: 238). Both James and 
Hitchcock reverse the traditional prioritisation of action over percep-
tion in narratives (in both novels and films). The lead characters of their 
films and novels are observers (like Strether) and not fast-moving action 
heroes. By letting the audience know more than the protagonists of the 
plot, James and Hitchcock make the spectator/reader active participants 
in an epistemological and psychological quest for complexity.
Beyond thought’s purity: contamination in James’s  
The Portrait of a Lady
Here we know more than the ‘beastly pure mind’ of Isabel Archer. In 
striking contrast to the children in The Turn of the Screw the child Pansy 
denotes innocence untouched by the contamination of ghosts. Isabel is 
taken in by such displays of innocence at Osmond’s abode in Florence. 
Her disposition lends itself to falling prey to such moral deception. As 
her friend Henrietta Stackpole unsuccessfully attempts to make her 
aware, it partakes of her ‘dangerous tendencies’: ‘I mean your exposure 
on the moral side’ (James 1995: 187). She has ‘too many graceful illu-
sions’ (James 1995: 188). These illusions find their point of reference 
in the supposed innocence of Osmond’s aestheticism. Osmond’s child 
Pansy evidences the innocence in question here. Pansy lives the harm-
lessness of infantile submission: ‘She was evidently impregnated with 
the idea of submission, which was due to any one who took the tone 
of authority; and she was the passive observer of the operation of her 
fate’ (James 1995: 202). Her master or father is, however, ‘of the world’ 
(James 1995: 202). His interests are political and worldly.
As Lee Edelman has argued, ‘the image of the Child invariably shapes 
the logic within which the political itself must be thought’ (Edelman 
2004: 2). Osmond’s child is indeed the pawn of deception with which 
he ensnarls the ever so active Isabel Archer. The supposed innocence of 
both his child and his aesthetic pursuits is a façade that hides his true 
interests in power and control. Together with Madame Merle he gains 
power over Isabel’s mind through deceptive displays of harmlessness. 
Isabel’s moral exposure to the life of action rather than critical per-
ception preconditions her victimhood. Like Pansy, she is passive even 
though her goal is an active, free and independent life. Only in chapter 
42 does she gain some form of independence. At this crucial point, 
action and perception are no longer mutually exclusive spheres.
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The spell of recognitions haunting Isabel Archer contemplating her 
life ‘by her dying fire’ may be surprising to her but not to the readers of 
the novel. For the readers already know of Madame Merle’s manipula-
tive powers. Isabel might have grasped the threat of being at risk of 
falling into Madame Merle’s trap (by marrying the latter’s former lover 
and accomplice Gilbert Osmond): her aunt Mrs Touchett has pointed 
this out to her before she actually marries Mr Osmond.
As readers, we are privy to a conversation between Madame Merle 
and Mr Osmond where the former replies to the latter’s conscientious 
question ‘Isn’t she [i.e. Isabel Archer] meant for something better than 
that’ [i.e. living with him, Gilbert Osmond] by admitting her disinterest 
in what might be beneficial for others: ‘I don’t pretend to know what 
people are meant for’ and, worse still, by acknowledging her ruthless 
and selfish scheme of manipulation: ‘I only know what I can do with 
them’ (James 1995: 207). The question of ‘doing’ has been neglected in 
discussions of James’s The Portrait of a Lady. Instead, the focus of atten-
tion has been on what Nina Baym has called ‘a drama of consciousness’, 
and as Baym, following F. O. Matthiessen and Anthony J. Mazzella, has 
rightly pointed out there is indeed a striking shift between the 1881 and 
the 1908 versions of the novel: ‘The changes of 1908, transforming the 
story into a drama of consciousness, overlaid and in places obliterated 
the coherence of the 1881 version’ (Baym 1995: 620). As a consequence 
of these changes, the action taking place in the 1908 edition ‘was the 
development of her [Isabel Archer’s] perception and awareness’ (Baym 
1995: 620). It is, however, also true that much of what happens takes 
place not only on the basis of perception and awareness but rather due 
to a lack of consciousness on the part of Isabel Archer.
The novel is certainly concerned with consciousness but also – and 
this is the crucial point – with a new understanding of consciousness 
which cannot be separated from the sphere of action. Isabel, however, 
compartmentalises thought and deed, perception and action, reading 
literature or philosophy and embarking on an active life. Right from the 
beginning she appears as a reader ‘trudging over the sandy plains of a 
history of German Thought’ (James 1995: 34). German Thought in the 
nineteenth century has of course been the vanguard of a philosophy of 
freedom, autonomy and independence which Isabel is keen to practise 
in a life of action (see Mack 2003). Despite this implicit connection 
between the transformational ideas she encounters in her reading 
and what she attempts to realise in her actual life, Isabel nevertheless 
repudiates any osmosis between books and reality: ‘The poor girl liked 
to be thought clever, but she hated to be thought bookish; she used to 
read in secret and, though her memory was excellent, to abstain from 
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showy reference. She had a great desire for knowledge, but she preferred 
almost any sort of information to the printed page; she had an immense 
curiosity about life and was constantly staring and wondering’ (James 
1995: 41). Here we indeed encounter an opposition (as discussed in the 
previous section) between action in terms of – avant-là-lettre digital – 
‘information’ and the contemplation associated with the ‘printed page’. 
It is as though books were to impede access to action: ‘Her reputa-
tion of reading a great deal hung over her like the cloudy envelope of 
a goddess in an epic’ (James 1995: 41). According to Isabel, books, 
contemplation and reading seem to impede rather than enhance ‘real 
life’.
Being bookish here seems to be a symptom of being sick, and indeed 
the mortally ill cousin Ralph Touchett embodies for Isabel the morbid 
ambience of literature and philosophy.5 Ralph is indeed an observer and 
yet, ironically, he also sets in motion the preconditions for Isabel’s so 
longed-for life of action. As she finds out far too slowly and far too late 
– but as the reader knows from early on – Ralph Touchett persuades his 
father to make Isabel the inheritor of most of his financial assets. After 
having inherited £70,000 from Mr Touchett Isabel mistakes wealth to 
be the springboard for a life of action that should overcome the confine-
ments of bookishness and contemplation.
Ironically, her presumed active life remains incarcerated in visions 
which turn out to be delusions: ‘She lost herself in a maze of visions; the 
fine things to be done by a rich, independent, generous girl who took 
a large human view of occasions and obligations were sublime in the 
mass. Her fortune therefore became to her mind a part of a better self; it 
gave her importance, gave her even, to her imagination, a certain ideal 
beauty’ (James 1995: 193). The novel reveals Isabel’s ‘large human view’ 
to be rather narrow. What she takes to be action has been in her mind’s 
eye all along a play of her imagination. The crucial point is her belit-
tling perception without realising that perception preconditions actions. 
James’s novel thus helps us discover how action cannot be segregated, as 
it has previously been, from perception.
Madame Merle and, in a more innocent, observing way, Ralph 
Touchett rather than Isabel, are, however, in charge of the doing. Rather 
than being a heroine of consciousness, Isabel Archer repudiates any 
form of perception. Her cousin, however, confronts her with percep-
tion. Before her marriage, he explicitly warns her that her engagement 
to Gilbert Osmond would not be one of freedom and independence but 
one of confinement: ‘Because you’re going to be put into a cage’ (James 
1995: 288). Isabel repudiates her cousin’s apprehensions of her life and 
this repudiation enforces a sense of her limited rather than enhanced 
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consciousness. These limitations in consciousness literally prepare for 
her limited, confined life in her marriage to Mr Osmond.
The presumed life of action eventuates in a state of total passivity. 
When leaving Osmond’s fortress-like palace in Rome to visit her dying 
cousin Ralph in England she ‘envied Ralph his dying’ (James 1995: 465). 
Her shame of being bookish and contemplative ironically leads to her 
being tired of life:
She had moments indeed in her journey from Rome which were almost as 
good as being dead. She sat in her corner, so motionless, so passive, simply 
with a sense of being carried, so detached from hope and regret, that she 
recalled to herself one of those Etruscan figures couched upon the receptacle 
of their ashes. [. . .] The only thing to regret was that Madame Merle had 
been so – well, so unimaginable. Just here her intelligence dropped, from 
literal inability to say what it was Madame Merle had been. (James 1995: 
465)
The failure of her decision to marry Osmond is here revealed to be a 
failure of perception and of consciousness. Hers is a limited imagination, 
rather than a boundless one. Her action has been shaped by this limited 
imagination for which only Osmond’s show of refinement is imagina-
ble, but Madame Merle’s vulgar manipulation remains unimaginable. 
Significantly, she falls into Merle’s trap by crossing over to Osmond’s 
dominion, first by ceding to him in her imagination:
What had happened [i.e. her falling for Osmond] was something that for a 
week past her imagination had been going forward to meet; but here, when 
it came, she stopped – that sublime principle somehow broke down. The 
working of this young lady’s spirit was strange, and I can only give it to you 
as I see it, not hoping to make it seem altogether natural. Her imagination, 
as I say, now hung back: there was a last vague space it couldn’t cross – a 
dusky, uncertain tract which looked ambiguous and even slightly treacher-
ous, like a moorland seen in the winter twilight. But she was to cross it yet. 
(James 1995: 265)
Action – the act of crossing – takes place in the imagination – in the 
mind – before it actually materialises. What the novel narrates is what 
its heroine denies from the outset: the interconnection between percep-
tion and actions, between reading and life. Towards the end of the novel 
Isabel’s marginalisation of reading intensifies into a state of disinterest 
and, worse still, incapacity to read: ‘Besides, she had never been less 
interested in literature than to-day, as she found when she occasion-
ally took down from the shelf one of the valuable volumes of which 
Mrs Touchett had spoken. She was quite unable to read; her attention 
had never been so little at her command’ (James 1995: 482–3). Isabel’s 
inability to read is an inability to perceive passivity in what she takes to 
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be action. It also instantiates her refusal to discover action in what she 
assumes to be passivity (such as, for instance, reading and reflection).
Conclusion: James, Hitchcock, Benjamin, or the persistence 
of fiction as ‘aura’
For Isabel’s imagination Madame Merle has ‘a sort of greatness’ (James 
1995: 166). Her imagination exerts a deleterious spell which turns 
reality into fiction. It is important to emphasise here that she takes what 
is fiction to be reality. However, by being taken for real the fictitious 
or fraudulent indeed shapes our action as it materialises in actuality. 
Similarly to the way in which Scottie in Hitchcock’s Vertigo elevates 
the vulgar con girl Judy into the glamorous Madeleine, James’s Isabel 
Archer extols the scheming and rather worldly characters who manipu-
late her (i.e. Madame Merle and Gilbert Osmond) into epiphanies of 
transcendental beauty.
From Isabel’s point of view Madame Merle was neither ‘affected’ nor 
‘pretentious, since from these vulgar vices no woman could have been 
more exempt’ (James 1995: 167). From this elevated position, Madame 
Merle manipulates Isabel’s mind, describing her American friend who 
resides in Italy in terms of a blank page – a blank page of emptiness 
which ideally lends itself to be superabundantly filled by Isabel’s phan-
tasies: ‘He [i.e. Gilbert Osmond]’ s exceedingly clever, a man to be dis-
tinguished; but, as I tell you, you exhaust the description when you say 
he’s Mr Osmond who lives tout bêtement in Italy. No career, no name, 
no position, no fortune, no past, no future, no anything’ (James 1995: 
172). Madame Merle seems to know avant-là-lettre the psychoanalysis 
of desire. She glamorises her companion in terms of what Žižek has 
recently called ‘less than nothing’. Her tactics are Hegelian, dialectical: 
she depicts Osmond as nothing in order to extol him into the epitome 
of glamour.
Following Hegel, Žižek has analysed the attractive power of nothing-
ness. Osmond’s negativity here gains in positive force:
At the beginning (even if it is a mythical one), there is no substantial One, but 
Nothingness itself; every One comes second, emerges through the self-relating 
of this Nothingness. In other words, Nothing as negation is not primarily the 
negation of something, of a positive entity, but the negation of itself. (Žižek 
2012: 378)
By appearing to negate his substantiality Osmond does not, however, 
turn the show of ephemeral appearance into an aesthetic programme 
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of the immaterial as he and Madame Merle attempt to make Isabel 
believe.
When Isabel at last realises that ‘Madame Merle’s interest was identi-
cal with Osmond’s’ (James 1995: 428) she also recognises the worldly 
and substance-driven schemes of the two. Madame Merle at one with 
Gilbert Osmond are indeed the actors who drive Isabel into a life of 
passivity: ‘More clearly than ever before Isabel heard a cold, mocking 
voice proceed from she knew not where, in the dim void that surrounded 
her, and declare that this bright, strong, definite, worldly woman, this 
incarnation of the practical, the personal, the immediate, was a power-
ful agent in her destiny’ (James 1995: 427–8). Isabel, who sets out ‘to 
choose’ her ‘fate’, belatedly (and far too slowly) realises that the activity 
of choosing has been co-opted not only by Madame Merle but also by 
her failure of consciousness. Her consciousness has not been perceptive 
enough to recognise in Osmond’s presumed lack of substance the sub-
jectivity of an oppressor who does not so much ignore substantial issues 
but imposes his own self as the only valid form of all there is to know 
and feel (i.e. his subjectivity poses as objectivity).6
For Isabel’s imagination Osmond instantiates Žižek’s ‘Hegelian motif 
of “Substance as Subject” ’ (Žižek 2012: 380). What, however, about a 
form of subjectivity that assumes the position of substance, of all there 
is? This is precisely the reality which Isabel’s awakened consciousness 
faces in chapter 42. In chapter 42 Isabel’s sight turns into a vision of 
discovery.
Chapter 40 describes Isabel’s process of registering an image that 
instantaneously vanishes from mental awareness rather than becoming 
absorbed by the workings of the mind. Here she recognises the connec-
tion between Osmond and Madame Merle, and significantly the link 
is not based on motor-action but on perception – on the gaze which 
the two share and which binds them together into a unity: ‘But the 
thing made an image, lasting only a moment, like a sudden flicker of 
light. Their relative positions, their absorbed mutual gaze, struck her as 
something detected. But it was all over by the time she had fairly seen it’ 
(James 1995: 343). In the last paragraph of chapter 42 her mind turns 
active in a way we have not witnessed before in this novel and perhaps 
in any of the novels that preceded it.7
It is an internal activity generating so much energy that it achieves 
the physical effect that the external presence of a fire normally causes: 
keeping the body warm: ‘For herself, she lingered in the soundless saloon 
long after the fire had gone out. There was no danger of her feeling the 
cold; she was in a fever. She heard the small hours strike, and then the 
great ones, but her vigil took no heed of time’ (James 1995: 364). Here 
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we witness the collapse of categories which separate the external from 
the internal, the cerebral from the corporeal.
What, however, causes the fever infusing the body with heat in an 
otherwise unheated room and makes Isabel lose track of the passing of 
time? The activity of the mind generates an energy and sense of warmth 
unrivalled by fire. This mental energy turns the sight of chapter 40 into 
visions: ‘ Her mind, assailed by visions, was in a state of extraordinary 
activity, and her visions might as well come to her there, where she sat 
up to meet them, as on her pillow, to make a mockery of rest’ (James 
1995: 364). Sight enlivens into visions. Rest makes a mockery of itself 
by turning restless.
This move from sight to vision constitutes a shift toward the inner 
regions of consciousness. It is, however, misleading to characterise con-
sciousness in terms of the immaterial as Anna Despotopoula and Kimberly 
C. Reed have recently done: ‘In other words, the “spirit” in James, in as 
much as it may be either spectral or human, is always ghostly in the sense 
that that it is represented as an immaterial consciousness’ (Despotopoula 
and Reed 2011: 5). The form of consciousness may be immaterial but its 
object of contemplation is nevertheless material. This clearly comes to the 
fore towards the end of chapter 42 when Isabel’s consciousness conjures 
the material presence of Gilbert Osmond: ‘Then it was that her husband’s 
personality, touched as it never had been, stepped forth and stood erect’ 
(James 1995: 362). There is a haptic quality to Isabel’s consciousness, 
as the verb ‘touched’ highlights. Moreover the sentence closes with the 
ominous and sexually charged phrase ‘stood erect’.
While it may be pertinent to argue that James’s concern with con-
sciousness anticipates Freud, neither the writer nor the founder of 
psychoanalysis retreats from the sphere of matter and embodiment as 
Anna Despotopoula and Kimberly C. Reed seem to argue: ‘And perhaps 
anticipating Sigmund Freud, James is one of the first writers who 
acknowledged that we are primarily and most devastatingly haunted 
from within rather than without’ (Despotopoula and Reed 2011: 5). 
Indeed the novel shows how Isabel Archer becomes entrapped in delu-
sions when she elevates Osmond to transcendental regions beyond 
substance while refusing to countenance his embodied presence and his 
material interests. What is crucial here is that it is only when her con-
sciousness moves from the externality of sight to the intellectual gaze of 
visions that she faces up to the reality of matter.
Whereas Isabel’s deceptive play of the imagination creates a world 
transcending substance, the ghostly play of consciousness – the turn 
from mere sight to the scientific reach of visions – lets her grasp not only 
Osmond’s sexuality (and his previous affair with Madame Merle) but 
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also his worldly longings and calculations (to do of course with Isabel’s 
substantial inheritance).
Osmond, who first attracted her for his social and sexual innocence (a 
mere nothing lacking social and bodily substance), here emerges as being 
‘unable to live without’ society:
he had looked at it [i.e. society] out of his window even when he appeared to 
be most detached from it. He had his ideal, just as she had tried to have hers; 
only it was strange that people should seek justice in such different quarters. 
His ideal was a conception of high prosperity and propriety, of the aristo-
cratic life, which she now saw that he deemed himself always, in essence at 
least, to have led. (James 1995: 361)
Prosperity refers to the wealth for which he, on Madame Merle’s insti-
gation, marries Isabel. Propriety describes the ways in which Osmond 
tyrannically prescribes his subjectivity as a universal norm of what is 
appropriate and seemly.
While it is ethically justifiable for him to have his ideal, it is prob-
lematic to impose his conception of what is justice onto that of his wife 
who ‘had tried to have hers’. As a tyrant, Isabel’s husband denies her 
independence of mind: ‘The real offence, as she ultimately perceived, 
was having a mind of her own at all. Her mind was to be his – attached 
to his own like a small garden plot in a deer park’ (James 1995: 362). 
James here and elsewhere conceptualises the mind as being attached to 
and concerned with matter and embodied life.
Focusing on this innovative interplay between the cerebral and the 
corporeal, between the material and the immaterial, in his 1908 preface 
to the New York edition of The Portrait of a Lady James highlights 
chapter 42 as ‘obviously the best thing in the book’ (James 1995: 15). 
In making this critical judgement, James clearly emphasises the collapse 
of traditional distinctions between perception and action as the crown-
ing achievement of his novel. The novel lets us experience reflection as 
adventure. This coincidence of observation and agency is precisely what 
Isabel discovers in chapter 42.8 The ‘extraordinary activity of the mind’ 
rivals the claim for the audience’s captivated absorption and attention 
which the genre of the adventure story promises to its readers.
In the preceding chapter (chapter 41) the narrative voice reiterates 
Isabel’s denigration of reflection in terms of suffering and passivity, with 
which we have become familiar throughout the novel (see discussion 
above): ‘She could never rid herself of the sense that unhappiness was a 
state of disease – of suffering as opposed to doing. To “do” – it hardly 
mattered what – would therefore be an escape, perhaps in some degree 
a remedy’ (James 1995: 348). By contaminating perception with action, 
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James’s novel overturns traditional medical associations of suffering and 
unhappiness with the lack of motor-action, which our contemporary 
digital culture tends to reinforce.
The ‘disease’ of reflection turns into an enlivening remedy in chapter 
42, where Isabel finally realises that doing without the perception 
accompanying reading may cause the unhappiness that the escape into 
action attempted to avoid in the first place. Only then does she recognise 
that the failure of her action constitutes a misreading of Osmond: ‘she 
had not read him right’ (James 1995: 357). A reading sharpened by the 
‘extraordinary activity of the mind’ makes visible the crucial but so far 
invisible underside of Osmond’s glamorous show of doing.
At this point Isabel anticipates a mental sketch of what Walter 
Benjamin would later in the mid-1930s analyse as the rendition 
of politics as aesthetics. By marrying Osmond, Isabel Archer risks 
destroying her independence of mind and her control over her mate-
rial interests. Benjamin’s famous essay ‘The Work of Art in the Age of 
Its Technological Reproducibility’ helps illuminate the subordination 
of aesthetics to serve rather than constitute politics and questions of 
power. Crucially, Benjamin discusses such subservience of art to power 
as destruction and self-destruction:
Humankind, which once, in Homer, was an object of contemplation for 
Olympian gods, has now become one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached 
the point where it can experience its own annihilation as supreme aesthetic 
pleasure. Such is the aestheticizing of politics, as practiced by fascism. 
Communism replies by politicizing art. (Benjamin 2008: 42)
While Osmond is not a fascist, he is certainly a misogynist. He is an 
instrumentalist who employs aestheticism in order to obfuscate his 
political interests in gaining power through his marriage to Isabel Archer 
procuring for him prosperity and propriety.
Making the aesthetic subservient to politics partakes of a political 
strategy: it anaesthetises, rather than enlivens, the mental activity of 
those whom power wants to deceive and dominate. James makes clear 
that Isabel rather than becoming more independent and active has 
turned passive under the ‘spell’ of Osmond’s aura. ‘What, then, is the 
aura’, asks Benjamin and goes on to define it as follows: ‘A strange tissue 
of space and time: the unique apparition of a distance, however near 
it may be’ (Benjamin 2008: 23). The apparition of a seemingly unique 
distance produces the anesthetising effect of aura.
Too late Isabel realises that she has been the victim of such anesthe-
tisation. She misreads Osmond’s show of unique (quasi other-worldly) 
insubstantiality as an absence of any interest in power and politics. Now 
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she realises that the opposite was the case. Osmond ‘was unable to live 
without’ (James 1995: 361) power over society: ‘he had looked at it 
outside his window even when he appeared to be most detached from it’ 
(James 1995: 361). Osmond’s narrow, power-driven window on society 
contrasts with the infinite diversity of windows which, as James makes 
clear in the 1908 preface to the novel, describes the openness of art: ‘The 
house of fiction has in short not one window, but a million – a number 
of possible windows not to be reckoned, rather; every one of which 
has been pierced, or is still pierceable, in its vast front, by the need of 
the individual vision and by the pressure of the individual will’ (James 
1995: 357). Art is open-ended and fluid. It encourages a contaminating 
diversity of views and perspectives.
As Posnock has put it, ‘James’s heterogeneity translates into some-
thing resembling an expressivist pluralism that disperses power and rigid 
identification with one role or place and replaces them with a dynamic 
of shifting involvements that resist finitude and definition while breeding 
possibility and spontaneity’ (Posnock 1991: 76). Where the politics of 
power is conclusive, exclusive and narrows down our perspectives on 
life, true art is inconclusive, furthering diversity and opening up hori-
zons for both contemplation and action: ‘The antidote to the despair 
of conclusiveness is the inconclusive, or what both Adorno and Henry 
James call the aesthetic. The surrender of security that Adorno urges 
upon aesthetics is everywhere the note sounded in James’s prefaces’ 
(Posnock 1991: 132). Osmond’s politics of power, however, reduces the 
multiplicity of views to that of one window: his own.
Osmond cannot endure the presence of different perspectives, differ-
ent minds. This dictatorial mindset preconditions his hatred of his wife 
and his misogyny.9 After marrying Osmond, Isabel Archer resembles 
his façade. According to Ralph, she turns into an advertisement: ‘if she 
wore a mask it completely covered her. There was something fixed and 
mechanical in the serenity painted on it; it was not an expression, Ralph 
said – it was a representation, it was an advertisement’ (James 1995: 
330). As will be discussed in the following chapter, Pasolini’s films 
contaminate such masks, such representations, with the presentation of 
what he calls an obstacle or scandal (scandalo) and what I have theo-
rised in this book under the figure of contamination.
Notes
1. See Wilson (1962: 102) and Renner (1995: 223–41).
2. ‘But of course, nature is not a thing that can be “supplied,” and the “eyes 
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shut tight” phrase just about gives completely away the question of the gov-
erness’s reliability’ (Pippin 2001: 121).
3. See Biederman and Vessel (2006: 249–55).
4. See Barr (2012: 63).
5. ‘that the finest of pleasures is the rush of action. Living as he [i.e. Ralph 
Touchett] now lived was like reading a good book in a poor translation’ 
(James 1995: 45).
6. For a detailed discussion of the totalitarian presumptions of a manipulative 
and deceptive form of ‘objectivity’ see the discussion of Sylvia Plath’s poetry 
in Mack (2014: 107–39).
7. The reputation of James as formalist has blinded critics to a certain conti-
nuity of his conception of art and life. As Ross Posnock has put it, ‘James’s 
lived experience of the mimetic continuity of art and life is usually ignored 
because of his reputation as an archformalist who segregates art from life’ 
(Posnock 1991: 187).
8. As quoted previously in this chapter; see James (1995: 14–15).
9. As quoted previously in the chapter; see James (1995: 362).
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6Contaminating the Sacred with the 
Profane: Pier Paolo Pasolini and 
Biopolitics
Introducing Pasolini and his Hollywood legacy, or the 
contamination of the mental with the corporeal: Deleuze, 
Hitchcock, Scorsese
According to Deleuze, Pasolini fully realised Hitchcock’s mental image. 
Here the mind disrupts the distortions (or fictions) governing various 
forms of representations we confront in everyday life – an important 
theme in James’s novels and in Hitchcock’s films, as discussed in the 
previous chapter. There is no doubt that Pasolini’s films have a strong 
mental or philosophical bent. According to the film director (and former 
assistant of Pasolini) Bernardo Bertolucci, Pasolini’s cinematic style ‘can 
be defined as Romanesque’ (Bertolucci 2000: 7): ‘His tracking fronts 
resemble the first tracking shots in the history of cinema. His close-ups 
resemble the invention of the close-ups’ (Bertolucci 2000: 7). Bertolucci 
distinguishes his own cinematic style from that of Pasolini as follows: 
‘My style is more impressionistic. I approach things much more gently 
and don’t see them from an entirely frontal position’ (Bertolucci 2000: 
7). It may be reductive to characterise Pasolini’s style of shooting as 
‘from an entirely frontal position’, as Bertolucci seems to be saying here. 
However frontal shots are characteristic of Pasolini’s films. Similarly 
to film critics such as Naomi Green and Pascal Bonitzer (see Jacobs 
2011: 88–121), Bertolucci argues that Pasolini’s style is Romanesque or 
frontal.
However, in his cinematic as well as in his literary work there is also 
a strong sense of lived embodiment that sits side by side with what 
Deleuze calls the ‘mental image’. Pasolini does not dialectically switch 
back and forth between the corporeal and the cerebral. Rather, he con-
taminates the mental sense as conveyed by his close-ups with the bare 
life of embodied existence. The two entities are not separated in different 
MACK PRINT.indd   159 26/11/2015   11:14
160    Contaminations
realms from which they traverse dialectically from one place to another 
but they simultaneously co-inhabit each other. Roberto Esposito has 
recently emphasised this element of bare, embodied life which Deleuze’s 
notion of the mental image seems to exclude:
Although itself the expression of a centuries-old historical development, this 
‘eager,’ ‘animal,’ ‘bodily’ life with which the poet identifies in his very flesh, 
is by now situated on the outer edge of history, in an anthropogenic stratum 
that is indistinct and chaotic, without any formal characterization – not a 
‘form of life,’ but, in the literal sense of the term, a stripped-down life, coin-
ciding in every way with its bare presence: that life is nothing but a shiver; 
bodily, collective presence; you feel the absence of all true religion; not life, 
but survival – maybe happier than life – like a population of animals, in 
whose arcane orgasm there is no passion other than for their daily function-
ing: humble fervor which gives a sense of festivity to humble corruption. 
(Esposito 2012: 202)
As Esposito goes on to elaborate, this bareness of life embraces the 
presence of death within life: ‘Starting from the homage to Gramsci’s 
remains (concluding a cycle of Italian poetry inaugurated by Foscolo’s 
Sepulchers), death constitutes the emotional and lexical horizon with 
a slant destined to traverse and in some way influence Pasolini’s entire 
experience, all the way to his tragic end’ (Esposito 2012: 204). Life 
in its biological pulse has to be simultaneously thought in the frozen 
stillness of death. The mental – the frontal, arrested image of some of 
Pasolini’s close-ups – contaminates the bare presence of corporeal pulsa-
tions. While far from insinuating that Pasolini’s murder on the desolate 
beach of Ostia, on the outskirts of Rome, was a planned self-sacrifice, 
Esposito interlinks the slaughter of Pasolini’s body with the intellectual 
preoccupation with embodiment in his literary and cinematic oeuvre in 
its entirety:
Without resorting to the radical hypothesis of a consciously planned sacri-
fice, there is no doubt that death, taken as a ‘frame around the furious gift of 
life,’ represents an essential interpretive key for his entire oeuvre. The author 
himself, moreover, on several occasions identifies death as the only place 
from which the meaning of an individual life can be understood, in a remark-
able correlation with what Auerbach said about Dante’s conception of the 
‘figure’. (Esposito 2012: 204)
Erich Auerbach’s notion of the figure is rhetorical. The figure of contam-
ination, however, encompasses both the embodied and the conceptual. 
Contamination itself denotes the simultaneity of the corporeal and the 
cerebral – an alternative to the dialectical changing of places where one 
entity nevertheless remains distinct and opposed to the other. Pasolini’s 
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term ‘scandal’ (scandalo) points to the figure of contamination in so 
far as it simultaneously comprises the scandalous presence of stripped-
down life and the mental image of a form of intellectual-spiritual affront 
whose extreme may be seen in death itself.
One could say that this co-presence of life’s pulse and the freezing of 
lively states in the mental image is Pasolini’s cinematic legacy, which 
also found its way to some quarters of Hollywood. Martin Scorsese’s 
Cape Fear (1991) perhaps best illustrates a meeting of Pasolini and 
Hitchcock in late twentieth-century Hollywood. This film is obviously 
indebted to the Hitchcockian use of suspense as the musical score by 
Bernard Herman makes clear on a formal level. The audience knows 
more than the protagonists: it is made aware that the psychotic Max 
Cady will keep haunting the prosperous family of a lawyer who failed in 
his duties as a defender in a trial that found Cady guilty of rape.
What has eluded critical attention is how Scorsese brings together 
the art-house film tradition of Pasolini with Hitchcock’s Hollywood 
Studio production. Scorsese himself emphasises the major role Pasolini 
plays in his work.1 Cape Fear is a case in point, what Deleuze calls a 
theorematic film: in fact, one based not so much on the previous version 
of Cape Fear but on Pasolini’s Teorema.2 In both films, lives arrested in 
bourgeois conformism encounter the stripped-down life of an outsider 
who is so alive as to be transgressing the boundaries of regimented con-
ceptions of the human: the psychotic Cade whose body pulses with an 
energy that bursts the screen of the film,3 or the boy of Teorema whose 
sexual-mental presence unhinges the entire bourgeois family whom he is 
visiting – visiting simultaneously in an embodied and in a spiritual sense.
One could discuss Cape Fear as a Teorema-like observation or theory 
about what could happen to a normal bourgeois family exposed to 
an extraordinary, psychotic character. John MacDonald’s novel The 
Executioner, on which the two film versions Cape Fear are based, estab-
lishes an opposition between insider and outsiders, between normal 
and psychotic, between civilised and savage: ‘Cady follows a social and 
moral code other than that of the Bowdens. Or, indeed, he appears like 
Lewis Henry Morgan’s savage, to adhere to no norms’ (Wegner 2009: 
89). Pasolini’s Teorema focuses on such a collapse of bourgeois order 
and norms, enfolding it into a sociological analysis of anxieties about 
class, status, propriety and property. Similarly to the mysterious guest of 
Teorema, Cady is a nonconformist. Both are masculine nonconformists. 
Phillip E. Wegner writes: ‘The masculine nonconformist is dangerous 
precisely because he threatens to disrupt the normal processes by which 
the social order reproduces itself, processes Lee Edelman names “repro-
ductive futurism” ’ (Wegner 2009: 89). In Teorema as well as in the 
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novel (1957) and the (1962) film versions on which Scorsese’s Cape Fear 
is based, a masculine outsider contaminates previously stable notions 
of class, health and sexuality. Anxieties about outsiders thus inform 
Pasolini’s Teorema as they do all three versions of Cape Fear.
However, as Wegner has shown, Scorsese’s 1991 remake radically 
departs from the previous version (the 1962 film and the 1957 novel) by 
presenting Cady as a psychotic outsider who is at the same time uncan-
nily powerful through omniscient and quasi-supernatural insights into 
the workings of the word and the world: ‘However, the most recent Cape 
Fear departs dramatically from both its predecessors in suggesting that 
Sam’s [the lawyer and father of the bourgeois family in Scorsese’s Cape 
Fear] reading of the law is the root of the conflict’ (Wegner 2009: 108). 
Comparable to the factory owner and father figure in Pasolini’s Teorema, 
the lawyer and patriarch Sam of Scorsese’s Cape Fear becomes divested 
of his power and his status. Indeed, Wegner goes on to elaborate that in 
Scorsese’s film Max Cady’s reading refers not only to the words on the 
page but to a sense of almost supernatural power over the world:
Sam [the lawyer and father of the bourgeois family in Scorsese’s Cape Fear] 
becomes the passive looker (through a two-way mirror during the police 
interrogation; from behind a trash bin during the assault on Cady; and later, 
through the boat window as his family is abused) and Cady the apparent 
maker of their world. Cady himself will render explicit the film’s equation 
of the act of reading with power, when he asserts, ‘I’m better than you all. 
I can out-learn you. I can out-read you, I can out-think you, and I can out-
philosophize you. And I’m gonna out-last you.’ (Wegner 2009: 108)
Similar to the guest in Pasolini’s Teorema, Cady appears to be the maker 
of the world, turning upside down a previously seemingly intact sense 
of order, law, propriety and property. Of course in Pasolini’s film the 
character is not a psychotic but a fusion of the divine and the sexual 
allure of a boy. In Scorsese it goes without the homosexual connotations 
of a beautiful boy entering the life of a bourgeois family and turning it 
upside down. Here it is a quasi-spiritual force nonetheless. In Scorsese’s 
film it is the uncanny presence of the theological which contaminates the 
psychotic, hyper-alive body of Max Cady quoting the mystic Silesius: ‘I 
am like God and God like me. I am as large as God. He is as small as I. 
He cannot above me nor I beneath him be. Silesius, 17th century.’ The 
largeness of the evoked spiritual entity only reinforces Robert De Niro’s 
(in the role of Cady in Scorsese’s film) larger-than-life physical presence 
on the screen.
De Niro’s hefty muscular and heavily tattooed body confronts the 
audience at the film’s opening scene which closes in a Pasoliniesque 
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frontal shot. Here De Niro literally walks into an arresting and arrested 
standing camera, bursting the frame of the screen. At the same time 
as instantiating the bare life of the body, De Niro’s Cady is a notably 
self-conscious psychotic who contaminates the line between health and 
pathology, between law and transgression. In his final confrontation 
with the lawyer Sam Bowden, Cady indeed assumes the role of a legal 
system, saying ‘We two lawyers are fighting it out.’ This scene indeed 
highlights a contamination of two spheres which public representation 
separates into two distinct and opposed entities: violence and law.
By contaminating the violent figure of Cady with that of the purport-
edly non-violent lawyer, Scorsese demolishes common societal categori-
sations of legality’s opposition to violence. Cady’s violence makes visible 
that of the law, that of the lawyer Sam Bowden.4 Indeed, towards the 
end of Cape Fear we are shown the frantic enjoyment the lawyer takes 
in killing Cady who supposedly represents violence as bare life. Cady 
here ‘is the person the violence of the legal system is unleashed on: its 
immune system consists in perpetuating life through the sacrifice of the 
living’ (Esposito 2012: 33). The logic of this sacrifice is dialectical: the 
law switches sides with violence in order to protect life.
What, however, if there is not a dialectics but simultaneity of law 
and violence? Scorsese’s Cape Fear opens up this question wherein 
Cady and the lawyer come to be viewed as not distinct selves but as 
being contaminated and the ‘we’ highlights this amalgamation: ‘We two 
lawyers are fighting it out.’ The ‘it’ denotes the figure of contamination 
which Pasolini, following Benjamin, kept insisting on in his scandalous 
confrontations with the legal system.
Pasolini’s context of scandal
‘I’ll never be able to forget that Italian society condemned me 
in its courtrooms’
Pasolini, Il Giorno, 17 February 1966
As the quote above indicates, Pasolini’s life and death were characterised 
by scandal and outrage. He was summoned to court more than thirty 
times accused of obscenity, blasphemy and paedophilia. However, 
despite the intense interest in his personal life, he was never convicted 
of these offences, yet scandal was nevertheless an important theme in 
his literary and cinematic work. Indeed, his biographer Enzo Siciliano 
described it in such terms: ‘It is the scandal that bursts forth from 
confessions, from the projection into words of what our bodies and 
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sensibilities unconsciously contain. This was the scandal that boomer-
anged on the heart and passion of Pasolini’ (Siciliano 1982: 359). Even 
Pasolini’s death was controversial, and his murder on a derelict field on 
the outskirts of Rome has been the subject matter for debate over the 
last four decades. It is not therefore surprising that someone so intrigued 
and connected to sexual controversy chose the topic of incest to play a 
central role in his work. This chapter will first introduce the reader to 
Pasolini’s ethics and aesthetics of scandal and contamination, through 
a brief discussion of his early films Accattone and Mamma Roma (both 
released in the early 1960s) and his later works Edipe Re and Teorema.
Pasolini’s unarticulated notion of contamination – he does not use this 
term but the word scandalo (scandal) – is at once political and scientific. 
The term scientific here denotes a broadening of our horizon of knowl-
edge and understanding about cognitive operations that do not fit into 
accounts of what is considered at a given time as normal and normative. 
Pasolini’s idiosyncratic usage of the word scandal (scandalo) precisely 
describes a departure or divergence from what has become accepted as 
common knowledge. The discovery of new knowledge about our minds, 
our feelings, our experiences and our thoughts is scandalous – an affront 
to the one-size-fits-all slogan of homogeneity. Pasolini does not differ-
entiate between art and science, between interpretation and perception. 
Strikingly, his approach is backed up by new neuroscientific findings 
which show that the acquisition of knowledge never goes without 
interpretation. There is no such thing as immediate or ‘pure’ empirical 
perception of facts and data. Bare life is always already contaminated 
with intellectual questions.
In this context, it is worth introducing Pasolini’s controversial 
approach to cinema – controversial because, taking issue with his non-
representational interpretation, Umberto Eco argued that film repro-
duced semiotic systems which we are already familiar with. According 
to Pasolini, film presents us with the presence rather than the representa-
tion of life on the screen (Vanessa Lemm’s term biocentric5 might best 
describe what Pasolini, here following Nietzsche and Freud, understands 
by life – denoting the simultaneity of the biological and the spiritual).
Provoking Eco’s critical response, Pasolini sees the filmic medium not 
in terms of already established semiotics. Rather than representing a sign 
system, film presents a version of embodied life. This sense of an embod-
ied and simultaneously mental life comes under threat with the increas-
ing virtualisation of life under neo-capitalist consumerism. As Andrea 
Righi has recently argued, ‘Pasolini’s most important contribution to the 
critical understanding of the new modernization takes in fact the form 
of a linguistic analysis of social processes’ (Righi 2011: 82). These new 
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social processes reduce bodies to the zero-point of existence where they 
are nothing but messages applied to further the consumption of virtual 
goods. Trying to counter such erasure of the lived in a neo-capitalist 
information culture, Pasolini locates in cinema ways of contaminating 
the biological and the intellectual, of co-inhabiting bodies and forms of 
meaning.
As recent neuroscientific findings have shown, this simultaneity 
between the embodied and the interpretative constitutes the field of 
cognition. We co-inhabit the biological and the intellectual not in two 
separated, compartmentalised structures where we would dialectically 
switch from one place and one form to another, but these two spheres 
are in fact not separated at all and instead exist in states of mutual 
contamination.
According to the philosopher and neuroscientist Daniel C. Dennett, 
simultaneous and non-linear streams of perception and interpretation 
constitute cognition:
What we actually experience is a product of many processes of interpretation 
– editorial processes, in effect. They take in relatively raw and one-sided rep-
resentations, and yield collated, revised enhanced representations, and they 
take place in the streams of activity occurring in various parts of the brain. 
(Dennett 1993: 112)
There is no central control centre in the brain (the so called ‘Cartesian 
theatre’): ‘In other words, discrimination does not lead to a representa-
tion of the already discriminated feature for the benefit of the audience 
in the Cartesian Theater – for there is no Cartesian Theater’ (Dennett 
1993: 113). Pasolini’s presentation of scandalous knowledge enriches 
the multilayered stream of consciousness which constitutes knowledge.
Our acquisition of knowledge resembles ‘a narrative stream or 
sequence, which can be thought of as subject to continual editing by 
many processes distributed around in the brain, and continuing indefi-
nitely into the future’ (Dennett 1993: 113). However, by contaminating 
our consciousness with what has been deleted from ‘multiple “drafts” 
of narrative fragments’ (Dennett 1993: 113), Pasolini illuminates what 
has been suppressed not so much by the working of our minds but by 
the rules and commands of a politics which attempts to put an end to 
the heterogeneity through and by which our brains work (in terms of 
infinitely multiple drafts of narrative).
This cognitive-scientific questioning of what has become accepted 
as normative knowledge is also political: it articulates and brings into 
public discussion voices which have been previously silenced. The ‘scan-
dalous’ public articulation of what has been marginalised and silenced 
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undermines a politics of homogeneity suppressing knowledge which 
does not square with what those in power proclaim to be valid.
Foregrounding suppressed knowledge, this chapter will then discuss 
what I call the cognitive-affective role of the mother, in Pasolini’s infa-
mous love poem to his mother, ‘Supplica a mia madre’, which appears in 
Edipe Re, in his last (posthumously published) novel Petrolio and in his 
play Affabulazione. The latter is concerned with a father who becomes his 
son’s lover and is consequently so possessive that he murders the boy. This 
constitutes a reversal of Oedipus’s plot and, as we shall see, Sophocles’s 
ghost is a key character in the play. Thus Affabulazione problematises 
incest with the gay reversal of the Oedipus complex. The crucial point is 
that the reversal of Oedipus in Pasolini’s play Affabulazione is Oedipal 
too, being premised on the desire for power and the power of desire.
Ex negativo, this chapter focuses on the birth of a form of new 
politics. This novel form of politics interrupts the violence governing 
the desire for power that has come to coincide with the power of desire. 
This coincidence of sexuality, domination and violence characterises 
what Freud discovered when he first discussed the Oedipus complex 
in his Traumdeutung (1899). The work of Pier Paolo Pasolini looms 
large in reflections about this topic: in different but related ways, his 
cinematic and literary oeuvre pivots around the sexual politics of father–
son as well as mother–son relationships. These relationships govern 
the structure of politics and history. In order to find ways out of this 
violent arrangement, we therefore need to enquire into the ambiguities 
of love–hate encounters between fathers and sons. Psychoanalysis and 
art here meet politics.
Introduction to Pasolini’s ethics of subjectivity
The political aspect of mental life and its deceptive representations are 
themes permeating Pasolini’s approach not only towards the father–
son relationship but also towards that between mother and son. The 
assumption of a central, homogeneous control centre gives rise to 
deceptive representations which Pasolini attempts to disrupt through his 
cinematic and poetic presentation of scandalous knowledge. In doing so 
he adumbrates an understanding of selfhood which is truly diverse and 
turns false when it appears as homogeneous. As Dennett has argued, the 
self is indeed a heterogeneous assembly:
In our brains there is a cobbled-together collection of specialist brain circuits, 
which, thanks to a family of habits inculcated partly by culture and partly 
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by individual self-exploration, conspire together to produce a more or less 
effective, more or less well-designed virtual machine, the Joycean machine. 
By yoking these independently evolved specialist organs together in common 
causes, and thereby giving their union vastly enhanced powers, this virtual 
machine, this software of the brain, performs a sort of internal political 
miracle: It creates a virtual captain of the crew, without elevating any one of 
them to dictatorial power. (Dennett 1993: 228)
Pasolini’s cinema of poetry endeavours to disrupt the dictatorial power 
of one homogeneous voice or narrative which deceptively proclaims to 
represent the world as it is (an image of itself). This chapter highlights 
the so far ignored cognitive-scientific basis of Pasolini’s political cri-
tique of homogeneity. The discussion of this chapter will first focus on 
mother–son relationships in Pasolini’s work. Even though it does not 
explicitly allude to Oedipus, his early film Mamma Roma (1962) has 
an Oedipal subtext or subplot: the violent, deceitful and exploitative 
father who – like Accattone (1961), his first film produced in the early 
1960s – is a pimp; with the important difference, however, that Pasolini 
turns Accattone into a Christ-like figure due to his social decline and 
total exclusion.6
Accattone performs contamination: the film comingles the profane 
with the sacred, social abjection with the saintly. At the centre of the film 
is a fight in the slums of Rome, (borgate). The frame of the profane fight 
scene draws upon sacred allusions: long shots accompanied by Bach’s 
religious music from the St Matthew Passion. The voices of Bach’s music 
sing of eternal peace whereas the reality of the scene in Accattone is a 
seemingly endless fight to drive away the crooked outcast, the loser (in 
Italian accattone), and the mean exploiter and pimp (pappone) Vittorio 
(aka. Accattone). At one point the father of Vittorio’s wife even draws 
a knife, threatening to intervene with deadly force in the hand-to-hand 
fisting and wrestling.
Accattone’s scandal is stylistic: the style of the film contaminates 
the sacred with the profane. Pasolini’s translation of the literary term 
(derived from a reading of Dante’s Divine Comedy) ‘free indirect 
discourse’ into cinematography describes the simultaneity of two pur-
portedly opposed entities (sacred and vulgar) within the presence of the 
screen. What brings about this scandalous contamination is the allegori-
cal, highly self-conscious and artistic superimposition of one language 
(the sacred and highly intelligent, refined music of Bach) onto a radically 
different one (the profane parole of pimps and thieves of the borgate). 
The life of these ‘low lives’ does not dialectically mutate to its opposite 
but instead simultaneously inhabits the sacred ‘higher’ realm of Bach’s 
St Matthew Passion.
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As Esposito has recently pointed out, the profane language of pimps 
and thieves is concrete and present (rather than represented); it confronts 
us with spiritually and intellectually contaminated ‘bare life’ becoming 
increasingly marginalised in the virtualisation that accompanies the 
high modernity of neo-capitalism: ‘All the traumatic transitions that in 
Pasolini’s view had marked Italian society were ultimately attributable 
to a kind of dematerialization of the bodily dimension which, until a 
few years previously, had been kept vital or even intact by the lower 
classes who were not yet affected by consumerism’ (Esposito 2012: 
208). His subsequent film Mamma Roma focuses on the psychological 
pressures to partake of the disembodied promises held out by careerism 
and consumerism.
Style in Accattone thus becomes a critique of petit-bourgeois aspira-
tions in Mamma Roma. In Pasolini’s words: ‘The element that distin-
guishes this film from Accatone is the moral question not to be found 
in Accatone’ (Siciliano 1982: 250). Most importantly, the stylistic and 
the ethical operate on the same level: both are scandalous and diverge 
radically from the status quo. At the point where it is most disturb-
ing, art embodies as well as enacts difference. As has repeatedly been 
pointed out, from Enzo Siciliano (1982) to, more recently, Armando 
Maggi (2009), the word scandalo permeates Pasolini’s cinematic and 
literary work in its entirety. What, then, is scandalous? In philosophical 
terms it is comparable to Benjamin and Scholem’s notion of ‘redemp-
tion through sin’ (as discussed in Chapter 4). On a popular, tabloid 
newspaper level, scandal is what brings about the fall or the vilification 
of public figures. Indeed, as a celebrity Pasolini was the subject of many 
scandals which, often instigated by the Italian press, ended up in tedious 
and hurtful condemnations in over thirty different court hearings.
Pasolini thus came to embody scandal for the Italian and international 
public at large. It can be said of many authors that they contaminated 
their literary work with their personal life but this tendency is perhaps 
most pronounced in Pasolini’s case, as Esposito has recently argued:
Pasolini made his art a sort of living appendix of himself. Not only did he 
refuse to shield his texts from the emotions, sensations, and excitements that 
he felt, he literally filled them up with his feelings, sucking his writings into 
his overflowing, subjective experience. The impression given to the reader is 
that they couldn’t have been written by anyone else – at least not in the form, 
or to be more precise, in the nonform or antiform that they have. It is as if he 
had purposely intended, through his own exhibited ‘impurity,’ to contami-
nate literature by dragging it into the same maelstrom into which he himself 
was slipping deeper and deeper. (Esposito 2012: 206)
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(This emphasis on subjectivity comes clearly to the fore in section 4’s 
discussion of Pasolini’s poem ‘Supplica a mia madre’.) According to 
the statutes of conformist or homogeneous society, scandal is a form of 
contamination. It must be avoided at all costs, because scandal is what 
makes one stand out, and makes one different. The cost of such avoid-
ance is of course reality and truth. In reality we are not homogeneous 
but different: we clearly come from different cultural backgrounds, 
communicate differently, have different interests and do not all share the 
same sexual orientation. Pasolini employs the literary device of allegory 
in order to perform heterogeneity and difference in his cinematic works.
This chapter will show how the ethics of Pasolini’s art is scientific – it 
brings to the fore or makes visible horrendous or scandalous truths 
of difference. Artistic style and poetic form ethically precondition the 
acceptance of these different realities which have been repressed, hidden 
or extinguished by societal forces of homogeneity and conformism. By 
bringing to light what has been excluded or deleted from the multiple 
scripts which constitute our consciousness, Pasolini overturns the aes-
thetic as well as ethical compartmentalisation of the profane and the 
sacred.
Pasolini’s science of difference grows out of the artistic discovery 
which reveals the sacred and the profane in their mutual contamina-
tion.7 This is precisely what scandal does – it connects the sacred with 
the profane: ‘I am scandalous. I am so to the extent to which I stretch 
a cord, an umbilical cord, in fact, between the sacred and the profane’ 
(Siciliano 1982: 359). The umbilical cord refers to birth. Pasolini here 
highlights our non-homogeneous constitution: at birth the profane and 
the sacred, the corporeal and the mental already contaminate each other.
As the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio has recently argued, the 
concept of contamination goes hand in hand with the social emotion of 
disgust: ‘Humans can be disgusted not just by seeing spoiled food and 
the foul smell and taste that accompany it but by a variety of situations 
in which the purity of objects or behaviour is compromised and there is 
“contamination” ’ (Damasio 2010: 117). Our society and culture train 
and accustom us to feel disgust at what we perceive to be contaminat-
ing. The contamination in question precisely concerns the meeting point 
between purity and danger, selfhood and the other – the latter here 
appears as a threat.
In terms of visual studies, contamination could be defined in terms of 
the gaze. Pasolini’s aesthetic and ethical notion of scandal makes us see 
the profane, the threatening other, the abject or poisonous from a new 
perspective: as being – resembling an umbilical cord – bound up with 
its seeming opposite, the sacred, the exalted and sound. Introducing 
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us to ‘scandal’ Pasolini’s art opens our horizon towards the discovery 
of difference. Pasolini’s sight of scandal is first of all his selfhood, his 
autobiographical self.
It is important, however, not to equate the artistic presentation of 
Pasolini with Pasolini himself (Pasolini in the flesh as it were). The 
author and director Pasolini often uses his subjectivity for various scien-
tific experiments. He does so from the important poem ‘Supplica a mia 
madre’ to his last, posthumously published novel Petrolio (1992).
In a letter to his friend, poet Alberto Moravia, Pasolini highlights 
the novelty of the reader’s shocking confrontation with the author’s 
subjectivity. Whereas in traditional novels the author’s selfhood recedes, 
making place for the objectivity of the main characters, Pasolini stages 
the subjective front and centre:
In a novel the narrator usually disappears, giving way to a conventional 
figure who alone can have a real relationship with the reader – real precisely 
because it’s conventional. . . . [In Petrolio] I have spoken to the reader myself, 
in flesh and bone, as I write you this letter . . . I have made the novel an object 
between the reader and me, and I have discussed it (as one can do by oneself 
when writing). (Pasolini 1997: xi–xii)
Pasolini highlights the contamination of the written text with the pres-
ence of bare life: ‘I have spoken to the reader myself, in flesh and bone’. 
Clearly, here Pasolini distances himself from John Keats’s ‘negative 
capability’8 as well as from other poetic and narrative techniques which 
are premised on the identification with different, ‘objective’ characters.
Pasolini’s innovative scientific, or, in other words, cognitive poetics 
contrasts with one crucial aspect of Keats’s ‘negative capability’, namely 
with what Keats has called ‘pleasures of not knowing’ (Gittings 1979: 
262). ‘Negative’ denotes the not knowing. The capability in question is 
that of identification. Pasolini’s poetic voice, however, knows or wants 
to know. His cinematic version of Sophocles’s Oedipus Rex interprets 
the cause of the tragedy not in a quest for knowledge but in its avoidance 
through mindless acts which resemble the violence in action movies. 
Pasolini’s Oedipus does not even listen to the Sphinx. Far from solving 
her riddle, with brute force he pushes her into the abyss.
Knowledge here, however, does not refer to the biographical facts of 
Pasolini himself. Maggi rightly admonishes some critics not to fall prey 
to a simple error of narratology:
Some critics have hailed the novelty of Pasolini’s direct voice in his last 
novel, ignoring or forgetting the distinction between author (the person 
who has written the book and whose name is printed on the cover) and the 
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extradiegetic/intradiegetic narrator, that is, the character of the writer who 
narrates in the ‘I’ form and, even when he is external to the events, speaks 
from within the narrative space. (Maggi 2009: 169) 
There is still, however, a capability at work in Pasolini’s foregrounding 
of subjectivity: it is the capability to identify with a self that transcends 
the boundaries of selfhood.
The identification at work here is a knowing or cognisant one which 
also maps the scientific scope of knowledge beyond the limits which 
patriarchal society places on matters considered contaminating or scan-
dalous. Rather than revealing private subject matters, Pasolini highlights 
the self in order to discover universal forms of knowledge whose uncov-
ering has been interdicted by the authority of the father – the figure 
of the father yet again does not coincide with the father of Pasolini’s 
biography.
Violating the laws of the father (which from a Lacanian perspective 
are the statutes of society),9 Pasolini embarks on a scientific or cognitive 
enquiry into the psycho-physical foundations of his life. His autobio-
graphical self has its foundation in the paradigm established by Freud 
and Kafka. The precise philological or textual location of Freud’s para-
digm is not relevant here because, as Nicola Petkovic has pointed out, 
‘Freud’s work exists in bourgeois Europe as a kind of common cultural 
usage, whether or not that usage refers explicitly to any of Freud’s writ-
ings’ (Petkovic 1997: 42). In this paradigm the father embodies the inter-
diction of the scientific quest for self-discovery. The father is an allegory 
for political repression proscribing a cognitive encounter with reality.
The patriarchal figure represses cognition of different realities and 
he reduces human experience to an instrumental exploitative level. 
Contrasting with the character of Accattone, in Mamma Roma the 
father figure lacks any contamination with the sacred: his modus vivendi 
is pure instrumentality; he is a pimp, an exploiter of women. The father’s 
exploitative and instrumental role contrasts with the mother who loves 
her son and does everything for him, only to find out that she has sacri-
ficed their lives to petit bourgeois aspirations. She is the victim of decep-
tions. Pasolini does away with the illusion of love’s innocence (most 
famously in his reputation of his three films comprising the Trilogy of 
Life). Love needs to be exposed to the contamination of knowledge in 
order to avoid being taken in by deceptions. Pasolini’s cognitive rule of 
contamination, however, allows for the discovery of complex realities.
Crucially, the disclosure of such disavowed actualities falsifies both 
our fears (of the abject or poisonous) and our hopes (of innocent desire 
freed from power).The figure of contamination comingles our fears with 
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our hopes. Instead of dialectically moving from one to the other, hope 
and fear simultaneously coexist. Power, by contrast, depends on dia-
lectics: it includes as distinct entity what it excludes. Quoting Pasolini’s 
line, ‘In fact, the only true anarchy is the anarchy of power’, Esposito 
writes: ‘The fact that underlying arche – understood in the sense of origi-
nal domination – there is something that includes its own negation, in 
other words, that is based on nothingness, demonstrates its power and 
fragility at the same time’ (Esposito 2012: 214). Power posits its own 
other and includes it into its movements so as to dialectically be able to 
destroy it. It embraces its own negation in order to erase the negative as 
part of a dialectical move from one entity to another.
Rather than simultaneously contaminating two supposedly opposed 
entities, power dialectically spaces out those entities and traverses from 
one to the other over periods of time. These movements of dialectics 
seem to be inclusive but, crucially, they exclude what they include. In 
this way power includes its negation with the aim of excluding it. In 
the same way, biopolitical dialectics moves to the position of bare life 
not be contaminated by it but, on the contrary, to exclude it: ‘The body 
defeats poison not by expelling it outside the organism, but by making 
it somehow part of the body. As we have been saying: the immunitary 
logic is based more on a non-negation, on the negation of a negation, 
than on an affirmation’ (Esposito 2011: 8). Instead of non-negating the 
negative, dialectics famously negates the negative. Power enacts this 
dialectical movement over space and time and does away with what it 
apparently includes. Rather than affirming difference, power embraces 
its negations in order to annihilate what differs.
The point of Pasolini’s science of difference is precisely to disrupt 
homogeneity and conformism. The art and ethics of such science con-
sists in what Pasolini calls ‘scandal’, and his idiosyncratic understanding 
of scandal amounts to the performance of contamination. Instantiating 
power/dialectics, the figure of the father attempts to render void the 
possibility of more than one actuality. The father reduces the past to the 
present, the virtual to the actual, the exuberant to the profitable, and 
each entity to that which conforms to its nomenclature.
In this way Pasolini embodies his allegories of power around the figure 
of the Father. The darkness of his cinematic and literary creations arises 
from the absence of a clearly delineated alternative to power. Where 
such an alternative appears as in his light-hearted Trilogy of Life (early 
1970s) the innocence of desire portrayed in these films (The Decameron 
(1971), The Canterbury Tales (1972) and Arabian Nights (1974)) turns 
out to be delusory and deceptive. Hence Pasolini’s ‘Repudiation of the 
Trilogy of Life’ which finds its cinematic equivalent in the one-dimen-
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sional horror of sadistic and criminal domination, torture and murder 
in his last film Salò (1975). Salò presents the simultaneity between the 
contemporary conformism of consumerist and permissive ‘freedom’ and 
the systematic genocide of what is perceived to be different in fascist 
violence.
The Trilogy of Life, by contrast, celebrates desire beyond power or 
domination, and in doing so it has already been co-opted or manipu-
lated by the powers of permissive consumerism. As a result, Pasolini 
renounces his three highly popular films because of their deceptive and 
manipulated depiction of desire’s innocence. Rather than being inno-
cent, desire has already been controlled by power: ‘one must realize how 
much one has been manipulated by the power structure’ (Pasolini 2005: 
xvii). In Pasolini’s work, love is always already contaminated by power 
and violence. As intimated above, Mamma Roma is obsessed with 
social advancement – which she attempts to accomplish by working as 
a prostitute. Her social and economic ambitions ironically prepare for 
the death of her beloved son. It is advancement towards not well-being 
but brutality.
Mother-sons: Mamma Roma, ‘Supplica a mia madre’ and 
Edipe Re
Violence lies at the core of Pasolini’s early novels Vita Violenta (1959) 
and Ragazi di Vita (Streetboys) (1955). Everyone falls prey to violence. 
It governs the Oedipal as well as the reversal of the Oedipal. Someone is 
bound to be killed, whether it is the son or the father, and one parent is 
bound to be a partner to incest – whether it is homosexual (father–son) 
or heterosexual (mother–son). Pasolini’s Oedipus film emphasises this 
point.
The concluding part of this chapter will discuss how the alternative to 
Pasolini’s apocalyptical assessment of our private as well as social lives 
could be called the disruptive (or contaminative) moment. Examples of 
such a disruptive or contaminative scenario can be found in the ending 
of almost all of Pasolini’s films. In the closing scene of Mamma Roma 
this is exemplified when Anna Magnani’s manic stare of recognition 
prompts the spectator to realise that the view from her middle-class 
apartment actually coincides with the morbidity of a cemetery – the 
view of her previous working class flat. The ending of Oedipus also 
demonstrates this scenario, as it is the absolute exclusion from society 
that contaminates Oedipus’s incest-induced impurity with the purity of 
the outcast and the blind. Perhaps the prime instance of contamination 
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is in Teorema (1968), where the sudden appearance and subsequent 
absence of the divine boy – whom everyone has fallen in love with – 
causes complete disintegration. This disintegration is illustrated by the 
catatonic madness of the daughter, the wild promiscuity of the wife, and 
by the husband’s giving away of cherished possessions, disposing of his 
factory and his clothes at Milan’s train station.
This part of the chapter, however, sets out to discover – mainly via 
a reading of Pasolini’s poem ‘Supplica a mia madre’ and an analysis 
of notes from his last novel Petrolio, as well as a brief discussion of 
his film Edipe Re (1967) – the ways in which the question of power 
or desire governs life from its earliest beginnings in the mother–child 
relationship. Pasolini wrote ‘Supplica a mia madre’ in the same year in 
which he filmed Mamma Roma (1962). As we have seen, the mother 
figure is ambiguous, even though she is clearly presented in terms that 
are likely to win some of the audience’s sympathies. Conversely, she 
represents Pasolini’s abhorrent view of the petite bourgeoisie as a social 
group intent upon socio-economic advancement. The film reveals such 
advancement to result in the catastrophic breakdown of all human 
relations. Pasolini confronts these false hopes and aspirations with the 
bitter reality of affect- or desire-ridden politics. As his biographer Enzo 
Siciliano has astutely put it: ‘He was a utopian – but he did not hesitate 
to rend this utopianism for the inescapable demands of eros. From there 
sprung his originality – he was not afraid of his own demon’ (Siciliano 
1982: 389). In his poem ‘Supplica a mia madre’, he articulates his own 
demon in a complex and highly original way.
In contrast to other pleas for the survival of a parent, Pasolini’s 
poem does not exclude horrendous aspects of the affective relationship 
which binds parent and child. Whereas a comparable poem – Dylan 
Thomas’s ‘Do not go gentle into that good night’ – revolves around 
humanity’s struggle against death (‘rage, rage against the dying of the 
light’), Pasolini’s ‘Supplica a mia madre’ opens and ends with the subjec-
tive position of the poet. This is not to play one poem against another. 
Both poems are major achievements and both are quite related in their 
concern for the relationship between the fate of the individual (the father 
in Thomas’s poem) and the general prospect of mortality faced by all of 
us.
The focus of Thomas’s famous poem is clearly the confrontation with 
mortality on a level that includes and yet goes beyond the singular fate 
of the poet’s father. Pasolini’s ‘Supplica a mia madre’ revolves not only 
about the poet’s subjective position but also about power/domination 
(schiavitù) and desire (amore). Hence the orrendo conoscere: it is indeed 
a horrendous, terrible subject matter which is of course also that of 
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Kafka (in his Letter to my Father). Similarly to Kafka’s Letter, Pasolini’s 
poem pivots around power relationships as the foundation of family 
life.10
The poem dramatises its seeming subjectivity and reaches a crisis 
point with the enjambment:
. . . your love is my slavery:
My childhood I lived a slave to this lofty
incurable sense of an immense obligation.
(il tuo amore è la mia schiavitù:
ho passato l’infanzia schiavo di questo senso
alto, irrimediabile, di un impegno immenso.) (Pasolini 1982: 108)
Through its repetition of the schiav root, the middle or centre of the 
poem formally inscribes a sense or feeling of being enslaved. Slavery 
moves the already hard, difficult (difficile 1.1) and anguished situation 
(angoscia 1.6) into a larger socio-political context. The whole poem 
vibrates in the tension between innocence and corruption, love and 
domination (orrendo conoscere 1.5, tua grazia . . . mia angoscia 1.6). 
The halting opening (È difficile dire) doubles or mirrors its oxymoronic 
force towards the opening of its penultimate strophe, when the poet 
invokes survival after the previous line has already spelled out the end 
of a certain life or relationship between mother and son: ‘. . . now it’s 
over.//We survive (‘ora è finita.//Sopravviviamo’). This is a most curious 
survival which takes place after the end, after everything is over. The 
concept of survival after the end of life is paradoxical and it is of course 
an important theological topos – especially in the New Testament where, 
according to the Gospel of John, Jesus restores Lazarus of Bethany to life 
four days after having died.
Pasolini’s poem evokes the theological horizon of resurrection while 
immediately withdrawing from such belief-based context. In keeping 
with the cognitive approach that permeates the poem in its entirety, the 
poetic voice characterises the paradox of life after the end as irrational:
We survive, in the confusion
of a life reborn outside reason
(Sopravviviamo: ed è la confusione
di una vita rinata fuori dalla ragione) (Pasolini 1982: 108)
This precarious survival faces yet another end in the last stanza of the 
poem which only then fulfils what its title promises: it only then turns 
into a plea and prayer, a ‘supplica’. The title already anticipates the 
invocation of and withdrawal from the theological which the poem as 
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a whole performs. It is a prayer, however, not to a transcendent, theo-
logical point of reference but to an immanent one: the mother. It is not 
until the poem’s last two lines where we encounter the main theme of 
Thomas’s poem, ‘Do not go gentle into that good night’ – the struggle 
against death, the hope not to die:
I pray you, oh, I pray: Do not wish [my trans.] to die . . .
I am here alone, with you, in a future April . . .
(Ti supplico, ah, ti supplico: non voler morire . . .
Sono qui, solo, con te, in un futuro aprile . . .) (Pasolini 1982: 108)
The poetic voice here too foregrounds selfhood: the mother’s life in a 
future April involves the otherwise isolated self of the poet (Sono qui, 
solo, con te). In Thomas’s ‘Do not go gentle into that good night’, by 
contrast, we do not find the subjectivity of the speaker foregrounded. 
On the contrary, the poem invokes general terms which are the subject 
matter of each strophe, except for the first and last one. The poet refers 
to ‘wise men’, then ‘good men’, then ‘wild men’ and then ‘grave men’. A 
variety of general types of men should serve as example of how to rage 
against the dying of the light. In the end, the poem apparently returns 
from general types of men to the singular figure of the father, but here 
too the language is broad rather than particular, evoking a range of 
possible characteristics encompassing the extremities of cursing and 
blessing.
This is not the place to do justice to Dylan Thomas’s complex and 
most significant poem. ‘Do not go gentle into that good night’ is evoked 
here rather than compared with Pasolini’s poem about death and life. 
Striking a related but slightly different note (and tone) from Thomas’s, 
Pasolini’s ‘Supplica a mia madre’ avoids referencing what we may be 
accustomed with – the traditional forms of cursing and blessing which 
figure prominently in Thomas’s poem. Even before evoking the mortal-
ity theme of Thomas’s poem, Pasolini introduces us to an end which is 
not that of the end of life, but the closing of a specific relationship. The 
poem takes pains to do justice to the specific and the singular. This may 
be the poem’s main theme around which it revolves both in terms of its 
form and content – and this from the very opening:
It’s so hard to say in a son’s words
What I am so little like in my heart.
(È difficile dire con parole di figlio
Ciò a cui nel cuore ben poco assomiglio.) (Pasolini 1982: 108)
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The poem gives form to the difficulty of finding equivalence in the 
generality of words for the singularity of events, feelings, happenings 
both in the subjective and the objective sphere. Its opening almost takes 
back what it has just begun to unfold: the son’s words are not adequate 
enough to do justice to what is actually taking place in the heart of the 
self profiled here.
Figlio rhymes with assomiglio but the rhyme associates a coincidence 
called into question by the strophe itself: the son (figlio) does not coin-
cide with its representation or likeness (assomiglio) established through 
the generality of words (parole).
Representation disrupts itself here. This disruption instantiates the 
form of the poem, creating a new space wherein we enter a world to 
which are not accustomed: one in which we are capable of discovering 
so far invisible or entirely new forms of life. The poem witnesses the 
discovery of the infinitely contaminated constitution of life, of which the 
maternal figure is of course the giver or originator. The opening strophe 
announces and performs this hybridity in its evocation of words which 
are then almost withheld or withdrawn. Words do not fill the page with 
wordiness but shrink to little signs or to silences which could do justice 
to the life of the heart – the subjectivity of the speaker.
In the following strophe the heart no longer belongs to the subject. 
The mother knows more about the beginnings of affection than the one 
who carries the heart:
Only you in all the world know what my
heart always held, before any love.
(Tu sei la sola al mondo che sa, del mio cuore,
Ciò che è stato sempre, prima d’ogni altro amore.) (Pasolini 1982: 108)
The son’s words are inadequate not least because the subject is always 
already displaced by what preceded subjectivity. Here the cognitive 
theme of the poem first introduces the mother (sa, del mio cuore) in 
cognitive terms as a vessel of and for knowledge. The relationship 
between mother and son covers the intersection of affect and cognition. 
The poem traces the itinerary of a cognitive trajectory in which the son 
becomes the discoverer of a terrible recognition:
So I must tell you something terrible to know:
From within your kindness my anguish grew.
(Per questo devo dirti ciò ch’è orrendo conoscere:
È dentro la tua grazia che nasce la mia angoscia.) (Pasolini 1982: 108)
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Here we witness a second birth, which is one of cognition. It is the rec-
ognition of the hybrid reality of life.
Most importantly, thought and life here contaminate each other. We 
behold the discovery of a new form of birth in which one phenomenon 
or characteristic (‘grazia’) simultaneously coexists with that of its sup-
posed opposite (‘angoscia’). This is exactly what Pasolini understands by 
scandal: that there are no such things as pure entities but the contamina-
tion of such entities with each other. The adjective ‘orrendo’ evokes the 
scandal of this discovery. As Maggi has recently pointed out, Pasolini’s 
central notion of a second birth describes ‘the acquisition of a cultural 
consciousness’ (Maggi 2009: 186). Cultural consciousness introduces 
the subject to the symbolic order.
As Claude Lévi-Strauss has maintained, the prohibition of incest is the 
foundation of all kinds of symbolic orders which constitute all human 
societies. Following Lévi-Strauss, Julia Kristeva has argued that the 
universal prohibition of incest depends on the social conditioning of an 
affect: that of abjection or disgust when faced with the maternal body. 
According to Kristeva, affect combines the biological or physical with 
cognition and science:
If it be true, as Claude Lévi-Strauss has demonstrated, that the prohibition 
of incest has the logical import of founding, by means of that very prohibi-
tion, the discreteness of interchangeable units, thus establishing social order 
and the symbolic, I shall maintain that such a logical operation is carried out 
owing to a subjective benefit derived from it on the level of libidinal economy. 
(Kristeva 1982: 63)
As Winfried Menninghaus has recently put it, Kristeva’s notion of the 
abject ‘is universally and biologically grounded (in the maternal body); 
likewise, the constitution of the speaking subject through the repudia-
tion of the pre-objectival corps maternal and its pleasure belongs, for 
Kristeva, to the fundamental, unchangeable givens of subject forma-
tion and of the symbolic order in general’ (Menninghaus 2003: 392). 
Prohibition of incest is of course normative. No doubt it is a social norm 
and partakes of the social order. Feeling and intellection are, however, 
intimately bound up with each other: a feeling of the abject accompanies 
the normative avoidance of incest.
Pasolini’s second birth includes Lévi-Strauss’s universal prohibition of 
incest. The second birth of cognition, however, brings about what I call 
the disruptive moment of contamination. Pasolini introduces an inter-
ruptive or contaminating moment to both Kristeva’s and Lévi-Strauss’s 
accounts of the universal homogeneity of prohibiting incest.
This moment is creative and nascent: it validates life from a cogni-
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tive perspective, by bringing together dangerous or disgusting elements 
(‘angoscia’) with beneficial ones (‘grazia’). Neither one exists without 
the other. In contrast to Kristeva’s account, the mother is here not solely 
the object of rejection and abjection. Rather Pasolini’s science of dif-
ference allows for hybridity and fluidity in natural and social entities. 
His language interrupts itself and in doing so it precludes the consump-
tion of solid and ready-made cognitive statements of truth. Truth here 
emerges as fractured and highly nuanced. The abject is not so much 
affiliated with the mother’s body (as in Kristeva) but with the symbolic 
order as a whole. Disgust with the social order, however, does not mean 
a rejection or repudiation of it. On the contrary, the abject or anxious 
here includes the peaceful or beautiful: anxiety (angoscia) contaminates 
the peace of grace (grazia).
In a repressive and distortive society we have become accustomed to 
separate or purify entities to one single point of denomination (a striking 
example is Kristeva’s distinct notion of the abject). This custom of isola-
tion and compartmentalisation turns our lives into lies. Pasolini’s poem 
attempts to counter such lies of the instrumental, reductive and exploita-
tive by scandalously bringing together what we have been trained to 
separate. From its opening stanza onwards, ‘Supplica a mia madre’ takes 
one step in one direction while simultaneous taking another one into the 
opposite direction: it evokes words while at the same time highlighting 
their potential inadequacy. During the course of the poem we discover 
that the distortion of words resides in their isolation: in the separation of 
grazia from its contaminating opposite angoscia, in the separation of the 
affect (amore) from domination (schiavitù). The work of art (whether 
film, the novel or the poem) offers a new space to which we have not 
become accustomed otherwise: a space in which we discover the hybrid-
ity of our world.
Under the figure of contamination, the form of the poem connects 
what it ostensibly separates. The most glaring point of such separation 
is the love of bodies without soul:
And I don’t want to be alone. I have an infinite
Hunger for love, love of bodies without soul.
(E non voglio esser solo. Ho un’infinita fame
d’amore, dell’ amore di corpi senza anima.) (Pasolini 1982: 108)
The hybrid form of the poem, which, as we have seen, instructs us to 
read words not in isolation, refers the sequestered expression ‘senza 
anima’ back to its deceptive opposite – to:
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For the soul is inside you, it is you, but
You’re my mother and your love is my slavery
(Perché l’anima è in te, sei tu, ma tu
Sei mia madre e il tuo amore è la mia schiavitù) (Pasolini 1982: 108)
The love for bodies without soul grows out of the attachment to the 
mother wherein resides the soul (l’anima è in te, sei tu). This con-
nection between the chastity of the maternal and promiscuity, which 
characterises Pasolini’s understanding of homosexuality – ‘For Pasolini, 
the male homosexual pursues sexual encounters only with ‘real’ men, 
heterosexual men who use the homosexual as woman’ (Maggi 2009: 
201) – finds a striking point of culmination in the notorious note 55 of 
his last novel Petrolio.
Note 55 describes how a man (Carlo 2) who has been transformed 
into a woman becomes penetrated by twenty young heterosexual men 
from Rome’s sub-proletariat. Pasolini contaminates promiscuity with its 
supposed opposite, purity:
But Carlo’s heart was pure, despite the tension of his nerves: a tension due, 
among other things, to a sexual desire so strong and exclusive as to be, in the 
end, tragic, or at least to impress itself as such. On the other hand, all twenty 
of those boys there, standing out against the sky (stupidly crowding on top 
of a mound, where they could be seen from the street), were poor. (Pasolini 
1997: 167)
Carlo 2’s humiliating penetration by twenty young men – wherein he is 
compared to a prostitute who is paid for her services – of course affronts 
bourgeois values of pride, success and conformity. The field in which it 
takes place ‘evokes [in the context of Pasolini’s films and novels] humili-
ation, suspension of social norms, poverty, and violence’ (Maggi 2009: 
202). Within this violent suspension of social norms, the maternal mani-
fests itself in the seemingly ‘soulless bodies’ of the young men:
He was perhaps barely sixteen and in fact in his eyes sparkled the smile 
not only of a boy but of a boy who practises the good manners his mother 
has taught him: a mother from the people, for whom a good upbringing is 
naturally an instinctive, deep-rooted politeness. This maternal politeness was 
betrayed in all of Sandro’s gestures and movements. It had remained attached 
to him like a smell. Moreover, his clothes, too, the simple pants and plain 
shirt, had the appearance of having been bought at some market stall by him 
and his mother together, with money from the family. (Pasolini 1997: 168)
In loving the ‘soulless bodies’ of young men the poetic voice honours 
the soul of the mother. Whereas while still being a heterosexual man, 
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Carlo 2 violates his mother, grandmother and his sisters in acts of incest, 
once he has morphed into a woman (or in Pasolini’s terminology into 
a homosexual man) he avoids acts of defilement. ‘Carlo 2 brings to the 
fore (gives life to) a revenant, the image of a maternal home that is gone 
forever. This home ruled by the mother is natural and divine’ (Maggi 
2009: 216). Pasolini frames the maternal in terms of the sacred.
One of the most striking instances of such framing emerges at the 
opening of his film Edipe Re where Pasolini stages a mother–baby scene 
on green grass surrounded by idyllic trees. The camera switches from the 
baby to the face of the mother and lingers there. We are confronted with 
an unsettling close-up which traces maternal affects from the peaceful to 
the foreboding of anguish to come. In Cinema 1 (1983), Gilles Deleuze 
characterises close-ups as affection-images. Deleuze goes so far as to claim 
that on a general and universal level close-ups have to do with nothing 
else but affects: ‘But, in all these cases, the close-up retains the same power 
to tear the image away from spatio-temporal co-ordinates in order to call 
forth the pure affect as the expressed’ (Deleuze 1997: 99). Deleuze argues 
that the affection-image removes us from the action-image. Whereas 
action takes place in time and space, the close-up expresses affect.
Why does Pasolini detach the audience from the sphere of action 
right at the beginning of the film? Pasolini is of course well known for 
the contemplative nature of his films. Nevertheless the length (over two 
minutes) and the position (at the beginning of a movie) of this affect-
image highlights its significance. The face of the mother reveals truthful 
affects, because the foreboding feeling of anguish will prove to be true 
in acts of violence and incest. The baby we see will literally violate his 
mother.
With a Kafkaesque sensibility Pasolini thus combines the affective 
with the truth or factuality of the action-image. As Deleuze has pointed 
out, Kafka was the first to connect two types of modern technologies of 
transport:
Kafka distinguished two equally modern technological pedigrees: on the one 
hand the means of communication-translation, which ensure our insertion 
and our conquests in space and time (boat, car, train, aeroplane . . .); and 
on the other hand the means of communication-expression which summon 
up phantoms on our route and turn us off course towards affects which are 
unco-ordinated, outside co-ordinates (letters, the telephone, the radio, all 
imaginable ‘gramophones’ and cinematographs . . .). (Deleuze 1997: 102–3)
Ironically, in the close-up of the mother at the opening of Edipe Re 
communication-translation does not summon up phantoms but the 
action to come.
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Hence its central position at the beginning of the movie. Here the 
affect-image in a sense anticipates the action-image. How does it do so? 
Similar to the operation of the poem ‘Supplica a mia madre’, Pasolini’s 
work in its entirety explores affects not to detach us from factual reality 
but, on the contrary, to make us recognise truths that we would other-
wise not be able to uncover.
Feelings partake of cognitive processes. As Damasio states, ‘emotion 
and core consciousness are clearly associated’ (Damasio 2000: 169). The 
close-up of the mother’s face in the opening section of Edipe Re depicts 
consciousness. We do not hear and read words but are faced with an 
image which in turn re-enacts the workings of the mind. Damasio has 
shown that ‘core consciousness occurs when the brain’s representation 
devices generate an imaged, non-verbal account of how the organism’s 
own state is affected by the organism’s processing of an object, and 
when this process enhances the image of the causative object, thus 
placing it saliently in a spatial and temporal context [italicised in the 
original quote]’ (Damasio 2000: 169). Crucially what we see in the 
affect-image of the mother’s close-up is not the spatial and temporal 
context – as discussed above, this would be an action-image – but how 
her facial expressions anticipate (as affective states) the violence and 
anguish to come in the action scenes of Oedipus’s fratricide and incest.
Whereas the mother’s affective work at the same time brings truth to 
the fore, her son Oedipus spaces out and separates emotions from cogni-
tions, moving from one to the other. However, the maternal sphere is 
simultaneously emotive and truthful. The son, by contrast, violates the 
mother by dialectically moving from affect to action. His action includes 
both affect and cognition in order to expel these two entities which the 
mother contaminates by binding them together at one and the same 
time.
In striking contrast to Sophocles, Pasolini’s Oedipus does not solve 
the riddle of the Sphinx. Instead of solving a cognitive problem, Oedipus 
here simply shouts and pushes the Sphinx into the abyss. Before dying, 
the Sphinx quickly admonishes Oedipus to search for knowledge in 
his interior sphere rather than blindly rushing from affect into action. 
Oedipus, the adult son, has abandoned the contemplative sphere which 
his mother inhabits in the close-up discussed above. The maternal is the 
sacred where we encounter the affective as at once a cognitive force, illu-
minating truths hidden by conventions. The action scenes of Edipe Re 
show the work of affects which are no longer contemplated or thought 
through. They are blind acts of violence or incest.
In his poem ‘Supplica a mia madre’, Pasolini associates the maternal 
with both the affective and the cognitive – with the emotions of the 
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soul. Like anguish or the abject, the soul, however, is not a pure entity. 
Pasolini’s cinematic and poetic and novelistic forms uncover purity as 
scientific illusion which turns out to be pseudo-scientific.
Impurity is a fallacious concept too. At the point of Oedipus’s recog-
nition of his impure actions, he blinds himself and becomes an outcast 
of his native city. As outcast Oedipus, however, is no longer one-
dimensionally impure. On the contrary, Pasolini has the blind Oedipus 
with his young partner Angelo wander dissatisfied through both modern 
Italian bourgeois and working class society. He only reaches peace 
when he finds himself on the spot on which the close-up of the maternal 
face took place at the opening section of the film. Oedipus the impure 
contaminates the purity of Oedipus the seer (blind like the seer Tiresias) 
and outcast. In the poem ‘Supplica a mia madre’, apparently soulless 
bodies are contaminated with the soul. Edipe Re ends where it began: 
on the green and tree-lined idyllic spot of the mother’s affect-image. The 
form of the poem as well as the film allow for the flowing together of 
otherwise compartmentalised spheres of purity and impurity, of false-
hood and truth.
In doing so, Pasolini’s cinematic and poetic work changes the meaning 
of words as we encounter them in their instrumentalist and reductive 
isolation. Far from saying that the love for bodies without souls is soul-
less, ‘Supplica a mia madre’ connects this affect with the attachment to 
the soul which is the mother. The flow of the poem’s form thus disrupts 
the order of separated entities which is the work of reduction. The con-
fusion outside or beyond the realm of reason may not be irrational. It 
could give rise to a new constellation. As Armando Maggi has recently 
postulated, Pasolini diagnosed modernity in terms of confusion and 
mental illness (schizophrenia):
His interviewer Jean Duflot remarks that, according to Herbert Marcuse, 
our modern values require a new language. Nowadays, it is impossible to 
conceive of a morality based on the concept of beauty. Pasolini responds by 
saying that this is because ‘we are entering the moment of variants’, by which 
he means a time of variations and confusion, a sort of modern tower of Babel 
whose builders await divine punishment. (Maggi 2009: 159)
The image of the tower of Babel evokes the sin of hubris and its con-
sequent divine punishment. This moralistic aspect is, however, absent 
from Pasolini’s diagnosis of modernity. As Maggi points out later on, 
‘the “form” invoked by Pasolini is a statement, a “something” that 
exposes itself as neither good nor bad , neither progressive or regressive, 
but only existent’ (Maggi 2009: 159). The notion of confusion refers 
back to ‘Supplica a mia madre’, but also alludes to Pasolini’s film Edipe 
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Re and his last novel Petrolio. The two latter works profile the scandal 
of incest which Pasolini’s poem of 1962 evokes but eventually avoids – 
hovering ambiguously in the confusing hybridity of soulless bodies and 
the soul of the mother. Crucially, neither the main protagonist of Edipe 
Re nor Carlo 2 of Petrolio find a defining moment of identity in the act 
of incest, because Pasolini’s aesthetics and ethics has done away with 
points of beginning and end which would define a distinct identity or 
entity.
Pasolini’s last novel creates a new form that has overcome the com-
partmentalisation or isolation of specific subjects and substances. The 
novel unfolds not so much the vertical line of a building such as the 
tower of Babel but the horizontal growth of infinite birth: ‘The concept 
of giving birth to a form is crucial for a correct understanding of 
Petrolio. The “initial form of thought” is a thought that is in a perennial 
state of birth’ (Maggi 2009: 160). Strikingly, the novel begins with the 
repudiation of a beginning: ‘This novel does not begin’ (Pasolini 1997: 
3). Having neither beginning nor end, Pasolini’s last novel grows later-
ally rather in terms of linearity. It practises as form what Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari have confined to a thought-image: that of the rhizome 
which is non-hierarchical and allows for multiplicity and diversity.
Multiple narrators compose Petrolio and its main character is not 
even a single subject, but splits into two: Carlo 1 and Carlo 2. Carlo 1 
desires power and wealth by trying to climb the hierarchical ladder of 
the state-owned Italian petroleum company Eni. Power is, however, not 
pure but corrupted. Corruption does its work through Carlo 1 and Eni’s 
as well as various political parties’ affiliation with the Mafia. The other 
side of impurity is the splitting of Carlo 1 (who as Eni executive belongs 
to the ruling class) into Carlo 2 (who is a middle-class heterosexual engi-
neer). Carlo 2 is driven by incestuous desires: he has sexual intercourse 
with his mother, grandmother and his sisters. The identity of the man 
Carlo 1 and Carlo 2 completely breaks down when they both undergo a 
sex-change from male to female.
The stories of Carlo 1 and Carlo 2 are, however, not the subject 
matter of the novel, as Pasolini repeatedly emphasises:
Well, these printed but illegible pages are intended to announce my decision 
in a way that is extreme – but is then established symbolically for the rest of 
the book; that is, not to write a story but to construct a form (as will become 
clearer later on): a form consisting simply of ‘something written’. I do not 
deny that certainly the best thing would be to invent an alphabet, perhaps of 
ideographs or hieroglyphics, and to print the entire book that way. (Pasolini 
1997: 129)
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Pasolini goes on to refer to Henri Michaux’s Idéogrammes en Chine 
(1975) – a book constituting ‘the patient invention of non-alphabetic 
signs’ (Pasolini 1997: 129). Rather than working with non-alphabetic 
signs, Pasolini reconstructs modern allegories which are illegible, which 
refuse to turn into linear and understandable narrative. The form which 
Pasolini creates not only in Petrolio, but also in various films (Accattone 
to Edipe Re to Teorema and Salò o le 120 giorante di Sodoma) is that of 
allegory – an allegory bursting with a multiplicity of meanings so as to 
render ‘meaning’ or ‘narrative’ into multiple and contaminating constel-
lations. Pasolini’s notion of allegory comes close to Walter Benjamin’s. 
The relationship between Pasolini and Benjamin has, however, not yet 
been investigated. Regardless of whether Pasolini was deeply familiar 
with Benjamin’s work, their mutual emphasis on a modern form of alle-
gory is crucial for a better understanding of their critique of regressive or 
brutalising elements within modernity, of which incest is a most striking 
example. Central to both Benjamin’s and Pasolini’s interpretations of 
allegory is the element of interruption.
Allegory is modernity’s interruption of itself. A break of course con-
stitutes the definition of the modern: the departure from the past, from 
tradition or the beginning of the new (modernity is Neuzeit in German). 
Why does the break with the past require a second break – a breaking 
away from itself? This is due to the failure of the modern project to 
implement what it had promised: a plural world beyond pressures to 
embrace homogeneity and other forms of violence.11
From Pasolini’s perspective incest instantiates the homogeneous oper-
ations of power: for him, incest increases rather than abates in the wake 
of neo-capitalism. He argues that the modern urgently needs renewal – a 
renewal that returns to premodern forms of cognition such as allegory. 
The birth of the modern requires a second cognitive birth which returns 
to the intellectual-spiritual realm of the contemplative mother which 
predominates the opening sequence of Edipe Re. Pasolini describes this 
renewal out of the past as follows: ‘Even if I had not determined it, 
willed it, this writing necessarily had to be a “new game” – even if not, 
perhaps, lexically and formally; everything in it, in fact, is heavy alle-
gory, almost medieval (that is, illegible)’ (Pasolini 1997: 37). According 
to both Pasolini and Benjamin modernity’s second, more thoughtful 
birth coincides with the renaissance of a modern and premodern hybrid 
of contemplation: allegory.
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Conclusion: Walter Benjamin’s allegory and Pasolini’s 
Affabulazione
In order to address the question of how the politics, and by implication 
the history, with which we are familiar is closely bound up with sexual-
ity, I shall briefly discuss a play which Pasolini wrote while working on 
his film Edipe Re. Pasolini’s Affabulazione (Fabrications) stages incest 
as a neo-capitalist form of globalisation. Here incest is no longer hetero-
sexual but has turned homosexual. As in almost all of Pasolini’s works, 
the play Affabulazione revolves around family life. The setting is the 
home of a wealthy Milanese industrialist. We do not know his first name 
or his surname. He simply appears as ‘Father’, his wife as ‘Mother’ and 
his son as ‘Son’. The absence of specific names turns the characters into 
representatives of their roles. They act out a specific role. In this way 
they are allegories. As allegories, the actors purport to represent some 
form of truth in a symbolic way.
Walter Benjamin has established a salient account of allegory which 
relates the term to the radically secularised world of bourgeois moder-
nity. Benjamin developed his understanding of allegory in his Trauerspiel 
book. Here he analyses how the Baroque mourning play depicts secu-
larisation in a highly aestheticised manner in order to debunk both the 
attraction of this world and the status of those who wield power over 
the world, of those who are privileged to enjoy such attractions. The 
desire to escape from this world is motivated by the confrontation with 
a radically this-worldly, secularised society.
The disgust with the profane – evoked by its radical aestheticisation 
– brings about the will to read the world allegorically. As a secularised 
literary device Benjamin’s modern and postmodern allegory may have 
become stripped of its theological context but it nevertheless relates to 
theology, whose content it empties of spiritual as well as intellectual 
meaning. According to Benjamin, allegorical readings destroy profane 
bodies, reassembling them in the body politic of a messianic age. Secular 
forms of destruction rule the workings of allegory. Signs are now valid 
without carrying any spiritual or intellectual significance. The pros-
pect of transcendent redemption has disappeared but what remains is 
the now secularised version of guilt – Augustine’s original sin – that 
encompasses nature and our embodied life on an all-encompassing 
scale.
This contempt with nature, with the body, with the profane, furthers 
the desire to read the world allegorically. Allegory performs the destruc-
tion of the natural and the corporeal. According to Benjamin it is the lit-
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erary trope for the destruction of an immanence that cannot be salvaged 
by a now defunct transcendence. The command to destroy the profane 
motivates allegorical readings of the world (here these readings of course 
go without any reference to a spiritual realm).
According to Benjamin, this allegorical destruction of the body gains 
in force with the progress of capitalism. Benjamin does not abandon the 
theological. Indeed the profane re-discovers and thereby re-establishes 
its spiritual or intellectual significance at the point where it burst into 
fragments, into shards which could form the basis of a new life and a 
new form of politics. Creative and destructive aspects of the arts are 
the basis for this novel polis.12 Intellectual critique is therefore always 
already part of the constructive work towards a less violent body 
politic.13
In order to gain a new perspective on politics – which is central to a 
discussion of Pasolini’s art that does justice to its political potential – a 
brief consideration of Raymond Geuss’s social thought may be pertinent. 
Geuss has recently suggested that we ‘would be well advised to take as 
basic’ concepts for politics not – as has been philosophy’s predilection 
from Plato to Rawls and Habermas – ‘belief’ or ‘opinion’ but ‘action’: 
‘Political judgments are not made individually one by one, but always 
stand as parts of larger sets of beliefs and judgments, and a political 
judgment is always embedded in a context of action’ (Geuss 2010: 5). As 
we have seen in the above discussion of Pasolini’s film Edipe Re, cinema 
can be at once contemplative (affect-image) and active (action-image). 
Affect here partakes of cognition. The affect-ridden actions of the inces-
tuous politician Oedipus, have, by contrast, severed any connection with 
contemplation or cognition.
Pasolini’s cinematic and literary work is indeed pertinent here: it 
performs a fierce animadversion with the norms of the status quo. His 
work reads norms allegorically until they burst into pieces, into frag-
ments where they can be reassembled in new configurations that may be 
the basis for a new form of politics. Pasolini undermines heterosexual 
normativity by contaminating these norms with the incestuous. His 
heterosexual men betray the maternal by violating it in incest (Oedipus, 
Carlo 2). The allegory of the father in his play Affabulazione goes one 
step further: by reading the heterosexual father in terms of a homo-
sexual abuser and, worse still, murderer of his son.
Allegory here interrupts the workings of signification. Patriarchal 
power so insistently reinforces its rights to ownership that it makes 
impossible what sanctions its existence: heterosexual partnerships. The 
father drives his son’s girlfriend away by accusing her of having stolen 
what properly belongs to him, the father:
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Father
Well tell me then, if you’re as brave as you seem
Are you satisfied with that part of my son’s body
You’ve stolen from us? (Pasolini 2010: 34)
Power in the form of neo-capitalist rights to ownership creates a biopoli-
tics which unceasingly fabricates new forms of violation. Fabrications 
act as if they were reality and indeed within the confines of the play they 
do turn out to be real: they happen. In the latter part of the play the 
father fabricates an image of the son as one attempting to set sight on 
the patriarch’s genitals. A complete reversal has taken place. The father 
here projects himself to be his own son who is keen on his father’s penis:
Kill me, kill the child
that wants to see your prick (Pasolini 2010: 56)
Rather than contemplating his son’s life, the father imposes his affect-
ridden fabrication onto the body of his offspring. When the ghost of 
Sophocles appears to intervene in the play he admonishes the father to 
make use of his contemplative and cognitive capacities:
But you, instead of contemplating him
are chasing after him to grab hold of him.
Ah that old, dreadful habit of possession! (Pasolini 2010: 65)
In a long monologue before he kills his son, the father allegorically 
reveals the history of violence to coincide with the action/affect-driven 
rule of patriarchy. The opening of Edipe Re stages an alternative to such 
mythic as well as modern violence in the affective-cognitive close-up of 
the maternal:
Thousands of sons are murdered by their fathers,
while just occasionally a father’s killed by his son
– this can’t be denied. But how does
the murder of sons by fathers come about?
By means of prisons, trenches, concentration camps
cities bombed to bits. And how,
on the other hand, does the murder of fathers
by sons occur? By means of the growth
of an innocent body, which is just there,
a newcomer in the old city, the city of the old,
and which finally asks nothing but
to be admitted. (Pasolini 2010: 89)
The allegorical reflection of the incestuous father illuminates violence 
as the rivalry between youth and age. The desire for power, and with 
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it possession, amounts to sexual rivalry between old and young. The 
reversal of the Oedipus complex, as Laius complex, extends the sphere 
of incest from heterosexuality to homosexuality. Pasolini reveals both 
forms of incest to be driven by affect- as well as action-ridden urges to 
possess and dominate; similar to his last film Salò in which homosexual 
as well as heterosexual practices have been corrupted to exertions of 
power over life.
Pasolini thus foregrounds his contemplative techniques (such as his 
usage of allegory or his cinematography of close-ups) to make us see 
ways out of such circles of incest/violence – alternatives wherein we con-
taminate cognition and affect. Here the figure of contamination could 
give rise to a thoughtful form of politics that avoids exertions of power 
over life. The following chapter analyses ways in which we can over-
come a dialectics of inclusion and exclusion that has governed biopoli-
tics not only in traditional humanism but also in some contemporary 
versions of posthumanism. Uncritical approaches to posthumanist issues 
(such as cloning) may merely reproduce the dialectics of inclusion and 
exclusion if they do not sufficiently address the Cartesian understanding 
of the mind as controlling the bare life of the body. Posthumanism may 
then be at risk of replicating past types of bio-political power under new 
technological apparel.
Notes
 1. As Stephen Holden (1993) has put it: ‘Of all the films in the series that 
exerted an impact on Mr Scorsese, the two that have had the most sweeping 
influence, he said, are John Cassavetes’s “Shadows” (1960), which opens 
the series today, and Pier Paolo Pasolini’s “Accatone!” (1961). He studied 
both films when he was a film student at New York University.’
 2. This is of course not to deny that Scorsese’s Cape Fear is a remake of its 
earlier version. However, as Phillip E. Wegner has recently pointed out, the 
earlier film is itself a remake of John D. MacDonald’s novel (1957), The 
Executioner: ‘the mid-Century Cold War and gender anxieties evident in 
MacDonald’s novel; the nightmares of racial conflict allegorically staged 
in the first film; and finally, in Scorsese’s 1991 remake, the explosive re-
emergence – as these earlier fears seem to have been put to bed (an illusion, 
as I will show later) – of anxieties about new forms of class conflict. In each 
case, this complex of fears results in violence against a variety of what Evan 
Watkins calls “throwaway” bodies – those of women, poor whites, African 
Americans, immigrants, and working people – precisely out of a paranoid 
anxiety contained in them’ (Wegner 2009: 88).
 3. As Wegner has pointed out, this scene ‘has become the stuff of countless 
film and television parodies, by his [i.e. Cady’s] aggressive march, on his 
release, directly into the lens of the camera’ (Wegner 2009: 86).
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 4. As Wegner has put it, ‘Late in the film, Cady tells Sam, “Now you and I will 
truly be the same.” The irony is that they always already were the same, 
Sam’s violence perhaps more covert, but having no less devastating conse-
quences for his victims’ (Wegner 2009: 114–15).
 5. Vanessa Lemm has recently described this term as follows: ‘This biocen-
tric notion of culture in Nietzsche, as reconstructed in Nietzsche’s Animal 
Philosophy, is different from previous materialist and spiritualist inter-
pretations of his philosophy of culture, because it avoids the biologism of 
the first and the anthropomorphism of the second. Rejecting a biologistic 
interpretation of life, I consider Nietzsche’s thesis to be that every organic 
cell has spirit’ (Lemm 2009: 2).
 6. For a discussion of this point see Siciliano (1982: 247).
 7. So far scholars of Pasolini’s work have confined the notion of contami-
nation to the aesthetic sphere only where it concerns the mediation and 
interaction between different cultures and historical moments. See Rumble 
(1997).
 8. For a discussion of Keats’s term ‘negative capability’ see Gittings (1979: 
262–71).
 9. Commenting on Freud’s Oedipus complex Lacan establishes the law of the 
father as follows: ‘Why does this minimal schema of human experience 
which Freud gave us in the Oedipus complex retain its irreducible and yet 
enigmatic value for us? And why privilege the Oedipus complex? Why does 
Freud always want to find it everywhere, with such insistence? Why do we 
have here a knot that seems so essential to him that he is unable to abandon 
it in the slightest particular observation – unless it’s because the notion 
of father, closely related to the fear of God, gives him the most palpable 
element in experience of what I’ve called the quilting point between the 
signifier and signified’ (Lacan 2000: 268).
10. For a detailed discussion of Kafka’s avoidance of becoming a father in 
terms of an avoidance of power see Elias Canetti (1989).
11. For a discussion of modernity as promise of diversity see Mack (2010).
12. The term polis is appropriate here because Benjamin’s politics of art 
sharply contrasts with Plato’s exclusion of the arts from his conception of 
an ideal republic.
13. For a discussion of the innovations that are part of the work of critique see 
Mack (2014).
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Introduction: posthumanism, biopolitics and the figure of 
contamination
This chapter will analyse the ways in which we can see both posthu-
manism and bio-political theory in the new context of contamination. 
Both theoretical approaches are capable of contaminating what have 
traditionally been posited as opposites: human and animal, nature and 
society, mind and body, natural and human history. The bio-political 
concern with life has an emancipatory potential. As Miguel Vatter has 
recently put it: ‘The constitution of a life-world makes possible “man” 
as a species because from the start it identifies human life as a form 
of animal life that additionally has the capacity of being-political or 
being-rational’ (Vatter 2008: 48). This new understanding of biopoli-
tics liberates embodied life from the traditional sovereign rule of the 
cerebral (going under various names such as law, medicine, economics 
and politics). Instead of subordinating one to the other – mind to body 
or body to mind – a parallelism between the two comes into the purview 
of scientific and philosophical discourse, a Spinozan parallelism which, 
according to contemporary neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, has always 
constituted our life in an embodied, natural environment. As we will see, 
like bio-political theory, posthumanism emerges from mid-twentieth-
century schools of thought such as poststructuralism, deconstruction, 
feminism and subaltern studies. What these schools have in common is 
a hermeneutics of suspicion as regards claims to universalism.
Contamination as both an idea and a way of life, however, allows us 
to conceive of the common or the universal not in the traditional terms of 
inclusion or exclusion but as the interdependence of what has so far been 
seen as incompatible. Firstly we will see how posthumanism shares with 
bio-political theory a critical concern with what traditional forms of phi-
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losophy, science, economics and politics have excluded from a suppos-
edly inclusive conception of life. However, the main part of this chapter 
discusses how we can come to understand both posthumanism and a 
critical engagement with biopolitics as transgressing twentieth-century 
forms of theory at the point at which a new universal emerges under the 
sign of contamination. Contamination is truly universal because it has 
outdone the binaries of inclusion and exclusion with which subaltern 
studies, feminism and deconstruction have rightly taken issue.
Posthumanism critically reflects on the unacknowledged practices of 
exclusion which have informed and inflected the history of humanism. 
The work of posthumanism is thus one of critique. It takes issue with 
standards of normality, gender-, ethnic- and species-cohesions, as well 
as with other forms of homogeneity. Pramod K. Nayar has recently 
defined critical posthumanism as follows:
Critical posthumanism, as we shall come to call this philosophical and politi-
cal theme in literature, popular culture and theory, is the radical decentring 
of the traditional sovereign, coherent and autonomous human in order to 
demonstrate how the human is always already evolving with, constituted by 
and constitutive of multiple forms of life and machines. Literary texts that 
have since the Renaissance always shown us how humans behave, react and 
interact – indeed it has been said that literature ‘invented’ the human – have 
now begun to show that the human is what it is because it includes the non-
human. (Nayar 2014: 2)
Rather than abandoning or avoiding the term humanity,1 however, 
posthumanism expands our understanding of what is human into 
areas which have traditionally been deemed to be the opposite of our 
 constitution – namely, other species, such as animals or plants, and tech-
nological apparatuses such as machines. Posthumanism contaminates 
the human with what has traditionally been seen as its opposite: the 
animal and the machine.
By contaminating assumed binaries with each other, posthumanism 
may prove capable of achieving a so far elusive form of universalism 
that allows for the mutual contamination of different entities. The 
term ‘posthumanism’, however, may be quite misleading because it 
may suggest a teleological or progressive movement that has done 
away with or, in other words, has overcome the human. This form of 
temporal abandonment of what preceded it – signalled by the prefix 
‘post’ – would, however, reiterate past exclusions in a new context in 
which whatever goes under the sign of ‘human’ denotes the inferior or 
excluded. As Cary Wolfe has recently put it, ‘the point is not to reject 
humanism tout court – indeed, there are many values and aspirations 
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to admire in humanism – but rather to show how those aspirations are 
undercut by the philosophical and ethical frameworks used to concep-
tualize them’ (Wolfe 2010: xvi). As we will see through a close reading 
of Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel Never Let Me Go, the point of posthuman-
ist writing and thought is to contaminate what has traditionally been 
defined as the non-human (the animal or the cyborg) with the human 
(or vice versa, to contaminate the animal with the human). The figure 
of contamination as it has been developed in this book thus changes the 
way we perceive ourselves and our environment.
From its inceptions, posthumanist writing and thought has contami-
nated the organic with the inorganic and in this respect it shares, on a 
structural level, a bio-political concern with the relationship between 
form and mere life, between the cerebral and the corporeal, between 
mind and biology. In perhaps the first posthumanist manifesto (1990), 
Donna Haraway combines the technological with the organic when she 
focuses on the hybrid nature of the cyborg: ‘A cyborg is a cybernetic 
organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality 
as well as a creature of fiction’ (Haraway 2001: 465). The collapse of 
the distinction between the inorganic machine-like and the organic (the 
animal) accentuates a blurring of the traditional opposition between 
social reality and fiction:
Late twentieth-century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the dif-
ference between natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and 
externally designed, and many other distinctions that used to apply to organ-
isms and machines. Our machines are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves 
frighteningly inert. (Haraway 2001: 468)
Humans create or fabricate fictions and machines. Once these inorganic 
productions turn organic, the distinction between literature and social 
reality collapses. Then fictions and machines have a life of their own and 
interact with social reality.
This is not entirely new.2 Literature has previously shown how the 
fictitious can exert a powerful and lively – if deleterious – hold over 
social reality. A striking example is of course Henry James’s Portrait of 
a Lady, in which the heroine Isabel Archer takes the aesthetic deceptions 
of Madame Merle and Mr Osmond for real, realising only too late what 
socio-political and economic interests art here serves to cover up. Isabel 
Archer’s imagination makes her fall prey to the all too real materialistic 
interests of Madame Merle and Mr Osmond. James’s novel depicts how 
our lives are ambiguously shaped by narratives, by the fabricated or 
artificial, by fictions which are capable of forming our social reality with 
unintended consequences.
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Neither the blurring of the line that divides the imagined or fictitious 
from social reality – think of the ambiguity of the ghost in Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet – nor the inclusion of machines into human society are new. It is 
important to keep in mind that humans have always been interacting with 
machines – such as prostheses (witness captain Ahab in Melville’s Moby 
Dick) – and with other species such as animals. Following Jean-Luc Nancy, 
Roberto Esposito has argued that ‘what we should be talking about is the 
supplemental, or technical, character of the body itself’ (Esposito 2011: 
150).3 Uncritical or non-reflective humanism has, however, tended to 
define machines and animals in terms of what the human is not.
At this point posthumanism critically intervenes and argues for what 
Nayar has recently called ‘multispecies citizenship that involves all 
forms of life’ (Nayar 2014: 155). This ‘species cosmopolitanism is an 
openness toward the Other but also an opening up to uncertainty and 
possibilities of the not-yet’ (Nayar 2014: 155). Nayar’s term ‘species 
cosmopolitanism’ counters various strategies of exclusion that he sees 
operating in the entire history of humanism, even in humanism’s more 
self-reflective and critical strands:
[. . .] critical posthumanism proposes that the category of the human was 
constructed by expelling the animal, the plant and the machine. In other 
words, where critical humanism unravelled the exclusionary nature of the 
allegedly sovereign human, critical posthumanism proposes that the sover-
eign human is in fact a hybrid, constituted by the very forms of life that were 
excluded to define the limits and identity of the human. (Nayar 2014: 30)
The quotation, however, raises the question whether critical humanism 
does not already acknowledge the hybridity and the fluid identity of the 
human when it undermines notions of sovereignty, disregarding whether 
they are supposedly human or supposedly non-human. Machines can 
be violent too, as can clearly be seen in their employment in military 
activities (a striking example is of course the use of drones for bombing 
missions). We might therefore ask whether critical posthumanism may 
be inclined to abstain from the work of critique when it thoughtlessly 
welcomes machines.
Here the idea and praxis of contamination may prove beneficial. How 
so? Contamination allows for a blurring of distinct entities. As result 
of such blurring, we can no longer employ the term machine to demote 
the human, as is sometimes done when robots are appraised for their 
economic and ethical efficiency over and above the vulnerability and 
inefficiency of the human. Robots are positively opposed to humans due 
to their non-emotive, ‘cool’ or rational behaviour and their inexhaust-
ibility and their independence of embodied needs.
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Rather than pitching the machine against the human (or, vice versa, 
the human against the machine), contamination outdoes such opposi-
tions which perpetuate traditional bio-political forms of exclusion and 
inclusion as analysed by Foucault and Agamben (see discussion below). 
Thinking and acting within the force field of contamination makes us 
realise that the distinction between machines and humanity is spurious, 
because both entities have been mutually implicated with each other: 
humans after all invent and programme machines.
As Haraway has pointed out, machines such as robots or cyborgs 
have been first developed not in the interest of species cosmopolitanism 
but intra-species warfare: ‘The main trouble with cyborgs, of course, 
is that they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal 
capitalism, not to mention socialism’ (Haraway 2001: 467). Haraway, 
however, goes on to belittle this militaristic aspect of a posthumanist 
infatuation with machines, writing: ‘But illegitimate offspring are often 
exceedingly unfaithful to their origins. Their fathers, after all, are ines-
sential’ (Haraway 2001: 467). In contemporary literature and theory, 
however, the distinction between the organic and inorganic has become 
increasingly important to the establishment of the posthumanist field of 
animal studies.
Whereas Haraway’s 1990 A Cyborg Manifesto partakes of a post-
modernist and poststructuralist linguistic turn, contemporary animal 
studies are part of a countermovement: the post-linguistic turn.4 In 
her recent study Animal Capital: Rendering Life in Biopolitical Times, 
Nicole Shukin has analysed the way in which poststructuralist theory, 
from Deleuze to Derrida (to Lippit, who follows Derrida), operates in a 
disembodied, symbolic environment which is akin to the high modernity 
of our current capitalist forms of exchange:
Rather than idealizing the alterity of animal affect, as Deleuze, Derrida, and 
Lippit are variously prone to do, one of the questions this book poses is 
How does animal affect function as a technology of capital? The Deleuzian 
and Derridean figures of animality I have traced unravel the presumption 
that Homo sapiens is an all-powerful presence and self-same subject. Yet 
in liberating animality from the metaphysical strictures of Western thought 
and reenvisioning animals as pure intensities and undying specters, these 
poststructuralist discourses may inadvertently resonate with market forces 
likewise intent on freeing animal life into a multiplicity of potential exchange 
values. (Shukin 2009: 42)
Haraway’s approach of the 1990s is clearly affiliated with a poststruc-
turalist exclusion of embodied, ‘natural’ life. According to Haraway’s 
1990 A Cyborg Manifesto, social reality is not a natural given but 
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subject to political-linguistic construction.
In the wake of a recent post-linguistic turn, however, contempo-
rary writing and thought increasingly deviates from postmodernism’s 
‘general emphasis on the textuality of our environments, to the neglect 
of material realities’ (Boxall 2013: 15). Literary as well as philosophical 
attention has shifted from the supposed self-referentiality of texts to the 
material interconnections of our lives.
It might, however, be rather one-sided to neglect or marginalise post-
structuralism’s preoccupation with language. Rather than being either 
linguistic or embodied, our world contaminates the symbolic with the 
corporeal, the societal with the natural. The figure of contamination 
makes us wary of discarding the linguistic for the post-linguistic turn. 
As with the machine, the animal and the human, oppositions between 
the symbolic and embodied are fictions that precondition societal acts 
of exclusion. Rather than being one instead of another our life is always 
already contaminated, blurring and meshing various opposites. The 
idea and praxis of contamination alerts us not to exclude one school of 
thought in favour of another.
In this way, deconstruction has taught us that our perception of mate-
rial reality remains mired within various textual practices and linguistic 
systems. To be oblivious of this postmodern insight into the artificial-
ity of what appears to be innocuously ‘there’ risks embracing a rather 
distorted view of our society and our environment wherein we uncriti-
cally endorse new technological developments as if they were not part 
of socio-linguistic constructions and political agendas. While in many 
ways contemporary posthumanism has initiated a post-linguistic turn, 
the question of the human and the question of language still, however, 
haunt our approach to human knowledge and ethics.
Posthumanism has thus to take into account linguistic constructions 
when it seriously engages with the ethics of material, embodied experi-
ences that go beyond what has traditionally been considered human (i.e. 
animals, clones and cyborgs). The question of how to include aspects 
of our world which traditional humanism excluded from its linguistic 
construction of what supposedly constitutes humanity is at once a politi-
cal and ethical issue. This contamination of the ethical and the political 
first emerges while being articulated (i.e. on a linguistic level). We simply 
cannot ignore or belittle the role of language in inter- or intra-species 
politics and ethics. Indeed language is often employed as a criterion for 
exclusion.
In this way, animals have often been marginalised or excluded with 
reference to their supposed lack of linguistic capacities. In Giorgio 
Agamben’s words: ‘Just as, in the words of Foucault, man “is an animal 
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whose politics places his existence as living being in question,” so also is 
he the living being whose language places his life in question’ (Agamben 
2010: 69). Both Foucault and Agamben include the notion of the animal 
in their understanding of humanity. Humanity is, however, a linguistic 
and political animal. In order to engage with the politics and ethics of 
posthumanism we therefore ignore the preceding linguistic turn at our 
peril.
Within the contemporary post-linguistic turn, Haraway’s postmodern 
1990 appraisal of cyborgs has been subjected to critical analysis in some 
recent approaches to posthumanism. As Stefan Herbrechter has argued, 
Haraway’s combination of the organic and the inorganic in her notion 
of the cyborg repeats the humanistic mind–body division in which the 
embodied becomes subservient to the controlling agency of cerebral 
work. As Herbrechter has put it in his critique of Haraway’s cyborgs 
manifesto:
Cyborgization is, therefore, not merely a hybridization of the organic and the 
mechanical, but the grafting of an informational and digital (i.e. virtual and 
virtualizing), coded and simulated (i.e. no longer relying on representation) 
reality onto human embodiment. And this new hybrid reality already func-
tions according to the rules and codings of an artificial intelligence. The idea 
of embodiment, in turn, however, runs the danger of, in fact, contributing 
– as a quasi-extension and continuation of the long history of Christian and 
Cartesian duality between mind and body – to the notion of the body as the 
location of animality or organicity, while the neuro-informatic combination 
of consciousness and simulation technology is seen as liberation or ‘purifica-
tion’ of the eternal mind from its bodily demise. This dualism allows for new 
forms of ideological dematerialization (as can be seen in the Matrix trilogy), 
which might make an intensified biotechnological exploitation of the ‘animal’ 
body (whether in human or nonhuman animals) more likely. (Herbrechter 
2013: 188)
This return of the traditional Christian and, in its modern scientific 
form, Cartesian mind–body duality within a posthumanist social reality 
– shaped as it is by digital and genetic technologies – constitutes the so 
far underappreciated critical kernel of Ishiguro’s novel Never Let Me 
Go.
Contaminating the linguistic with the embodied: Ishiguro’s 
Never Let Me Go
There is no doubt that Never Let Me Go does not dispute the rights 
of clones to equal rights. However, this is not the moot point of the 
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novel. Ishiguro narrates the novel from the personal plural perspective 
of the clones. This means that we experience the clones as humans. The 
socio-political order of the novel, however, categorises the clones as 
non-humans. The novel thus lets us experience (from the first person 
plural perspective of the clones) the injustice of unequal rights. Indeed, 
as Nancy Fraser has shown, Never Let Me Go reveals the humaneness 
of those whom we choose to label ‘non-human’:
Unlike Plato, Ishiguro makes no attempt to represent a just social order, 
but instead offers a chilling picture of one that the reader comes to view as 
deeply unjust. This already makes a profound point: justice is never actually 
experienced directly. By contrast, we do experience injustice, and it is only 
through this that we form an idea of justice. Only by pondering the character 
of what we consider unjust do we begin to get a sense of what would count 
as an alternative. (Fraser 2012: 43)
What is crucial is that the clones are (of course unjustly) represented by 
their guardians as mere bodies which lack thought, consciousness and 
feelings. The guardians categorise the clones as non-humans and yet 
the novel shows them to be part of humanity. It is this tension between 
representation or categorisation and actual reality which constitutes the 
theoretical framework of the novel: ‘The clones can be exempted from 
moral consideration because they are categorically different from the 
originals’ (Fraser 2012: 44). Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go contaminates 
the symbolic with its supposed opposite: embodied life. In a related 
way it presents us with the contamination of binaries which prepare 
for the political division between the organic and the inorganic (and 
the human and the animal in a different context). Similarly to the repli-
cants in Ridley Scott’s film Blade Runner or the cloned child in Steven 
Spielberg’s Artificial Intelligence, the clones in Ishiguro’s Never Let Me 
Go are capable of the same emotions and the same forms of behaviour 
characterising humans. These films as well as Ishiguro’s novel persuade 
us to change the way we think about distinct and opposed entities: as no 
longer distinct in opposition but as mutually implicated with each other. 
The figure of contamination describes this force of mutual implication 
and interdependence.
As Fraser has shown, the injustice of socio-political representation 
in Ishiguro’s novel goes so far as to encompass the self-perception of 
the clones: ‘Clearly, injustice is a matter of objective victimization, a 
structural relation in which some exploit others and deny them moral 
standing as subjects of justice. But the harm is compounded when the 
exploited lack the means to interpret their situation as unjust’ (Fraser 
2012: 45). Fraser concludes her argument about the injustice depicted 
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in Ishiguro’s novel by making a plea for the inclusion of those who are 
excluded from equal rights, status and respect:5 ‘We should examine 
the public sphere for biases that impede equal access to political voice, 
and figure out how to overcome them, by broadening the terms avail-
able for naming social problems and disputing their causes’ (Fraser 
2012: 51). Her concern is both with structural and interpretive 
injustices. The figure of contamination reverses unjust structures of 
interpretation precisely by prioritising what has been rejected, margin-
alised, or excluded as the abject, deficient, abnormal – in short as the 
contaminated.
Contamination fuses the singular with the plural and thus practises 
a universalism that is non-exclusive. Significantly, Ishiguro’s novel is 
composed in a first-person plural narration – from the perspective of the 
clones. The narration establishes this point of view in terms of a mirror 
that de-familiarises us from accustomed forms of representation. The 
narration projects mirror images that turn freakish or monstrous. The 
monstrosity in question is the realisation of a difference superimposed 
by linguistic devices to do with representation and categorisation. For 
the clones, accustomed forms of representation produce not identity but 
alienation. What they see in the mirror does not validate their selfhood 
but, on the contrary, renders it disturbing, monstrous, freakish:
So you’re waiting, even if you don’t quite know it, waiting for the moment 
when you realise that you are really different to them [i.e. the guardians and 
‘proper’ humans in general]; that there are people out there, like Madame 
[i.e. one of the guardians], who don’t hate you or wish you any harm, but 
who nonetheless shudder at the very thought of you – of how you were 
brought into this world and why – and who dread the idea of your hand 
brushing against theirs. The first time you glimpse yourself through the eyes 
of a person like that, it’s a cold moment. It’s like walking past a mirror you’ve 
walked past every day of your life, and suddenly it shows you something else, 
something troubling and strange. (Ishiguro 2005: 33)
Critics have so far ignored how this crucial passage harks back and 
subverts Lacan’s 1936 lecture on the mirror stage. According to Derrida 
(2008: 114), Lacan introduces the mirror stage to establish his human-
ist credentials by differentiating between a young chimpanzee’s and a 
child’s first encounter with its mirror image. Lacan emphasises how in 
the case of the chimpanzee the mirroring act exhausts itself ‘once the 
image has been mastered and found empty’ (Lacan 1977: 1). The human 
child, by contrast, fully absorbs the illusion of the act of mirroring: ‘he 
[i.e. the human child] experiences in play the relation between the move-
ments assumed in the image and the reflected environment, and between 
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this virtual complex and the reality it duplicates – the child’s own body, 
and the persons and things, around him’ (Lacan 1977: 1) The child takes 
the virtual or symbolic mirror image to be real.
This is exactly what the clones do in Never Let Me Go too. In the quota-
tion above they do not master and disregard the mirror image for what it 
is – as is the case with Lacan’s chimpanzees – namely as an insubstantial 
illusion, a sign but not the thing as such. As Derrida has recently argued, 
by depriving animals of the mirror stage, Lacan denies them access to 
language and to the symbolic. For Derrida, Lacan’s thesis about the mirror 
stage has clear implications for animals and other non-humans: ‘the animal 
has neither the unconscious nor language, it does not have the other, it has 
no relation to the other as such, except by an effect of the human order, 
by contagion, appropriation, domestication’ (Derrida 2009: 114). The 
passage through the mirror stage initiates the child into the order of the 
symbolic, which prepares for human responsiveness – the openness to the 
other which Lacan categorically rules out for the non-human.
Ishiguro’s clones, however, have gone through the mirror stage in 
exactly the same ways as other humans have. They are subjects of 
images and signs. It is precisely at this point that they are vulnerable to 
feelings of discrimination and inadequacy. Having been told that they 
are different, that they have come into the world as cloned materials 
rather than human persons, they suddenly see their mirror image no 
longer in terms of reassurance but as ‘something troubling and strange’. 
It is this symbolic estrangement that prepares for the acceptance of their 
real, material inferiority as mere embodiment or (as we shall see) ‘bare 
life’: ‘And it’s curious, when we were older and the guardians were 
giving us those talks [about the prearranged purpose of their life as mere 
materials for organ donation] nothing came as a complete surprise. It 
was like we’d heard everything somewhere before’ (Ishiguro 2005: 75). 
Paradoxically, it is through language, through their exposure to catego-
risation and representation that the clones accept their exclusion from 
humanity as distinguished by linguistic and other signifying practices 
which go beyond the merely embodied sphere of ‘bare life’. Linguistic 
and other cerebral operations are violent if they are used to demote life. 
Ishiguro’s novel takes issue with a political regiment that through the 
mental constructions of representation or categorisation governs life 
from a position outside the merely embodied: i.e. within the symbolic 
sphere of sign-systems.
Against this background one could argue that Never Let Me Go 
affirms mere life in a way that chimes with Agamben’s and Esposito’s 
respective approaches to bio-political theory. As Vatter has pointed 
out:
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In both Agamben and Esposito, therefore, the power over life has its source 
outside of life. It is as if there is something irreducibly affirmative about the 
concept of life, of ‘biopower,’ that never lets itself be placed at the service 
of the power over life, which is also the power of death (‘thanatopolitics’). 
(Vatter 2011: 218)
Indeed we could say that the clones in Ishiguro’s novel are subjected to 
the power over life at the point where the political regiment represents 
the purpose of their existence as organ donors who can be left to die 
once their organs have fully matured. Maturation of life here coincides 
with cessation of life (i.e. the lethal effect of a body deprived of organs 
which have been donated for the non-cloned population). The socio-
linguistic reality within the precincts of Ishiguro’s novel demotes and 
thereby reduces those who are called ‘clones’ to bodily organs which 
can be of instrumental use to humans – the latter are defined as humans 
on the basis of their exclusive possession of signifying practices which in 
turn serve to evidence mental life.
By questioning this discriminatory and exclusivist divide between 
body and mind – which is Cartesian and humanist but one that is 
nevertheless capable of returning in the posthumanist age of genetic 
engineering – Ishiguro’s novel prepares for contemporary theoretical 
approaches in the field of both biopolitics and posthumanism. These 
theoretical approaches are self-reflective about the way in which new 
technologies may merely aggravate rather than help alleviate traditional 
forms of discrimination and exclusion. In order to overcome such accus-
tomed structures of ostracisation, we need to reflect on the history of 
the mind–body division which keeps informing our approach both to 
new technologies and to what is perceived as the non-human. Ishiguro’s 
novel thematises the bio-political kernel of posthumanism with its focus 
on one form of life (i.e. that of the clones), which becomes represented 
as being deprived of mental capacities.
Within in the political regiment of the novel the clones are repre-
sentative of life that goes without creativity, contemplation and thought. 
Never Let Me Go confronts us with the violence accompanying a radical 
division between life and thought, body and mind, nature and society. 
In doing so it sensitises us to contaminate these supposedly separate 
entities. From a bio-political perspective Vatter has done so when he 
argues that ‘philosophy becomes truly political when it provides a con-
ception of life (zoé) that is immediately theoretical and contemplative. 
Philosophy is political, or political philosophy exists, only where biology 
is philosophical’ (Vatter 2011: 218). Another complementary way to 
call representation’s mentally constructed power over life into question 
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is to abandon the Cartesian prioritisation of the mind over the body. 
This is precisely Cary Wolfe’s new approach to posthumanism:
To return, then, to the question of posthumanism, the perspective I attempt 
to formulate here – far from surpassing or rejecting the human – actually 
enables us to describe the human and its characteristic modes of communi-
cation, interaction, meaning, social significations, and affective investments 
with greater specificity once we have removed meaning from the ontologi-
cally closed domain of consciousness, reason, reflection, and so on. It forces 
us to rethink our taken-for-granted modes of human experience, including 
the normal perceptual modes and affective states of Homo sapiens itself, 
by recontextualizing them in terms of their entire sensorium of other living 
beings and their own autopoietic ways of ‘bringing forth a world’ – ways that 
are, since we ourselves are human animals, part of the evolutionary history 
and behavioural and psychological repertoire of the human itself. (Wolfe 
2010: xxv)
Literature and the arts have a crucial role to play when it comes to 
a critical engagement with new technologies and issues of life and 
death.6 As we shall see in an analysis of Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go, 
this is a moot point not only as regards a theoretical broadening of our 
approach towards what constitutes a distinct species (such as the plant, 
the animal and the human) but also for practical questions of bioethics, 
whether they concern what is seen to be human or what is seen to be 
non-human.
Whether some theoretical approaches (such as Wolfe’s) like it or not 
(such as N. K. Hayles’s), the notion of the human will continue to loom 
large in our ordinary lives, shaped as they are by the politics of life. 
Posthumanism introduces new possibilities of being human. As Rosi 
Braidotti has recently put it:
Concrete, actualized praxis is the best way to deal with the virtual possibili-
ties that are opening up under our very eyes, as a result of our collectively 
sustained social and scientific advances. Human embodiment and subjectivity 
are currently undergoing a profound mutation. Like all people living in an 
age of transition, we are not always lucid or clear about where we are going, 
or even capable of explaining what exactly is happening to and around us. 
(Braidotti 2013: 196)
Ishiguro’s novel foregrounds precisely this lack of distinction in biopoli-
tics between what is human and what is not. Like the replicants in Blade 
Runner, Ishiguro’s clones are alive and suffer regardless of whether 
they are categorised as being incapable of human feelings. The film as 
well as the novel challenges us to countenance the violence inherent in 
aspects of our cerebral activities – such as categorisation. Humanism has 
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elevated the mind into a controlling position over merely material life. 
Uncritical humanism has habituated us to see mere matter as being stuck 
in the lowly sphere of embodiment. What it has thereby neglected are 
the violence and the distortion to which mental life can give rise. A case 
in point is the linguistic or symbolic construction of difference which 
posthumanism rightly takes issue with.
Difference, however, is not in itself problematic. What we need to be 
cautious about are representations which demote what is different to 
a matter of ‘mere’ life that goes without creativity, contemplation and 
other intellectual capacities. Such distortive mimesis of the ‘merely alive’ 
paves the way for a politics of violence and death. The category ‘merely 
alive’ represents an aspect of life which is deficient or inferior in mental 
life. Ishiguro makes us question such dichotomies of the merely corpo-
real and the cerebral, by contaminating our perception with that of the 
others, the clones who according to the political regiment of his novel 
are confined to being alive in a body deprived of a mind.
The crucial issue is therefore not so much the question of how to 
define the human or the non-human but how the various socio-linguistic 
constructions of politics affect life. As Derrida has shown, the rational-
ist humanist tradition of Descartes’s cogito ergo sum (and, as we have 
seen, which Lacan belongs to) has been premised on the demotion, 
denigration and exclusion of mere life or ‘bare life’: ‘Descartes proposes 
abstracting from his “I am,” if I can put it this way, everything that 
recalls life’ (Derrida 2008: 72). The central focus of Ishiguro’s Never 
Let Me Go is life subjected to the language games that exert power over 
life. In this linguistic theatre life turns into a copy of a given political 
norm. Everything that does not conform to this norm has to be excluded 
from the sphere of the living. The purported rendering knowledgeable 
so far arcane processes of life so that life itself can become a subject of 
certainty and predictability – in short a subject of rule and subjected to 
rule – eventuates into the equation of the biological with the politically 
normative. As Michel Foucault has succinctly put it, ‘a normalized 
society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on 
life’ (Foucault 1979: 144). The normalised society of biopolitics is par-
ticularly disturbing if the knowledge on which it is founded is not that of 
science but that of the pseudo-science and pseudo-theology of racism.7 
Here the focus is on life too: on what distinguishes a racial definition of 
human life from what racism excludes from belonging to humanity (i.e. 
groups against which it discriminates).
Critical humanism focuses on intra-species strategies of exclusion 
and discrimination – in short it questions various forms of racism and 
sexism. Ishiguro’s novel Never Let Me Go engages with a posthumanist 
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problematic that has grown out of the scientific discovery of cloning. 
So far animals – the famous sheep Dolly – but not humans have been 
cloned. The novel imagines a future which takes place in a post-World 
War II past. This extraordinary cohabitation of the past with the future 
highlights the persistence of traditional forms of exclusion premised on 
the mind–body divide.
In the past future of Ishiguro’s novel humans will have been cloned. 
Strikingly, the novel gives us a sense that clones are human and it is 
precisely the political denial of their humanity that turns them into ‘mere 
bodies’ which can be used and abused – into what Giorgio Agamben 
has called ‘bare life’. As Agamben has argued, ‘bare life’ can legally be 
killed: the clones in Never Let Me Go are left to die (deprived of their 
biological substance) once they have donated their fully developed 
organs. Agamben emphasises that the main argument of his famous 
book Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life analyses the blurring 
of the distinction between life (the organic) and the juridical (inorganic) 
mechanism of discrimination and judgement, writing:
The present enquiry concerns precisely this hidden point of intersection 
between the juridico-institutional and the biopolitical models of power. What 
this work has had to record among its likely conclusions is precisely that the 
two analyses cannot be separated, and that the inclusion of bare life in the 
political realm constitutes the original – if concealed – nucleus of sovereign 
power. It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the 
original activity of sovereign power. (Agamben 1995: 6)
Life has become a question of power, turning into mere embodiment or 
mere matter which can be used for so-called higher ends as determined 
by juridical processes.
This is precisely the subject matter of Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go. The 
clones are socio-politically categorised in terms of lacking the mental life 
of humans. Their bodies are represented as uncontaminated by the life 
of the mind. This abrogation of mind-centred humanity renders them 
non-human and thereby mere bodies that are deprived of the souls and 
minds by which traditional humanism defines humanity’s distinction 
over and above the animal and the machine. Critics who see parallels 
between Agamben’s notion of ‘bare life’ and the status of the clones in 
Ishiguro’s novel nevertheless avoid establishing a crucial connection to 
the traditional mind–body divide which makes for the fusion of past and 
future in Never Let Me Go.8
Agamben’s notion of ‘bare life’ refers back to the important Greek 
terms bios and zoé. Bios denotes a distinct or idiosyncratic way of life – 
that of a particular group or a particular person. It is a unique journey 
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of life and our word biography derives from this semantic field. Zoé, on 
the other hand, expresses ‘the simple fact of living common to all human 
beings (animals, men, or gods)’ (Agamben 1995: 1). Significantly, our 
word for the study of animals, zoology, derives from zoé. According to 
Agamben’s analysis, traditional humanist political theory and practice 
has been constituted by this distinction between merely embodied ‘bare 
life’ (zoé) and mentally endowed life (bios):
The fundamental categorical pair of Western politics is not that of friend/
enemy but that of bare life/political existence, zoé/bios, exclusion/inclusion. 
There is politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates 
and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains 
himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion. (Agamben 1995: 
8)
According to Agamben politics (and thereby biopolitics) operates in and 
through language. It is mired in the illusive insubstantiality of Lacan’s 
mirror stage which, as we have seen, Lacan uses to distinguish the 
human from the animal (his example of the chimpanzees who do not 
buy into the symbolic illusion of the mirror image). This insubstantiality 
of sign systems (images as Lacan calls them) prioritises the mental over 
and above the merely embodied (the latter is what Agamben calls ‘bare 
life’).
Agamben, however, refers to the mind–body problem within human-
ism while not mentioning it. His notion of the political denotes the 
intellectual/mental aspect by which humanism has defined humanity’s 
distinctiveness. This is bios. The living, embodied part of humanity 
cannot be denied but it has become an issue evoking shame. Bare life 
(zoé) gives rise to shame because it betrays humanity’s possible animal 
nature. It is therefore included in order to be excluded or, as Agamben 
has put it, ‘at once excluding bare life from and capturing it within the 
political order’ (Agamben 1995: 9). This paradoxical, theoretical move-
ment of an inclusion that excludes what it purportedly includes is lethal 
in socio-political praxis.
In this bio-political scenario Agamben speaks of ‘the originary excep-
tion in which human life is included in the political order in being 
exposed to an unconditional capacity to be killed’ (Agamben 1995: 
85). Strikingly, Agamben speaks of human life here while at the same 
time saying that the boundary between the human and the non-human 
has become indistinct in the founding movement of a bio-political city: 
‘Not the act of tracing boundaries, but their cancellation or negation is 
the constitutive act of the city’ (Agamben 1995: 85). The preconditions 
for violence and murder are societal representations or categorisations 
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which are employed to reduce life to the homogeneous phenomenon of 
bare life: the mechanical functions common to all biological systems 
which this socio-political system represents as being cut off from, as 
being uncontaminated by the life of the mind.
Racism and other forms of discrimination depict the life of the other 
as ‘pure’ body that proves resistant for any contamination by intellect 
or spirit (the German word Geist connotes this indistinction between 
the intellectual and the spiritual). The figure of the animal has come to 
represent the purity of the biological uncontaminated by the mind. As 
Nicole Shukin has recently put it apropos the treatment of Iraqi prison-
ers in Abu Ghraib:
Trophy photos of U.S. military personnel terrorizing Iraqi prisoners in Abu 
Ghraib prison in 2004 showed, among other things, a naked Iraqi man on all 
fours, with a leash around his neck, and prisoners cowering before German 
shepherd dogs. Cruelly, the dog is made to function as a racist prosthetic of 
the U.S. military’s power to animalize ‘the other,’ a power that applies in the 
first instance to the animal itself. The biopolitical production of the bare life 
of the animal other subtends, then, the biopolitical production of the bare life 
of the racialized other. (Shukin 2009: 10)
Once the distinction of the human bios has been reduced to the general-
ity of the animal or the genetic (zoé) – as is the case with the clones in 
Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go – life, on a theoretical as well as practical 
level, can be legally killed. If we are no longer valued for our mental con-
tribution to humanity (either as individuals or as groups) we are expand-
able and thus superfluous: mere bodies to be used for the greater mental/
spiritual good which defines humanity in a non-critical, traditional 
humanist framework. This is precisely the topic of Ishiguro’s Never Let 
Me Go. The setting of this novel is a posthumanist future. Crucially 
it is a posthumanist future that is still governed by both the rejection 
of the figure of contamination and the embrace of a traditional mind–
body divide – long-established by uncritical humanism which reaches 
back to Plato, Christianity and the scientific paradigms of Cartesian 
thought.
Biopolitics of memes
In Never Let Me Go, the clones exist to satisfy a health market – a non-
cloned population that consumes their vital organs. Liberalism coincides 
with an immanent or bio-political control of freedom: ‘The new govern-
mental reason needs freedom therefore, the new art of government con-
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sumes freedom. It consumes freedom, which means it has to produce it’ 
(Foucault 2008: 63). In Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go, the production of 
free consumer goods clearly coincides with the creation of clones whose 
very existence depends on the consumption of their vital organs by the 
larger population. The clones are not physically forced to do what they 
have to do. Rather their life freely turns into a copy of what has been 
preordained for them: not to procreate as well as not to age and instead 
to die prematurely due to the donation process.
The life of clones is subjected to the power of political and legal 
institutions. By questioning the working of biopolitics, Ishiguro’s novel 
assists us in analysing how philosophy and literature engage in the 
ethical work of uncovering the illusions and distortions within some 
aspects of post-Darwinian biopolitics. This chapter (and the book as a 
whole) aims to fill an important gap within contemporary bioethics.
As Cary Wolfe has recently pointed out, bioethics has become an 
uncritical support mechanism for the exertion of power over life: 
‘Indeed, contemporary bioethics is best understood, perhaps not as an 
ethics at all, in the sense that someone like Derrida will use the word, 
but rather as a textbook example of what Michel Foucault has analysed 
as the rise of “biopower” during the modern period’ (Wolfe 2010: 51). 
Wolfe’s analysis has clearly shown it in such terms:
Bioethics as it is currently institutionalized represents something like the 
apotheosis of this medico-administrative edifice and its dense imbrication 
in contemporary apparatuses and institutions of state and economic power, 
serving, as it were, as its self-designated conscience. (Wolfe 2010: 53)
One of the arguments developed in this book Contaminations questions 
our current conflation of ethics with the interests of institutional admin-
istration and economic power. It does so by bringing to the fore the 
fabrication (rather than the actual existence) of a dualism between mind 
and body (order and disorder and so forth). It is a fabricated dualism 
that confounds the ethical credentials of contemporary bioethics at the 
point at which the latter becomes indistinguishable from the exertion of 
power over life. At the same time, the figure of contamination as defined 
here emerges as an alternative to notions which posit divisions between 
‘pure’ entities such as the one separating mind from body, natural 
history from human history or bios from zoé.
The term biopolitics has rather sinister or lethal connotations.9 
Foucault, who coined the word, employed it in order to analyse moder-
nity’s attempt to control the body via various forms of power.10 In 
biopolitics the body has become one with politics. Here our life only 
has any worth or meaning when we embody the ideological norms and 
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commandments that certain forms of politics impose on us. Bio-political 
forms of control may be assisted by physical force and violence, or 
they may operate in a more subtle manner. The more elaborate forms 
of biopolitics do their work not so much in violent ways. Instead 
they try to establish a type of mental control through a sophisticated 
political or managerial usage of representation. The precondition for 
bio-political violence is the representation of a certain group of people 
as being purely biological or animalistic, as being solely defined by 
zoé.
Representations here have the function of memes, which replicate 
standard types of behaviour within a given community. Evolutionary 
biologist Richard Dawkins and neuroscientific philosopher Daniel C. 
Dennett define the term memes as follows: ‘the units are the smallest ele-
ments that replicate themselves with reliability and fecundity. Dawkins 
coins a term for such units: memes’ (Dennett 1993: 201). Memes are 
the cultural equivalent – what Lacan would call linguistic/symbolic – of 
genes. Strikingly Dennett uses the term in a celebratory manner, arguing 
that memes adumbrate human immortality: ‘As with genes, immortality 
is more a matter of replication than of the longevity of individual vehi-
cles. The preservation of Platonic memes, via series of copies of copies, 
is a particular case in point’ (Dennett 1993: 205). The ethics of literature 
questions the violence that can accompany the replication of various 
symbolic orders which have consequences for embodied life. The clones 
of Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go allow us to experience what it is like to 
be subjected to the symbolic order of bare life. They are objectified and 
used in a system of representation and replication, thus bringing to light 
the potential violence of memes and the mimetic.
What is important to note is that it is not life which is problematic 
here but its representation as uncontaminated by a soul or intellect or 
spirit. In order to counteract past and future discriminations against 
those who happen to get classified and represented as merely alive, it is 
ethically incumbent upon us to contaminate bios with zoé and thereby 
to undermine traditional divisions between the two terms (replicating 
the split between body and mind). As Vatter has put it: ‘if biopolitics can 
be transformed into thanatopolitics, this may derive from the fact that 
the life here produced, namely, a zoé entirely separate from a bios, is a 
life destined to die, a life that has death inscribed into it from the very 
beginning’ (Vatter 2011: 218). The future of posthumanism is at risk of 
repeating the violence of the past when it structurally adheres to notions 
of a pure mind or pure spirit separating zoé from bios. In Never Let 
Me Go the clones are indeed removed from the so-called proper human 
population. By avoiding the figure of contamination, posthumanist 
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futures may thus replicate the violence in traditional (and, according to 
Latour, modern) purification projects.
Significantly, the setting of Ishiguro’s novel about cloning simultane-
ously features a science fiction-like future – where humans are subjects 
of cloning – and the traditional humanist context of an educational 
institute in post-World War II Britain. The political scenario is thus not 
that of totalitarianism but of liberal democracy. The British government 
has ordered the cloning of citizens with the aim of enhancing the health 
of the population. The agenda is thus in keeping with the benign form of 
biopolitics as appraised in Rose’s The Politics of Life Itself. Rose argues 
that such an innovative and harmless type of biopolitics promotes hope 
rather than fatalism or despair: ‘Crucially, it is a biopolitics in which 
references to the biological do not signal fatalism but are part of the 
economy of hope’ (Rose 2007: 167). In Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go we 
encounter an economy of hope but it only applies to those who are in 
receipt of organ donations rather than those who are excluded from full 
participation in such a society focused on the management of health. 
The clones participate in a rather one-sided way in such an ‘economy of 
hope’. They are born not to give birth, in return, but to serve as donors 
for the non-cloned and procreative part of the population.
Here we witness the complete separation between birth and age, 
because the clones exist solely for the purpose of aging and dying pre-
maturely. Theirs is an ever shrinking world: due to the single-minded 
and socio-political purpose of their life – that of donating organs for 
the non-cloned part of the population – their life is foreshortened. They 
thus embody traditional humanism’s avoidance of any form of contami-
nation between zoé and bios within a posthumanist setting. They are 
included in order to be set apart, and they are incapable of procreation 
and their world is a closed and continually declining one. While describ-
ing an imaginary community that is circumscribed by the stereotypical 
perimeters of death – death which, as Vatter has argued, is ‘bare life’ 
uncontaminated by anything intellectual or spiritual – the novel’s hidden 
heart is that of birth. The title of the novel Never Let Me Go is a quota-
tion from a pop song which profoundly captivates its narrator, Kathy 
H. ‘What was so special about this song?’, she queries and goes on to 
say that it was what she read into it that made the song special for her:
Well the thing was, I didn’t use to listen properly to the words; I just waited 
for that bit that went: ‘Baby, baby, never let me go . . .’ And what I imagined 
was a woman who’s been told she couldn’t have babies, who really, really 
wanted them all her life. Then there’s a sort of miracle and she has a baby, 
and she holds this baby very close to her and walks around singing: ‘Baby, 
never let me go . . .’ partly because she is so happy, but also because she is so 
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afraid something will happen, that the baby will get ill or be taken away from 
her. Even at the time, I realized this couldn’t be right, that this interpretation 
didn’t fit with the rest of the lyrics. But that was not an issue for me. (Ishiguro 
2005: 64)
As we will find out a couple of pages later on, the issue is that, like all 
clones, Kathy cannot have babies. Remembering her fascination with 
the lines of the song, she recalls: ‘By then [the time of her captivation 
by the song], of course, we all knew something I hadn’t known back 
then, which was that none of us could have babies’ (Ishiguro 2005: 66). 
The significance of the song for her is that of a delusion that keeps her 
going. She thinks the song represents the miracle of birth for someone 
who – similar to her – has been excluded from procreation. She has been 
excluded from childbirth because her life has been categorised as zoé 
uncontaminated by bios. Her existence represents use-value only.
Ishiguro’s novel depicts the way in which we submit to social and 
political forms of control without being physically forced to do so. The 
clinging to delusions, to various fictions and to a belief that the fictitious 
will turn real in a miracle-like fashion make us avoid reality. Never Let 
Me Go shows how we are enthralled by ideational and self-replicating 
fictions when we uncritically subscribe to the influence of memes. In 
other words, Ishiguro’s novel alerts us to the potentially deleterious con-
sequences of self-replication patterns within a given society. The pattern 
in question here revolves around the rejection of the idea and praxis of 
contamination in a traditional humanist society and a possible future 
posthumanist one. By refusing to allow for a contamination between 
body and mind, between zoé and bios, politics demotes embodied life 
(i.e. the clones whose organs are used as resource for the rest of society) 
under that of a higher entity that goes by the name ‘soul’ or ‘mind’ (and 
of which the clones are represented to be deprived). As Derrida has 
shown, this idea has been the self-replicating foundation of traditional 
humanism from Plato via Christianity to Descartes and Lacan.
The cloned protagonists of Never Let Me Go willingly do what is 
expected of them because they avoid both recognising and believing 
in the reality of their lives’ preordained purpose. Instead they fabricate 
fictions and trust in miracles. The imposition of a preordained socio-
political model upon the life of the cloned community characterises the 
plot of the novel. As teenagers, the cloned are not allowed to be young. 
They are forbidden to plan their own life itineraries. They are interdicted 
to interact with the world on their own terms – leaving for America, 
working in a supermarket or being film stars, for example. Miss Lucy – 
one of the educators or guardians at the Hailsham boarding school for 
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the cloned – attempts to be clear about what cannot be fully spelled out 
and acknowledged:
The problem, as I see it, is that you’ve been told and not told. You have been 
told, but none of you really understands, and I dare say, some people are 
quite happy to leave it that way. But I’m not. If you are going to have decent 
lives, then you’ve got to know and know properly. None of you will go to 
America, none of you will be film stars. And none of you will be working in 
supermarkets as I heard some of you planning the other day. Your lives are 
set out for you. You will become adults, then before you’re old, before you’re 
even middle-aged, you’ll start to donate your vital organs. That’s what each 
of you was created to do. You’re not like the actors you watch on your videos, 
you’re not even like me. You were brought into this world for a purpose, and 
your futures, all of them, have been decided. (Ishiguro 2005: 73)
Miss Lucy’s message is that of the meme: it does not so much explicitly 
impose but it spreads a preordained life from which there seems to be 
no way out. The aim of her message is mimetic: it tries to represent the 
future of the community of cloned teenagers. The representation makes 
claims to be accurate but the phrasing is highly euphemistic and distorts 
the bleak reality of the life that has been prearranged for the clones. The 
euphemism mainly consists in depicting their biography as being free 
from aging. They will never reach old age. This bleak prospect euphe-
mistically turns into its opposite. Instead of being subject to the forces 
of aging, the clones – so the euphemistic account goes – will live decent 
lives. The hope of decency depends on their willingness to copy what the 
preordained representation of their life tells them to do: namely to find 
their sole purpose and fulfilment in the donation of their ‘vital organs’ 
for the non-cloned community.
Decency here denotes the voluntary embrace of life as copy, as a 
clone. If nothing else, the word ‘vital’ betrays the euphemism. How can 
someone have a ‘decent life’ with the near or preordained prospect of 
missing one’s vitality? More importantly, life that is that of a represen-
tation is static and lacks the unpredictability that comes with growth. 
Growth is another word for aging. By being deprived of growth, the 
clones are already at their endpoint, close to death. They live within the 
deadly arena of a zoé which is uncontaminated by bios (as analysed by 
Vatter).
Strikingly, Miss Lucy’s revelation about their prefabricated biogra-
phy does not strike the students of Hailsham as new or surprising (see 
Ishiguro 2005: 75). This testifies to the power of the meme: it spreads 
in such subtle ways that those it affects are not even aware of it. The 
content of the flat mimesis which advertises its message in meme-like 
fashion is that of a fiction which nevertheless determines socio-political 
MACK PRINT.indd   211 26/11/2015   11:14
212    Contaminations
life: the Britain depicted in Never Let Me Go is indeed divided into 
the sphere of the human non-clone population and those who are con-
sidered to be clones and thus non-humans. The name of the boarding 
school for the clones is telling: Hailsham literally means the counterfeit 
or fraud (sham) of glory or acclaim (Hail).
Part of the hoax at Hailsham is the guardians’ focus on the creativ-
ity of the students (i.e. the clones). The students have to paint and to 
write poetry. The product of their creative efforts is then collected by 
the guardians of Hailsham. The students read much into such apparent 
appreciation of their creativity. They see in it the attempt of a romantic 
or lamp-like insight into the workings of their inner life. As we find 
out at the end of the novel such interest is actually driven by a political 
agenda, as one retired former guardian makes clear:
You said it was because your art would reveal what you were like. What you 
were like inside. That’s what you said, wasn’t it? Well, you weren’t far from 
wrong about that. We took away your art because we thought it would reveal 
your souls. Or to put it more finely, we did it to prove you had souls at all. 
(Ishiguro 2005: 238)
Proof of the clones’ inner life would support the claim that they are 
humans. This means that the touchstone of our humanity is that of a 
unique or idiosyncratic core which is denoted by the term bios (some-
times called ‘soul’ or ‘inner life’ or someone’s distinctive biography).
The clones, by contrast, represent zoé separated from bios: they are 
defined not as singularities, but as mere copies lacking psychic complexity. 
Creativity here turns into a benchmark which tests whether one resides 
either on the side of bios or that of zoé. The parameters of this test are cru-
cially premised on the rejection of any contaminating principle whereby 
zoé might fuse with bios. The outcome of the test is as such already 
established: those who are categorised as purely residing within zoé are 
categorically precluded from being creative, because creativity would pre-
suppose contamination with bios. The presupposed lack of artistic capaci-
ties serves as evidence of going without a mental life (and thereby failing 
to be a language-endowed agent who has gone through Lacan’s mirror 
stage). Indeed creativity here becomes reduced to an instrumental device 
by means of which society differentiates between bios and zoé.
Art and literature, however, promise to disrupt the workings of flat 
mimesis. Having seen evidence that those under their charge are indeed 
creative, the well-meaning guardians could now go to their superiors and 
dispute that the clones are mere copies, mere representations of someone 
else: ‘Look at this art! How dare you claim these children are anything 
less than fully human?’ (Ishiguro 2005: 239) – they could exclaim.
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Yet the power of socio-political representations seems to be insuper-
able. The guardian could not change the public image of the clones. The 
politics of representation does away with the suggestion that those who 
are categorised as belonging solely to zoé – in this case those represented 
to be clones – are humans: ‘But I have to tell you, my dear, it wasn’t 
something commonly held when we first set out all those years ago. 
And though we have come a long way since then, it’s still not a notion 
universally held, even today’ (Ishiguro 2005: 66). Here, clearly literature 
does not have the ability to disrupt mimesis’s power over life. This is so 
because creativity is seen not as a disruptive political force but rather as 
yet another mimetic or representational device. The public perception of 
the arts remains that of mimesis and representation: they merely copy 
the world rather interacting with it.
The poetry and the paintings of the students at Hailsham are nothing 
more than a lamp-like copying of the otherwise invisible regions of their 
inner life. The arts are segregated and separated from the medical and 
political management that governs society. This is why creativity cannot 
disrupt the power over life that condemns Hailsham’s students to live 
solely for the purpose of organ donations. As one retired guardian 
makes clear, a deferral of their bleak fate would not have been granted 
under any past or current circumstances: ‘But this dream of yours, this 
dream of being able to defer [i.e. being able to defer the donations of 
their vital organs]. Such a thing would always have been beyond us to 
grant, even at the height of our influence’ (Ishiguro 2005: 238). The 
guardians – even the best-intentioned ones – are also shaped by the 
public representation of their students as clones. Their response there-
fore mirrors that of their society at large.
It is one of disgust and revulsion – despite their protestation of 
empathy and admiration of a mimetic kind of creativity. Even the best 
inclined of the guardians admits: ‘We’re all afraid of you. I myself had 
to fight back my dread of you all almost every day I was at Hailsham. 
There were times I’d look down at you all from my study window and 
I’d feel such revulsion’ (Ishiguro 2005: 246). Ishiguro’s Never Let Me 
Go focuses on the all-pervasive power of public representations that 
reject the possibility of contamination, thus dividing society into the 
included and the excluded, into bios and zoé. This division characterises 
mimesis’s power over life in its totalitarian as well as in its more subtle 
medical and free market version as depicted in Ishiguro’s presentation of 
an imaginary post-World War II Britain where clones serve to increase 
the health of the nation.
Serving the health of the nation is of course a euphemism for the 
power and violence exerted over those who provide the service. As we 
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have seen, the ‘persistence of this euphemistic language’ (Currie 2009: 
100) that pervades the novel is only one aspect of a larger critique of 
mimesis. The title Never Let Me Go refers to the capacity for birth or 
creativity as a potential disruption of representations that have come 
to shape various uncontaminated forms of mind and body; of zoé and 
bios. Were the clones allowed both to procreate and to age, they would 
have outdone their public representation as that of clones that represent 
bare life and are thus mere material or corporeal copies (zoé) rather 
than distinct and mentally animated individuals (bios). The clones, as 
well as their guardians and their society at large, are held captive by the 
perimeters of what they have come to represent. This is why they cannot 
find a way out of victimisation. A non-mimetic-natal form of creativity 
would have disrupted mimesis’s lethal power over life. Birth as the crea-
tion of something new would have unsettled their public representation 
as ‘purely’ zoé, as clones.
Notes
 1. As Kari Weil has recently argued: ‘we should understand posthumanism 
not as the death of humanism, but as a necessary rethinking of humanist 
frameworks, including rethinking what thought is, what agency and auton-
omy are in order to further humanism’s noble aims’ (Weil 2012: 149).
 2. As N. Katherine Hayles has put it in a discussion of the blurring between 
fiction and social reality in Borges’s famous short story ‘Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis 
Tertius’: ‘Text metamorphoses into context, context into text, text into 
context, in a Strange Loop that makes the distinction between “fiction” and 
“reality” an undecidable question’ (Hayles 1984: 146).
 3. Esposito (2011: 150). See also Nancy (2008: 107).
 4. In this way Kari Weil has recently argued that ‘theory’s turn to animals 
grows out of, on the one hand, a weariness with post-structuralism’s lin-
guistic turn and a resulting search for a postlinguistic and perhaps posthu-
man sublime and, on the other hand, an often conflicting turn to ethics 
that raises the question of human responsibility to the animal-other’ (Weil 
2012: xx).
 5. Fraser elaborates: ‘as sweat shop labour, as breeders, as disposable 
workers; as providers of organs, babies and sex; as performers of menial 
service, as cleaners and disposers of waste; as raw material to be used up, 
ground down and spat out, when the system has got from them all it wants’ 
(Fraser 2012: 49).
 6. As Herbrechter has put it: ‘It is the task of the posthumanities of the future 
to guarantee that the question of the human will not become the exclusive 
domain of the bio- and life sciences – a development which might in fact 
merely represent a replacement of a transcendental humanist definition 
of the human with an equally transcendent scientist posthumanist one’ 
(Herbrechter 2013: 169).
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 7. For a detailed discussion of how racism pseudo-science is founded on a 
pseudo-theological paradigm see Mack (2003).
 8. Concurring with Shameem Black’s comparison between Agamben’s notion 
of ‘bare life’ and that of the clones (see Black 2009: 785–807), Nayar 
argues that ‘the clones in Ishiguro’s are what Giorgio Agamben identifies as 
Homo sacers: they are bodies and lives that may be terminated (by humans 
through legally and socially accepted procedures, in hospitals, in 1990s 
London, according to the novel) without attracting punishment, but they 
may not be sacrificed’ (Nayar 2014: 61). Clearly, the novel is set not in the 
recent past of the 1990s but a past future when human cloning would have 
become a socio-politically acceptable scientific practice; moreover a future 
that constitutes a continuation of past models of thought which demote 
embodied life (i.e. those of the clones).
 9. As Cary Wolfe has rightly pointed out, recent discussion of biopolitics as 
‘neutral’ or innocuous management of life wilfully ignores this lethal aspect 
which Agamben’s analysis highlights. See Wolfe’s critique of Rose (2007) 
in Wolfe (2013: 50–1).
10. For a detailed discussion of the history and meaning of the term biopolitics 
see Esposito (2008).
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